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PLATO CONTRA ATHEOS. 


----.. ----..... 


PLATO 


AGAINST THE ATHEISTS; 


OR, THE 


TENTH BOOK OF THE DIALOGUE ON LAWS, 


ACCOMPANIED WITH 


CRiVe), O* LD NOTE S, 


AND FOLLOWED BY 


eae Ge NDED DISSERTATIONS 


ON SOME OF 


THE MAIN POINTS OF THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE- 
OLOGY, ESPECIALLY AS COMPARED WITH THE 
HOLY SCRIPTURES. 


BY TAYLER LEWIS, LLD. 


PROFESSOR OF THE GREEK LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN THE UNIVERSITY 
y~ IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK. 


wan) nnn 
As the Lord liveth, and as thy soul liveth. 
Hebrew Oath. 


NEW YORK: 
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, 


FRANKLIN SQUARE. 


1870. 





Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1845, by _ 
Harrer & Broruers, 


in the Clerk’s Office of the Southern District of New-Yors. 


TO YHE 


REV. ELTPHALET NOTT, DD, 


THE VENERABLE ANi VNNF Yat GE PRESIDENT OF UNION COLLEGE 
ΜΝ ΒΝ «ERED ALMA MATER, 


THIS WORK 
is most respectfully ¥nscribed, 


IN REMEMBRANCE OF THOSE LESSONS, BOTH OF THEORET 
ICAL AND PRACTICAL WISDOM, WHICH HAVE AIDED 
IN FORMING THE MINDS AND CHARACTERS 
OF SO LARGE A PORTION 


OF 


THE EDUCATED MEN OF OUR L4S®# ἢ 


coos py 1373 723 "De 


Psalm xiv., 1. 


WIT? ON) 89D US PINTTAN) ἘΦ τ ΓΝ XD 
Jeremiah, XXlii., 24 


Ἔν αὐτῷ yap ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καί ἐσμεν. 
Acts, XVil., 28. 


Πιστεῦσαι yap δεῖ τὸν προσερχόμενον τῷ Θεῷ, OT: 
‘HIT, καὶ τοῖς ἐκζηταῦπιν αὐτὸν μισθαποδότης γένε 
Tat. 
Hebrews, X1., 6 


INTRODUCTION. 


Ir is generally agreed among those who hold The 
Laws of Plato to be a genuine production, that it was 
a treatise written in his old age. If so, it may be re- 
garded as containing his most matured and best-set- 
tled opinions on many of the great subjects discussed 
in his other dialogues. Some have thought that they 
discovered many contradictions between this work and 
the Republic. One has even gone so far as to say that 
they are opposed in every page. In this opinion, how- 
ever, We cannot concur; although it must be admitted 
that they difier in respect to style, and, notwithstand- 
ing the near relationship which would seem to be in- 
dicated by their titles, are very dissimilar in design. 
In the one, the State is the main subject of discussion ; 
in the other it is a secondary part, subordinate to what 
the writer evidently regards as a higher and more 
philosophical investigation into the nature of right or 
righteousness. The practice of contrasting these two 
works has arisen from a wrong view of the true title 
of the one generally styled the Republic. Its most 
appropriate designation is Περὲ Δικαίου, or, An Inquiry 
into the Nature of Right. The imaginary State is ev- 
idently made subservient to this, or, as he expressly 
tells us in the second book, intended only as a model » 
of the human soul, so magnified that we might read 
therein, in large letters, what would not be distinct 
enough for the mental vision when examined in the 
smaller characters of the individual spirit. Vide lib. 
ii., 369, A. This comparison of the soul to a com- 
monwealth has been a favourite, not only with Plato, 

A 2 


vl INTRODUCTION. 


but with the most philosophical minds in all ages. We 
find it on a much smaller scale in the eleventh book of 
‘The Laws, where the Nightly Conference, or the most . 
solemn legislative and judicial body in the state, is com- 
pared to the head in the human system. In the Re- 
public it is the great idea, to which the construction of 
the fancied State is altogether secondary. Sometimes, 
however, it must be admitted, the author seems so 
taken up with this imaginary commonwealth, that he 
unconsciously, perhaps, brings it into the primary 
place, and thus distorts his plan. It is this occasional 
forgetfulness of his main design that has introduced into 
Plato’s Republic those incongruities which, in all ages, 
have been so much complained of. Somctimes the con- 
sistency of the under or fictitious part is overlooked, or, 
in other words, the State is utterly forgotten, while we 
are carried away to some of the most abstruse of all 
metaphysical discussions, such as may be found in the 
sixth and seventh books. Again, his attention seems 
to be so occupied with the outward drapery that he 
loses sight of his main theme, and, pleased with the 
efforts of his own fancy, dwells at great length on 
‘what, in reality, is merely external to the higher and 
inner sense. In the third, fourth, and last three books, 
the harmony of primary and secondary is well pre- 
served. In the sixth and seventh he seems to lose sight 
of the commonwealtk .smost wholly, while in some 
parts of the second he appears to have nothing else 
before him. The fifth may be regarded as a sort of 
hybrid production, arising from a confusion of both 
views. Some of its arrangements are altogether too 
unnatural to allow the supposition that they were ever 
intended for a real State; and yet it is very difh- 
cult to discover what bearing they can have upen the 


INTRODUCTION. Vib 


higher philosophy to which the whole scheme was in- 
tended to be subservient. The least we. can say is, 
that Plato here lost himself, and produced something 
which was neither allegory nor reality, neither philos- 
ophy nor legislation. 

It is on the subject of the Τα relations, which 
are supposed to be assailed in this fifth book, that there 
exists the greatest contrariety between the Republic 
-and The Laws. Plato seems, even in his own day, to 
have been so reproached with this apparent blot in his 
philosophy, that he was led to take special pains to do 
it away in this work of his old age; and hence the 
great desire he shows in The Laws to set in their high- 
est light the sanctity of the family, or parental and fil- 
ial relations. We have adverted to this at some 
length in the first of the dissertations appended to the 
text. In other respects, the discrepancies between the 
Republic and The Laws have been greatly exaggera- 
ted. Differing, however, as they may in some of their 
minor details, no one can attentively study both with- 
out discovering evidences that they are productions of 
the same mind, and that, in the main elements of that 
higher philosophy on which all legislation and morals 
depend, they are substantially the same. 

The Treatise on Laws is undoubtedly intended for a 
really practicable, if not a really existing State. In 
discussing, however, the primary principles of legisla- 
tion, the author takes a very wide range, occupying 
far more time in what he styles the preambles, or rec- 
ommendatory reasonings about the laws, than in the 
laws themselves. Hence there are but few points in 
‘the Platonic philosophy and ethics, as exhibited in the 
other dialogues, but what have some representative 
here. We find the same questions started respecting 


Vill INTRODUCTION. 


the nature and origin of virtwe—whether it is διδακτή, 
or capable of being taught as a science or not; wheth- 
er it is one or many—that is, whether the virtues are ali 
so essentially connected that one cannot exist without 
the others. We find the same views in regard to the 
end and origin of law—the importance in all things ot 
looking to the idea, the ὃν ἐν πολλοῖς, or one in many. 
There is the same reverence for antiquity and ancient 
myths, the same disposition to regard religion as the 
beginning and foundation of every system of civil pol- 
ity, and the same method of representing the ideas of 
a God, of his goodness, his providence, of a present 
and future retribution, as lying at the foundation of all 
morals and all religion. Even in the departments of 
psychology and ontology we find many things in The 
Laws which remind us of the author of the Pheedon, 
the Parmenides, and the Theztetus. The favourite 
doctrines and methods of reasoning contained in the 
Gorgias are exhibited everywhere; and perhaps there 
is no other part of Plato’s works more in the style and 
spirit of the Timzeus than this very tenth book of The 
Laws, which we have selected as the ground of our 
comments in the present work. 

It was on this account chosen as forming, in our 
judgment, one of the best central positions from whence 
to make excursions over a large part of the Platonic 
philosophy. We may perhaps be charged with hav- 
ing sometimes used the text as a mere thread on which 
to hang our own discussions; but even should it be 
admitted that there is some truth in this, still might it 
be maintained that those discussions are all closely 
connected with the Platonic philosophy and theology, 
and that from this field we never depart, unless, per- 
haps, to dwell on kindred subjects suggested by the 


INTRODUCTION. ΙΧ 


fHoly Scriptures. Our object has not been merely te 
make a classical text-book, but to recommend Plato to 
the student or reader by every means through which 
attention could be drawn to our favourite author; be- 
lieving that in no other way could we render a better 
service to the cause of true philosophy and religion. 
Some may say that, in our great partiality, Plato is 
made to talk too much like a Christian. It may be 
that we have found senses higher and more Scriptural 
than are contained in the letter of the passages to 
which reference is made; yet even if this is, to some 
extent, the case, it only shows the suggestive nature 
of his philoséphy ; how it is capable of carrying the 
earnest reader to more spiritual views than the author 
himself, perhaps, ever entertained, and how he differs, 
in this respect, from all other profane writers of an- 
cient or modern times. We think it will be found 
that the views in which we have indulged are thus 
naturally suggested ; that they are not hunted for, or 
brought from afar, but are such as, if not always con- 
tained in the precise letter of our text, do most easily 
present themselves in connexion. with it, especially to 
one who reads Piato by the light of the Christian Rev- 
elation. On this subject, of what may be called the 
Platonic Spiritual Sense, or capability of accommoda- 
tion to higher views, the reader is referred to Disserta- 
tion LX., where it is treated of at some length. 

In pursuance of this favourite plan of recommending 
Plato and the Platonic philosophy, the method follow- 
ed in the present work was adopted. The text and 
critical notes form by much the smallest part, and 
even these accompanying annotations frequently ex- 
hibit as much of a philosophical and theological as of 
a critical character. The longer dissertations an 


x INTRODUCTION. 


nexed, and which, for the reader’s convenience, we 
have divided into numbered sections, with general and 
running titles, are devoted almost entirely to the eluci- 
dation of some of the main points of the Platonic phi- 
losophy, in their connexion with other systems of an- 
tiquity, to a comparison, whenever there was occasion 
for it, with the sentiments of Aristotle, illustrations 
drawn from the Grecian poets, together with a con- 
tinual reference to the Holy Scriptures, by way of 
resemblance, contrast, agreement, or condemnation. 
For these purposes, there have been introduced, from 
almost all the other Platonic dialogues, very frequent 
and extended quotations of the most striking passages ; 
heing such as, besides having a natural connexion with 
the subject discussed, would promote our main design, 
by producing in the reader a desire to have a deeper 
-knowledge of Plato than is generally possessed by the 
greater part of our philosophical and theological wri- 
ters. To these quotations, in almost every case, full 
translations have been given, sometimes literal, and 
sometimes paraphrastic. The exceptions to this course 
are, when the nature and substance of the quotation 
were sufficiently indicated by the manner of its intro- 
duction. The main references are to the Timeeus, 
the Republic, the Phzdon, Gorgias, Thezetetus, Par- 
menides, Philebus, Protagoras, Symposion, Politicus, 
Cratylus, Sophista, and the other books of The Laws, 
with occasional citations from most of the minor dia- 
logues having any claims to be regarded as genuine. 
The work has been the result of a careful examin- 
ation of the Platonic writings; in which we have 
sought to interpret Plato mainly by himself,.and by 
the aid, on the one hand, of his jealous rival, Aris- 
totle, and on the other, of his enthusiastic admirer 


INTRODUCTION. 21 


Cicero. Of modern critical and philosophical helps, 
whether English or German, we make little display, | 
because, in fact, we have made but little or no use of 
them. In regard to the text, we have followed that 
of Bekker and Ast, who hardly differ at all, either in 
words or punctuation. Wherever there has been a 
departure from them, the reasons are assigned, mainly 
in the shorter notes. The critical means within our 
power have been very limited, and we therefore, in . 
this department, ask indulgence for any errors which 
may have been committed. For the philosophical opin- 
ions advanced no such plea is interposed. By their 
own merit, and their accordance with the true inter- 
pretation of the Platonic system, they stand or fall. 

One design of the work is to serve as a text-book 
for senior classes in college, not so much by way of 
furnishing an exercise in the study of the Greek lan- 
guage, as for the higher object of exhibiting, in connex- 
ion with the Platonic, the other systems of Greek phi- 
losophy, and their bearing upon the Christian theology. 
On the same grounds, it is supposed that it may be found 
useful to students in our theological seminaries, and 
form no unprofitable addition to the libraries of cler- 
gymen, besides commending itself generally to the at- 
tention of our scholars and literary men. 

We believe that in this age there is a peculiar call 
for a deeper knowledge of Plato. Some acquaintance 
with his doctrine of ideas seems needed as a correct- 
ive to the tendency, so widely prevalent, to resolve all 
knowledge into an experimental induction of facts, not 
only in physical, but also in ethical and _ political 
science. If the Good, to adopt our author’s own 
style,* is something more than pleasure or happiness 


———— — ————— eee 


ΧΙ INTRODUCTION. 


either present or anticipated—if the True is something 
higher than past, present, or future facts—if the Beau- 
tiful is something more than a generalization from 
pleasing individual sensations—if the Just and the 
Right involve inquiries far above those endless logoma- 
chies, and questions of casuistry, which form the main 
features of modern ethics—if the State is a reality 
transcending a present aggregation of flowing and 
perishing individuals—if Law is a spiritual power dis- 
tinct from the muscular force of a majority of present 
wills—if God is something more than gravitation, or 
the eternal development of a physical fate, which is 
only another name for an eternal succession of inex- 
plicable phenomena—if there is a real foundation for 
the moral and religious, as distinct from, and not em- 
braced in, the natural, or, in other words, if penalty 
and retribution are terms of far more solemn import 
than the modern jargon about physical consequences— 
then surely is it high time that there should be some 
disturbance of this placid taking for granted of the 
opposing views; then surely should Plato be stud- 
ied, if for no other purpose, as a matter of curiosity, 
to see if there may not possibly be some other philoso- 
phy than this noisy Baconianism, about which there is 
kept up such an everlasting din, or that still more noisy, 
because more empty, transcendentalism, which some 
would present as its only antidote. In place ofall this, 
we want the clear, simple, common sense philosophy of 
Plato, commending itself, when rightly understood, to 
all the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, or universal ideas of the race, in 
distinction from that miscalled common sense which is 
only the manufactured public opinion of the moment— 
a philosophy most religious—most speculative, and yet 
most practical—mest childlike in its primeval simpli- 


INTRODUCTION. Xi 


city, and yet most profound. We speak with confi- 
dence on this point. ‘The young man who 15 an en- 
thusiastic student of Plato can never be a sciolist in 
regard to education, a quack in literature, a dema- 
gogue in politics, or an infidel in religion. 


Our main object, then, is to recommend this noble phi- 
losopher to the present generation of educated young 
men, especially to our theologians. The present work 
by no means professes to set forth his system as a 
whole, but merely to present some of its attractive 
points, to allure other minds among us to a more thor- - 
ough examination. The main doctrine of ideas, al- 
though alluded to in almost every dissertation, is not 
discussed under its own title, because we had formed. 
the design, if permitted to accomplish it, and if the 
present work should be acceptable to the public, of 
treating it by itself in an*examination of another of the 
most interesting of the Platonic dialogues. 

We conclude with the remark that, in a moral and 
practical, as well as in a speculative point of view, the 
particular subject of the dialogue selected has some 
claim to attention. He who thinks most deeply, and 
has the most: intimate acquaintance with human na- 
ture, as exhibited in his own heart, will be the most 
apt to resolve all unbelief into Atheism. Especially 
will this be the case at a time when physical science, 
in league with a subtle pantheism, is everywhere sub- 
stituting its jargon of laws, and elements, and nebular 
star-dust, and vital forces, and magnetic fluids, for the 
recognition of a personal God, and an ever wakeful, 
ever energizing special providence. ‘Theism, we ad- 
mit, 15 everywhere the avowed creed, but it wants 
life. It is too much of a mere philosophy. There 

B 


X1V INTRODUCTION. 


are times when the bare thought tnat God is, comes 
home to the soul with a power and a flash of light 
which gives a new illumination, and a more vivid in- 
terest to every other moral truth. It is on such occa- 
sions the conviction is felt that all unbelief is Atheism, 
or an acknowledgment of a mere natural power cloth- 
ed with no moral attributes, and giving rise to no 
moral sanctions. We want vividness given to the 
great idea of God as a judge, a moral governor, a 
special superintendent of the world and all its move- 
ments, the head of a moral system, to which the ma- 
chinery of natural laws serves but as the temporary 
scaffolding, to be continued, changed, replaced, or 
finally removed, when the great ends for which alone 
it was designed shall have been accomplished. Just 
as such an idea of God is strong and clear, so will be 
a conviction of sin, so will be a sense of the need of 
expiation, so will be a belief in a personal Redeemer, 
and so will follow in its train an assurance of all the 
solemn verities of the Christian faith, so strong and 
deep, that no boastful pretension of that science which 
makes the natural the foundation of the moral, and no 
stumbling-blocks in the letter of the Bible will for a 
moment yield it any disquietude. There is a want of 
such a faith, as is shown by the feverish anxiety in re- 
spect to the discoveries of science, and the results of 
the agitations of the social and political world. This 
timid unbelief, when called by its true name, is Athe- 
ism. The next great battle-ground of infidelity will 
not be the Scriptures. What faith there may remain 
will be summoned to defend the very being of a God, 
the great truth involving every other moral and reli- 
gious truth—the primal truth, chat Hi IS, and that he 
is the rewarder of all who diligently seek him. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION . 
STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT . 
GREEK TEeExT AND CriticaL Notes 


EXCURSUS I. 


The Platonic View of the Parental and Filial Relations, and 


the Ancient Doctrine generally on this Subject 
TT. 


The Words Προοίμιον and Hapayi6cov.—The Preamble, the Ad- 


visory or Argumentative Part of the Law 


III. 
Subjective Sense of the Word ’AA7Getw . 
IV. 
The Orphic Poetry . 
v. 


Plato’s Regard for Antiquity and the Ancient Pr es —His 


Use of the Word Θεοέ 


Vi. 
Philosophy and Character of Anaxagoras 
ΕἾΜΑΙ: 
The Divine Justice the Ground of Human Law 
VIO. 
Universality of the Belief in a God 
ΙΧ. 
Antiquity of Atheism : : 
X. 
Principle of Authority i 
ΧΙ. 
Degrees of Atheism.—Peculiarity of Plato’s Style 
| XII. 
Ancient Doctrine of the Four Elements . 
ΧΗΣ. 


Atheistical Doctrine of Φύσις, Τύχη, and Τέχνη 


Page 


1 to 84 


87 


95 


97 


99 


. 102 


. 105 
. 110 
sod 
. 114 
8 
7 
7.819 


. 130 


XVI CONTENTS. 


XIV. 
Atheistical Doctrine that Law and Religion were not by Na- 
ture, but by Art : : : ; : 
ΧΥ 
The Figure Aposiopesis : 
XVI. 
Argument for the Existence of a God from Motion . 
XVII. 
Soul Older than Body . 
XVIII. 
Remarkable Comparison of the Dangerous Flood 
XIX. 


Invocation of the Divine Aid in the Argument. — Striking Ex- 
amples of this from other Dialogues : 


XX. 


The Great Question of the Ancient Schools, Do all Things 
flow? &c.; with a Sketch of some of the principal Mate- 
rializing or ’Atheistical Philosophers who belonged to the Ion- 


ic, and to the Physical School of Elea 
XXI. 
Mathematical Use of the Word Λόγος 
XXII. 
Paradox of Circular Motion ᾿ 
XXIII. 
The words Φθίσις, Τένεσις, Πάθος, and Φθορά 
XXIV. 


Philosophy of the Verb TO BE.— Platonic use of ee and 
Viyvopat ; 


ΧΧΥ. 


Ancient Divisions of Motion.—According to Plato.—According 
to Aristotle-— Distinction between Τένεσις and ’AAAoiworc. 
--T'he Atomic Theory more favourable to Theism than the 
Doctrine of Occult Qualities : ν 3 ὶ 


XXXVI. 

Αὐτοκίνησις, or Self-motion of Soul. — Energy or Action be 
longs to the Essence of the Deity. — Whether on this View 
God must have created Worlds from Eternity.—Aristotle’s 
Misrepresentations of Plato on this Point. — His own Doc- 
trine.—Aristotle’s Immoveable Essence. — Moral Reasons 
the first of Moving Causes ‘ : , ς : 


XXVII. 
The Words Λόγος, Εἶδος, and ’Idéa . : ἔ 


Fage 


. 135 


139 


. 141 


. 144 


. 146 


. 148 


. 152 


. 164 


- 166 


Lor 


. 170 


. 184 


CONTENTS. XVI 


XXVIII. Page 


Distinetion between Λόγος and Ὄνομα. : : ; . 196 
X XIX. 


Infinite Distance between Self-motion and Motion by Impulse. 
—Impassable Chasm between Spirit and Matter.—Ideas of 
Change, Cause, and Spirit inseparable. — The Word Πολ- 
Aoatn.—Principle of Euphonic Attraction . : : . 201 


XXX. 


Argument of Ancient Atheists that Apparent Evidences of 
Design were only Evidences of subsequent Accommodation. 
—Things (they said) older than ap aaa ae of ae and 


therefore older than Soul. . 204 
XXXI. 
Platonic Doctrine of the Evil ee —Of Sey or Ne- 
cessity . : : ; 07 
XXXII. 
Platonic Analogy between the Motion of pee and Yun and 
that of a Sphere, or of the Heavens. 4 er 9 
XXXII. 


lhe Motions of the Evil Soul Irregular and Disorderly. — The 
nearer an Approach to the Pure Reason, the more of Fixed- 
ness and Uniformity.—Heaven a State of Eternal Rest.— 
Atheistic Objection from the unvarying Regularity of the 
Heavens, from whence was inferred the Absence of Will and 
Reason : : : : : i : . 224 


XXXIV. 


Platonic Doctrine of the Animation of the Heavenly Bodies. 
—Ancient Belief that each Nation had its own peculiar 


Guardian Daemon or Genius : : : ; : . 229 
XXXV. 
Three Hypotheses in respect to the Animation of the Heay- 
enly Bodies . : ; : : ν : : : 233 
XXXVI. 
Mic “Oynua, or Vehiculum Mundi.—Examination of a Remark 
able Passage from Euripides Σ : i : : eas 
XXXVI. 
Second Grand Division of the Argument. — Doctrine of a 
Special Providence.—Mistake of Cudworth . 3 ᾿ W237 
XXXVITI. 
The Greek Words for Blessedness, Happiness, Fortune, &c. . 239 
XXXIX. 


Atheistic Argument against Providence drawn from the Pros- 
perity of the Wicked. — Plato’s paneusee, Meise witn 
that of the Scriptures . ; . 243 

B2 


XVII CONTENTS. 


XL. ; Puge 
The Singular Word ᾿Αποδιοτομπέομοι, Ὁ and the Remarkable 
Use made of it by Plato ; i : 245 
ΧΙ. 
Defect of Plato’s Theology in regard to the Doctrine of Atone- 
ment and the Necessity of Expiation . : : : . 249 
XIE g | 
Highest Proof of the Divine Goodness, the a priori Convic- 
tion of the Moral Sense : ‘ : : , : ies 
XUN. 


Sublime Mode in which the Bible represents the Divine Provi- 
dence and Omniscience as contrasted with all mere Philos- 
ophizing on these Attributes.—Analysis of the Greek Word 
᾿Ανδρεία, as denoting one of the Cardinal Virtues of Soul.— 


Piety of Epicureanism . : 2 : Σ : ¢ . 255 
ΧΊΩΝ, 
The true Dignity of Man his Religious Nature. — ae of 
the Greeek Words Xé6ac, EioHerd, &e. : . 259 
XLV. 


Men Compared to Sheep of the Divine Pasture.—Language of 
Plato on this Subject in Harmony with that of the Scriptures 261 


XLVI. 
Peculiarity of certain Negative Forms of Greek Verbs . . 262 


XLVII. 


Great Things cannot Exist without Small. — Application of the 
Maxim to the Doctrine of a Special Providence, to Educa- 


tion, and to Politics. 3 : : Σ : A . 264 
XLVIUIT. 
Gentleness of Piato’s Mode of Argument, and its peculiar 
Adaptation to the Minds of the Young , i ; » 267 
XLIX. 


The Machinery of Physical Events controlled by Invisible Spir- 
itual Agencies.—The Doctrine of Plato and of the Bible. . 268 


ἘΣ 


The Ancient Maxim De Nihilo Nihil.—Greek Ideas in Respect 
to Creation. — Language of the Fathers. — Plato defended 
against the Charge of teaching the Eternity of the World 
and of Matter.—Platonic Sense of the Maxim.—Comparison 
οἵ Hebrews, xi., 3, with the Language of Plato.—Difficulties 
of Reason when the Doctrine of Creation is examined apart 
from Revelation . Σ P : : ; 4 ‘ » 272 


CONTENTS. ΧΙΧ 


1,1. Page 


Doctrine that the Parts are made for the Whole as set forth 
by Plato, and as viewed by Modern Rationalists and Semi- 
Infidels—The Converse Doctrine, that the Whole is also for 
the Parts, examined with Reference to the Mutual Harmony 


of both . i ᾿ ἱ : i : Ἢ . 286 
1,11. 

Atheistic Objection drawn from the Extent of the Universe . 292 
1.111. 


Explanation of a Difficult Passage.—Remarks on those Views 
that resolve Morality into an Obedience to Physical Laws, 
and regard all Punishment as Consequential instead of Penal 294 


ἘΣ: 
The Word ᾿Ανώλεθρος as distinguished from Aiévioc.—Remark- 
able Passage in the Timeus : : : : . 900 
LV. 
The Greek Words for Eternity, Αἰών and Alovioc ; . 302 
LVI. 
Plato’s Doctrine of the Freedom of the Will, viewea in Con- 
nexion with the Law of Cause and Effect in Nature . , 997 
LVII. 
Explanation of a Difficult Passage . : : ‘ ΤΗΣ ΘΝ 
LVIUII. 
The Greek Word “Acdy¢ and the Hebrew 5jyyi and podyy pra 316 
LIX. 
Similar Views of a Future State, and Similar Fears of Hell 
inall Ages . ἃ : : : Σ : : : . 318 
LX. 


The Word “Ayioc.— Exceeding Spirituality of some of Plato’s 
Views.—Many of his Thoughts capable of being fairly ac- 
commodated to a “piritual Sense higher than the Author him- 
self had ever intended to convey. — Difference in this Re- 
spect between his Writings and those of all other Philoso- 


phers, Ancient and Modern . . é : : . 322 
Ed, 

Mythical Sense of the Word Θάνατος 4 : : “ ᾿Ξ 
ΠΧΠ1]. 


Omnipresence of the Divine Justice. —Remarkable Resem- 
blance of Plato’s Language to some Passages from the Bible 332 


LXILII. 
Doctrine of a Final. Judgment.—Use of the Word Συντέλεια 53:34 


AX CONTENTS. 


LXIV. ϑ Page 
Platonic Use of the Word Tizoc . ἰ ἷ : ς . 398 
LXV. 


Explanation of a Difficult Passage, in which Plato seems to 
assert that our Evils in the Present State exceed our Good 339 


LXVI. 


Μάχη ᾿Αθάνατος, or Battle of the Universe, between the Pow- 
ers of Good and Evil. — Sin, therefore, no Light Matter, be- 
cause it is Treason against the Cause of Good, for which 


God is contending with the Evil Soul . . ; ‘ . 342 
LXVIL. 

Plato’s Doctrine of the Δαέμονες, or Genii : i : . 347 
LXVIII. 


Beauty and ἀεί of the Ancient and Platonic Division of 
the Four Cardinal Virtues.—Deep Moral Significance of the 
Four Greek Words, ’Akodacia, ’Axpareia, ᾿Εγκρώτεια, and 
Σωφροσύνη, as indicating the Four Moral Degrees ἢ . 35 


LXIX. 


Peculiar Use of the Indicative Mode in certain Cases.—Com- 
parison of Passages from the New Testament . : . 355 


Lee 


Use of the Word IAecovetia. — Aristotle’s Distinction between 
Arithmetical and Geometrical Equality ᾿ - 4 . 356 


LXXI. 
Impiety and Folly of attempting to bribe Heaven . : . 357 


LXXII. 


Different Species of Atheists.—Morality of Atheists not found- 
ed on Principle.—First Species styled Δίκαιος by Plato, and 
invested by him with too Good a Character.—Second Species, 
the Magician or Juggler. — The Atheist often in Secret the 
Victim of Superstition.—Hobbes.—The Ironical Species of 
Atheist, a Character peculiar to the Ancient World.— Ely- 


mas the Sorcerer.—Apollonius of Tyanea . 3 ς . 959 
LXXIII. 
The Nightly Conference, or ATER of Plato’s State. — 
The Athenian Areopagus . . 363 
LXXIV. 


Common Law against all Private Religions.—Examination of 
Plato’s Doctrine in respect to Changes in the Public Wor- 
ship and Religion of the State a i ; - . 964 


LXXV. 


Belief in Apparitions, pet Spectres, ea &c., the same 
inall Ages . : ; : : ν᾿ : ‘0209 


STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT. 


As a dramatic work, The Laws is far inferior to the Republic. 
The speakers are three: namely, Clinias, a Cretan, Megillus, a. 
Lacedzemonian, and a stranger, who passes by no other name than 
the Athenian. The latter is the Socrates of the dialogue. ‘The first 
two are either mere listeners, or only brought in as suggestive helps 
in the various transitions of the discourse. After nine books occu- 
pied with varied and extended schemes of legislation, and where 
laws are mingled with reasonings and introductory preambles, which 
need not here be specified, the author comes, in the tenth book, to 
treat of offences against the public worship and religion, which it 
is supposed, of course, the State must possess, if it would be a state 
indeed, and not a mere herding together of men and women in 2 
political congregation, having no other bond of union than the tem- 
porary consent of individual wills. Previously, however, to the en- 
actment of laws for the punishment of sacrilege and other offences 
against religion, the chief speaker proposes that there should be 
laid down, by way of foundation, a preamble or hortatory statement, 
containing the reasons of the laws; which preamble, although con- 
cisely expressed at first (page 3), is subsequently expanded into an 
argument which occupies nearly the whole book, the few last pages 
only being taken up with the laws and the penalties annexed. 

The argument is divided into three parts; 1. Against those who 
denied the Divine existence ; 2. Against those who, while they ad- 
mitted the existence of a God, denied a providence ; and, 3. Against 
those who, while they admitted both a God and a providence, main- 
tained that the Deity was easily propitiated, or would not punish 
sin severely. ‘The first part is introduced by a declaration of Clini- 
as, that it must be easy to prove the existence of the Deity. He 
appeals at once to the most obvious phenomena of nature, the sun, 
the earth, and stars, &c.,as conclusive evidence, especially if taken 
in connexion with the universal sentiments of mankind. This gives 
occasion to the chief speaker to suggest that the subject is involved 
in greater difficulties than the other, in his simplicity, had imagined ; 
difficulties, however, not intrinsic, but arising from the perverseness 
of those who imposed upon themselves by the words chance, nature, 
art, &c., referring to the old Atheists of the Ionic or Materializing 
school (page 4 to page 15). After a short digression, in whie} it is 


ΧΧΙ] STATEMENT OF THE AKGUMENT. 


debated whether it is best at once to apply the law to such men, 
without argument (15 to 19), the Athenian devotes himself to the 
work of refutation, and commences a most subtle disquisition re- 
specting the nature of soul as implying self-motion involved in its 
very essence. Hence he proves that matter cannot possess this 
power, and, therefore, soul being more ancient than body, the prop- 
erties of soul must also be older than the properties of body. From 
this it is inferred that nature is the child, and not the mother of Art, 
as the Atheists said, and that, therefore, law, and will, and design, 
and theught, must have been before hard, and soft, and heavy, and 
hight, and all the adaptations of the natural world. The Atheists 
had held that religion, and the belief in the existence of Gods, being 
the production of human law, which was a production of art, and 
art itself being the offspring of Nature, therefore religion and all 
ideas of the just and right were conventional among men, and had 
no other foundation. This argument is refuted by the Athenian 
by showing the superior antiquity of soul, and, therefore, of these 
ideas as essential parts of its constitution (25). In proving the self- 
energy of soul, he goes into a very minute examination of the differ- 
ent kinds of motion, summing them all up, however, under two gen- 
eral heads; namely, motion by impulse, and that which moves some- 
thing else by commencing motion in itself. This latter he identifies 
with psyche, or soul, by a species of logical necessity, or an argu- 
ment drawn from the force of terms and the innate ideas involved 
in them. The next step is to determine whether it is one or more 
souls which are engaged in the affairs of the universe; the result 
of which inquiry is, that there are two, the one good and the other 
bad; the one constant, uniform, and ever exhibiting the highest 
reason in all its motions, which he compares to those of a sphere, 
the other irregular, disorderly, without reason, and full of madness 
(36). After this, there are stated three methods by which soul may 
guide the motions of the heavenly bodies; namely, by an indwell- 
ing spirit, or by a soul with an ethereal body, or entirely destitute. 
of body, and external to the object of its guidance (42). 

This brings the Athenian to the second grand division of the sub- 
ject, namely, the arguments of those who deny a Providence. ΑΓ 
ter premising that men are led to this opinion by seeing the appa- 
rent impunity and prosperity of the wicked (45), he shows that it is 
utterly derogatory to any right views of the Divine Nature. For if 
we admit that God is possessed of every virtue, indolence and indif- 
ference can form no part of his character. Neither can it be that. 
there is in him any want of power. Therefore we cannot suppose” 


STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT. XXlll 


that he will neglect anything, either great or small. Next is shown 
the importance of small things as parts of a whole, absolutety essen- 
tial to its totality, and that, without small things, the great could 
not exist. Hence the doctrine of a minute special providence, un- 
less the Deity is to be regarded as inferior in wisdom to human art- 
ists (56). The method of this special prc vidence is shown to be by 
such arrangements in the sovereignty of God (but not by any inhe- 
rent necessity of things), that every agent finds its fitting place 
namely, virtue rises and wickedness descends, until the one reaches 
The Most Holy Place, and the other sinks down to the most painful 
retributions of Hades (61). This Eternal Justice, or fixed law of 
God’s government, no one can escape, and, unless it is kept in view, 
t will be impossible to form any right opinion respecting a blessed 
cr miserable life (64). 

The third grand division of the argument respects those who 
view sin as a trifle, and who confide in the general mercy of God 
as capable of being easily moved by prayers and sacrifices. He 
contrasts their views of the Deity with such as are entertained of 
the lowest class of human guardians, as though God could be bribed 
by the wages of iniquity, when dogs could not be prevailed upon by 
similar motives to admit the wolf into the flock. Arguments against 
those views which would regard sin as a small matter, and God as 
easily appeased, are drawn from the μάχη ἀθάνατος, the battle of 
the universe, or everlasting conflict between good and evil, in which 
God and all good influences are contending for the victory, and 
where, of consequence, the least taking part with the enemy, or the 
least neutrality is treason against the cause of good throughout the 
universe (69, 74). 

There are then enumerated six classes of offenders ; namely, two 
to each of the three divisions of Atheists or semi-Atheists, differing 
in their degrees of guilt, and therefore requiring different gradations 
of punishment. ‘The book closes with a specification of the various 
penalties, and a law against private chapels and private religious 
rites ; in the course of which a very striking description is given of 
that class of Atheists who, while they had no religious belief them- 
selves, made it their business to excite the superstitious fears of 
mankind for their own unnatural pleasure or profit. 


N.B.—AIl references to any of the dialogues of Plato, except the 
text of the present work, are made according to the pages and let. 
ters of the alphabet, as given in the standard edition of Stephanus. 

‘and as they may be found in the margin of the Leipsic. 








bes ie ἐφ στὰς hi saan 


OMT RS 














Mens on ee 
int Memd eat kes sn ene ee, ApS tees Ae 
ἱ - . ν᾿ c ’ Pa τῷ 1 


. re 
# } : ΤῸΝ 4 
Υ ‘ 4 i” ΨΩ δι Saat ; 
᾿ ὁ Tem r a ae Db aa νὼ a 














᾿ | | Ea Ra ete ἐὺ ΓΝ arse with ἃ . peceriany 


μριναπηκοτῃ αἱ «σον RD ‘ie ἦ 
ie ible aera al ail 











τ Poe Spnrseate VG vet sess aa 
Bea) > Pe: “ganar” εἰ ρον te pane ag 


a acon wt ath mye 
Bn sae sees ὠψμαα" 


᾿ δὴ ον, ἵ ee ἥ ae 
OE τὴς Sepang at ever AB 
} oy. eT eh ae γερό κινοῦν. fa OR re ἢ ᾿ 
es a) aA La at ne boi 


ae 





γ : 1 ' 

ms. ’ ' 4 ᾿ 

“ ta ὦ} ' sen 

Ἔρις ~--— at” 
Perce Hea “ὦ 


PLATO CONTRA ATHEOS, 


DE LEGIBUS LIBER X. 


META δὲ τὰς αἰκίας, περὶ παντὸς" ἕν εἰρήσθω τοιόνδε 
τι νόμιμον βιαίων πέρι" τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδένα μηδὲν 
φέρειν μηδὲ ἄγειν "" μηδ᾽ αὖ χρῆσθαι μηδενὶ τῶν τοῦ πέ- 


1. Περὶ παντὸς. In reference to the whole subject discussed in 
the preceding book (ix.), namely, ὕδρεις, or wrongs committed wil- 
fully and with some degree of violence, of which aixia, treated of 
at the close of the ninth book, is one species, and sacrilege another. 

2. Φέρειν----ἄγειν. A collective phrase. ‘To take and carry away by 
violence.”” Compare Thucydides, 1., 7 : "Edepov yap ἀλλήλους. “Ayetv 
καὶ φέρειν is a phrase derived from the earliest times, and is always 
employed in reference to acts of violence. Hence, because personal 
courage was anciently regarded as the chief part of human virtue, 
some have supposed that from ἄγειν, in this sense, came ἀγαθὸς, 
and from φέρειν, its comparative and superlative, φέρτερος, φέρτατος, 
or φέριστος. Such a view encounters etymological difficulties in 
the termination of ἀγαθὸς. Besides, it can only be maintained on 
the false theory that the savage life was the original state of men, 
and that moral terms partake of the ideas most prevalent in such a 
condition. We much prefer the derivation of Plato, although, in 
general, he is entitled to but little deference as a philologist. Ac- 
cording to him, τὸ ἀγαθὸν is τὸ ἀγαστὸν, “ the wonderful, the admi- 
rable,” from ἄγαμαι ἀγάομαι, “ to wonder at,” also ““ἴο admire with 
great delight.” See the Cratylus, p. 412. The force of this will be 
better felt by comparing what the philosopher says in the sixth book 
of the Republic, of the wondrous idea of the ἀγαθὸν, or The Good, as 
surpassing all human comprehension. No one, on reading it, will 
be at a loss as to what led him to this etymology, whatever we may 
think of its philological correctness. It must be remarked, however, 
that, in reading the Cratylus, it is difficult to determine in what 
parts the writer is sincere, or how far he may be indulging in the 
severest satire against certain false systems of philosophy. 

A 


κὸν CONTRA ATHEOS. 


λας, ἐὰν μὴ πείσῃ" τὸν κεκτημένον. ἐπ yap δὴ TOV τοιού- 
του πάντα ἠρτημένα τά τε εἰρημένα κακὰ γέγονε, καὶ "ἔστι 
καὶ ἔσται. μέγιστα δὲ δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν αἱ τῶν νέων ἀκολα- 
σίαι τε καὶ ὕθρεις “ἡ εἰς μέγιστα δὲ, ὅταν εἰς ἱερὰ γίγνων.- 
ται, καὶ διαφερόντως αὖ μεγάλα, ὅταν εἰς δημόσια καὶ 
ἅγια ἢ κατὰ μέρη κοινὰ φυλετῶν ἤ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων 
κεκοινωνηκότων " εἰς ἱερὰ δὲ ἴδια καὶ τάφους, δεύτερα καὶ 
δευτέρως." εἰς δὲ γονέας, τρίτα, χωρὶς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν 
εἰρημένων," ὅτων ὑθρίζῃ τις. τέταρτον δὲ γένος ὕθρεως, 
ὅταν ἀφροντιστῶν τις τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄγῃ ἢ φέρῃ ἢ χρῆταί 
τινι" τῶν ἐκείνων, μὴ πείσας αὐτούς. πέμπτον δὲ, τὸ πο- 
λιτικὸν ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν ὑθρισθὲν, δίκην ἐπι- 
καλούμενον. οἷς δὴ δοτέον," εἰς κοινὸν νόμον ἑκάστοις. 
ἱεροσυλία μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται ξυλλήθδην, βίαιός τε καὶ λάθρα 
ἐὰν γίγνηται, τί χρὴ πάσχειν. boa δὲ λόγῳ καὶ ὅσα ἔργῳ 
περὶ ϑεοὺς ὑθρίζει τις λέγων ἢ πράττων," τὸ παραμύθιον 
ὑποθεμένῳ"" ῥητέον ἃ δεῖ πάσχειν. ἔστω δὴ τόδε" ϑεοὺς 

8. ᾿Εὰν μὴ πείσῃ, “unless he get the consent.” 

4. “Ὑόρεις, “violent wrongs committed wilfully and with malice 
prepense, whether by act or speech.” ‘The writer now proceeds to 
specify five different grades into which offences of this kind might 
be divided: 1st, against sacred things public; 2d, against sacred 
things private ; 3d, against parents ; 4th, against magistrates ; 5th, 
against private political rights of individual citizens. 

5. Δευτέρως has respect to διαφερόντως above, referring not, like 
δεύτερα, to numerical rank, but to the grade of enormity. 

6. Εἰς δὲ γονέας. See Note I., App. 

ἡ. Χωρὶς τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων, namely, those mentioned in the 
ninth book. 

8. Ὅταν ἀφροντιστῶν τις, ‘when any one who is reckless of the 
authority or respect due to magistrates.” 

9. The case of τινὲ is determined here grammatically by the sast 
verb, χρῆται, although in sense it is the common object of them all. 

10. *Oi¢ δὴ δοτέον, “for all which cases there must be a common 
law,” or “a law in common containing provisions applicable te 
each respectively.” 

11. λέγων ἢ πράττων, “by speech or action.” 

12 See Note II., App. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. , 3 


ἡγούμενος εἷναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἐργον 
ἀσεθὲς εἰργάσατο ἑκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον. ἀλλὰ 
ἕν" δή TL τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο ὕπερ εἶπον οὐχ 
ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον, ὄντας, οὐ φροντίζειν ἀνθρώπων, 
ἢ τρίτον, εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι, ϑυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς πα- 
οαγομένους. 

ΚΛ. Τί οὖν δὴ δρῷμεν ἂν ἢ καὶ λέγοιμεν πρὸς αὐτούς: 

ΑΘ. Ὦ ᾽γαθέ, ἐπακούσωμεν αὐτῶν πρῶτον ἃ τῷ καταφρο- 
νεῖν ἡμῶν" προσπαίζοντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν μαντεύομαι. 

ΚΛ. Ποῖα δῆ; 

ΑΘ. Ταῦτα τάχ᾽ ἂν ἐρεσχελοῦντες εἴποιεν. ἾΩ ξένε ᾿Αθη- 
ναῖε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιε καὶ ἹΚνώσιε, ἀληθῆ λέγετε. ἡμῶν 
yap οἱ μὲν τοπαράπαν ϑεοὺς οὐδαμῶς νομίζουσιν " οἱ δὲ, 
μηδὲν ἡμῶν φροντίζειν " οἱ δὲ, εὐχαῖς παράγεσθαι, οἵους 
ὑμεῖς λέγετε. ἀξιοῦμεν δή, καθάπερ ὑμεῖς ἠξιώκατε περὶ 
νόμων, πρὶν ἀπειλεῖν ἡμῖν σκληρῶς, ἡμᾶς πρότερον ἐπι- 
χειρεῖν πείθειν καὶ διδάσκειν ὡς εἰσὶ ϑεοί,᾽" τεκμήρια Aé- 
γοντες ἱκανά, καὶ ὅτι βελτίους ἢ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπό 
τίνων δώρων παρατρέπεσθαι κηλούμενοι. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ταῦ- 
Ta ἀκούοντές τε καὶ τοιαῦθ᾽ ἕτερα τῶν λεγομένων ἀρίστων 
εἷναι ποιητῶν τε καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ μάντεων καὶ ἱερέων, καὶ 


-. 





18. ἀλλὰ ἕν, Supply as follows: ‘‘but when he has done thus, 
he has done it—éy δή τι τῶν τριῶν madoywv—being in one or the other 
of these three states.”’ 

14. τῷ καταφρονεῖν ἡμῶν, “in their contempt for us.” προσπαι- 
Covrac is best rendered adverbially, “ sportively.” 

15. ὡς εἰσὶ Geof. This example furnishes an excellent illustration 
of the general difference between the particles ὡς and ὅτι. Both 
follow nearly the same class of verbs, and are frequently regarded 
- and rendered as though they were nearly, if not quite, synonymous. 
The difference, however, in this and similar cases, is obvious. “Ὅτι 
would simply refer to the fact ; ὡς, to the manner or reason of it. As, 
for example, διδάσκειν ὅτι, “to teach us the fact, that there are 
Gods ;” διδάσκειν dc, “to teach us how ;” that is, ‘in what manner, and 
for what necessary reasons, there are Gods.” And so in the follow- 
ing sentence: καὶ ὅτι βελτίους ἢ, kK. τ. λ., ‘and also the fact that they 
are better than,’’ &c., or ‘‘ that they are too good.” 


4 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾷν τὰ ἄδικα τρϑ- 
πόμεθα οἱ πλεῖστοι, δράσαντες δ᾽ ἐξακεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα. 
παρὰ δὲ δὴ νομοθετῶν φασκόντων εἷναι μὴ ἀγρίων, ἀλλὰ 
ἡμέρων, ἀξιοῦμεν πειθοῖ πρῶτον χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ 
πολλῷ βελτίω" τῶν ἄλλων λέγοντας περὶ ϑεῶν ὡς εἰσίν, 
ἀλλ᾽ οὖν βελτίω γε πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. καὶ τάχα πειθοίμεθ᾽ 
ἂν ἴσως ὑμῖν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιχειρεῖτε, εἴτι μέτριον λέγομεν, εἰ- 
πεῖν ἃ προκαλούμεθα. 

ΚΛ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ padtov eivat ἀληθεύοντας" 
λέγειν ὡς εἰσὶ ϑεοί ; 

ΑΘ. Πῶς; 

ΚΛ. Πρῶτον μὲν γῆ καὶ ἥλιος, ἄστρα τε Ta ξύμπαντα; 
καὶ τὰ τῶν ὡρῶν διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς οὕτως, ἐνιαυτοῖς 
τε καὶ μησὶ διειλημμένα " καὶ ὅτι πάντες “Ἑλληνές τε καὶ 
βάρθαροι νομίζουσιν εἷναι ϑεούς. 

ΑΘ. Φοθοῦμαί γε, ὦ μακάριε, τοὺς μοχθηρούς, (οὐ γὰρ 
δή ποτε εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν ὥσγε αἰδοῦμαι) μήπως ὑμῶν καταφρονή- 
σωσιν. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἴστε αὐτῶν πέρι τὴν τῆς διαφθο- 
ρᾶς" αἰτίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡγεῖσθε ἀκρατείᾳ μόνον ἡδονῶν τε καὶ 


Ι. οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾷν τὰ ἄδικα. This may be freely rendered thus : 
‘Instead of being turned away from the commission of sin, the most 
of us are wholly occupied in attempts to avert its consequences.”’ In 
this there 15 most concisely, yet most forcibly expressed, the essen- 
tial difference between two things that are often mistaken the one 
for the other, namely, between true religion, consisting in right views 
of the Divine Nature, or that true ‘‘ fear of the Lord which is ¢o de- 
part from evil” (τρέπεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾷν Ta ἄδικα), and superstition, 
which is wholly occupied, not in the avoidance of sin, but in vain 
attempts fo cure the evils and terrors which it brings upon the soul, 
(δράσαντες δ᾽ ἐξακεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα). ‘This superstition, or false reli- 
gion, as Plato elsewhere shows, is nearly allied to Atheism. See 
Note LXXX. and LXXXI., App. | 

2. πολλῷ βελτίω. The antithesis here is between πολλῷ βελτίω 
and βελτίω ye, ‘better, indeed, in respect to truth, if not far better.” 

3. ἀληθεύοντας. See Note IiI., App. 

4. διαφθορᾶς. We have adopted this instead of the common read- 
ing, διαφορᾶς. It is supported by the authority of Cornarius and 
Stephanus, although Ficinus seems to have read διαφορᾶς, and is in 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 5 


ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀσεθῆ βίον ὁρμᾶσθαι" τὰς ψυχὰς av- 
τῶν. 

KA. Τὸ δὲ τί πρὸς τούτοις αἴτιον ἄν, ὦ ξένε, εἴη ; 

ΑΘ. Σχεδὸν ὃ παντάπασιν ὑμεῖς ἔξω ζῶντες οὐκ ἂν εἰ- 
δείητε, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς ἂν λανθάνοι. 

KA. Τί δὴ τοῦτο φράζεις τανῦν ; 

ΑΘ. ᾿Αμαθία τις" μάλα χαλεπή, δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη 
φρόνησις. 

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; 

ΑΘ. Ἑϊσὶν ἡμῖν ἐν γράμμασι λόγοι κείμενοι, οἱ παρ᾽ 
ὑμῖν οὐκ εἰσὶ δι’ ἀρετὴν πολιτείας, ὡς ἐγὼ μανθάνω " οἱ 
μὲν, ἔν τισι μέτροις, οἱ δὲ, καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων, λέγοντες 
περὶ ϑεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι, ὡς" γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις 
οὐρανοῦ, τῶν τε ἄλλων - προϊόντες" δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ πολὺ 
ϑεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμενοί τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους 
ὡμίλησαν. ἃ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εἰ μὲν εἰς ἄλλο τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ 
far better accordance with all the words of the context—morum cor- 
ruptio atque depravatio—rottenness of soul. In the same way are the 


same class of persons characterized by the Psalmist: “ The foot 
hath said in his heart, there is no God;” ΤΡ ΡΠ annwn 


corrupt are they, and abominable in their deeds. Psalm xiv.,1. yy‘: 
Pp γ Ws, 


corrupti, perditis moribus sunt. They are altogether become jutny. 

5. ὁρμᾶσθαι, ‘to rush impetuously or violently.” Admsirably de 
scriptive of the headlong course of those to whom it is ere applieo 

6. ᾿Αμαθία τις. Amore perfect description of this disease of Athe 
ism (διαφθορᾶς) could not be given. It sets forth the malady with it, 
cause, and is equally applicable to ancient and to modern times: 
“an invincible ignorance, fancying itself the highest wisdom.” ᾿Αμαθία 
here has no reference to speculative or scientific knowledge, but is 
used in the usual Platonic sense for “ ignorance of one’s self.” 

ἡ. οἱ μὲν ἐν μέτροις. See Note IV., App. 

8. λέγοντες... ὡς. See remarks on ὡς and ὅτι, page 3, 15. 

9. προϊόντες de, “ Advancing, or going on from the discussion of 
the origin (τῆς ἀρχῆς) of the first nature (τῆς πρώτης φύσεως), Which 
was the subject of the most ancient (or Orphic) writings (τῶν παλαι- 
οτάτων), they treated next of the theogony, that is, the individual 
births and generations of the Gods, with their actions and mutual 
intercourse,” as set forth by Homer and Hesiod. 


A 2 


6 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


καλῶς ἔχοι, οὐ ῥάδιον ἐπιτιμᾷν παλαιοῖς οὖσιν.." εἰς μέντοι 
γονέων τε ϑεραπείας καὶ τιμὰς" οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγέ ποτε ἐπαι- 
νῶν εἴποιμι, οὔτε ὡς ὠφέλιμα, οὔτε ὡς τοπαράπαν ὀρθῶς 
εἴρηται." τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ τῶν ἀρχαίων πέρι μεθείσθω καὶ 
χαιρέτω, καὶ ὅπη ϑεοῖσι φίλον λεγέσθω ταύτῃ “" 
τῶν νέων ἡμῖν καὶ σοφῶν" αἰτιαθήτων ὅπη κακῶν αἴτια. 
τόδε οὖν οἱ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξεργάζονται λόγοι. ἐμοῦ γὰρ 
καὶ σοῦ, ὅταν τεκμήρια λέγωμεν ὡς εἰσὶ ϑεοί, ταῦτα αὐτὰ 
προσφέροντες, ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα καὶ γῆν, ὡς 
ϑεοὺς καὶ ϑεῖα ὄντα, ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἀναπεπειο- 
μένοι ἂν λέγοιεν ὡς γῆν τε καὶ λίθους ὄντα αὐτὰ, καὶ οὐ- 
δὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα, λό- 
yolot δὲ ταῦτα εὖ πως εἰς τὸ πιθανὸν περιπεπεμμένα.. 


τὰ δὲ 


10. παλαιοῖς οὖσιν. See Note V., App. 

ΠΤ], γονέων ϑεραπείας καὶ τιμὰς. He alludes here to the poetical 
fables respecting the treatment of Saturn by his son Jupiter. This, 
to Plato, was the most offensive part of the Grecian mythology, and 
he often alludes to it, as a sort of standing example, whenever he 
attacks the poets in other portions of his works. See the Republic, 
ii., 377, P: τὰ δὲ δὴ τῦυ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱέως, K. τ. A. 
It interfered with his high views respecting those duties which grow 
out of the domestic relations, especially the duty of filial obedience. 
Hence it furnishes his constant example, whenever he would con- 
demn the demoralizing and irreligious tendency of some of the an- 
cient poetry. , 

12. οὔτε ὡς τοπαράπαν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται. ‘These and similar portions 
of the mythology he would altogether expunge, as being utterly in- 
capable of any improved allegorical meaning, however gently he 
might deal with the system as a whole. See Note V., App. 

13. καὶ ὅπη ϑεοῖσι φίλον, ‘May what we have said respecting these 
ancient and venerable matters be thus said as may be agreeable to 
Heaven,” as it may be paraphrased. We see, from this expression, 
with what a gentle, pious, and cautious hand he touches the ancient 
mythology; how he seems to implore forgiveness for venturing to cast 
away anything that might have claims to reverence for its antiquity, 
and which, under all its deformity, might yet, perhaps, contain the 
corrupted and disguised remains of some primitive or anciently-re- 
vealed truth. } 

14. νέων σοφῶν... See Note VI., App. 


15. περιπεπεμμενα---περιπέττειν This is a term of cookery, and 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 7 


KA. Χαλεπόν ye λόγον, ὦ ξένε, εἰρηκὼς τυγχάνεις, et 
γε εἷς ἦν μόνον: νῦν δὲ ὅτε πάμπολλοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἔτι 
χαλεπώτερον ἂν εἴη. 

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν 04; τί λέγωμεν ; τί χρὴ δρᾷν ἡμᾶς ; πότερον 
ἀπολογησώμεθα οἷον κατηγορήσαντός τινος ἐν ἀσεθέσιν 
ἀνθρώποις ἡμῶν φεύγουσι' περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, λέγουσιν 


signifies to crust over—crustare. Compare Seneca, De Provid., 6, | 
non est ista sincera felicitas—crusta est. Also Aristophanes, Plutus, 
159: 
᾿Αισχυνόμενοι yap ἀργύριον αἰτεῖν ἴσως, 
"Ovéuare περιπέττουσι τὴν μοχθηρίαν. 

“ With a name they crust over their ἀορταυτίψ."" ‘The metaphor here 
suggests the thought of vile doctrines, like pernicious and unhealthy 
dishes, crusted over with some specious disguise to allure the eye 
and tempt the appetite. Socrates was ever fond of drawing com 
parisons from the body to the soul, from the health of the one to the 
moral soundness of the other, and from the sciences and arts that 
pertain to the one, to that higher philosophy which is concerned with 
the wants and relations of the other. The use of this word here 
carresponds well with his ordinary similes, and especially those 
made use of in the Gorgias, in which false philosophy (σοφιστικὴ) 
holds the same relation to the soul that the unhealthy confectionary 
art (ὀψοποϊικὴ) bears to the body. See the Gorgias, pages 28, 29, 
Leip. : ὅτε ἡ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομο- 
θετικὴν, καὶ ὅτι H ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν τῦυτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιο- 
σύνην. 

1. φεύγουσι. This is rendered by some aversari, non tolerare. So 
Ast, qui nos aversantur. It also, as a term of the Athenian courts 
of law, signifies to be defendant in a suit or prosecution, aS διώκων sig- 
nifies the plaintiff, pursuer, or prosecutor ; both terms being derived 
from the ancient custom of the pursuzt of the homicide by the aven- 
ger of blood, and from thence transferred to other legal contests both 
of a civil and criminal kind. Ficinus, in accordance with this idea, 
renders—in judicium pertractos. ‘To warrant this, however, the read- 
ing should be φεύγοντες or φεύγοντας, with a change in the construc- 
tion of the Greek. The first version seems so far fetched, that we 
would prefer combining the two ideas by translating φεύγουσι, ‘ whe 
put us on our defence.” ‘This agrees well with ἀπολογησώμεθα, and 
with the whole context. The speaker is complaining of the hard- 
ship of being compelled to assume the attitude of apologist or de- 


9 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ὡς δεινὰ ἐργαζόμεθα νομοθετοῦντες ὡς ὄντων ϑεῶν; ἡ 
χαίρειν ἐάσαντες, ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους τρεπώμεθα πάλιν, U7) 
καὶ τὸ προοίμιον" ἡμῖν μακρότερον γίγνηται τῶν νόμων; 
οὐ γὰρ βραχὺς ὃ λόγος ἐκταθεὶς ἂν γίγνοιτο, εἰ τοῖσιν 
ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀσεθεῖν, τὰ μὲν ἀποδειξαιμεν," μετρίως τοῖς 
λόγοις, ὧν ἔφραζον δεῖν πέρι λέγειν " τὰ δὲ, εἰς φόθον τρέ- 
ψαιμεν - τὰ δὲ, δυσχεραίνειν ποιήσαντες, ὅσα πρέπει" μετὰ 
ταῦτα ἤδη νομοθετοῖμεν. 

ΚΛ. ᾿Αλλ’, ὦ ξένε, πολλάκις μὲν ὥσγε" ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρό- 
νῳ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ εἰρήκαμεν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖ 
προτιμᾶν βραχυλογίαν μᾶλλον ἢ μῆκος. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμᾶς, 
τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπείγων διώκει. γελοῖον δὴ καὶ φαῦλον τὸ 
πρὸ τῶν βελτίστων τὰ βραχύτερα αἱρουμένους φαίνεσθαι. 
διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐ σμικρὸν ἀμωσγέπως" πιθανότητά τινα τοὺς 
λόγους ἡμῶν ἔχειν, ὡς ϑεοί τ᾽ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί, δίκην τιμῶν- 
fendant in such a cause, and of being required to give reasons for 
the belief in the existence of the Deity, especially before profane and 
ungodly men. 

2. mpooiutov. See Note 11., App. 

3. τὰ μὲν ἀποδείξαιμεν, x. τ. A., “ Should in some things demonstrate 
by arguments, &c.—ra δὲ, ei¢ φόθον τρέψαιμεν, should in others excite 
their fears—ra δὲ, dvoyepaiverv, x. τ. A., and in others making them 
dislike, or appealing to their prejudices,” &c. Or it may be para- 
phrased still more generally : If we should address ourselves to their 
reason, their fears, or their tastes, namely, their moral sentiments, of 
which they cannot wholly divest themselves, or their wholesome 
prejudices. | 

4. ὅσα πρέπει. In most editions there is a comma after πρέπει. 
It is clear, however, that these words are connected with νομοθετοῖ- 
μεν which follows, and that the comma should be after ποιήσαντες. 

5. Goye ἐν ὀλίγῳ, “ for so short a time as we have been together.” 

6. duwoyérwc. A difficult particle to analyze, so as to show the 
force of each part. It may be rendered “2m some one way or other, at 
least ;’? ἀμως, in some way, expressing the certainty that there is 
such a way; πὼς (indefiniteness), whatever that way may be ; γε, that 
there is one such way at least, if no more. ye always, whether alone 
or in composition, implies that the writer chooses to limit the mean- 
ing of a word, although intimating that he could say more if it pieas- 
ed him. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 9 


τες διαάεροντως ἀνθρώπων. σχεδὸν γὰρ τοῦτο" ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ 
ἁπάντων τῶν νόμων κάλλιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον προοίμιον 
ἂν εἴη. μηδὲν οὖν δυσχεράναντες μηδὲ ἐπειχθέντες, ἥντι- 
νά ποτε ἔχομεν δύναμιν εἰς πειθὼ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, 
μηδὲν ἀποθέμενοι, διεξέλθωμεν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἱκανῶς. 
AO. Εὐχήν μοι δοκεῖ παρακαλεῖνϑ ὁ λεγόμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ 
νῦν λόγος, ἐπειδὴ προθύμως συντείνεις " μέλλειν δὲ οὐκέτι 
ἐγχωρεῖ λέγειν. φέρε δή, πῶς ἄν τις μὴ ϑυμῷ λέγοι περὲ 
ϑεῶν, ὡς εἰσίν, ἀνάγκη γὰρ δὴ χαλεπῶς φέρειν καὶ μισεῖν 
ἐκείνους οἱ τούτων ἡμῖν αἴτιοι τῶν λόγων γεγένηνται καὶ 
γίγνονται νῦν, dv πειθόμενοι" τοῖς μύθοις, OVC ἐκ νέων παί- 


7. σχεδὸν γὰρ τοῦτο. See Note VII., App. 

8. Evyjv παρακαλεῖν, “to invite the wish,” that is, to second one’s 
wishes—to invite one to do what he already desires to do. 

9. γίγνονται viv, od πειθόμενοι. In the common text this stands 
thus: γίγνονται. Nov οὖν πειθόμενοι : the great objection to which 
is, that it is impossible to make any suitable sense out of it. Fici- 
nus felt the difficulty, and therefore made a paraphrase rather than 
a translation. ‘The correction was made by Stephanus, partim (as 
he says) velerzs exemplaris ope, partum conjectura mea. In fact, the 
exigentia loci absolutely requires the reading of Stephanus, which we 
have given, although not altogether free from objections. It is fol- 
lowed by editors generally in their notes and translations, although 
the other reading is retained in their text. The words οὐ πειθόμενοι 
may therefore be regarded, not as a commencement of the follow- | 
ing, but as the conclusion of the preceding sentence, which runs on, 
without coming to a close, until it terminates in οὐκ ἐισὶ ϑεοί, some 
distance below. The whole passage being the language of. justly- 
indignant feeling against those who would ruthlessly destroy all the 
religious reminiscences of youth, and all the hallowed associations 
of domestic instruction, is, on this account, rather involved and pa- 
renthetical. The thoughts and, emotions. outrun the expressions, 
leaving much to be supplied to bring out the meaning in all its ful- 
ness. This we attempt in the following free paraphrastic transla- 
tion: ‘For we must feel indignant, and dislike those who have ever 
been and are now the causes of such discussions ; who believe not 
the myths, which, when yet. children, they heard of nurses and 
mothers in soothing strains of sportive or serious song, as they lis- 
tened to the prayers and gazed upon those attending spectacles (of 


10 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


rng 


¥ 
δων ἔτι Ev γάλαξι τρεφόμενοι, τροφῶν TE ἤκουον Kal μητέ- 
ρων, οἷον ἐν ἐπῳδαῖς μετά τε παιδιᾶς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς 
λεγομένους, καὶ μετὰ ϑυσιῶν, ἐν εὐχαῖς αὐτοὺς ἀκούοντές 
τε, καὶ ὄψεις ὁρῶντες ἑπομένας αὐτοῖς, ἃς ἥδιστα ὅ γε νέος 
Opa TE καὶ ἀκούει πραττομένας, ϑυόντων ἐν σπουδῇ τῇ με- 
γίστῃ τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων, ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων ἐσ- 
πουδακότων, ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα οὖσι ϑεοῖς εὐχαῖς προσδιαλε- 
γομένων καὶ ἱκετείαις " ἀνατέλλοντός τε ἡλίου καὶ σελή- 
νης καὶ πρὸς δυσμὰς ἰόντων, προκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυ- 
νήσεις ἀκούοντές τε καὶ ὁρῶντες “Ελλήνων τε καὶ βαρθά- 
ρων" πάντων ἐν συμφοραῖς παντοίαις ἐχομένων καὶ ἐν Ev- 
πραγίαις, οὐχ ὡς οὐκ ὄντων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὄντων, 
καὶ οὐδαμὴ ὑποψίων ἐνδιδόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ ϑεοί. τού- 
των δὴ πάντων ὅσοι καταφρονήσαντες οὐδὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἱκανοῦ 
λόγου, ὡς φαῖεν ἂν ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦ κέκτηνται, νῦν 
ἀναγκάζουσιν ἡμᾶς λέγειν ἃ λέγομεν, πῶς τούτους ἄν τις 
ἐν πρᾳέσι λόγοις δύναιτο νουθετῶν ἅμα διδάσκειν περὶ 
ϑεῶν πρῶτον ὡς εἰσί; τολμητέον δέ. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα γε δεῖ 
μανῆναι," τοὺς μὲν, ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἡδονῆς, ἡμῶν, τοὺς δ᾽ 
religious worship) which the young soul hears and sees so joyfully 
—their parents sacrificing with selemn earnestness for themselves 
and their families, and by their vews and supplications conversing 
with the Gods as the most real of existences—who too, at the ri- 
sings and settings of the sun and moon, have often seen and heard 
the prostrations and adorations both of Greeks and Barbarians, in 
every diversified situation of prosperity and adversity appealing to 
the Gods, not as unreal fancies, but as existing in the highest sense, 
and without any suspicion to the contrary.” It is a strain of elo- 
quence fervid and indignant, yet not unkind or harsh, against those 
who, trampling under foot the most sacred associations, demand 
proof for that which never should have been doubted, and which 
seldom again finds a secure resting-place in that soul in which false 
reasoning, the result of licentious passions, has taken the place of 
wholesome religious authority. 

10. Ελλήνων te καὶ Bapbdpwv. See Note VIII., App. 

11. Οὐ γὰρ Gua ye δεῖ μανῆναι, τοὺς μὲν... ἡμῶν, τοὺς δε, &e. Ste- 
phanus, Cornarius, Ast, and most of the commentators, would here 
reject ἡμῶν, although without the authority of any manuscripts. We 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 11 


ὑπὸ τοῦ ϑυμοῦσθαι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἴτω δὴ πρόῤῥησις τοι- 
άδε τις ἄθυμος τοῖς οὕτω τὴν διάνοιαν διεφθαρμένοις " καὶ 
λέγωμεν πρῴως," σθέσαντες τὸν ϑυμόν, ὡς ἑνὶ διαλεγόμε. 
Vol τῶν τοιούτων, Ὦ παῖ, νέος εἶ - προϊὼν δέ σε ὃ χρόνος 
ποιήσει πολλὰ ὧν νῦν δοξάζεις μεταθαλόντα, ἐπὶ τἀναντία 
τίθεσθαι. περίμεινον οὖν εἰς τότε κριτὴς περὶ τῶν μεγίσ- 
των γίγνεσθαι. μέγιστον δὲ, ὃ νῦν οὐδὲν ἡγῇ σύ, τὸ, 
περὶ τοὺς ϑεοὺς ὀρθῶς διανοηθέντα, ζῇν καλῶς ἢ μῆ. πρῶ- 
τον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἕν τι μέγα σοι μηνύων οὐκ ἄν ποτε φα- 
νείην ψευδῆς, τὸ τοιόνδε: οὐ σὺ μόνος οὐδὲ οἱ σοὶ φίλοι 
πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτον ταύτην δόξαν περὶ ϑεῶν ἔσχετε " yly- 
νονται δὲ ἀεὶ" πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχον- 
τες. τόδε τοίνυν σοι παραγεγονὸς αὐτῶν πολλοῖς φρά- 
Coun’ ἄν, τὸ μηδένα πώποτε λαθόντα ἐκ νέου ταύτην τὴν 
δόξαν περὶ ϑεῶν ὡς οὐκ εἰσί, διατελέσαι πρὸς γῆρας" " μεί. 
would, however, by all means retain it, as essential to the full sense 
intended to be conveyed. “It must not be that some of us (ἡμῶν) 
become frantic through the ravenings of licentiousness, and others 
(of us) through indignation at such persons.” The passage would 
lose all its tender charity in the loss of ἡμῶν. It binds together.the 
two classes here described, by representing the fault of either ex- 
treme as arising out of that deep-seated depravity which is the com- 
- mon inheritance of the race. It may be thus paraphrased: ‘ All 
ultraism, into which all of us are so apt to run, must be avoided ; 
whether it be the ultraism of sensuality, or of harsh and denuncia- 
tory religious zeal.”” No man can be truly charitable who is not a 
firm believer in the common depravity of the race. Every other 
appearance of charity is only a spurious liberality or a hollow indif- 
ference. : 

12. καὶ λέγωμεν πράως. Nothing can be more in accordance with 
the very spirit of charity than this most gentle and exquisitely ten- 
der address : “ But let us say unto them, meekly quenching all angry 
feeling, as though we were now conversing with one of this class, 
‘My child, you are young, and time, as it rolls on, will produce 
many a change in opinions once formed,” &c. Compare with it 
some of the tender expostulations of the Bible: ‘‘ My son, forget not 
my law. Hear, O ye children, the instruction of a father.” 

13. γίγνονται δὲ det. See Note IX., App. 

14, διατελέσαι πρὸς γῆρας. The sentiment is that speculative athe- 


12 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


vavTa ἐν ταύτῃ TH διανοήσει. τὰ δύο μέντοι πάθη περὶ 
ϑεοὺς μεῖναι, πολλοῖσι μὲν οὔ, μεῖναι δὲ οὖν τισί, τὸ τοὺς 
ϑεοὺς εἶναι μέν, φροντίζειν δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, καὶ 
τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς φροντίζουσι μέν, εὐπαραμύθητοι δέ εἰσι 
ϑύμασι καὶ εὐχαῖς. τὸ δὴ σαφὲς ἂν γενόμενόν σοι περὶ 
αὐτῶν κατὰ δύναμιν δόγμα, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, περιμενεῖς ἀνασ- 
κοπῶν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, πυνθανόμενος παρά τε 
τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου. 
ἐν δὲ δὴ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μὴ τολμήσῃς περὶ ϑεοὺς μηδὲν 
ἀσεθῆσαι. πειρωτέον γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νόμους σοι τιθέντι νῦν, 
καὶ εἰς αὖθις διδάσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ὡς ἔχει. 

ΚΛ. Κάλλισθ᾽ ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, μέχρι γε τοῦ νῦν' εἴρηται. 

ΑΘ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν," ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία" 
λελήθαμεν δ᾽ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰς ϑαυμαστὸν λόγον ἐμπεπτω- 
κότες. 

ΚΛ. Τὸν ποῖον δὴ λέγεις ; 

ΑΘ. Τὸν παρὰ πολλοῖς δοξαζόμενον. εἷναι σοφώτατον 
ἁπάντων λόγων. | 

KA. Φράζ᾽ ἔτι σαφέστερον. 
ism does not often continue in old age, but that, although a specu- 
lative theism may take its place, the other accompaniments, name- 
ly, unbelief in a special Providence, or an indifferent trust in the 
Divine placability, may continue to the latest period. We think that 
this remark of Plato would be abundantly confirmed by an actual 
observation of life. It 1s seldom that we find an old man a specu- 
lative Atheist, whatever he may have been in his youth. It is, 
however, much more common to meet with those whose insensi- 
bility in respect to the reality of the Divine anger against sin is in 
direct proportion to the years in which they have experienced the 
special care and sparing mercy of Heaven. | 

15. καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ. The combination of particles here is 
worthy of notice. Καὶ 67 generally denotes an application of a pre- 
vious assertion, and is commonly used ῳ ἃ fortiori, ‘learning from 
others, and, therefore, if from others (a fortiori), from the lawgiver 
also, and in the highest degree.” The second καὶ is to be taken 
With μάλιστα, and the third with νομοθέτου. See Note X., App. 


1. μέχρι ye Tod νῦν, “80 far at least.” 
2. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. See Note XI., App. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 13 


AO. Aéyovoi ποῦ τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγ- 
νόμενα, καὶ γενόμενα, καὶ γενησόμενα, τὰ μὲν, φύσει, τὰ 
δὲ, τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην. 

ΚΛ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς ; 

ΑΘ. Εἰκός γέ τοί που" σοφοὺς ἄνδρας ὀρθῶς λέγειν. 
ἑπόμενοί γε μὴν αὐτοῖς, σκεψώμεθα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν," τί ποτε 
καὶ τυγχάνουσι διανοούμενοι. 

ΚΛ. Πάντως. 

ΑΘ. Ἔοικε, φασί, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα αὐτῶν καὶ κάλλιστα 
ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα, τέχνην" 
ἣν δὴ παρὰ φύσεως λαμθάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ 
πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων, πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα 
τὼ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ πάντες προσαγορεύομεν. 

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; 

ΑΘ. ὯΩδ᾽ ἔτε σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ 
ἀέρα, φύσει πάντα εἷναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί" τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν 
τούτων." καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου 
καὶ σελήνης, ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι. παν- 
τελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως 
ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ἡ ξυμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, 


3. ᾽Εικός γέ τοί που. This is the usual Socratic or Platonic irony. 
‘Tt may be likely, at least, that these wise people talk correctly.” 
Εἰκός ye, ‘‘ likely, plausible, probable, at least, 1f not certain.” Té τοί 
mov is a combination of particles deserving special notice. Té has 
its usual limiting sense as given above; τοι, like 67, confirms and 
strengthens the limitation, while ποὺ seems in the usual manner to 
diminish the positiveness of the expression by way of appeal to the 
party addressed. ‘‘ Surely (τοι) may we say, may we not (που), that 
these wise men talk plausibly at least (ye), to use no stronger term.” 

4. τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν. Haud dubie (says Ast) scribendum est, τὸ ἐκεῖθεν, 
qued ex illo consequitur. We have but little doubt, on the other hand, 
that Ast is wrong. ‘The old and established reading, τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν, 
may be rendered ‘those from, or of that school,” namely, their fol- 
lowers, those who expand and explain the doctrine more fully, as in 
the next answer. 

5. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν. See Note XII., App. 

6. ἀύσει. ... Téexvy. See Note XIII., App. 


[4 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ϑερμὰ ψυχροῖς, ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρά, Kal μωλακὰ πρὸς σκληρά, 
καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγεν- 
νηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ᾽ οὐρα- 
vov: καὶ ζῷα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ ξύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν EK τού- 
των γενομένων, οὐ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διά τινα ϑεὸν 
οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην, ἀλλὰ, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. τέχ- 
γην δὲ ὕστερον EK τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν ϑνη- 
τὴν ἐκ ϑνητῶν, ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδιάς τινας, ἀλη- 
θείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ὠλλὰ εἴδωλ᾽ ἄττα ξυγγενῆ 
ἑαυτῶν, Ol” ἡ γραφικὴ γεννᾷ καὶ μουσικὴ, καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις 
εἰσὶ συνέριθοι τέχναι " αἱ δ᾽ εἴτι καὶ σπουδαῖον ἄρα γεννῶ- 
σι τῶν τεχνῶν, εἷναι ταύτας ὁπόσαι τῇ φύσει ἐκοίνωσαν 
τὴν αὑτῶν δύναμιν" οἷον αὖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γεωργικὴ καὶ 
γυμναστική. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν σμικρόν τι μέρος El- 
ναί φασι κοινωνοῦν ili τέχνῃ δὲ, τὸ πολύ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ 
τὴν ΘΜ ΘΘΕΘΙρΡΩΙ πᾶσαν, OV φύσει, τέχνῃ δέ- ἧς οὐκ ἀλη- 
θεῖς εἶναι τὰς ϑέσεις. 

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; 

ΑΘ. Θεούς, ὦ μακάριε, εἷναι πρῶτόν φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, 
οὐ φύσει, ἀλλά τισι νόμοις " καὶ τούτους "ἄλλους ἄλλοις, 
ὅπη ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι " καὶ 
δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ, φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἷναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα" τὰ 
δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ᾽ εἶναι τοπαράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφισθητοῦν- 
τας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα" 
ἃ δ᾽ ἂν μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἷναι, γιγ- 
νόμενω τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, GAA’ οὐ δή τινι φύσει. ταῦτ᾽ 
ἐστίν, ὦ φίλοι, ἅπαντα ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν παρὰ νέοις ἀνθρώ- 
ποις, ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, φασκόντων εἵναι τὸ δικαιό- 
τατον 0, τί τις ἂν νικᾷ βιαζόμενος. ὅθεν ἀσέθειαί τε ἀν- 
θρώποις ἐμπίπτουσι νέοις, ὡς οὐκς ὄντων ϑεῶν οἵους ὃ νό. 
μος προστάττει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖν στάσεις τε διὰ ταῦτα, 
ἑλκόντων" πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον, ὅς ἐστι τῇ 


7. νομοθεσίαν πᾶσαν. See Note XIV., App. 
8. ἑλκόντων. The article τῶν would seem to be required here be- 


Φ 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 15 


ἀληθείᾳ κρατοῦντα ζῇν τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μὴ δουλεύοντα 
ἑτέροισι κατὰ νόμον. 3 

KA. Οἷον διελήλυθας, ὦ ξένε, λόγον, Kai ὅσην λώθην 
ἀνθρώπων νέων δημοσίᾳ πόλεσί τε καὶ ἰδίοις οἴκοις. 

ΑΘ. ᾿Αληθῆ μέντοι λέγεις, ὦ Κλεινία. τί οὖν οἴει χρῆ- 
vat δρᾶν τὸν νομοθέτην, οὕτω τούτων πάλαι παρεσκευασ- 
μένων; ἢ μόνον ἀπειλεῖν στάντα ἐν τῇ πόλει ξύμπασι τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις, ὡς, εἰ μὴ φήσουσιν" εἶναι ϑεοὺς καὶ διανοηθή- 
σονται, δοξάζοντες τοιούτους οἵους φησὶν ὃ νόμος ; καὶ 
περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν μεγίστων, 
ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅσα τε πρὸς ἀρετὴν τείνει καὶ κακίαν, ὡς 
δεῖ ταῦτα οὕτω πράττειν, διανοουμένους ὅπηπερ ἂν ὃ νομο- 
θέτης ὑφηγήσηται γράφων" ὃς δ᾽ ἂν μὴ παρέχηται ἑαυτὸν 
τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθῆ, τὸν μὲν δεῖν τεθνάναι, τὸν δὲ τινα 
πληγαῖς καὶ δεσμοῖς, τὸν δὲ, ἀτιμίαις, ἄλλους δὲ πενίαις 
κολάζεσθαι καὶ φυγαῖς - πειθὼ δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,," ἅμα 
fore ἑλκόντων, although there is no authority of manuscripts for it. 
It seems to refer to φασκόντων above. ‘ Hence factions or quarrels 
arise by reason of these things, while they violently drag (the young) 
to that mode of life which is right by nature (that is, in their opin- 
ion), Which consists, in reality, in so living as to have power over 
others, and to be in subjection to none by virtue of law.” In this 
metaphorical expression, ἑλκόντων, Plato seems to have had an eye 
to some of those violent contests which Homer so vividly describes 
as taking place over a dead body, in which both sides are pulling 
with all their might, the one to carry off, the other to rescue; as in 
the battle over the body of Patroclus, in the sixteenth book of the 
Iliad. He rises, however, infinitely above Homer in his subject. 
It is not the dead body of the slain hero which is here the object of 
contention, but the living soul of the young man that the atheistic 
crew are seeking to drag down to their own kingdom of darkness ; 
or, to accommodate the language of the Grecian poet to a sense far 
beyond his highest conceptions, we may say, with a slight change 
of the verse, Iliad, xxii., 161: 

᾿Αλλὰ περὶ χυχῆς μάρνανται ἀθανάτοιο. 

9. See Note XV., App. 

10. πειθὼ δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Connect this with 7 μόνον ἀπειλεῖ», 
about ten lines back ; and then, by leaving out all that is explanatory 


16 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


τιθέντω αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους, μηδεμίαν ἔχειν τοῖς λόγοις 
προσάπτοντα εἰς δύναμιν ἡμεροῦν ; 

ΚΛ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ ξένε: ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ. τυγχάνει. γε οὖσα 
καὶ σμικρὰ πειθώ τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, δεῖ μηδαμῆ κάμνειν 
τόν γε ἄξιον καὶ σμικροῦ νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν, τὸ λε- 
γόμενον, φωνὴν ἱέντα," τῷ παλαιῷ νόμῳ. ἐπίκουρον γίγ- 
νεσθαι λόγῳ, ὡς εἰσὶ ϑεοί, Kal doa νῦν δὴ διῆλθες σύ, καὶ 
δὴ καὶ νόμῳ αὐτῷ βοηθῆσαι καὶ τέχνῃ: ὡς ἐστὸν φύσει ἢ 
φύσεως οὐχ ἧττον, εἴπερ νοῦ γέ ἐστι γεννήματα, κατὰ λό- 
γον ὀρθὸν ὃν σύ τε λέγειν μοι φαίνῃ καὶ ἐγώ σοι πιστεύω 
τανῦν. 

ΑΘ. Ὦ προθυμότατε Ἰζλεινία, τί δ᾽; οὐ χαλεπά τέ ἐστι 
ξυνακολουθεῖν λόγοις εἰς πλήθη, λεγόμενα, μήκη τε av”? 
κέκτηται διωλύγια ; 





dr parenthetical, the contrast may be exhibited thus: “ΟΥ ought he 
to threaten them only, that unless they shall say, &c. ; but not, by 
attaching it to his arguments, exercise persuasion towards men at 
the same time that he lays down the laws, so that (by such persua- 
sive arguments) he may render them as mild, or as well-disposed to- 
wards the laws as possible.”? δὲ here may be rendered “and,” 
which, in a similar connexion in English, is sometimes a disjunctive 
particle: ‘Shall he threaten, &c., and shall he not persuade?” Or 
the disjunctive force of δὲ may be better brought out, and the con- 
nexion with the first part of the sentence at the same time preserv- 
ed, by rendering it “ὁ instead of,” thus: ‘Ought he only to threaten 
anstead of using persuasion?’’? &c. In this construction, ἔχειν, as 
well as ἀπειλεῖν, will depend on οἴει χρῆναι, about twelve lines back. 

11. πᾶσαν φωνὴν iévra, “letting out all his voice,” that is, omitting 
nothing which may tend to produce conviction. A proverbial ex- 
pression, for which see Erasmus, Adag., p. 788. 10 seems some- 
what to resemble a nautical metaphor, of which the Greek poets 
were very fond, and of which we have a Striking example, Eurip., 
Medea, 280: 


Ἐχθροὶ yap ἐξίασι πάντα by κάλων. 
‘For my enemies let out all their rope,” that is, “ are attacking. me 
under full sail, and straining every nerve.” 


12. μήκη te ad. There is a harshness here in consequence of the 
sudden change from the participle to the indicative mode κέκτηται. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 1% 


KA. Τί δέ, ὦ ξένε ; περὶ μέθης" μὲν καὶ μουσικῆς οὕτω 
μακρὰ λέγοντας ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περιεμείναμεν,᾽" περὶ Dewy δὲ 
καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὐχ ὑπομενοῖμεν ; καὶ μὴν καὶ νομοθε. 
σίᾳ γέ ἐστί που τῇ μετὰ φρονήσεως μεγίστη βοήθεια, διότι 
τὰ περὶ νόμους προστάγματα ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντα, ὡς δώ- 
σοντα εἰς πάντα χρόνον ἔλεγχον, πάντως ἠρεμεῖ """ ὥστε 
οὔτ' εἰ χαλεπὰ Kat’ ἀρχὰς ἀκούειν ἐστὶ φοθητέον, a γ᾽ Eo- 
Tat καὶ τῷ δυσμαθεῖ πολλάκις ἐπανιόντι σκοπεῖν - οὔτε 
εἰ μακρά, ὠφέλιμα δέ, διὰ ταῦτα λόγον οὐδαμῆ ἔχει, οὐδὲ 
ὕσιον ἔμοιγε εἷναι φαίνεται τὸ μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν τούτοις τοῖς 
λόγοις πάντα ἄνδρα κατὰ δύναμιν. 

MET. "Ἄριστα, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ χέγειν Κλεινίας. 

ΑΘ. Kai μάλα γε, ὦ Μέγιλλε - ποιητέον τε ὡς λέγει. 
This, however, must be rendered as though it were κεκτημένα, if, 
indeed, this is not the true reading. 

13. περὶ μέθης. This refers to discussions in the first and third 
books of this treatise, which had been continued at great length. 

14. περιμένω, “ to linger around a subject—to wait one’s own lei- 
sure.” ὑπομένω, ‘to endure, to wait with patience.” After ὑπομε- 
νοῦμεν supply περιμένειν, thus: ody ὑπομενοῦμεν περιμένειν, ‘ shall 
we not endure to wait?” or, taken adverbially, “shall we not wait 
patiently ?” There is evidently a case of paronomasia, or play upon 
words here. 

15. ἠρεμεῖ. ‘* Are altogether silent.” Compare this with the myth 
respecting the God Theuth in.the Phedrus, 275, D., where oral in- 
struction is commended, as better than that of books, and doubts 
are suggested, whether, after all, the art of writing has been of real 
service to mankind : ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον (γραφή) Cwypagia: καὶ γὰρ τὰ 
ἐκείνης ἕστηκεν μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀνέρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ. ταὐτὸν 
δὲ καὶ ἡ γραφή. ἐάν τι ἔρῃ βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἕν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταὐ- 
τὸν ἀεί. καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ γε καὶ un: πλημμελούμενος δὲ 
καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λοιδορηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ. αὐτὸς γὰρ 
οὔτ᾽ ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὑτῷ. In the Gorgias, 525, B., 
this term ἠρεμεῖ is applied, in a somewhat different manner from 
this, to the victorious party or argument that holds its gronnd in 
quietness, after the rest have been silenced: ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις 
TOV ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος. 

1. ἐπανιόντι. Like a gerund, “ Sepius animo agitando.”’ 


B2 


18 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


καὶ yap εἰ μὴ κατεσπαρμένοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἐν 
τοῖς πᾶσιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τῶν 
᾿ ἐπαμυνούντων λόγων ὡς εἰσὶ ϑεοί + νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη. νόμοις 
οὖν διαφθειρομένοις τοῖς μεγίστοις ὑπὸ κακῶν ἀνθρώπων. 
τίνα καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκει βοηθεῖν ἢ νομοθέτην ; 

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν. 

ΑΘ. ᾿Αλλὰ δὴ λέγε μοι πάλιν Κλεινία, καὶ σύ. κοινω.- 
νὸν γὰρ δεῖ σε εἷναι τῶν λόγων. κινδυνεύει" γὰρ 6 λέγων 
ταῦτα, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι 
τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, 
ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον. ἔοικε δὲ οὐ κινδυνεύειν ἀλλὰ 
ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ. 

KA. Πάνν μὲν οὖν. 

ΑΘ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν, πρὸς Διὸς οἷον πηγήν τινα ἀνοήτον δόξης 
ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων ὁπόσοι πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως 
ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων ; σκόπει, πάντα λόγον ἐξετάζων. οὐ 
yap δὴ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν λόγων ἁπτόμε- 
vot ἀσεθῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες, μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτα οὕ- 
τως ἔχειν. 

KA. Εῤ λέγεις ' ἀλλ᾽ ὅπη, πειρῶ φράζειν. 

ΑΘ. Ἔοικε τοίνυν ἀηθεστέρων ἁπτέον" εἶναι λόγων. 


2. κινδυνεύει. The primary sense of this word is “to be in dan- 
ger ;”’ the secondary and quite as frequent sense is ‘‘to seem.” The 
connexion between them is not obvious. In its secondary meaning 
it is not synonymous with doxé, and the primary may be preserved 
with tolerable distinctness in many of those places in which it is ren- 
dered ‘to seem.” As, for example, in this passage,—‘“ ventures to 
regard,” or “is in danger of regarding.” It implies that the senti- 
ment is a bold one, and one which, probably, he would not adopt, if 
he could trace all the consequences of this dogma, viz., ‘‘ that fire, 
and water, and earth, and air, were the first of all things.” In con- 
firmation of this view, compare what follows a few lines below : οὐ 
yap δὴ σμικρόν ye τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν λόγων ἁπτόμενοι ἀσέθων, 
“ for it would make no small difference if they should appear,” &c 
This sense of κινδυνεύω is quite a favourite with Plato. 

3. édpyovrec—auspicantes—qui allis auctores sunt. 

4. anfeorépwv. See Note XVI., App. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 19 


KA. Οὐκ ὀκνητέον, ὦ ξένε. μανθάνω γὰρ ὡς νομοθεσίας 
ἐκτὸς οἰῆσῃ βαίνειν, ἐὰν τῶν τοιούτων ἁπτώμεθα λόγων. 
εἰ δέ ἐστι μηδαμῆ ἑτέρως συμφωνῆσαι τοῖς νῦν κωτὰ νόμον 
λεγομένοις ϑεοῖς ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχουσιν ἢ ταύτῃ, λεκτέον, @ 
ϑαυμάσιε, καὶ ταύτῃ. 

ΑΘ. Λέγοιμ᾽ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἤδη σχεδὸν οὐκ εἰωθότα λό- 
γον τινὰ τόνδε. ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον 
ἁπάντων, τοῦτο OV πρῶτον ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἷ- 
val γεγονὸς οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεθῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λό- 
you*® ὃ δὲ ὕστερον, πρότερον. ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ ϑεῶν 
τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας. ° 

KA. Οὔπω μανθάνω. 

ΑΘ. Ψυχήν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλί- 
you ξύμπαντες οἷόν τε ὃν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει" 
τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι, καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώ- 
τοις ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν" πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μετα- 
θολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἁπάσης ἄρχει παντὸς 
μᾶλλον. εἰ δὲ ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως, ἄρα οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ 
ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι 
προσηκόντων, οὔσης ταύτης πρεσθυτέρας ἢ σώματος ; 

ΚΛ. ᾿Ανάγκη. 

ΑΘ. Δόξα δὴ" καὶ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νό- 
μος, σιληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ κούφων πρότε- 
ρα ἂν εἴη καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξ- 

5. συμφωνῆσαι. Plato was very fond of metaphorical expressions 
derived from the science of music. Similar terms in similar con- 
nexions are found throughout all the dialogues, such as ovvddevy, 
ovvwodn, ἐπάδειν, ἐπῳδῇ, &C. 

6. οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεθῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι, “ Which render 
the soul of the impious what it is.” Equivalent to this other ex- 
pression, ἀπεργασάμενοι τὴν τῆς αὐτῶν ψυχῆς ἀσέθειαν. 

7. ὃ δὲ ὕστερον (ἀπεφήναντο) πρότερον. They are guilty of the 
fault which logicians style hysteron proteron, that is, putting the ef- 
fect for the cause, and the cause for the effect ; which they did, in 
making τέχνη posterior to φύσις and τύχη. 

8, 9. σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν. See Note XVII., App. 


20 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


εἰς, τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο, ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις " τὰ δὲ φύσει 
καὶ φύσις (ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν αὐτὸ" " τοῦτο) ὕσ- 
τερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ. 

KAS Tac; 

ΑΘ. Οὐκ ὀρθῶς φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν 
περὶ τὰ πρῶτα. εἰ δὲ φανήσεται ψυχὴ πρῶτον, οὐ πῦρ οὐδὲ 
ἀήρ, ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἐν πρώτοις γεγενημένη, σχεδὸν" ὀρθότατα 
λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν εἷναι. διαφερόντως, ὅτε φύσει," ταῦτ᾽ ἔσθ᾽ οὕτως 
ἔχοντα, ἂν ψυχήν τις ἐπιδείξῃ πρεσθυτέραν οὖσαν σώμα- 
τος, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς. 

. ΚΛ. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. ) 

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο στελλώ- 
μεθα; 

KA. Té qv; 

ΑΘ. Φυλάττωμεν δὴ παντάπασιν ἀπατηλὸν λόγον, μή 


10. αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ‘which they incorrectly call this, very thing,” 
namely, ‘ this first thing, which we call ψυχῆ, they call φύσις." to- 
τερα καὶ, &c., ‘ Nature and its works would be posterior to.and ruled 
by art and reason, or mind.” 

11. σχεδὸν, here, does not. qualify ὀρθότατα, but. Aéyorro,—* it might 

almost be said with the highest. degree of correctness,”’. . It, in fact, 
renders. the whole declaration stronger instead of weakening it... It 
seems. to be often used as a sort. of apology for a bold expression, 
and thus, instead of diminishing or. impairing its force, as the com- 
mon rendering (almost) would imply, it has. directly the contrary 
effect. ; 
12. φύσει. ‘‘It.might then be said. with the highest degree.of cor- 
rectness, that these things are thus by nature, if any one should show 
that soul is older than body, but otherwise not.” Plato seems some- 
how to have changed the sense of the word upon the atheist. He 
evidently here makes φύσις the same with the truth of things, what- 
ever that mav be, and, therefore, if soul is.o.der than body, then in 
the highest sense may this be said to be the order of nature. If any 
should regard it as a mere play upon words, it certainly should be 
deemed pardonable in.a contest with those whose whole strength 
consists in the dexterous use of such words, as τύχη, φύσις, chance, 
nature, &¢. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 9] 


mn πρεσθύτας ἡμᾶς ὄντας νεοπρεπὴς ὧν παραπείσῃ, καὶ δι- 
αφυγὼν καταγελάστους ποιήσῃ" καὶ δόξωμεν, μείζονα ἐπι- 
θαλλόμενοι," καὶ τῶν σμικρῶν ἀποτυχεῖν. σκοπεῖτε οὖν, 
καθάπερ εἰ" ποταμὸν ἡμᾶς ἔδει τρεῖς ὄντας διαθαίνειν pé- 
ovta σφόδρα, νεώτατος δ᾽ ἐγὼ τυγχάνων ὑμῶν καὶ πολλῶν 
ἔμπειρος ῥευμάτων, εἶπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρῆναι πειραθῆ- 
ναι κατ᾽ ἐμαυτόν, καταλιπόντα ὑμᾶς ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ, σκέψασ- 
θαι εἰ διαθατός ἐστι πρεσθυτέροις οὖσι καὶ ὑμῖν, ἢ πῶς 
ἔχει, καὶ φανέντος μὲν ταύτῃ, καλεῖν ὑμᾶς τότε καὶ συν- 
διαθιθάξειν ἐμπειρίᾳ, εἰ δὲ ἄθατος ἦν ὡς ὑμῖν, ἐν ἐμοὶ τὸν 
κίνδυνον γεγονέναι " μετρίως ἂν ἐδόκουν λέγειν. καὶ δὴ 
καὶ νῦν ὁ μέλλων ἐστὶ λόγος σφοδρότερος, καὶ σχεδὸν ἴσως 


18. ἐπιθαλλόμενοι. “Lest, aiming at things too great, we should 
fail even of the small.” 


14. καθάπερ εἰ. The common reading is εἰ καθάπερ. We have 
ventured to make the change from the exigency of the place, and’on 
the authority of Stephanus; ‘as if we three had to cross a violent- 
ly-flowing river.”—See Note XVIII., App. 


15. πειραθῆναι. Whenever a verb is used only in the middle 
voice to the entire exclusion of the active, or when the middle is the 
predominant form—or when the active has a causal signification, 
thus giving rise to what in the middle is seemingly an independent 
sense—in all such cases, the passive aorists and passive perfect do 
not denote the receiving of an action, or, in other words, are not the 
passive of the active, even when it is in use, but are strictly middle 
tenses. Thus, πειράω, “to tempt another ;” πειράομαι, “to tempt 
one’s self, or to attempt, to try ;” πειραθῆναι, not to be tempted, but 
“to attempt, or try ;” same as the middle. So, also, πλάζω, “to 
cause to wander ;” πλάζομαι, “‘ to wander ;” πλαγχθῆναι, not “to be 
made to wander,”’ but to wander ; same as the middle. Such cases 
are very frequent in Greek. Nothing seems to us to be gained by 
calling them deponent, a term which would seem to belong peculiarly 
to the Latin where there is no middle form, except as it is supplied 
by the passive. In Greek no good reason can be assigned why such 
verbs should be regarded as essentially different from others of the 
middle voice. This peculiarity does certainly exist in cases where 
there is an actual middle beyond all doubt, as shown in the use both 
of the middle and passive aorists with the same sense. 


2: CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ἄθατος" ὡς τῇ σφῷν ῥώμῃ" μὴ δὴ σκοτοδινίαν ἴλιγγόν" TE 
ὑμῖν ἐμποιήῆσῃ, παραφερόμενός" τε καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἀήθεις ὄντας 
ἀποκρίσεων, εἶτ᾽ ἀσχημοσύνην ἀπρέπειάν τε ἐντέκῃ ἀηδῆ, 
δοκεῖ δή μοι χρῆναι ποιεῖν οὑτωσὶ τανῦν ἐμέ ἀνερωτᾷν 
πρῶτον ἐμαυτὸν ἀκουόντων ὑμῶν ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ, καὶ μετὰ 
ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι πάλιν ἐμέ: καὶ τὸν λόγον ἅπαντα 
οὕτω διεξελθεῖν, ἄχριπερ ἂν ψυχῆς πέρι διαπεράνηται, καὶ 
δείξῃ πρότερον ὃν ψυχὴν σώματος. 

KA. "Αριστ᾽, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖς ἡμῖν εἰρηκέναι " ποίει τε ὡς 
λέγεις. 

ΑΘ. "Aye δή," ϑεὸν εἴποτε παρακλητέον ἡμῖν, νῦν ἔστω 
τοῦτο οὕτω γενόμενον - ἐπί γε ἀπόδειξιν ὡς εἰσὶ THY αὖ- 


1. σχεδὸν ἴσως ἄθατος. See page 20,11. Here also, σχεδὸν, instead 
of impairing, increases the force of the expression, and may be re- 
garded as an apology for not using a stronger term. ‘ We might 
almost say d6aroc,” ὅτ. 

2. σχοτοδινίαν ἴλιγγόν τε ὑμῖν ἐμποιήσῃ. These are favourite terms 
with Plato to express that state of intellectual dizziness with which 
the soul approaches the contemplation of those great truths, which 
may be regarded as the ἀρχαὶ or foundations of all others. Compare 
the language used in the beginning of the seventh book of the Repub- 
lic, as applied to those who are supposed suddenly to emerge from the 
dark cave of error and phenomena into the upper world of light and 
truth. Compare, also, the Gorgias, 527, A.; Thezxtetus, 155; Ὁ. 
That this language was common with Socrates himself, and that 
Plato in this, as well as in almost everything else, truly represents 
his peculiarities, not only of reasoning, but of style, may be inferred 
from the manner in which Aristophanes joins together these two 
terms in evident allusion to Socrates, whose philosophy and favourite 
modes of speech he omits no opportunity to ridicule, not only in the 
Clouds, but also in many places of his other comedies. Vide the 
Acharnenses, 1218. 

ἰλιγγιῶ Kapa λίθῳ πεπληγμένος, 
καὶ σκοτοδινιῶ. 

3. παραφερόμενος. In this word the metaphor of the rushing 
stream is still sustained, although, in a critical point of view, it is 
rather awkwardly dropped in ἐρωτῶν. λόγος is to be supplied for 
both. See Note XVIII., App. . 

4. See Note XIX., App. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 23 


τῶν, σπουδῇ πάσῃ" παρακεκλήσθων. ἐχόμενοι δὲ ὥς τινος 
ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος, ἐπιθαίνωμεν εἰς τὸν νῦν λόγον. καί 
μοι ἐλεγχομένῳΐ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐρωτήσεσι τοιαῖσδε ἀσ- 
φαλέστατα ἀποκρίνεσθαι" φαίνεται. Kata δέ, ὦ ξένε, ὃπό- 
ταν φῇ τις, ἄρα ἕστηκε μὲν πάντα, κινεῖται δὲ οὐδέν ; ἢ 
τούτῳ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ; ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ 
μένει ; Τὰ μὲν κινεῖταί tov,” φήσω, τὰ δὲ μένει. Μῶν οὖν 
οὐκ ἐν χώρᾳ τινὶ τά τε ἑστῶτα ἕστηκε, καὶ τὰ κινούμενα 
κινεῖται ;* Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ; Kat τὰ μέν γε ἐν μιᾷ ἕδρᾳ ποὺ ἂν 

5. See Note XIX., App. 

6. ἐχόμενοι δὲ ὥς τινος ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος. ““ Holding fast as by 
some sure cable.” There is still preserved here the metaphor of 
the dangerous flood, and there can be no doubt, that by this sure 
cable is meant that Divine strength and guidance for which he had 
just prayed. See Notes XVIII. and XIX., App. 

7. ἐλεγχομένῳ. This word is generally rendered “refuted,” or 
“convicted of error.’’ It here, however, means simply ‘engaged 
in an argument.”’ It is thus frequently used in the Gorgias and 
elsewhere. 

8. ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ‘to take the part of respondent” as well as that 
of interrogator. Κάτα dé.—See Note XX., App. 

9. ἕστηκε μὲν πάντα. See Note XX., App. 

i9. πουι This particle, of so frequent use in the Platonic dia- 
logues, in its primary sense implies doubt or hesitation, and is, there- 
fore, generally said to take away from the positiveness of a declara- 
tion, in a manner directly the opposite of δ). It is, however, often 
employed, when nothing of this kind is really intended, but only an 
appearance of it, in those familiarities of the colloquial style, to which 
this particle is so admirably adapted. It is a term of courtesy, by 
which the speaker, to avoid being thought dogmatic or positive, ap- 
peals to the other party for his assent, without, however, intending 
any doubt of the proposition advanced. If connected here with 
φήσω, it should be rendered, ‘‘I will say, shall I not?” Or if with 
κινεῖται, it comes nearly to the same thing, ‘‘some things move, do 
they not 2?” 

11. ἑστῶτα ἕστηκε. .. . κινούμενα κινεῖται. Perhaps a better ex- 
ample could not be found in Greek to illustrate the essential differ- 
snce between the present and the perfect. From its very nature 
whe idea of resf is finished and complete, and is therefore denoted 


24 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


τοῦτο δρῴη, Ta δὲ, ἐν πλείοσι. Ta τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων" ἐν 
μέσῳ λαμθάνοντα δύναμιν λέγεις, φήσομεν, ἐν ἑνὶ κινεῖσ- 
θαι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἑστάναι λεγομένων κύκλων στρέφεται 
περιφορά; Ναί. Μανθάνομεν δέ γε ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ περιφο- 
pa τὸν μέγιστον καὶ τὸν σμικρότατον κύκλον ἅμα περιά- 
γουσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις, ἀνὰ λόγον" ἑαυτὴν διανέμει σμιιε- 
ροῖς τε καὶ μείζοσιν, ἐλάττων τε οὖσα καὶ πλείων κατὰ 
λόγον. διὸ δὴ τῶν ϑαυμαστῶν ἁπάντων πηγὴ γέγονεν, 
ἅμα μεγάλοις καὶ σμικροῖς κύκλοις βραδυτῆτάς τε καὶ τάχη 
ὁμολογούμενα," πορεύουσα, ἀδύνατον ὡς ἄν τις ἐλπίσειε 
γίγνεσθαι πάθος. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. τὰ δέ γε κινούμενα 
ἐν πολλοῖς" φαίνῃ μοι λέγειν, ὅσα φορᾷ κινεῖται μεταθαί- 
νοντῶ εἰς ἕτερον ἀεὶ τόπον - καὶ τοτὲ μὲν, ἔστιν ὅτε βάσιν 
ἑνὸς κεκτημένα τινὸς κέντρου, τοτὲ δὲ πλείονα, τῷ περι- 
κυλινδεῖσθαι. προστυγχάνοντα" δ᾽ ἑκάστοτε ἑκάστοις, τοῖς 


by the latter tense. Motion, on the other hand, is necessarily 
continued or incomplete action, and is therefore expressed by the 
present. Such verbs, however, as παύω, παύομαι, λήγω, do not so 
much express positive rest, as a ceasing of previous action, which, 
being a continuous idea, admits of a present form. 

12. Ta τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων. ‘ You mean, then, we will reply (to our 
imaginary interlocutor) that those which receive the faculty or prop 
erty (δύναμιν) of things at rest in the centre (another mode of say 
mg, the property of being at rest, &c.) move in one, just like the 
revolutions of those wheels that are said to stand.’? Another, and 
perhaps a better way would be to take μέσῳ with λαμόάνοντα, in 
stead of ἑστώτων, after this order, τὰ ἔν μέσῳ λαμθάνοντα τὴν τῶν 
ἑστώτων δύναμιν. Ficinus renders —queé in medio stare possunt 

13. See Note XXI., App. 

14. See Note XXII., App. 

15. ὁμολογούμενα, to be taken adverbially for ὁμολογουμένως. 
Adtvatov ... πάθος, “ἃ state of things (7a@oc) which, as one would 
expect, could not possibly take place.”’ ats ata 

1. ἐν πολλδις, the opposite of ἐν évi. ‘On many centres of mo- 
tion.” Or rolling on a plane, instead of revolving on a fixed point, 
such as Sextus Empiricus styles τοπικὴν petabaow. Sext. Emp., 
Pyrrh. Hypot., iii., 8 and 64. 3 

2. προστυγχάνοντα. ‘As they meet continually With individual 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 95 


ἑστῶσι μὲν διασχίζεται, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἐξ ἐναντίας ἀπαν- 
τῶσι Kal φερομένοις εἰς ἕν γιγνόμενα μέσα τε καὶ μεταξὺ 
τῶν τοιούτων συγκρίνεται. λέγω γὰρ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως 
. ἔχοντα wc σὺ λέγεις. καὶ μὴν καὶ συγκρινόμενα μὲν αὐξά- 
veTat, διακρινόμενα δὲ φθίνει" τότε ὅταν ἡ καθεστηκυῖα 
ἑκάστων ἕξις διαμένῃ - μὴ μενούσης δὲ αὐτῆς, δι’ ἀμφότερα 
ἀπόλλυται. γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἡνίκ᾽ ἄν τί πά- 
θος ἡ ; δῆλον ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαθοῦσα αὔξην," εἰς τὴν δευ- 
τέραν ἔλθῃ μετάθασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης, εἰς τὴν πλησίον, 
καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα, αἴσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις. 
μεταθάλλον μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ μετακινούμενον γίγνεται 
πᾶν. ἔστι δὲ ὄντως ὄν, ὁπόταν μένῃ" μεταθαλὸν δὲ εἰς 
ἄλλην ἕξιν, διέφθαρται παντελῶς. ἄρ᾽ οὖν κινήσεις πάσας 
εἰρήκαμεν ὡς ἐν εἴδεσι λαθεῖν μετ’ ἀριθμοῦ, πλήν γε, ὦ φί- 
λοι, δνοῖν ; 

KA. Ποίαιν 07 ; 

ΑΘ. Σχεδόν, ὦ ᾽γαθέ, Exeivaty, ὧν ἕνεκα πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἐσ- 
τὶν ἡ σκέψις τανῦν. 

KA. Λέγε σρῥδαπθβον 

ΑΘ. Ψυχῆς ἦν ἕνεκά που; 

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 

ΑΘ. Ἔστω τοίνυν ἡ μὲν oe δυναμένη" κινεῖν κίνησις, 
ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἀδυνατοῦσα αἰεὶ μία τις " ἡ δ᾽ ἑαυτῆν τ᾽ αἰεὶ 
καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη κατά τε αυγκρίσεις" ἔν τε διακρίσεσιν, 
αὔξαις τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ γενέσεσι καὶ φθοραῖς, ἄλλη 
UL τις αὖ τῶν πασῶν κινήσεων. 

ΚΛ. Ἔστω γὰρ οὖν. 
opposing objects, by those that stand they are divided, while with 
others that meet them (being borne from opposite directions) they 


unite, so that the centres and intervening parts come together into 
one.” 

3, 4, 5. See Note XXIII., App. 

6. See Note XXIV., App. 

7. διέφθαρται. ‘It is utterly destroyed,” that is, ‘the thing which 
before was, no longer is.” See Notes XXIII. and XXIV., App., on 
the words φθίσις, αὔξησις, φθορὰ, εἰμὶ, and γίγνομαι. 

8.9. See Note XXV., App. 





( 


26 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἕτερον ἀεὶ κινοῦσαν, Kai μεταθαλ- 
λομένην ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου, ϑήσομεν ἐνάτην. av,'® τήν τε ἑαυτὴν 
κινοῦσαν καὶ ἕτερα, ἐναρμόττουσαν πᾶσι μὲν ποιήμασι, 
πᾶσι δὲ παθήμασι, καλουμένην δὲ ὄντως τῶν ὄντων πάν-. 
τῶν μεταθολὴν καὶ κίνησιν, ταύτην δὲ δεκάτην σχεδὸν 
ἐροῦμεν. 

ΚΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 

ΑΘ. Τῶν δὴ δέκα μάλιστα ἡμῖν κινήσεων τίνα προκρί- 
ναιμεν" ὀρθότατα πασῶν ἐῤῥωμενεστάτην"" τε εἶναι καὶ 
πρακτικὴν διαφερόντως ; 

ΚΛ. Μυρίῳ"" ἀνάγκη που φάναι διαφέρειν τὴν αὑτὴν 
δυναμένην κινεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πάσας, ὑστέρας. 

ΑΘ. Ev λέγεις. ap’ οὖν ἡμῖν τῶν νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ῥηθέν- 
των μεταθετέον"" ἕν ἢ καὶ δύο; 

KA. Ποῖα φής; 

ΑΘ. Τὸ τῆς δεκάτης ῥηθὲν σχεδὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται. 

KA. Πῆ; 

ΑΘ. Πρῶτον" γενέσει. τέ ἐστι καὶ ῥώμῃ, κατὰ λόγον" 
τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔχομεν τούτου δεύτερον, ἄρτι ῥηθὲν ἀτό- 
πως ἔνατον. 

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις ; 

ΑΘ, Ὧδε. ὅταν ἕτερον ἄλλο ἡμῖν μεταθάλῃ, καὶ τοῦτο 
ἄλλο ἕτερον ἀεί, τῶν τοιούτων ἄρα ἔσται ποτέ TL πρῶτον 
μεταθάλλον ; καὶ πῶς, ὅταν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου κινῆται, τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται 

10. See Note XXV., App. 

11. τίνα προκρίναιμεν. This is the common reading. It is evi- 
dent, however, that ἂν should be supplied. 


12. See Note XX VI., App. | | 
13. μυρίῳ. Hyperbolical measure-of excess... “ΒΥ ten thousand 
times.”’ : 

14. μεταθετέον. ‘Must we change the order in one or two par- 
ticulars ?” 

15. πρῶτον. The meaning of this is, that what was last or tenth 
in the order of the previous investigation, becomes first in the order 
of nature and in the degree of importance ; and that which we be 
fore wrongly called the ninth, becomes now the second. See Notes 
XXV. and XXVI., App. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 97 


ποτὲ τῶν ἀλλοιούντων πρῶτον, ἀδύνατον γάρ. ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν 
ἄρα αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῆσαν ἕτερον ἀλλοιώσῃ, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον ἄλ- 
λο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ χίλια ἐπὶ μυρίοις γίγνηται τὰ κινηθέντα, 
μῶν ἀρχή τις αὐτῶν ἔσται τῆς κινήσεως ἁπάσης ἄλλη, 
πλὴν ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς αὑτὴν κινησάσης μεταθολῆ ; 

KA. Κάλλιστα εἶπες " συγχωρητέα τε τούτοις. 

ΑΘ. "Ere δὴ καὶ τόδε εἴπωμεν, καὶ ἀποκρινώμεθα πάλι» 
ἡμῖν αὑτοῖσιν. εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα, κα- 
θάπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίν᾽ ἄρα 
ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων ; 

KA. Τὴν αὑτὴν δή που κινοῦσαν. ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου yap ov μή- 
ποτε ἔμπροσθεν μεταπέσῃ, μηδεμιᾶς γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης 
ἔμπροσθεν μεταπτώσεως. 

ΑΘ. ᾽Αρχὴν ἄρα' κινήσεων πασῶν καὶ πρώτην ἔν τε ἑσ- 
τῶσι γενομένην καὶ ἐν κινουμένοις οὖσαν τὴν αὑτὴν κινοῦ- 
σαν, φήσομεν ἀναγκαίως εἷναι πρεσθυτάτην καὶ κρατίστην 
eh πασῶν" τὴν δὲ ἀλλοιουμένην ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου, KLVOV- 
σαϊδοὲ ἕ ἕτερα, δευτέραν. 

ΚΛ. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. 

ΑΘ. Ὁπότε δὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν τοῦ λόγου, τόδε 
ἀποκρινώμεθα. 

KA. Τὸ ποῖον ; 

ΑΘ. Ἐλδν ἴδωμέν που ταύτην" γενομένην ἐν τῷ γηΐνῳ, 
ἢ ἐνύδρῳ, ἢ πυροειδεῖ, κεχωρισμένῳ ἢ καὶ ξυμμιγεῖ, τί ποτε 
φήσομεν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθος εἶναι ; 

ΚΛ. Μῶν apa με ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ζῇν" αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν ὅταν 
αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῇ ; 

1. ἀρχὴν ἄρα κινήσεων. ‘Seeing, then, that it is the principle of 
all motions, the first among things that stand, and being self-mo- 
ving among things that move, we will say that it is the oldest and 
strongest,” ὅσο. 

2. ἐνταῦθα λόγου. “In this part of our argument.’”’ Compare 
such expressions as ποῦ Lith γῆς----εἰς τόδ᾽ ἀπορίας---ἶν᾽ el κακοῦ---- 


ὡς ὀργῆς ἔχω. 
9. ταύτην.- Supply κίνησιν. 
4. ζῇν προσεροῦμεν ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῇ ; ‘Shall we call it life (or 


‘ott CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ΑΘ. Nai, ζῇν. 

KA. Πῶς γὰρ ov; 

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; ὁπόταν ψυχὴν ἔν τισιν ὁρῶμεν, μῶν ἄλλο ἢ 
ταὐτὸν τούτῳ ζῇν ὁμολογητέον ; 

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλο. 

ΑΘ. Ἔχε δὴ" πρὸς Διός " ap’ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκασ- 
τον τρία νοεῖν ; 

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; 

ΑΘ. “Ev μὲν, τὴν οὐσίαν “ ὃν δὲ, τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον " 
ἕν δὲ, ὄνομα. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτήσεις εἷναι περὶ τὸ ὃν ἅπαν 
δύο. 

ΚΛ. Πῶς δύο; 

ΑΘ. Τοτὲ μὲν" ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοὔνομα προτεινόμενον 
αὐτὸ, τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν " τοτὲ δὲ τὸν λόγον προτεινόμε- 
νον, ἐρωτᾷν αὖ τοὔνομα. apa γε τὸ τοιόνδε αὖ βουλόμεθα 
νῦν λέγειν ; 

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


to live) when a thing itself moves itself?” Caw, to live, and Bo, to 


boil, to bubble, Pa bubble up, are unquestionably of the same radical 
idea. Effervescence or fermentation from the action of heat, taking 
place in matter otherwise apparently motionless, would be the phe- 
nomenon which of all others would most readily suggest to the 
primitive mind the idea of self-motion, and would thus be taken as a 
symbol of /2fe. 

δ. Ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός. ‘‘ Hold there by Jove.” An important posi- 
tion is gained. Let us secure it, and then advance to another view 
of the subject. Compare Gorgias, 490, A. The usual rendering ot 
this phrase, age dum, does not seem to us to give its peculiar sig- 
nificance. : ῥὰ 

6. ἕν μὲν, τὴν οὐσίαν, kK. τ. Δ. . One thing the essence, one the 
λόγος or reason of the essence, and one the name.” See Note 
XXVII., App. | en (23 

7. καὶ δὴ καὶ. This phrase generally denotes an application of a 
preceding proposition. ‘And accordingly, respecting every such 
essence, there must be always two questions.” eR 

8. τοτὲ μὲν. ὩΣ τοτὲ δὲς “Αἴ οη6 time, the name being present: 
ed, we demand the λόγος, reason or definition ; at another time, the 
λόγος or reason being given, we ask the name.” 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 29 


AO. Ἔστι που δίχα διαιρούμενον" ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν 
ἀριθμῷ. τούτῳ δὴ τῷ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν, ὄνομα μὲν, ἄρτιον " λό 
γος δὲ, ἀριθμὸς διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη. 

KAS Nat: 

ΑΘ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω. μῶν οὖν ob ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως 
προσαγορεύομεν,," ἄν τε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι, τοὔνομα 
ἀποδιδῶμεν, ἄν τε τοὔνομα, τὸν λόγον ἄρτιον ὀνόματι, 
καὶ λόγῳ, δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμὸν προσαγορεύοντες, 
ταὐτὸν ὄν ; 

KA. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 

ΑΘ. Ὧι δὴ ψυχὴ" τοὔνομα, τίς τούτον λόγος ; ἔχομεν 





9. δίχα διαιρούμενον. This may be taken impersonally. ‘It is 
divided into two,” or generally, ‘* there is or there may be this divis- 
ion into two, both in other things and also in respect to number.” 
τούτῳ δὴ. ‘To this thing, that is, this division’—r@ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν, 
‘‘namely, that which has respect to number, the NAME (ὄνομαν is 
ἄρτιον ; but the λόγος (notion, reason, or definition) is a number di- 
visible into two equal parts.” And this is the λόγος or notion given 
in the eighth book of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, in these very 
words. 

10. μῶν οὖν ov ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν. ‘The whole pas- 
sage may be thus freely rendered : ‘“‘ Do we not in both respects sub- 
stantially predicate the same, if, being asked in respect to the notion, 
we give the name (of the thing of which it is the notion), and being 
asked in respect to the name, we give the notion (to which the name 
belongs)—predicating of the name as subject, ἄρτιον, and of the 
notion as subject, a number divided, &c., being substantially the 
same.’ After all, there seems no little confusion in the sentence. 
The two questions may be thus stated: 1st. What is the name of 
that whose notion is a number divided, &c.? To this the answer is 
ἄρτιον. “4. What is the notion of that whose name is ἄρτιον or 
even? ΤῸ this the answer is ἀριθμὸς εἰς toa δύο μέρη διαιρούμενος--- 
a number divided or divisible, &c. We have placed a comma after 
ὀνόματι, although differing in this respect from the editions of Bekket 
and Ast. The following seems to us to be the order of the lattet 
part : mpocayapevovtec ΟΡ Ὁ ἄρτιον, Kat (προσαγορεύοντες) λόγῳ, 
δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμόν, ταὐτὸν ὄν (ἐν se ἀπ προσαγορευόμενον). 
See Note XXVIIL., App. 

11. See Note X XVIII., App. 

C2 


30 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν viv δὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν 
αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν ; - 

KA. Τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν" " φὴς ΡΝ ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσί- 
av ἥνπερ τοὔνομα ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν ; 

ΑΘ. Φημί γε. εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἄρα ἔτι πο- 
Govpev’® μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὃν καὶ τὴν 
πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν TE ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων 
καὶ ἐσομένων, καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις ; ἐπει- 
δή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταθολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἁπάσης αἰτία 
ἅπασιν ; 

KA. Οὔκ" ἀλλὰ ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάν- 
τῶν πρεσθυτάτη, γενομένη TE ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. 

ΑΘ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐχ ἡ δι᾽ ἕτερον" ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένη κί- 
νησις, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν αὑτῷ μηδέποτε παρέχουσα κινεῖσθαι μη- 
δὲν, δευτέρα τε καὶ ὁπόσων ἀριθμῶν βούλοιτο ἄν τις ἀριθ. 
μεῖν αὐτὴν πολλοστήν," τοσούτων, σώματος οὖσα ὄντως 
ἀψύχου μεταθολῆ ; 

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς. 

ΑΘ. ᾿Ορθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελεώτα- 
τα εἰρηκότες ἂν εἴμεν' ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώ- 


12. See Note XXVIII., App. 

13. dpa ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι. οθοῦμεν pregnantem 
sensum habet, est enim: num quid adhuc desideramus (existimantes) 
non satis demonstratum esse, g-c.—Ast. We see no necessity for this 
explanation of Ast, but would prefer directly connecting ποθοῦμεν 
with δεδεῖχθαι, without resorting to any ellipsis or pregnant con- 
struction. ‘Do we yet feel the want of its being sufficiently 
shown,’’ ἄς. M7 here occurs in the usual manner, and with the 
usual force which it has after verbs containing in themselves the 
sense of a negative either expressed or implied, such as those of for- 
bidding, preventing, want, &c.; and in such cases it is not to be 
rendered by itself, but regarded as strengthening the quasi deniai of 
the governing word. Tofoduev may be ranked in this class, and, al- 
although a verb of want or desire, invariably takes an accusative, - 

14. See Note XXIX., App. 

15. πολλοστὴν. For remarks on this word, see Note XXIX., App. 

1. εἶμεν. The common reading is ἦμεν, but as the optative is clear- 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 31 


ματος ἡμῖν " σῶμα δὲ, δεύτερόν TE Kal ὕστερον ψυχῆς ἀρ- 
χούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν. 

ΚΛ. ᾿Αληθέστατα μὲν οὗν. 

ΑΘ. Μεμνήμεθά γε μὴν ὁμολογήσαντες ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσ- 
θεν, ὡς εἰ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσθυτέρα σώματος οὗσα, καὶ τὰ 
ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσθύτερα. 

KA. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 

ΑΘ. Τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ 
δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι, πρότερα" μήκους 
σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα 
ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος. 

ΚΛ. ᾿Ανάγκη. 

ΑΘ. "Ap’ οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, τῶν 
τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἷναι ψυχὴν" καὶ τῶν καλῶν καὶ κακῶν 
καὶ αἰσχρῶν, δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων, καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναν- 
τίων ; εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν ϑήσομεν αἰτίαν ; 

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ ov ; 

ΑΘ. Ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν" ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς 
πάντη κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοι- 
μεῖν φάναι ; 

ice Trey: 


ly required, we have with Ast substituted εἶμεν, which is used for 
εἴημεν, the 7 in this form. being often dropped in the dual and 
plural. Κυρίως is a stronger word than ὀρθῶς. It means ‘by au- 
thority—as an established truth—or as something which we may 
now assert with confidence.” 

2. See Note XXX., App. 

3. τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν καλῶν. ‘Soul is the 
cause of the good, and fair, and right.” It is not, however, simply 
the efficient cause regarded objectively, but the very subjective 
ground of their existence, without which they could have no being, 
whether there was a universe of matter or not. Where soul is not, 
there can be no harmony, no beauty, no right, no good. And so, 
also, it not only makes its own paradise, but its own earth, and its 
own hell. Without it there is no discord, no deformity, no evil. 

4. διοικοῦσαν ---- ἐνοικοῦσαν, ‘ pervading — inhabiting — indwell- 
ing.” 


on ᾿ CONTRA ATHEOS. 


AO. Μίαν, ἢ πλείους ;° TlAeiovg: ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῶϊν aro. 
κρινοῦμαι. Δυοῖν" μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς 
τε εὐεργέτιδος, καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι. 

ΚΛ. Ae tg ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας. 

AO. Elev. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ᾽ οὐρανὸν 
καὶ γῆν καὶ ϑάλατταν, ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματά 
ἐστι, βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, 
δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς, ἐψευσμένως " χαίρουσαν, λυπουμένην " 
ϑαῤῥοῦσαν, φοθουμένην " μισοῦσαν, στέργουσαν" καὶ πά- 
cag’ ὅσαι τούτων ξυγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις, τὰς 


5. πλείους. The general sense of the passage is best preserved by 
rendering this word; not many, but more than one. 

6. δυοῖν. See Note XXXI., App., on the Platonic doctrine of the 
evil principle. 

7. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα. Yvy7 is here used collectively as the 
antithesis of matter, for all souls, including the spirits of men and 
angels (or δαίμονες), as well as the Divine soul, which he regards as 
the principium or fountain of the whole genus. The doctrine, that 
even the human soul was older than body, was taught by Plato, yet 
not in the sense in which it is commonly understood. It has, how- 
ever, no necessary connexion with his present argument against the 
atheists. 

8. χαίρουσαν. ‘The sudden change here from the infinitive to the 
participle seems made on purpose for variety. Xaipovoav, however, 
if any should choose so to regard it, may be taken with ψυχὴν as the 
accusative before these infinitives. The order would be thus: αἷς 
ὀνόματά ἐστι (TO) ψυχὴν χαίῤουσαν Avrovuévyy, K. τ. 2. ot 
σκοπεῖσθαι, κ. τ. 2X. 

9. πάσαις, connect with κινήσεσιν αἷς above. Πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις, 
‘first working motions,” viz., those of soul—such as βούλεσθαι 
σκοπεῖσθαι, &c. Δευτερουργοὺς αὖ, “second working motions,” cor- 
responding to order second of motion described some ways back— 
‘second causes,”’ or ‘‘ motions of matter produced by impulse” (ἐξ 
ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο μεταθολὴ). The author has in view the classification 
made page 27, line 16, and also 30, line 15. This we believe to be 
the true sense of the passage, but a glance at the position of the 
participles and infinitives above suggests another division, which, 
although it may not have been intended, is yet most important and 
true. It will be seen that these participles all express feelings of the 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 33 


δευτερουργοὺς av παραλαμθάνουσαι κινήσεις σωμάτων, 
ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, καὶ διάκρισιν καὶ 
σύγκρισιν " καὶ τούτοις ἑπομένας, ϑερμότητας, φύξεις - Ba- 
ρύτητας, κονφότητας " σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακόν - λευκὸν καὶ 
μέλαν + αὐστηρὸν, καὶ γλυκὺ, καὶ πικρόν " καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς" " 
ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν προσλαμθάνουσα αἰεὶ ϑεὸν, ϑεὸς 
οὖσα, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα. ἀνοίᾳ δὲ 
ξυγγενομένη, πάντα αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται. 
τιθῶμεν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ; ἢ ἔτι διστάζομεν εἰ ἑτέρως 
πως ἔχει ; 

ΚΛ. Οὐδαμῶς. 

ΑΘ. Πότερον" οὖν δὴ ψυχῆς γένος ἐγκρατὲς οὐρανοῦ 


moral nature, while the infinitives denote the motions or exercises 
of the intellect. Now the passions or feelings being the most essen- 
tial part of the soul, and that which excites the intellect to action, 
may, in respect to the latter, be styled πρωτουργοὶ (first working), 
just as the exercises of soul generally are πρωτουργοὶ, or first work- 
ang, when compared with the secondary motions of matter. Παραλ- 
aubavovoat, ‘‘taking along with themselves (as co-operatives or 
auxiliaries) the devtepovpyovs κινήσεις σωμάτων," namely, second 
causes, OY the laws of nature. 

10. καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς. ‘Orc, although neuter, refers to the above re- 
cited devrepovpyove κινήσεις of matter. Kai, if judged according to 
the English idiom, would be redundant as a connective. It may, 
however, retain its place as an intensive particle. Kai πᾶσιν οἷς 
is to be rendered as οἷς καὶ πᾶσιν. So Cornarius regards it—quibus 
omnibus si anima, qué Dea est, utitur, &c. Or it may be taken in 
the order of the words, only regarding καὶ as intensive instead of 
connective, so that πᾶσιν is not additional, but only a collective term 
for all the things mentioned before—‘ And all which,” or “ even all 
(those second working motions) which the soul using—itself being 
Divine, and taking along with it that Divine thing vodc—rightly and 
happily guides all things; but when conversant with folly, it ever 
doeth the contrary,’ &c. Θεὸς here, according to a common Pla- 
tonic usage, is equivalent to ϑεῖος. 

11. πότερον οὖν δὴ ψυχῆς γένος, ‘which of the two souls (lately 
mentioned), do we say, has the control of the heavens, &c.—the 
one wise and full of virtue, or the one that hath neither of these 
qualities 2” ° 


ΕΣ 


34 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


καὶ γῆς Kal πάσης τῆς περιόδου γεγονέναι φαμέν ; TO φρό- 
γέμον, καὶ ἀρετῆς πλῆρες ; ἢ τὸ μηδέτερα κεκτημένον ; 
βούλεσθε οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ὧδε ἀποκρινώμεθα ; 

KA. Toe ; 

AO. Ei μέν, ὦ ϑαυμάσιε, φῶμεν, ἡ ξύμπασα οὐρανοῦ ὁδὸς 
ἅμα καὶ φορὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντων ἁπάντων, νοῦ κινή.- 
GEL καὶ περιφορᾷ" καὶ λογὶσμοῖς ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχει, καὶ 
ξυγγενῶς ἔρχεται, δῆλον ὡς τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν φατέον 
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ κόσμου παντός, καὶ ἄγειν αὐτὸν τὴν τοι- 
αύὐτην ὁδὸν ἐκείνην. 

ΚΛ, Ὀρθῶς. 

ΑΘ. Ei δὲ μανικῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔρχεται, τὴν κακήν. 

ΚΛ. Καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς. 

ΑΘ. Τίνα οὖν δὴ νοῦ κίνησις φύσιν Eyer; τοῦτο ἤδη χα- 
λεπόν, ὦ φίλοι, ἐρώτημα ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπεῖν ἐμφρόνως. 
διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ὑμῖν δίκαιον τανῦν προσ- 
λαμθάνειν.᾽" 

KA. Eb λέγεις. 

AO. Μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον" " ἀποθλέπον- 
τες, νύκτα ἐν μεσημθρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπό- 
κρίσιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτὲ ϑνητοῖς ὄμμασιν ὀψόμενοί τε καὶ 
γνωσόμενοι ἱκανῶς - πρὸς δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου βλέ- 
ποντας ἀσφαλέστερον ὁρᾷν. 

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις ; 

ΑΘ. "Hz προσέοικε κινήσει νοῦς," τῶν δέκα ἐκείνων κι- 


12. Νοῦ κινήσει καὶ περιφορᾷ. See Note XXXII., App. 

13. προσλαμθάνειν here has nearly the sense of ξυλλαμθάνειν, “ to 
take part with, to assist you in the answer.” 

14. ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον. Compare with this the similitudes 
in the sixth book of the Republic, intended to illustrate the idea of 
the ἀγαθὸν ; also, the comparison of the dark cave in the beginning 
of the seventh book, and the representation of the demeanour of 
those who, after coming out of its obscurity, are supposed to look 
directly at the sun, without making use of such helps as are furnish- 
ed by the reflections of mirrors and of water. 

15. Ἧι προσέοικε κινήσει νοῦς. ‘Let us take as an image (since 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 35 


νήσεων τὴν εἰκόνα λάθωμεν" ἣν συναναμνησθεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγὼ, 
κοινῇ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ποιήσομαι. 

ΚΛ. Κάλλιστα ἂν λέγοις. 

ΑΘ. Μεμνήμεθα τοίνυν τόγε τοσοῦτον τῶν τότε ἔτι, ὅτι 
τῶν ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μένειν ἔθεμεν. 

ΚΛ. Ναί. 

ΑΘ. Τῶν δ᾽ αὖ κινουμένων τὰ μὲν ἐν Evi τόπῳ κινεῖσ 
θαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν πλείοσι φερόμενα. 

ΚΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. 

ΑΘ. Τούτοιν δὴ τοῖν κινήσεοιν' τὴν ἐν Evi φερομένην 
ἀεὶ περί γέ τι μέσον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι τῶν ἐντόρνων οὗ- 
σον μίμημά τι κύκλων, εἵἷναΐ τε αὐτὴν τῇ τοῦ νοῦ περιόδω 
πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν οἰκειοτάτην τε καὶ ὁμοίαν. 

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις ; 

ΑΘ. Τὸ" κατὰ ταὐτὰ δήπου καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐὖ- 
τῷ, καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτά, καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτά, καὶ ἕνα λόγον καὶ 
τάξιν μίων ἄμφω κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, νοῦν, THY τε ἐν ἑνὶ 
φερομένην κίνησιν, σφαίῥας ἐντόρνου ἀπεικασμέναἥ φοραῖς, 
we cannot look upon νοῦς directly with our mortal vision) that one 
of the ten motions to which mind or reason bears a resemblance.” 
These motions are called seven in the similar place of the Timezus, 
page 34, A. The ancient writers, when treating of physics, all varied 
in the enumeration, and sometimes the same writer varies from him- 
self, as Plato does in this, and in the passage of the Timeus re- 
ferred to. 

1. τούτοιν δὴ τοῖν κινήσεοιν. ‘The Attic connects masculine ad- 
‘iectives and pronouns in the dual, with feminine nouns—a rule, 
however, whieh is not universal. The common reading here has 
τοῖν ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένοιν : also, below, οὐσῶν instead of οὖσαν. Wehave 
made the corrections on the authority of Eusebius, Ficinus, Ste 
phanus, and the Cod. Voss., besides being alsolutely required by the 
exigentia loci. 

2. τὸ delongs to νοῦν κινεῖσθαι, several lines below. 

3. ἀπεικασμένα is neuter, because it refers both to νοῦν and κινήσιν. 
The order of this rather complicated sentence would be as follows: 
λέγοντες (τὸ) νοῦν τήν τε ἐν ἑνὲ φερομένην κινῆσιν, (ἀμφότερα) aret- 
κασμένα φοραῖς ἐντόρνου σφαίρας, κινεῖσθαι κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡπαῦτως, 
“καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ περὶ, ὅτο.... οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανεῖμεν, ὅς. That 


36 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανεῖμεν φαῦλοι δημιουργοὶ λόγῳ καλῶν εἰ 
κόνων. 

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. 

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἥ γε" μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως, μηδὲ κατὰ τὰ 
αὐτά, μηδὲ ἐν ταὐτῷ, μηδὲ περὶ ταὐτά, μηδὲ πρὸς ταὐτὰ 
φερομένη, μηδ᾽ ἐν κόσμῳ, μηδ᾽ ἐν τάξει, μηδὲ ἔν τινι λόγῳ 
κίνησις, ἀνοίας ἂν ἁπάσης εἴη ξυγγενής. 

ΚΛ. Ein γὰρ ἂν ἀληθέστατα. 

ΑΘ. Νῦν δὴ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἔτι διαῤῥήδην" εἰπεῖν, ὡς, 
ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ" 


which is here styled motion in one, is not to be regarded as the same, 
in all respects, with the motion of a sphere, otherwise it would not 
be said to be likened to it. It is rather to be taken as a general 
term, the opposite of motion in many, κίνησις ἐν πολλοῖς, or Motion 
accompanied by change of place. This, then, would be that higher 
species of motion, which, without change in the cause, produces 
motion in other things, itself remaining wholly in one, and is there- 
fore likened to the motion of a sphere,.which of all others presents 
to it the best similitude. It is the tenth of the above-mentioned 
enumeration, or the αὐτοκίνησις of soul. 

4. οὐκοῦν av ἥ ye. See Note XXXIII., App. 4 

δ. διαῤῥήδην. The way is now prepared for answering clearly the 
great question, whether it is the good or the evil soul which governs 
the universe. 

6. τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν. Ast here would substitute τήν ye for 
the common reading τὴν δὲς By such a change the μὲν preceding 
would be left alone, and φατέον, with all that follows, made dependant 
upon ὡς. In which case it must be taken as the proposition which 
the speaker thinks can now be so clearly affirmed—all from ἐπειδὴ 
to πάντα inclusive, being brought in by way of parenthesis as a 
preamble to the sentiment. The order in that case would be thus: 
viv δὴ, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν 7 περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν 
ἔτι εἰπεῖν ὡς φατέον THY γε οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν, &c., “but now, since 
it is soul that directs all things for us, there is no longer any diffi- 
culty in asserting, that we must say, that soul, &c., either the best 
soul or the contrary, conducts the revolutions, at least, of the 
hea¢ens.” This proposition, however, besides being a mere un- 
meaning repetition of the first clause, had been clearly asserted be- 
fore. We would, therefore, prefer the common reading (τὴν de), by 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 37 


οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον ἐπιμελου- 
μένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν, ἢ τὴν ἐναν- 
τίαν---- ' 

ΚΛ. Ὦ ξένε, ἀλλὰ ἔκ γε τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων, οὐδ᾽ ὅσιον 


which this part of the sentence, with its principal or governing word 
φατέον, is referred directly to ἐπειδὴ by the connective force of μὲν 
and δὲ, leaving ὡς without any dependant clause expressed ; so that 
the whole sentence might be regarded as unfinished or designedly 
abrupt, for the purpose of introducing with more effect the answer 
of Clinias, in which the proposition designed is brought out. This 
is nv uncommon device in the Platonic writings, by which the most 
impertant truths are evolved from the person with whom Socrates 
or the chief speaker is conversing ; thus furnishing a fine illustra- 
tion.of that mazeutical process in which Socrates so gloried as his 
peculiar method. ‘The whole passage, in accordance with this view, 
may be thus presented: viv 07, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἣ περιάγουσα 
ἡμῖν πάντα, THY δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν φατέον ἐξ avayKne ψυχὴν ἤτοι 
τὴν ἀρίστην ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν περιάγειν, 
χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἔτι διαῤῥήδην εἰπεῖν, ὡς---Κ ΛΚ. ᾽Ὦ ξένε, ὅς. “Βαϊ 
now, since soul (as had been shown) is that which guides all things, 
and since, also, we are compelled (from this premise) to say that 
therefore soul, either the best soul or the contrary, carefully and 
orderly conducts the revolution of the heavens, there is no longer 
any difficulty in affirming clearly that”—he would have said, as the 
the apodosis to ὡς, which had been suspended—“‘ that it is the best 
soul which doeth this,” and that we are shut up to this conclusion ; 
but at this point Clinias takes the proposition out of his mouth, and 
impatiently announces it in his own words: ὦ ξένε, (there is no need 
of so long a preamble) (ἀλλὰ), but (from what has been said) it would be 
impious to affirm otherwise than that the soul which hath all virtue 
guides, &c. ‘This impatience of Clinias, for what seemed to him 
the inevitable conclusion, is finally expressed by the word ἀλλὰ, 
which often, like yap, refers to something supposed to pass rapidly 
through the mind of the speaker, although not expressed—as in this 
case, 1n the negative words we have supplied before ἀλλὰ, or some- 
thing equivalent. The great objection to Ast’s substitution of yé 
for δὲ is, that it makes the whole proposition merely a repetition of 
what had been clearly affirmed before, and does not prepare the way 
naturally for the abrupt answer of Clinias. 


D 


3 


38 3 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ἄλλως λέγειν ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλεῖ» 
ους περιάγειν αὐτά. 

ΑΘ. Κάλλιεστα, ὦ Κλεινία, ὑπήκουσας τοῖς λόγοις - τόδε 
δὲ προσυπάκουσον ἔτι. 

KA. Τὸ ποῖον ; 

ΑΘ. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, εἴπερ 
ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ap’ οὐ καὶ ἕν ἕκαστον ; 

ΚΛ. Té pay; | » 

AO. Περὶ ἑνὸς" δὴ ποιησώμεθα λόγους, οἱ Kal ἐπὶ πάντα 
ἡμῖν ἄστρα ἁρμόττοντες φανοῦνται. 

ΚΛ. Τίνος: 

AO. Ἡλίου πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ, ψυχὴν 
δὲ οὐδείς: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου σώματος οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζῶν- 
τος οὔτε ἀποθνήσκοντος τῶν ζώων" ἀλλὰ ἐλπὶς" πολλὴ 
τοπαράπαν τὸ γένος ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἀναίσθητον πάσαις ταῖς 
τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπεφυκέναι,.) νοητὸν δ᾽ εἷναι. 


7. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην. See Note XXXIV., App. 

8. Περὶ ἑνὸς. Supply ἄστρου, which, in Greek, is often used for 
the sun and planets, as well as the fixed stars. 

9. “Ἡλίου πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ, &c. Compare the well- 
known passage Xen., Memorabilia, iv., c. 3, 14. 

10. ἐλπὶς. This word in Greek has a much larger signification 
than hope in English. It means here, and in many other places, 
expectation, or, rather, ground of expectation, or belief... So, also, the 
verb ἔλπομαι. 

11. ἀναίσθητον ----περιπεφυκέναι. ‘This should be rendered not 
simply, “15 not by nature an object of perception,” but rather, that 
(1 is so in consequence of being above the nature of the sense,” 
being of a higher order of essence. Such is the force of περ. Ast 
would amend as usual, and read περιπεφυκέναι νοητὸν μόνον. νῷ δὴ, 
&c., placing a comma after αἰσθήσεσι, rejecting εἶναι, and connect- 
ing περιπεφυκέναι With νοητὸν. . There is, however, no need of this. 
Περιπεφυκέναι bears more naturally upon ἀναίσθητον αἰσθήσεσι, or, 
rather, upon αἰσθήσεων understood. ναι, which Ast wholly re- 
jects, is far better adapted to the word νοητὸν. See Note XXIV., 
App., on the difference between ἐμὲ and the other substantive verbs, 
such as γίγνομαι and. φύω, when used with philosophical correctness. 
Such an expression as περιπεφυκὲναι νοητὸν would be at war with 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 39 


νῷ μόνῳ ὁὴ καὶ διανοήματι" λάθωμεν αὐτοῦ πέρι TO 
τοιόνδε. 

ΚΛ. Ποῖον ; 

ΑΘ. Ἥλιον εἴπερ ἄγει ψυχῆ, τριῶν αὐτὴν ἕν λέγοντες 
δρᾷν, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἀποτευξόμεθα. 

ΚΛ. Τίψων ; 

ΑΘ. ‘Qe ἢ ἐνοῦσα" ἐντὸς τῷ περιφερεῖ τούτῳ φαινομένῳ 
σώματι, πάντη διακομίζει τὸ τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἡ παρ᾽ 
ἡμῖν ψυχὴ πάντη περιφέρει" ἤ ποθεν ἔξωθεν σῶμα αὕτη 
πορισαμένη πυρὸς ἤ τινος ἀέρος, ὡς λόγος ἐστί τινων, 
ὠθεῖ βίᾳ σώματι σῶμα" ἢ τρίτον, αὐτὴ ψιλὴ σώματος οὖσα, 
ἔχουσα δὲ δυνάμεις ἄλλας τινὰς ὑπερθαλλούσας ϑαύματι, 
TOONYEL. 

KA. Nat. ; 

ΑΘ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη, τούτων ἕν γέ τι ὁρῶσαν ψυχὴν 
πάντα διάγειν. αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον," ταύτην τὴν ψυχήν, εἴτε 
ἐν ἅρμασιν ἔχουσα' ἡμῖν ἥλιον ἄγει φῶς τοῖς ἅπασιν, εἴτ᾽ 


some of the best-established Platonic distinctions, although it might 
perhaps be used by the author in a careless manner. Περὲ gives 
this word the sense of superiority, in the same way as in περίειμιε 
and περιγίγνομαι. The whole may be thus freely rendered : “ We 
have great reason for believing that this whole genus, being imper- 
ceptible to all the senses of the body, is above (the nature of) the 
senses, or is by nature above the senses, and is peculiarly an ob- 
ject of intelligence (νοητὸν εἶναι). Let us, therefore, apprehend by 
mind alone,” &c. 

12. διανοήματι. For a most philosophical and acute discrimina- 
tion between νοῦς and διάνοια, νόημα and διανόημα. νόησις and δια- 
νόησις, see the Republic, close of the sixth book. ‘They seem to be 
used here for the sake of amplification, and with little apparent dif- 
ference of meaning between νόημα and διανόημα. 

13. ὡς ἢ ἐνοῦσα. See Note XXXV., App. 

14. ποδηγεῖ. As the second was represented as impeiling or push- 
ing, 580 this purely spiritual unembodied influence is more properly 
described as guiding, monstrans viam. 

15. αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον. ‘The better part of it,” namely, this soul; 
if, with Stephanus, we read τὸ ἄμεινον, sed quere. 

1. ἐν ἄρμασιν ἔχουσα. See Note XXXVI., App. 


40 . CONTRA ATHEOS. 


5 


ἔξωθεν, εἴθ᾽ ὅπως," εἴθ᾽ ὅπη, ϑεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι χρεὼν πάντα 
ἄνδρα. ἢ TOC ; 

KA. Ναί" τόν γέ που μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀφιγμένον 
ἀνοίας. 

ΛΘ. "Αστρων δὲ δὴ πέρι πάντων καὶ σελήνης, ἐνιαυτῶν 
τε καὶ ων καὶ πασῶν ε΄ πέρι, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον 
ἐροῦμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ 
πάντων τούτων αἴτιαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, 
ϑεοὺς αὐτὰς Elvat φήσομεν ; εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῶα 
ὄντα, κοσμοῦσι πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπη TE καὶ ὅπως ; εἶθ᾽" 

2. ὅπως, φιιοηιοάο; ὕπη, qua parte. ϑεὸν here is equivalent to 
ϑεῖον. See Remarks, page 33, 10. We must not, at all events, in- 
terpret the term by our own theology, which attaches to Deity and 
Divinity the highest sense of an uncreated intelligence. In the 
Greek usage, as we have seen, the word includes all above man, 
and Plato even applies it to the daiuovec. 

3. KA. Nai, τόν γέ που uy. Whatever excellences (and they are 
certainly of a very high kind) this treatrse on laws may possess, it 
is undoubtedly, as a dialogue, inferior to many of the others in point 
of dramatic skill. Clinias and Megillus are too much men of straw; 
although, perhaps, it was one part of the author’s design to con- 
trast their simplicity and unreasoning faith with the philosophical 
acuteness of the chief speaker. They seem, however, to us, to as- 
sent too readily, and sometimes before we can well suppose from 
their characters, as here delineated, that they fairly understand 
some of the propositions presented. While involved in these con- 
tinuous abstract discussions, with the argument all managed by one 
person, we would gladly find relief in one of those vigorous logical 
contests, of which we have so fine a specimen in the Gorgias, as 
exhibited in the long-protracted struggle of the unprincipled yet bold 
Callicles against the most powerful reasoning that Socrates could 
command. Inrespect to dramatic excellence, the Gorgias, Phedon, 
and Protagoras are unrivalled by any similar sade cpp oa of ancient 
or modern times. 

A, cif’ ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖ. 'The common reading is εἴθ᾽ ὄστις, 
which seems to have been introduced from the two preceding ex- 
amples of that word. We have not hesitated to follow Boeck in 
reading εἶθ. Ast. would substitute ἔσθ᾽ ὅστις. ‘* We will say that 
they are Gods, whether being in bodies, and being animated, they 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 4} 


ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖ, ὑπομένει μὴ ϑεῶν εἶναι πλήρη 
πάντα; 

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ ξένε, παραφρονῶν" οὐδείς. 

ΑΘ. Τῷ μὲν τοίνυν μὴ νομίζοντι ϑεοὺς ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν 
χρόνῳ," ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, εἰπόντες ὅρους" ἀπαλ- 
λαττώμεθα. ’ 


τ 


order the whole Heaven, or in whatever way and manner it may be— 
and then (εἶθ᾽), or, in the second place, can any one who admits these 
things adhere (to the opinion) that all things are not full of Gods or 
Divine powers?” The last clause is a consequence or inference 
from the first, and therefore well introduced by εἶτα, which is an 
inferential particle, used when the conclusion is so plain, that sur- 
prise is expressed that any one should think it could be otherwise. 
It is on this account generally, as in the present case, brought in 
abruptly and interrogatively without any connective ; as, for exam- 
ple, Aristophanes, Acharn., 311: ῖ 
ταῦτα δὴ τολμᾷς λέγειν 

ἐμφανὼς ἤδη πρὸς ἡμᾶς ; εἶτ᾽ ἐγώ σου φείσομαι ; 
sometimes in the very beginning of the sentence : 

εἶτ, εἰ δίκαια, τοῦτον εἴπειν αὔτ᾽ ἐχρῆν. 

Acharn., 561. 

It iseasy to see how much more force and vividness is given to the 
passage in this way, than by the tame reading which Ast proposes. 
It may be thus paraphrased : ‘‘ What else can we do, but to say 
that they are Gods; and then, if this is admitted, who will have any 
difficulty with the necessary conclusion (ἃ fortiori) that they are 
everywhere?” ὙὙπομένει may be well rendered by the vulgar Eng- 
lish phrase, ‘‘ will any one stick to it?” that is, obstinately persevere 
in the denial? This declaration, that “all things are full of Gods,” 
was a saying of Thales, and is thus referred to by Aristotle, De 
Anima, lib. 1., 8: καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινὲς ψυχὴν μεμίχθαι φασίν, ὅθεν 
ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς πάντα πλήρη ϑεῶν εἶναι φήθη. Compare, also, the 
treatise De Mundo, ascribed by some to Aristotle, and generally 
published among his works, ch. vi.: καθόλου dé, ὅπερ ἐν vai κυθερ- 
νήτης, ἐν ἅρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν πόλει δὲ NOMOS, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ δὲ 
ἡγεμών---τοῦτο ϑεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ. 

5. παραφρονῶν. ‘ Beside one’s self,’’—deranged. 

6. ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνω. This does not refer to time absolutely. 
but to the state of the argument. 

7. εἰπόντες ὅρους. “Imposing terms,” viz., those that follow. 


D 2 


42 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


KA. Τίνας; 

AO. Ἢ διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγομεν, τιθέμενοι 
ψυχὴν γένεσιν ἁπάντων εἷναι πρώτην, καὶ τἄλλα ὁπόσα 
τούτων ξυνεπόμενα εἴπομεν, ἢ μὴ δυνάμενον βέλτιον λέ- 
yey ἡμῶν, ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι, καὶ ζῇν ϑεοὺς ἡγούμενον εἰς 
τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον. ὁρῶμεν οὖν εἴτε ἱκανῶς ἤδη τοῖς οὐχ 
ἡγουμένοις ϑεοὺς εἰρήκαμεν ὡς εἰσὶ ϑεοί, εἴτε ἐπιδεῶς. 

ΚΛ. “κιστά γε, ὦ ξένε, πάντων" ἐπιδεῶς. 

ΑΘ. Τούτοις μὲν τοίνυν ἡμῖν τὸ λόγων" τέλος ἐχέτω" 
τὸν δὲ ἡγούμενον μὲν ϑεοὺς εἶναι, μὴ φροντίζειν," δὲ αὖ-. 
τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, παραμυθητέον." Ω ἄριστε"" 
δή, φῶμεν, ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ ϑεούς, συγγένειά τις ἴσως σε ϑεία 
πρὸς τὸ ξύμφυτον ἄγει τιμᾷν καὶ νομίζειν εἷναι" κακῶν δὲ 
ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀδίκων τύχαι" ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀληθείᾳ μὲν 

8. πάντων, connect With ἥκιστά ye. A very strong negative. 

9. τὸ λόγων τέλος ἐχέτω. LEquivalent to 6 “λόγοι τέλος ἐχέτωσαν. 
Compare τὸ λόγων with τὰ τῶν διακόνων, for dt διάκονοι, Soph., Philoct., 
497; and τὸ τῶν ϑηρίων, for τὰ ϑήρια, Plat., Republic, viii., 563, c. 

10. See Note XXXVII., App. 

11. παραμυθητέον. ““ὙΘ must give him also a word of ἜΗΝ 
tion.” 

12. Ὦ ἄριστε---ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ Seovc. “That you believe in the ex- 
istence of Gods,” that is, ‘‘as far as the fact of your belief to that 
extent is concerned, we may say, that a certain kindred or innate 
feeling (ovyyéverd τις), imparted by or derived from the Divinity 
(ϑεία), leads you,” &c. Or, συγγένεια ϑεὶα May Mean What the phi- 
losopher elsewhere styles the Divine part of man, or the Divine in 
the human—a Divine affinity or kinsmanship—as we style conscience 
the immediate representative of the Divine nature in the human 
soul. ξύμφυτον should be connected with τιμᾷν and νομίζειν, “a 
natural honouring,’’ &c., which, however, is supposed to be suffi- 
ciently rendered by acknowledging their existence, like Epicurus 
and his followers, who pretended greatly to magnify and honour the 
Gods, when they assigned them a life of perfect repose, extra ceili 

Semoti ab rebus nostris longeque sejunciz. 


13. τύχαι. ‘The fortunes of wicked and unjust men, both in pub- 
lic and private life.” Compare the speech of Polus in the Gorgiag, 
A71, A. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 43 


οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις" δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι σφόδρα ἀλλ᾽ 
οὐκ ἐμμελῶς ἄγουσί σε πρὸς ἀσέθειαν, ἔν τε μούσαις Ovi 
ὀρθῶς ὑμνούμεναι"" ἅμα καὶ ἐν παντοίοις λόγοις. ἢ καὶ 
πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνοσίους ἀνθρώπους; ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γη- 
ραιούς, παῖδας παίδων καταλιπόντας ἐν τιμαῖς ταῖς μεγίσ- 
ταις, ταράττῃ τανῦν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδών," ἢ δι’ ἀκοῆς 
αἰσθόμενος, ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης προστυχὼν 
πολλῶν ἀσεθημάτων καὶ δεινῶν γενομένων τισί, δι᾽ αὐτὰ 


14. For the common reading δόξαι, we read, with almost all the 
commentators, δόξαις, which is not only necessary to the sense, but 
required as the antithesis of ἀληθείᾳ. "Ἐμμελῶς, ‘ considerately, or- 
derly, methodically, with a proportionate regard to all the circum- 
stances of the case.” 

15. ὑμνούμεναι. This was one of the charges made against the 
poets in the third book of the Republic: ὡς dpa καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ Aoyo- 
ποιοὶ κακῶς λέγουσι περὶ ἀνθρώπων Ta μέγιστα, ὅτι ἐισὶν ἄδικοι μὲν 
εὐδαίμονες δὲ πολλοί " δίκαιοι δὲ ἄθλιοι. Repub., 392, A. The same 
charge is made by the prophet against the Israelites. ‘ And now 
we call the proud happy, yea, those who do iniquity are exalted.” Mala- 
chi, iii, 15. On the words εὐδαίμονες εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι, see Note 
XXXVIII., App. 

1. πρὸς τέλος ἀνοσίους. See Note XXXIX., App. 

2. ταράττῃ τανῦν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδών. The common reading 
places a comma after τούτοις, and connects ἰδὼν with what follows. 
In this state, it has given a good deal of trouble to some of the com- 
mentators, especially to Ast. The difficulty, however, may be re- 
moved, as we think, by the reading adopted, although the location 
of the word would be rather unusual. Ταράττῃ ἰδὼν is equivalent to 
ταράττῃ ἰδεῖν, ‘‘ you are troubled at the sight.”” Αὐτόπτης προστυ- 
χὼν, ‘happening to be an eyewitness.’? The whole may be thus 
freely rendered : ‘‘ Or—when beholding men growing old, who con- 
tinue unholy even to the end of life, leaving children and children’s 
children in the highest honours, you are troubled at the sight ; or, 
when hearing by the ear, or happening to be an eyewitness of the 
impious and dreadful deeds which have occurred in the lives of cer- 
tain persons, you yet behold them, by reason of these very crimes, 
advancing from a low condition to the highest power, then it is evi- 
dent that you blame,” &c. Some editions omit ὁρᾶς altogether as 
redundant; but by the disposition we have made of ἰδὼν, it Js not 
only admissible, but necessary. 


44 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ταῦτα ὁρᾷς ἐκ σμικρῶν εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ τὰ μέγιστα 
ἀφικομένους + τότε διὰ πάντα τοιαῦτα δῆλος εἶ" μέμφεσθαι 
μὲν ϑεούς, ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων, διὰ ξυγγένειαν 
οὖς av* ἐθέλων " ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπό τινος ἀλογίας ἅμα, καὶ 
ov δυνάμενος δυσχεραίνειν" ϑεούς, εἰς τοῦτο νῦν τὸ πάθος 
ἐλήλυθας, ὥστ᾽ εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν αὐτούς, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπί- 
νων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων. ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἐπὶ 
μεῖζον ἔλθῃ σοι πάθος" πρὸς ἀσέθειαν τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν πὼς οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαιδ λόγοις αὐτὸ προσ- 
Lov γενώμεθα δυνατοί, πειρώμεθα, συνάψαντες" τὸν ἑξῆς 


9, δῆλος et. A peculiar Grecism, equivalent to δῆλον ἐστί σε 
μέμφεσθαι. It would be good Greek, and perhaps still more Attic, to 
say δῆλος εἶ μεμφόμενος. 

4. διὰ ξυγγένειαν οὐκ ἄν ἐθέλων. ἄν is joined to participles as well 
as to verbs, when the participle can be resolved into a subordinate 
clause. ‘*‘When you would not be willing, if you followed that 
natural feeling.” See Remarks on ξυγγένεια (12), page 42. 

5. δυσχεραίνειν. A most significant term, although not easily 
transferred to the English. Jt means, literally, to disrelish, that is 
(in this connexion), ‘‘to get rid of the innate moral sense or taste 
spoken of above, under the term gvyyéveva.”’ Or it may refer to the 
wholesome prejudices mentioned in note on 8, 3. 

6. πάθος. Some would reject this. word as having crept in asa 
repetition of the πάθος above... It may, however, be taken as in ap- 
position with τὸ viv παρὸν δόγμα. . 

ἡ. ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν. .This place may be freed from its difficulties if we 
read οἷόν τε, regard.7 understood as subjunctive to ἐὰν, and refer 
γενώμεθα to ἕνα, instead of ἐάν, as is generally.done. Ordo, iva οὖν 
μὴ ἔλθῃ... ἀλλ᾽ (ἐάν πως οἷον τ᾽ ἢ) ἵνα γενώμεθα δυνατοὶ ἀποδιοπομπή- 
σασθαι... πειρώμεθα, ἄα ““ΤΠαΐ it may not increase, but that (if 
possible) we may be able, &c. .... let us try.” 

8. ἀποδιοπομπήσαθαι. On the peculiar force and significance of 
this remarkable word, see Note XL., App... 

9. συνάψαντες. . “‘ Having connected our, next argument with that 
which we so thoroughly (διὰ) concluded (διεπερανάμεθα) against the 
man, who did not hold that there were Gods.” @ is to be referred 
to διεπερανάμεθα, although in the dative by the attraction of σὺν in 
συνάψαντες. Connect πειρώμεθα with προσχρήσασθαι. ‘* Let us en- 
deavour to use as an additional argument.” 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 45 


χόγον, ᾧ πρὸς τὸν τοπαράπαν οὐχ ἡγούμενον ϑεοὺς ἐξ dp- 
χῆς διεπερανάμεθα, τούτῳ τανῦν προσχρήσασθαι. σὺ 0’, ὦ 
Κλεινία τε καὶ Μέγιλλε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νέου καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς 
ἔμπροσθεν ἀποκρινόμενοι διαδέχεσθε: ἂν δέ τι δύσκολον 
ἐμπίπτῃ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ σφῷν ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ δεξάμενος 
διαθιθῶ τὸν ποταμόν." 

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις " καὶ σὺ οὕτω ταῦτα δρᾷ" ποιήσομέν 
τε ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἃ λέγεις. 

MET. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐδὲν τάχ᾽ ἂν ἴσως" εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασ- 
θαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσὶ ϑεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον ἢ 
τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων. ἤκουον γάρ που καὶ παρῆν τοῖς 


10. διαθιδῶ τὸν ποταμόν. There is yet an allusion to the strong 
flood mentioned, 21 (14): καθάπερ εἰ ποταμὸν ἡμᾶς ἔδει τρεῖς ὄντας 
διαθαίνειν. In that place it was figurative of the dark and profound 
argument respecting self-motion (αὐτοκίνησις), the depths of which 
had to be so carefully sounded by the Athenian before the others 
could venture to follow him. Here there is an allusion to a like 
difficult argument soon to follow, respecting a special Providence. 
Διαθιθῶ is Attic future for διαθιθάσω. 

11. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν tay’ dv ἴσως. The common reading gives this to 
the Athenian. The words ἤκουον and παρῆν below, show beyond 
doubt, that it belongs to Megillus. There are, it is true, several 
various readings, but they have all evidently arisen from a desire to 
accommodate some ancient error, which gave this passage to the 
Athenian. τοῖς viv δὴ λεγομένοις, “just now spoken,” referring to 
the argument by which it was shown that it was the best soul (ψυχῆ 
ἀρίστη) which moved and guided the heavens and the earth. What 
is said reminds us of the speech of Clinias, 4 (3). Here, as well 
as in that place, surprise is expressed that it should be thought ne- 
cessary to resort to laboured and recondite arguments to prove so 
plain a thing as the doctrine of a special Providence. <‘‘ Do this,” 
Clinias says, ‘‘and we, as far as is possible, will do what you tell 
1.5. And then Megillus, the simple-minded Spartan, breaks in, 
‘But it could not be any very difficult affair to show,” &c. From 
the position just proved, namely, that it was the best soul that 
moved, &c., they, in their simplicity, directly infer, or, as we might 
say, leap at once to the truth of a special Providence, although the 
Athenian or Socrates, having in view more stubborn disputants, 
wishes to enter more minutely into the argument. 


46 CONTRA ATHEOS. 

νῦν δὴ λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀγαθοί ye ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν 
τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὑτῶν οὖσαν KéEK- 
τηνται. 

ΚΛ. Καὶ σφόδρα ye" ἐπήκουον. 

ΑΘ. Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν κοινῇ συνεξετάζωμεν, " τίνα 
λέγοντες ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν, ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἷ- 
vat. φέρε, τὸ σωφρονεῖν, νοῦν τε κεκτῆσθαι, φαμὲν ἀρετῆς, 
τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία, κακίας ; 

ΚΛ. Φαμέν. ! 

ΑΘ. Ti δέ ; ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἷναι, δειλίαν δὲ, κακίας ; 

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 

ΑΘ. Καὶ τὰ μὲν, αἰσχρὰ, τούτων, τὰ δὲ, καλὰ φήσομεν 

ΚΛ. ᾿Ανάγκη. 

ΑΘ. Καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ," ὁπόσα φλαῦρα. 
ϑεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἐροῦ- 


μὲν. 


12. καὶ σφόδρα ye. Ast thinks that this also is the language of 
Megillus: Megulli sunt verba egregie in Spartanum convenientia. We 
cannot see why they do not agree as well with the character of 
Clinias. Besides, had it been the same speaker, we can hardly be- 
lieve that he would have used ἐπήκουον so soon after ἤκουον. The 
word κοινῇ, in the following answer of the Athenian, seems to im- 
ply that both the others had uttered their assent to what had been 
said. Té, when connected with such words as σφόδρα, μάλιστα, 
σχεδὸν, &c., seems not so much to qualify the sense as the force or 
vehemence of the expression; by which we mean, that it makes a 
sort of apology for the term, implying that a stronger one might per- 
haps have been used, but that the speaker means to keep within 
bounds. ‘Thus, Clinias says: σφόδρα ye, ““ earnestly to say no more, 
or to use no stronger expression, did I give heed to it.” In this 
way, although a limiting particle, it does, in an indirect manner, in- 
crease the force of the term to which it is attached. re 

13. συνεξετάζωμεν. The common reading here is συνεξεταζόντων, 
which neither suits the vulgar text preceding it, nor any of the vari- 
ous readings proposed. ‘The change is made on the authority of the 
best commentators, and the Latin versification of Ficinus—commu- 
miter investigemus. | 

14, καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν. Τῶν and ἡμῖν are neither of them 





CONTRA ATHEOS. 47 


KA. Kai ταῦθ᾽ οὕτως ὁμολογοῖ πᾶς av. 

AO. Τί δέ, ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ τρυφὴν εἰς ἀρε- 
τὴν ψυχῆς ϑήσομεν ; ἢ πῶς λέγεις ; 

KA. Καὶ πῶς ;*° 

ΑΘ. ᾿Αλλ’ εἰς τοὐναντίον. 

KA. Ναί. 


governed by προσήκειν, but by μετὸν below, which may have a dative 
of the person and a genitive of the thing. Ast regards τῶν as gov- 
erned by προσήκειν, but he is clearly wrong. μετὸν is used for με- 
τεῖναι ; and thus taken for the infinitive, there is no anomaly in the 
neuter plural ὁπόσα. In this use of the participle for the infinitive, 
the Greek resembles the English more than the Latin. Compare 
the Philebus, 22, E.: οὐδ᾽ αὖ τῶν δευτερείων ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς av 
mote λέγοιτο. ‘There should be a comma after εἴπερ, which is not 
to be connected with ὁπόσα φλαῦρα, but is to be taken elliptically, or 
with the ellipsis supplied, thus: εἴπερ (τινὲς εἰσὶν οἷς μέτεστι). ὁπόσα 
φλαῦρα is to be referred to τῶν μὲν. The order of the whole, with 
the ellipsis supplied, would be as follows: καὶ ἡμῖν, μὲν ἐροῦμεν mpoon- 
κείν μετεῖναι τῶν ὁπόσα φλαῦρα----εἴπερ (τινὲς εἰσὶν οἷς μέτεστι). ‘ And 
we will say, that to us (if to any beings) it pertains to have a share 
in those things that are bad, but to the Gods there is not the least 
participation,” &c. For this use of εἴπερ, compare Aristotle’s Politi 
Ca, il., 6 : χρησίμου δὲ οὔσης ϑρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ 
εἴπερ---πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. Aristot., Ethic. Nicomach., v., 9,9: οὐ 
δὲν yap παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διά + 
τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ---βλάπτεται μόνον. Aristophanes, Nubes, 227 : 
ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ ταῤῥοῦ τοὺς ϑεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς, 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς; εἴπερ. 

15. KA. Καὶ πῶς ; “Απᾶ how should we?” ΑΘ. ᾿Αλλ’ εἰς τοὐ- 
ναντίον. ᾿Αλλὰ, like γὰρ, frequently refers to something understood, 
supposed to pass rapidly through the mind of the speaker. It also 
always implies a negative, if not expressed. This use of these lit- 
tle particles gives singular beauty as well as force to the Greek 
language. They thus carry along with them variety and fulness of 
meaning, at the same time without encumbering or weakening the 
sentence with too many words. By silent implication they keep 
us from losing sight of previous propositions. Thus, ἀλλὰ here 
carries along with it, or keeps in mind, the whole of the preceding 
sentence, being pregnant with a denial of the question. ‘‘ No, we 
cannot assign ὀμέλειαν ἀργίαν, &c., to the virtue of soul, but (ἀλλὰ) 
to the contrary.” 


¢ 


48 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ΑΘ. Tavartia ἄρα τούτοις" εἰς τοὐναντίον. 

ΚΛ. Τοὐναντίον. 

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν δή ; τρυφῶν" καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε (ὃν 6 ποι- 
ητὴς κηφῆσι κοθούροισι μάλιστα εἴκελον ἔφασκεν εἰ ται) 
γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. 





1. τἀναντία ἄρα τούτοις, that is, “ the opposites of τρυφὴ ἀργία, &c. 
must be assigned εἰς τοὐναντίον ; that is, εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχής. 

2. τρυφῶν καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός TE... πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. Ast, as usual, is for 
emendation here, and thinks this could be made better by inserting 
after γίγνοιτ᾽ av the word ἐχθρὸς or μισητός, for which he deduces an 
argument, not very intelligible, from μισεῖ below. It may, however, 
be read as it stands, and regarded as an application, to human af- 
fairs, of the previous sentiment, by supposing ϑεὸς understood after — 
τοιοῦτος, and by taking away the interrogation which is found in 
most editions. ‘The order would be thus: τοιοῦτος (ϑεὸς) πᾶσιν ἡμῖν 
γίγνοιτ᾽ av τρυφῶν καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε, Ov ὁ ποιητὴς ἔφασκεν εἴκελον 
εἶναι, &c. ‘Such ἃ Deity would be to us all τρυφῶν, ἀμελὴς, &c. ; 
in short, one whom (ὃν), or just such a one as the poet said was 
like,” &c. The only real difficulty in the passage is in ὃν, which, 
as it stands, is somewhat harsh. The relative we should expect 
would be οἷον, corresponding to τοιοῦτος. From its position, how- 
ever, in the order of the words before its correlative, it may be re- 
garded as affected, through a species of attraction,.by the words im- 
mediately preceding. Had it followed τοιοῦτος, it would probably 
have been οἷον, in which case the sentence would have presented 
no difficulty. ‘The form of words in Greek is frequently affected by 
distance or contiguity, so as to be different from what would be re- 
quired by strict grammatical dependance. See remarks on the word 
πολλοστὴν, Note XXIX., App. The view taken in respect to ὃν is 
confirmed by similar examples which occur a few lines below: οὐ 
ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον 6 ye, instead of τοιοῦτον οἷόν ye. So, also, 
page 49 (5), in the words ᾧ δὴ ποοσήκει, &c. The poet here refer 
red to is Hesiod : 

τῷ δὲ ϑεοὶ νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες, ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς 
ζώῃ, κηφήνεσσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὀργήν. 
Works and Days, 278. 

It may be that we have ὃν, instead of οἷον, to accommodate it to 
the language of the verse quoted ; a circumstance which often in- 
terferes with the strict grammatical dependence of a sentence 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 49 


ΚΛ. ᾿Ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών." 

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τόν. γε ϑεὸνε οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον 
ὅ γέ τοι αὐτὸς μισεῖ " τῷ τέ τι τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι πειρω- 
μένῳ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον. 

KA. Οὐ μὲν δή. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; 

ΑΘ. Ὧε δὴ προσήκει" μὲν πράττειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δια- 
φερόντως τινός, ὁ δὲ τούτου γε νοῦς τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπι- 
μελεῖται, τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖ, κατὰ τίνα ἐπαινοῦντες 
τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον, οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι πλημμελοῖμεν ; TKO- 

3. ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών. Ast would subjoin these words to ἔφασκεν, 
and make them a part of what was said by the Athenian. ‘They un- 
doubtedly refer to ἔφασκεν, yet it is perfectly agreeable to the Greek 
idiom to regard them as the answer of Clinias. There is a great 
deal of vivacity in such an elliptical reply. It is equivalent to ἔφασ- 
κεν, ὀρθότατά ye εἰπών. Our own language admits of it; as, 6. g., 
when it is asserted that one said so and so, the reply may be, and 
most correctly too. 

4. οὐκοῦν τόν ye ϑεὸν. A most important truth. God hates that, 
and that only, which is unlike himself. The Divine character is the 
ground and sanction of the Divine Law. It must never be called in 
question : τῷ πειρωμένῳ τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον. ‘‘ No 
allowance is to be made to him whé would even attempt to utter 
such a thought.” 

5. Ὧι 67 προσήκει. ὯΩι 15 the relative of τοιοῦτον some distance be- 
low. If it had immediately followed it in the construction of the sen- 
tence, it would perhaps have been more properly οἵῳ 67. ‘The same 
reasons apply here that were given in respect to ὃν a few lines 
above. The order of the sentence would be as follows: κατὰ τίνα 
λόγον οὐκ ἂν πλημμελοῖμεν ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον ᾧ (οἵῳ) δὴ προσήῆ- 
κει, &c. ‘By what reason (or why) should we not act absurdly in 
praising such a being as the one to whom it belongs to act and to 
exercise care in a special manner, and yet the mind of this being 
should care only for the great, whzle it neglects the small.””, When dé 
occurs a number of times in a sentence, there is a difficulty in putting 
it into anything like tolerable English, without too much circumlo- 
cution. The first dé indicates an opposition between the two main 
members of the sentence; the second, between two subordinat:? 
clauses. In such cases the subordinate δέ is best rendered by our 
word while, in order to avoid the awkward repetition of the conjunic- 
tion bus. 


A) 
» 


50 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


πῶμεν δὲ ὧδε" ἄρ᾽ ov κατὰ δύο εἴδη τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττεϊ" 
ὁ πράττων εἴτε ϑεὸς, εἴτ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ; 

ΚΛ. Ποίω δῆ: 

ΑΘ. Λέγομεν - ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ 
ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ, εἰ δια- 
φέρει, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ. ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια; 
οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ἢ τῶν ἁπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσ- 
ϑαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων μὴ ἐπιμε- 
λουμένῳ," ὧν ἂν δυνάμει ϑεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὧν ἐλλιπὴς καὶ 
μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται. 


6. τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει, namely, neglects small things. 

7. ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ. Stephanus here would read ὅδε. Else, he says, 
dé must be regarded as redundant, or otherwise the sentence would 
remain suspended. According to this view of Stephanus, the fol- 
lowing would be the order: ὅδε ἀμελεῖ, ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος 
εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ, &c., ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ ei διαφέρει. ‘He neglects, 
either thinking that it makes no difference, &c., or through sloth and 
effeminacy, if it does make a difference.’’ - Wethink, however, there 
is no need of this supposition, or of regarding the δέ 5 redundant. 
There is a μὲν implied (if it is not rather lost by a corrupt reading) 
after or before διαφέρει. In that case, dé has its usual force of oppo- 
sition or contrast, and should be rendered while, as above. The al- 
ternative intended, and also the antithesis made by the δὲ in the sub- 
ordinate member—ei (μὲν) διαφέρει, ὁ δὲ GveAci—would be clearly ex- 
pressed thus: “‘ We say, then (ὁ πράττων πράττει), the doer doeth 
thus, either supposing that it makes no difference to the whole, 
when small things are neglected, or else (he doeth thus) through 
indolence and effeminacy, if, in fact, it does make a difference, while 
yet he neglects them.” 

8. μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ Ov ἂν. This is appended by way of explana- 
tion or epexegesis of the preceding ὅταν ye ἀδύνατον, &c. . The order 
would be thus: οὐ γάρ που ὅταν ye ἀδύνατον, &e., τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται 
τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων (τῷ) μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ (τούτων) ὧν ἂν δυνάμει 
ϑεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὧν γίγνηται ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, 
which may be freely rendered thus : ‘‘ When it is impossible to take 
care of all things, then no one, whether it be a God or any inferior 
being, can be justly charged with neglect of those things, be they 
great or small, in respect to which, he is wanting in the requisite 
power for a special Providence.” Or, in other words, there can be 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 5] 


ΚΛ. Πῶς γὸρ ἄν; 

ΑΘ. Νῦν δὴ δύ᾽ ὄντες" τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθω- 
σαν οἱ ϑεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι" ὁμολογοῦντες εἷναι " παραιτη- 
τοὺς" δὲ ἅτερος, ὁ δὲ, ἀμελεῖν τῶν σμικρῶν. πρῶτον μὲν, 
ϑεοὺς ἀμφότεροί φατε γιγνώσκειν καὶ ὁρᾷν καὶ ἀκούειν 
πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἷναι τῶν ὁπόσων"" 
εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. ταύτῃ λέγετε ἔχειν 
ταῦτα; ἢ πῶς; 

ΚΛ. Οὕτως. 

ΑΘ. Τί δαί ;." δύνασθαι πάντα ὁπόσων αὖ δύναμίς ἐστι 
ϑνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις ; 

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ; 

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρίστους" ὡμολογήκαμεν 
αὐτοὺς εἷναι πέντε ὄντες. 

ΚΛ. Σφόδρα γε. 

ΑΘ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατον αὖ- 


no neglect where there is no power. In such a case, μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσ- 
θαι is not the same with ἀμελεῖν. See Note XLVI., App., On the 
Peculiarities of certain Negative Forms of Verbs. Sed¢ ἢ φᾶυλός τις Ov 
is equivalent to τὶς εἴτε ϑεὸς εἴτε φαῦλος dv. So, also, σμικρῶν ἢ με- 
γάλων may be viewed as equivalent to εἴτε σμικρῶν εἴτε μεγάλων, 
“ whether small or great.”” Or, it may be regarded as understood, 
as in the Republic, vi., 486, B.: ov μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις. τὸ 
ποῖον ; εὐμαθὴς ἤ δυσμαθής. ‘Surely you will not omit this (circwm- 
stance). What circumstance? Whether docile or dull.” 

9. δύ᾽ ὄντες. The two supposed objectors. 

10. οἱ ϑεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι. ‘Who admit, both of them, that the 
Gods exist, while the one says that they are easily propitiated, and 
the other, that they are regardless of small things.” 

11. παραιτητοὺς. See Note XLI., App. 


12. τῶν ὁπόσων εἰσὶν ai αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. ““ ΑἸ] such 
things as are capable of being perceived by the sense and by the un- 
derstanding.” 


13. ti dai; Δαΐ has the same analogy to δή that vai has to v7. It 
differs from 67 only in a prolongation and sharpening of the voice to 
express surprise or wonder, which is its usual office. ‘“ But real- 
ly 19? 

14. ἀγαθούς τε kai ἀρίστους. See Note XLII., App. 


52 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


τοὺς ὁμολογεῖν πράττειν ὁτιοῦν τοπαράπαν, ὄντας γε οἵους 
ὁμολθγοῦμεν ; δειλίας γὰρ'" ἔκγονος ἔν γε ἡμῖν ἀργία" ῥᾳ- 
θυμία δὲ, ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς. 

KA. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. 

ΑΘ. ᾿Αργίᾳ μὲν δὴ καὶ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ οὐδεὶς ἀμελεῖ ϑεῶν. ov 
γὰρ μέτεστιν αὐτῷ που δειλίας. 

ΚΛ. ᾿Ορθότατα λέγεις. 

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ λοιπόν, εἴπερ ἀμελοῦσι τῶν σμικρῶν 
καὶ ὀλίγων τῶν περὶ τὸ πᾶν, ἢ γιγνώσκοντες ὡς τοπαρά- 
παν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, δρῷεν ἂν τοῦ- 
το" ἢ τί τὸ λοιπὸν πλὴν τὸ γιγνώσκειν τοὐναντίον ; 

ΚΛ. Οὐδέν. 

ΑΘ. Πότερον οὖν, ὦ ἄριστε καὶ βέλτιστε, ϑῶμέν δε λέ- 
γοντα, ὡς ἀγνοοῦντάς τε, καὶ δέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, Ov’ ἄγ- 
volav ἀμελοῦντας, ἢ γιγνώσκοντας ὅτι δεῖ, καθάπερ οἱ φαυ- 
λότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγονται ποιεῖν, εἰδότες ἄλλα εἷ- 
ναι βελτίω πράττειν" ὧν δὴ. πράττουσι, διά τινας ἥττας 
ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν, οὐ ποιεῖν ; 





15. detAiac yap. Connect this with what is said page 46, 10: 
ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ, κακίας. See Note XLIII., App. 

1. τὸ λοιπὸν. ‘For the rest of our argument.” τῶν περὶ τὸ πᾶν. 
«Which have a relation to the whole.” | 

2. ϑῶμέν σε λέγοντα. “Shall we put you down as. saying that 
the Gods are ignorant, and that even when they ought to exercise 
a care, they through ignorance neglect it; or, that knowing that 
they ought, yet still, as the meanest of men are said to do, who know 
better, &c.; so they (the Gods), through the overpowering influence 
of pleasures and griefs, do not do what they ought?” Δέον ἐπιμε- 
λεῖσθαι. A mode of expression very common with the nominative 
neuter participle of δεῖ and of the compounds of the substantive verbs. 
It is nearly equivalent to the genitive absolute, being, however, 
more closely connected with the reasoning of the sentence in which 
it stands, instead of denoting, like the latter, a mere accessory cir- 
cumstance of time or place. ‘It being necessary,” or ‘* when they 
ought,” &c. | ins 

3. βελτίω πράττειν. Stephanus,*on the authority of Eusebius, 
would here read βέλτιον πράττειν, melius esse alia facere. βελτίω 
πράττειν, however, is more strictly in accordance with the purest 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 53 


KA. Πῶς yap ἄν ; 

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ Taye ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα" τῆς TE ἐμ- 
ψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ ϑεοσεθέστατον" αὐτό ἐστι 
πάντων ζώων ἄνθρωπος. 

KA. Ἔοικε γοῦν. 

ΑΘ. Θεῶν γε μὴν nme φαμεν εἶναι. πάντα ὁπόσα 
ϑνητὰ ζῶα, ὧνπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον. ἷ 

ΚΛ. Πῶς yap ov; 

ΑΘ. Ἤδη τοίνυν σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταῦτα εἷναι 
τοῖς ϑεοῖς. οὐδετέρως" γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς ἀμελεῖν 
ἂν εἴη προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ ἀρίστοις. σκο- 
πῶμεν γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις. 

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 

ΑΘ. Τὸ περί τε αἰσθήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως, ap’ οὐκ ἐναν- 
τίως" ἀλλήλοιν πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ χαλεπότητά ἐστον πε- 
φυκότε ; 


Greek idiom. Compare the examples, χαλεπὰ or χαλεπώτερα ὁρᾶν ; 
also such phrases as ῥᾷδια μαθεῖν, καλὰ ἰδεῖν, λόγος δυνατὸς κατανοῆ- 
σαι, ἡ διστὴ πίνειν, ἀξία ϑαυμάσαι, and others, which are generally ex- 
pressed in Latin by the supine, d2ficile visu, mirabile dictu, &c. In 
such cases, of an infinitive dependent on an adjective, the Greek 
usage of the active, instead of the passive, corresponds to the Eng- 
lish idiom. As we say, hard to learn, cruel to behold, better to do, in- 
stead of better to be done, although some might regard this last ex- 
ample as hardly admissible. | 

4,5. ἀνθρώπινα mpaypata...... ϑεοσεθέστατον. See Note XLIV., 
App. | 

6. ϑεῶν κτήματα. See Note XLV., App. | 

7. οὐρανὸν ὅλον. This is here evidently put for the whole ani- 
mated universe, like Paul’s πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις, Rom.,, vili., 22, “the whole 
creation, the whole creature world.”” σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα, “be they great 
or small.”” See page 50, (8.) 

8. οὐδετέρως. ‘* In neither respect,’ that is, whether you take the 
ground that we are small or great. ἐπιμελεστάτοις ye οὖσι. The 
participle, in such connexions as this, often has the force of a con- 
ditional. clause, ‘‘ 2f they are most provident,” &c. 

9. dp’ οὐκ ἐναντίως. ‘ Have they not (that is, have not sense and 
power) reciprocally an opposite nature in respect to ease and diffi- 


hk 2 


54 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


KA. Πῶς λέγεις ; Riis 

AO. ὁρᾶν μέν που καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ σμικρὰ" χαλεπώτερον 
ἢ τὰ μεγάλα" φέρειν δ᾽ αὖ καὶ κρατεῖν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 
τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων παντὶ ῥᾷον ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων. 

KA. Καὶ πολύ γε. 

ΑΘ. Ἰατρῷ. δὴ προστεταγμένον" ὅλον τι ϑεραπεύειν, 


culty?” τὸ περὶ αἰσθήσεως is equivalent to τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ΟΥ̓ 77 
αἴσθησις ; and both taken together constitute a nominative for the 
dual verb ἐστὸν. 

10. τὰ σμικρὰ. We may say in Greek, χαλεπώτερόν ἐστι τὰ σμικρὰ 
ὁρᾷν, OY Ta σμικρά ἐστι χαλεπώτερα ὁρᾷν. See Remarks, page 52, 
(3), on the words βελτίω πράττειν. 

11. Ἰατρῷ δὴ προστεταγμένον. Ast would place a comma after 07, 
and render according to the following order : ἰατρῷ δὴ βουλομένῳ καὶ 
δυναμένῳ ϑεραπεύειν τι προστεταγμένον, &c. ““ΤῸ ἃ physician who is 
willing and able to heal something committed to his care,” &c. In 
this view αὐτῷ below is made redundant. This interposition of the 
pronoun, it is true, is not unusual in a long and complicated Greek 
sentence ; yet still it seems to us in this place more natural and easy 
to regard προστεταγμένον as the nominative (some would call it the 
accusative) neuter impersonal absolute, like δέον, page 52 (2). Itis 
true, this usage generally takes place with the neuter participle of 
dei, or of the impersonal compounds of the substantive verb, such as 
ἐξὸν, προσὸν, παρὸν, and the kindred ὑπάρχον, yet we not unfrequent- 
ly find it extended beyond these limits. The same usage occasion- 
ally prevails in respect to παρασχὸν, τυχὸν, δόξαν, sometimes with 
δοκοῦν, προσῆκον, and now and then with passive participles gener- 
ally; as, Thucyd., 1, 125, δεδογμένον δὲ αὐτοῖς, “ when it was de- 
termined by them.”’ So, also, with εἰρημένον and ov joined with ad- 
jectives; as, αἰσχρὸν ὃν, “it being base,”’ or, guum turpe sit—adndaov 
dv, δυνατὸν ὃν, ἕο. See Kuhner, 312. Ifthe rule may in this case 
admit of being extended to προστεταγμένον, which is somewhat akin 
to δόξαν δεδογμένον and εἰρημένον, the sentence may be thus render- 
ed, and according to the following order and punctuation : ‘latp@ δὴ 
ϑουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ προστεταγμένον, ὅλον τι ϑεραπεύειν, ἕξει ποτὲ 
«αλῶς τὸ πᾶν αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελουμένῳ, τῶν μορίων δὲ καὶ 
σμικρῶν ἀμελοῦντι ; ‘When, to a physician who is both willing and 
competent, it is appointed to heal any whole, will his work, as a 
whole, be ina condition creditable to him, attending, or if he attends 
only to the great portions while he neglects the small?” Take 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 55 


βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ, TOV μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελουμένῳ, 
τῶν μορίων δὲ καὶ σμικρῶν ἀμελοῦντι,᾽" ἔξει! ποτὲ καλῶς 
αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν ; 

KA. Οὐδαμῶς. 

ΑΘ. Od μὴν οὐδὲ κυθερνήταις, οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς, οὐδ᾽ οἰ- 
κονόμοις, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τισὶ πολιτικοῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων 
οὐδενί, χωρὶς τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ σμικρῶν, πολλὰ ἢ μεγάλα. 
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν" τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι 
λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι. 

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ av ; 

ΑΘ. Μὴ τοίνυν τόν γε ϑεὸν ἀξιώσωμέν"" ποτε ϑνητῶν 
δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἱ τὰ προσήκοντα αὑτοῖς ἔργα, 
ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τόσῳ ἀκριθέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα 
μιᾷ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται : τὸν dé ϑεὸν 
ὄντα" τε σοφώτατον, βουλόμενόν 7’ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ δυνά- 


ἐπιμελουμένῳ as ἃ conditional clause, like ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι, on 
which we remarked a short distance back. In this νὰ  ϑεραπεύειν 
is governed by προστεταγμένον, and αὐτῷ comes in easily in the 
order of the sense. 

12. ἐπιμελουμένῳ.... ἀμελοῦντι. See Note XLVI., App. 

13. ἄνευ σμικρῶν. See Note XLVII., App. 

14. ᾿Αξιώσωμεν. Some would here prefer the reading ἀξιῶμεν on 
account of the particle μὴ, which, itis contended, cannot be joined 
with the Ist aorist subjunctive active.. To this rule of the gramma- 
rians there are, however, sO many cases in direct opposition, that it 
may well be doubted whether the common reading should be chan- 
ged on account of it. See many of these cases, Matthie, Gr. Gram., 
728, and the emendations by which he proposes to make them con- 
form to this rule. 

15, τὸν δὲ ϑεὸν ὄντα. This. is to be connected with δημιουργῶν 
φαυλότερον above. Had it immediately followed, it would have re- 
quired only the connective τέ in μήτε, and would probably have read 
thus: μῆτε τοίνυν τόν ye ϑεὸν ἀξιώσωμέν ποτε ϑνητῶν δημιουργῶν 
φαυλότερον εἶναι, unre ϑεὸν ὄντα (ἀξιώσωμεν), &c. “1 60 us not deign 
to think that the Deity, of all others, is inferior to mortal workmen, 
nor that, being a God most wise, with the will and the power, &c., he 
should take no charge of those small things, the care of which is se 


56 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


4EVOV, ὧν μὲν ῥᾷον ἦν ἐπιμεληθῆναι σμικρῶν ὄντων, μηδα- 
un ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἀργὸν ἢ δειλόν τινα διὰ πόνους 
ῥωθυμοῦντα, τῶν δὲ μεγάλων" ---- 

ΚΛ. Μηδαμῶς δόξαν τοιαύτην περὶ ϑεῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἀπο- 
δεχώμεθα" οὐδαμῇ γὰρ οὔτε ὅσιον οὔτ᾽ ἀληθὲς διανόημα 
διανοοίμεθ᾽ ἄν. 

ΑΘ. Δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι νῦν ἤδη μάλιστα μετρίως" διειλέχ- 
θαι τῷ φιλαιτίῳ τῆς ἀμελείας πέρι. ϑεῶν. 


easy,’ &c. The δὲ in this case is occasioned by the parenthetical 
or explanatory clause, of τὰ προσήκοντα, &c. ‘There is an opposition, 
or, rather, contrast between this clause and what follows, and this 
contrast is denoted by δὲ, which, in consequence of its position and 
relation to a subordinate part, appears harsh and difficult to be 
rendered. It is a rule in English composition, that there should be 
no grammatical dependence between ἃ parenthesis and the other 
members of a period ; or that if should be so introduced, that it may 
be taken out without altering the grammatical relation of the other 
parts. The propriety of such a rule may:be doubted: At all events, 
the Greek writers allowed themselves’ much more freedom in the 
construction of their periods; and hence the frequent occurrence of 
what grammarians style anakolowtha, and suspended sentences... Per- 
haps, on the whole, it would be better thus to regard the passage be- 
fore us as suspended, for the sake of the stronger impression. > After 
speaking parenthetically of the exact care exercised by human artists, 
the writer breaks out in the following unfinished ‘contrast: “Βαϊ 
that God, being most wise, possessed of power and-will, é&c., should 
neglect small things like: some idle and cowardly being, while he 
concerns himself about the great”—The impatient and characteris- 
tic interruption of Clinias then comes in with admirable effect—No, 
we can hold no such opinion ; we can entertain no such false and unholy 
sentiment. In this way far more power is given to the sentence than 
could be imparted by the most perfect regularity. t bal 

1. τῶν δὲ μεγάλων. “ While he does’ concern himself about the 
greater.’ See the remarks on the best mode of rendering δὲ in cer- 
tain cases, page 49, 5 and 50, 7. 

2. μετρίως. ‘Properly, both in mannerand degree.” τῷ φιλαίτεῳ 
τῆς ἀμελείας πέρι ϑεῶν. ‘The one who loves to impute neglect to 
the Gods—who querulously arraigns the Divine Providence.” | Ordo 
--φιλαιτίῳ ϑεῶν περὶ τῆς ἀμελείας. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 57 


KA. Nai. 

ΑΘ. Τῷ ye βιάζεσθαι" τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸν μὴ 
λέγειν. ' 

KA. Ὀρθῶς." 

AO. Ἐπῳδῶν ye μὴν προσδεῖσθαί por δοκεῖ μύθων ἔτι 
τινῶν. 

ΚΛ. Ποίων, ὦ ᾽γαθέ; 

ΑΘ. Πείθωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις, ὡς τῷ τοῦ παν- 
τὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου 
πάντ᾽ ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν 
ἕκαστον τὸ προσῆκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. τούτοις δ᾽ εἰσὶν 
ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι" ἑκάστοις ETL τὸ σμικρότατον 
ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως, εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον τέλος 
ἀπειργασμένοι -ἴ ὧν ἕν καὶ τὸ σόν, ὦ σχέτλιε, μόριον εἰς 


3. τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι. See Note XLVIII., App. 

4. ὀρθῶς... Stephanus, whom Ast follows, and whom Eusebius and 
Ficinus seem to countenance, would connect ὀρθῶς with the pre- 
ceding λέγειν, making the whole, from τῷ ye to ἔτι τινῶν, the lan- 
guage of the Athenian. Alsoque λέγειν, sine hoc adverbio quem usum 
hic haberet? STEPH. Μὴ λέγειν itself, however, in the sense of 
“speaking improperly,” or of ‘‘ saying nothing to the purpose,” is so 
common in Greek, that we much prefer the vulgar text, which gives 
ὀρθῶς to Clinias, making it very similar to the reply of the same 
speaker, page 49 (3), ὀρθότατά ye εἰπών, on. which we have remark- 
ed. There is great vivacity, and much that is characteristic of the 
simple-hearted Clinias. in this interrupting assent. It is principally 
directed to the word βιάζεσθαι, and-intimates that, in his view, the 
argument had been perfectly irresistible, so that nothing more need 
be added. As much as to say—you are most correct in declaring 
that you have forced him; your argument is, indeed, most triumphant. 
And then this brings on very naturally the subsequent reply of the 
chief speaker: ‘* And yet there seems to me to be need in addition 
of something of a more persuasive kind.” τινῶν ἐπῳδῶν. 

5. συντεταγμένα. Not simply “appointed by” (although this sense 
is included), but “50 arranged as to co-operate (συν) with the uni- 
versal guardian.” 

6. ἄρχοντες. See Note XLIX., App. 

7. ἀπειργασμένοι. ‘This word must have here the sense of constt- 


58 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


TO πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπονϑ ἀεί, καίπερ πάνσμικρον OV. σὲ δὲ 
λέληθε περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὡς γένεσις" ἕνεκα ἐκείνου γίγνε- 
ται" πᾶσα, ὅπως ἡ ἡ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα εὐδαί- 
μων οὐσία, οὐχ ἕνεκα σοῦ" γιγνομένη, σὺ δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκεί- 
νου. πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουργὸς παντὸς 
μὲν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐργάζεται, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντεῖνον"" βέλ. 
τίστον " μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα 
ἀπεργάζεται. σὺ δὲ ἀγανακτεῖς, ἀγνοῶν ὅπη" τὸ περὶ σὲ 
ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ ξυμθαίνει καὶ σοὶ κατὰ δύναμιν'" τὴν 
τῆς κοινῆς γενέσεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀεὶ ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη" σώ- 
ματι τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλῳ, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλῳ, μεταθάλλει παντοίας 
μεταθολὰς δι᾽ ἑαυτὴν' ἢ Ov ἑτέραν ψυχήν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔρ- 


tuted, appointed, or organized, although such an application is some- 
what unusual. Εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον, “ to the most-minute di- 
vision.” Τέλος must be taken abverbially, as equivalent to τελέως. 
Ὧν must be referred to τούτοις and συντεταγμένα. 

8. ξυντείνει βλέπον. ‘* Looking tends.” The participle, being a 
favourite part of speech with the Greeks, is often thus used in con- 
nexion With a verb; in this manner becoming equivalent to two 
verbs in English, as though it were βλέπει καὶ τείνει. 

9. Téveoic. See Note L., App. 

10, 11, 12, 13. See Note LI., App. 

14. κατὰ δύναμιν, ἄς. ‘“ According to the power of the common 
generation,” that is, as far as it is possible for both these ends to be 
jointly accomplished, viz., the good of the individual and the good 
of the universe at the same time. 

15. ovvteraypévy. ‘The common reading here is ἐπιτεταγμένγ. 
We have, however, followed Eusebius and Stephanus, who refers 
to several old manuscripts as authority. Συντεταγμένῃ makes a 
much better sense, and is much better adapted to the context. It 
may be rendered here, “soul appointed to act in co-operation with 
body.” | 

1. δι’ ἑαυτὴν. “ΒΥ its own internal action.” δι᾽ ἑτέραν ψυχὴν 
‘Through the influence of another soul.” ‘This is one of those 
cases in which διὰ with the accusative would be said to signify the 
instrumental cause, a sense which it generally has with the genitive. 
Even here, however, we may perceive a difference. It denotes a 
spiritual instrumentality, either of soul upon itself, or of one soul upon 
another, and may, perhaps, be more appropriately rendered by reason 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 5Y 


γον τὼ πεττευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμει- 
γον γ'γνόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον, χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν 
χείρονα, κατὰ τὸ πρέπον αὐτῶν ἑκάστῳ, ἵνα τῆς προση.- 


κούσης μοίρας λαγχάνῃ. 

KA. Πῆ λέγεις; 

ΑΘ. Ἧιεπερ ἂν ἔχοι λόγον" ῥᾳστώνη ἐπιμελείας ϑεοῖς των 
πάντων, ταύτῃ μοι δοκῷ φράζειν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ 
ὅλον" ἀεὶ βλέπων πλάττοι τις, μετασχηματίζων τὰ πάντα, 
οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ ἐμψύχον," καὶ μὴ ξύμπολλα ἐξ ἑνὸς ἢ 
ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, πρώτης ἢ δευτέρας ἢ καὶ τρίτης γενέσεως 
μετειληφότα, πλήθεσιν ἄπεις" ἂν εἴη τῆς μετατιθεμένηςς: 
κοσμήσεως- νῦν δ᾽ ἔστι θαυμαστὴ ῥῳστώνη τῷ τοῦ παντὸς 
ἐπιμελουμένῳ. | 

KA. Πῶς αὖ λέγεις; 
of, than by means of, although the two expressions sometimes come 
nearly to the same thing, means reason and motive, in regard to spirit- 
ual agencies, having often the like relation. The sentiment is this: 
‘“‘'The adaptation of the soul to its appropriate state is its own work. 
Nothing, then, is left to the chess-player but to transfer the pieces 
thus adapted to their proper stations.” Merari@évar—calculum quasi 
retractare, ‘‘to take back or change a piece.””. We render πεττευτῆ, 
chess-player, by way of accommodation to a well-known game, in 
order to give more force to the simile. ψυχῇ here means more 
properly vis anima, than the substance of soul itself. 

2. Ἧιπερ. ἂν ἔχοι, &c. See Note LII., App. 

3, 4. Ei μὲν yap πρὸς τὸ ὅλον. For an extended explanation of 
this dificult passage, and of what follows for some distance, see 
Note LIII., App. 

5. ἄπειρα. Supply μετασχηματίσματα. 

6. Μετατιθεμένης κοσμήσεως. ‘* Displaced arrangement,” that is, 
requiring a new arrangement at every act of providential inter- 
ference ; a displacing of the whole order of the chess-board at each 
move. See the comparison of the πεττευτὴς a short distance back, 
where we have also the verb μετατιθέναι. Μετασχηματίζω would 
mean here, do transform immediately, without intermediate means 
’ (media) or successive generations of cause and effect. Merabadde, 
on the other hand, although active in form, has an intransitive or 
middle meaning, signifying a change from internal causes in the 
things themselyes, whether innate or implanted. 


60 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ΑΘ ‘de. ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὃ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους 
οὔσας τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν av- 
ταῖς οὗσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίων, ἀνώλεθρον" δὲ ὃν γενόμε- 
νον ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ. οἱ κατὰ 
νόμον ὄντες ϑεοί, (γένεσις γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἣν ζώων ἀπο- 
λομένον τούτοιν ϑατέρου) καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν ἀγαϑὸν ἀεὶ 
πεφυκός, ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς, διενοήθη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν βλάπ- 
τειν" ταῦτα πάντα ξυνιδὼν ἐμηχανήσατο" ποῦ κείμενον 
ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν, νικῶσαν ἀρετήν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν 
ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρέχοι μάλιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα. 
μεμηχάνηται" δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο, τὸ, ποῖόν TL γιγνόμενον 
ἀεὶ ποίαν ἕδραν δεῖ μεταλαμθάνον οἰκίζεσθαι, Kai τίνας 
ποτὲ τόπους. τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς" ἀφῆκε ταῖς 


7. ἀνώλεθρον ... αἰώνιον. See Notes LIV. and LV., App. 

8. ἐμηχανήσατο. Lxcogitavit. ‘This word savours somewhat of 

Plato’s peculiar doctrine of the necessary existence of evil, arising 
out of that depravity which was connected with matter, in the con- 
stitution of things. It seems to represent the Deity as struggling 
with this disorder, and employing all the resources of his wisdom in 
devising plans to counteract its influence. See Note XXXI., App., 
on the doctrine of the good and evil principle. Ποῦ κείμενον. “In 
what situation lying,” ubi gueque pars sita est, or “in what manner 
each part might be so disposed as in the best and easiest manner to 
give the victory to virtue, and the least advantage to wickedness or 
evil.” 
9. weunyavytat. A change is here made from the aorist to the 
perfect tense, to intimate that it is a finished, settled, or established 
mode of proceeding, employed at the present time as well as in the 
first origin ofthings. The aorist ἐμηχανήσατο had reference to single 
and individual parts and acts ; μεμηχάνηται has regard to the whole, 
πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο. It is best rendered here as a present: ‘‘ He con- 
trives this in reference to the whole, namely, what kind of a situa 
tion everything which becomes of a certain quality must receive and 
inhabit.” See Note LVI., App. 

10. τῆς γενέσεως Tod ποιοῦ τινὸς. This expression is equivalent 
to τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ποιόν τι. In the words ἕδραν, οἰκίζεσθαι, and τόπους 
above, we may yet discover the metaphor of the stones and the build- 
er, made use of page 55 (13). Like the comparison of the dark and 
dangerous flood, it lingers long in the writer’s mind, and affects, un- 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 61 


βουλήσεσιν ἑκάστων ἡμῶν τὰς αἰτίας. ὅπη yap ἂν ἐπιθυ- 
μῇ, καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὧν τὴν φψυχῆν, ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἑκάστοτε 
᾿ καὶ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται ἅπας ἡμῶν ὡς τὸ πολύ. 

"ΚΛ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός. 

ΑΘ. Μεταθάλλει μὲν τοίνυν πάνθ᾽ ὅσα μέτοχά ἐστι ψυ- 
χῆς, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα"" τὴν τῆς μεταθολῆς αἰτίαν " με- 
ταθάλλοντα δὲ φέρεται κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης" τάξιν 
καὶ νόμον. σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν" μεταθάλλοντα ἐλάτ- 
τω, κατὰ τὸ τῆς χώρας ἐπίπεδον μεταπορεύεται, πλείω δὲ 
καὶ ἀδικώτερα μεταπεσόντα, εἰς βάθος τά τε κάτω λεγόμενα 
τῶν τόπων, ὅσα “Αἰδην"" τε καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα τῶν OVO- 
μάτων ἐπονομάζοντες σφόδρα φοθοῦνται καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦ 
σι" ζῶντες διαλυθέντες TE τῶν σωμάτων" μείζων δὲ C7) 
ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν μεταλάθῃ, διὰ τὴν αὑτῆς 
βούλησίν τε καὶ ὁμιλίων γενομένην ἰσχυράν, ὁπόταν μὲν 
ἀρετῇ ϑείᾳ προσμίξασα' γίγνηται διαφερόντως τοιαύτη, 
διαφέροντα" καὶ μετέθαλε τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον, μετακομισθεῖ- 
oa εἰς ἀμείνω τινὰ τόπον ἕτερον, ὅταν δὲ τἀναντία, ἐπὶ 
τἀναντία μεθιδρύσασα τὸν αὑτῆς βίον. 


consciously perhaps, his language, even where there was no design- 
ed reference to it. This method of carrying along metaphors con- 
tained, yet half concealed, in single words and phrases, is a peculiar 
beauty of Greek composition, by no means confined to their poetry, 
although this abounds with the richest examples of it. 

11. ἐν ἑαυτοῖς. See the close of Note LVI., App. 

12. κατὰ τάξιν εἱμαρμένης. See Note LIV., App. 

13. σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν. For an extended explanation of this 
difficult passage, and of what follows, see Note LVII., App. 

14. “Acdnv ἐπονομάζοντες. See Note LVIII., App., on the Greek 
“Αἰδης, compared with the Hebrew 5yjyy7 and Ὁ} ΓΞ: 


15. φοθοῦνται καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦσι. See Note LIX., App., on the 
similar fears of Hell which have existed in all ages. 

1. ἀρετῇ ϑείᾳ προσμίξασα. Compare this with 2 Peter, i, 4: iva 
γίγνησθε ϑείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως. 

2. διαφέροντα. Connect this with τόπον, although such a con- 
struction is rather harsh and unusual. On this passage, and espe- 
cially the word ἅγιον, see Note LX., App., on the spirituality of some 

F 


62 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


Αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶ ϑεῶν οἵ "Ολυμπον ἔχουσιν. . 
ὦ Tat καὶ νεανίσκε, ἀμελεῖσθαι δοκῶν ὑπὸ ϑεῶν - κακίω 
μὲν γιγνόμενον, πρὸς τὰς κακίους ψυχάς, ἀμείνω. δὲ, πρὸς 
τὰς ἀμείνους πορευόμενον; ἔν τε ζωῇ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ϑανάτοις," 
πάσχειν TE καὶ ποιεῖν ἃ προσῆκον δρᾷν. ἐστι τοῖς προσφε- 
ρέσι τοὺς προσφερεῖς." ταύτης τῆς δίκης οὔτε σὺ μήποτε 
οὔτε εἰ ἄλλος ἀτυχὴς" γενόμενος ἐπεύξηται περιγενέσθαι 
ϑεῶν. ἣν πασῶν δικῶν διαφερόντως ἔταξάν τε οἱ τάξαντες, 





of the Platonic views in regard to the future blessedness of the soul, and 
the capability, which many parts of the Platonic writings possess, of be- 
ing accommodated to a higher system of truth. 

3. Αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶ ϑεῶν of “OAvurov ἔχουσι. This is an un- 
doubted hexameter line, evidently intended as a quotation. What 
immediately follows, although the language of the writer, and de- 
signed only for prose, is yet capable of being reduced to the same 
measure by a slight transposition, and by pronouncing ϑεῶν in one 
syllable, as must frequently be done in the Greek poetry, 


Ὦ rai καὶ νεανίσκε, δοκῶν ὑπὸ Gedy ἀμελεῖσθαι. 


The Platonic writings furnish many examples of a similar kind, 
which by slight changes, and sometimes with no change.at all, may 
be reduced to a pleasing rhythm. ‘They were, in all probability, not 
designed, but flowed spontaneously from the well-tuned ear and har- 
monized spirit of this poetical philosopher. Nothing could more 
perfectly describe the exquisite softness and polish of his own Greek, 
than what he says of Theztetus, in the dialogue of that name, page 
144, B.: οἷον ἐλαίου ῥεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ ῥέοντος. 

4. ἐν πᾶσι ϑανάτοις. See Note LXI., App.,.on the mystical senses 
of this word. | 

5. προσφερέσι τοὺς προσφερεῖς. ‘* Like to like.” 

6. ἀτυχὴς. Ficinus here evidently read εὐτυχὴς without εἰ, for 
he renders the passage thus: Quare nec tu neque ullus alius optet 
confidatque se adeo felicem fore ut judicium hoc Decorum effugiat atque 
exuperet. It is capable, however, of a very good sense according to 
the common reading. ‘‘ Neither do you expect, nor if any other is 
in like unfortunate condition (that is, exposed to the Divine jus- 
tice), let him ever boast he shall escape (or survive) the justice of 
Heaven.” Tleptyevéobar—superesse.. The same remarks apply to 
εἰ here, as to εἴπερ, page 46 (14). It is equivalent to οὔτε ἄλλος 
ἀτυχὴς γενόμενος, εἴπερ ἐστι τοιοῦτος, ἐπεύξηται, KC. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 63 


χρεών τε ἐξευλαθεῖσθαι τοπαράπαν. ov yap ἀμεληθήσῃϊ 
ποτὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς. οὐχ οὕτω σμικρὸς ὧν δύσῃ κατὰ τὸ τῆς 
γῆς βάθος, οὐδ᾽ ὑψηλὸς γενόμενος, εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν avaT- 
τήσῃ᾽ τίσεις δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν προσήκουσαν τιμωρίαν, εἴτ᾽ ἐν. 
θάδεϑ μένων, εἴτε καὶ ἐν “Αἰδου διαπορευθείς, εἴτε καὶ τούτων 
εἰς ἀγριώτερον ἔτι διακομισθεὶς" τόπον. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος 
σοι καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἂν εἴη, τῶν, OG σὺ κατιδὼν ἐκ σμι- 
ρῶν μεγάλους γεγονότας, ἀνοσιουργήσαντας, ἤ τι τοιοῦ- 
τὸν πράξαντας, φήθης ἐξ ἀθλίων εὐδαίμονας γεγονέναι, 
KATA, ὡς ἐν κατόπτροις," αὐτῶν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἡγήσω κα- 


7. οὐ γὰρ ἀμεληθήσῃ ποτὲ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς. ᾿Αὐυτῆς refers here to Aixy, or 
the Divine Justice or Law personified. See Note LXII., App., on the 
Divine Omniscience, and the remarkable resemblance between this passage 
and certain declarations of the Scriplures. 

8. ἐνθάδε. ‘In this world, or in Hades after having passed 
through (dta—zopevGeic) this world.” In the same way, ἐκεὶ is often 
used for the other world. 'There is a power in these brief adverbs, 
when thus employed, that no descriptive terms could equal. They 
are several times used in this manner in the Gorgias, especially in 
the passage where Socrates is pointing Callicles to that final and 
Divine tribunal, where he will stand so much more in need of a de- 
fence and of an advocate, than in the Athenian courts—yaopjon καὶ 
ἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐγὼ "ENOAAE, ov ’EKEI—No less than I 
would HERE (that is, before a human bar), will you be speechless and 
dizzy THERE. Gorgias, 527, A. With how much effect are they 
employed by Euripides, when Medea, in making her last address to 
her children, says so concisely, yet with such fulness of meaning : 

Evdaimovoirov: ἀλλ’ ’EKEIL: τὰ δ᾽ ENOAAE. 
Πατὴρ ἀφείλετ᾽: 
Would that ye might be blessed, but THERE; all HERE 
Your father’s hand hath ruined. 
Medea, 1069. 

9, διακομισθεὶς. The intensive sense of διὰ comes directly from 
its primitive local sense: through, thorough, significant of complete- 
ness. Here both offices unite : “‘ carried through all intervening states 
io the remotest bounds.” 

10. ὡς ἐν κατόπτροις, &c. “In the events of their lives, as in 
mirrors, you think you have seen (reflected) the neglect of all things 
by the Gods.” This fine simile is exceedingly descriptive of these 


64 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


θεωρακέναι τὴν πάντων ἀμέλειαν ϑεῶν " οὐκ εἰδὼς αὐτῶν 
τὴν συντέλειαν, ὅπη ποτὲ τῷ παντὶ ξυμθάλλεται. Try- 
νώσκειν δὲ αὐτῆν, ὦ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε, πῶς οὐ δεῖν δο- 
ἣν δ “ ΄ > o> Ἃ , 12 " Ζ 9 
KELC ; NV τις μὴ γιγνώσκων οὐδ᾽ av τύπον" ἴδοι ποτέ, οὐδὲ 
λόγον ξυμθάλλεσθαι περὶ βίου δυνατὸς ἂν γένοιτο εἰς εὐ- 
δαιμονίαν" τε καὶ δυσδαίμονα τύχην. ταῦτα εἰ μέν σε πεί- 


who look only upon the surfaces of things, superficial men, ἄνδρες 
ἐπιπόλαιοι. It suggests the similar comparison, by the Apostle 
James, of those ‘ who behold their natural faces in a glass :” ἐν 
ἐσόπτρῳ, James i., 23. Πράξεσιν αὐτῶν. Not ‘their deeds,” but 
rather, ‘the events of their lives,” namely, ‘‘ their seeming or super- 
ficial prosperity in the midst of all their crimes.’’ Πρᾶξις sometimes 
has almost the sense of πάθος, and may mean a condition or state, thus 
differing from the derivatives of ποιέω, and even from. most verbals 
of a similar form terminating in zc. ΑΒ in the Trachinie of Sopho-. 
cles, 151: 

Tor’ ἄν τις εἰσίδοιτο, τὴν αὑτοῦ σκοπῶν 

TIPAZIN, κακοῖσιν οἷς ἐγὼ βαρύνομαι. 

Πρᾶξις is also ἃ technical term, used in-reference to the stage or 
tragedy. It is so applied by Aristotle, in his Art of Poetry, to that 
event which constitutes the leading action of the drama. There 
may be some such allusion here to human life, and especially the 
life of such as are here referred to, in the light of a drama, a tragic 
πρᾶξις, which has not yet been wound up, or come to its catastrophe, 
and the issue of which has not yet been seen. Τὴν πάντων ἀμέλειαν 
ϑεῶν. The genitive, having a much more extensive significance in 
Greek than the corresponding possessive case in English, and em- 
bracing many more relations, frequently gives rise.to constructions 
which appear to us very harsh. . Thus here, Sedv bears to ἀμέλειαν 
the relation of agent, while πάντων has to it the. relation of ob- 
ject. Instead, however, of governing them both by. ἀμέλειαν, it 
would, perhaps, be better to regard ϑεῶν as an.ellipsis for the more 
usual expression of the cause or agent, ὑπὸ τῶν ϑεῶν. 

11. Οὐκ εἰδὼς αὐτῶν τὴν συντέλειαν. . See Note LXIII., App., on 
the doctrine of a final judgment. 

12. τύπον. On the use of this word, see Note LXIV., App. 

13. εὐδαιμονίαν... . δυσδαίμονα. (The location and context of these 
words in this passage, and a few lines above (ἐξ ἀθλίων. εὐδαίμονες 
γεγονέναι), furnish an admirable illustration of the remarks made Note 
XXXVIII., App., on the difference between happiness, in the usual 





CONTRA ATHEOS. 65 


Ger Ἰζ λεινίας ὅδε καὶ ξύμπασα ἡμῶν ἥδε ἡ γερουσία, περὶ 
ϑεῶν ὡς ovK οἷσθα 6, τι λέγεις, καλῶς ἄν σοι ὃ ϑεὸς ad- 
τὸς" ξυλλαμθάνοι" εἰ δ᾽ ἐπιδεὴς λόγου τινὸς ἔτι ἂν εἴης, 
λεγόντων ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸν τρίτον ἐπάκουε," εἰ νοῦν καὶ 
ὁπωσοῦν ἔχεις. OTL μὲν yap ϑεοί τε εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπων 
ἐπιμέλονται, ἔγωγε OV παντάπασι φαύλως" ἂν φαίην ἡμῖν 


worldly sense of the term, and blessedness. 'The passage may be 
paraphrased : ‘“‘ Without giving heed to this type of life, that is, with- 
out keeping in mind this general notion (see Note LXIV., App., on 
the word τύπον) of their contribution (συντέλειαν) to the good of the 
whole, you will be able to form no right judgment respecting blessed- 
ness or its opposite.” Or, if we take the other view of συντέλεια, 
adopted in Note LXIII., App., and regard it as including the idea of 
end, consummation, final reckoning, &c., we then have a sentiment 
almost the same with the famous declaration of Solon to Creesus, 
related by Herodotus, lib. i., 32, and which sometimes appears in 
the tragic poets as an ancient saying; as in the beginning of the 
Trachiniz of Sophocles : 

Λόγος μὲν ἐστ᾽ ’APXAIOZS ἀνθρώπων φανεὶς 

ὡς οὐκ ἂν αἰῶν᾽ ἐκμάθοις βροτῶν, πρὶν av 

ϑάροϊ TIC... 

(4. Ὃ ϑεὸς αὐτὸς. There cannot be a doubt but that this is to be 
taken here in its purest and highest sense, as referring to the One 
Ineffable Supreme—the One True God of Socrates and Plato. “The 
Deity himself, the very being whose existence and Providence we 
have been proving—may he assist you.’’ Had he referred in any 
way to the local Divinity of Athens or Pallas, he would have used 
the feminine αὐτῇ. . 

10. πρὸς τὸν τρίτον ἐπάκουε. * Keep listening (as the present im- 
perative here most impressively signifies) while we address our- . 
selves to the-third head of our argument.”’ This is evidently spoken 
not to the two companions who, with the speaker, formed the 
γερουσία mentioned above, but to the imaginary young disputant so 
frequently referred to. It has been shown, Ist, that GOD IS; 2d, 
that he exercises a special Providence ; which two propositions 
are almost eytivalent to what the apostle assigns as the objects of 
faith, Heb., xi., 6. It now remains to be shown that he is not 
easily propitiated, or turned away from the right, by the offerings 
_and sacrifices of the wicked. 

1. οὐ παντάπασι φαύλως. Tne speaker evidently looks back with 


"ὼ 


66 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ἀποδεδεῖχθαι" «ὃ δὲ παραιτητοὺς av τοὺς ϑεοὺς εἷναι τοῖ- 
σιν ἀδικοῦσι δεχομένους δῶρα, οὔτε τινὲ συγχωρητέον 
παντί: τ’ αὖ κατὰ δύναμιν τρόπῳ ἐλεγκτέον. 

KA. Κάλλιστ᾽ εἶπες " ποιῶμέν τε ὡς λέγεις. 

ΑΘ. Φέρε δὴ" πρὸς ϑεῶν αὐτῶν, τίνα τρόπον παραιτητοὶ 
γίγνοιντ᾽ av* ἡμῖν, εἰ γίγνοιντο av; καὶ τίνες ἢ ποῖοί τι- 


Γ 

a good deal of satisfaction, to what he regards as his master-piece 
in this argument: the subtle disquisition about self-motion. On the 
word παραιτητοὺς, see Note XLI., App. 


2. παντὶ τρῦύπῳ. He seems to regard this as the most important 
position of the three, as being, in fact, more vital to the soul’s highest 
interests than any speculative belief in the Divine existence, or in 
a Providence without it. Hence, he says, “ there must be no yield- 
ing here, and no pains must be spared in the refutation of this per- 
nicious error,” namely, that the wicked can easily propitiate the 
Deity by gifts. 

3. Φέρε δὴ. An never wholly loses its force as an inferential par- 
ticle. It has, however, much less strength as an illative than οὖν 
or dpa. It imports in such a connexion as this, a going on of the 
argument, a transition to another head, with an implication that 
something previous had been proved in a solid and satisfactory man- 
ner. It implies, therefore, when thus employed in argument, a con- 
sciousness of strength, and an anticipation of victory. Hence, when 
joined with dye, φέρε, λέγε, or with imperatives generally, it has been 
most appropriately styled 67 hortativa. 


4, γίγνοιντ᾽ dv. “ Would they become propitiated or placable ?” 
The use of γίγνοιντο instead of εἶεν implies that they are to be re- 
garded as previously angry. There is in the Protagoras, 340, c., a 
still more striking example, in which the true sense wholly depends 
on the distinction between these two substantive verbs. It is there 
shown that the two propositions χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν, and χαλε- 
mov εἶναι ἀγαθὸν, instead of being the same, as Protagoras rashly sup- 
posed, are, in fact, so widely distinguished, that one is true and the 
other false. For a bad man to become good in his own strength is na 
only difficult, but impossible. For one who has become, or who has been 
made good, or who is so by nature, TO BE good, is not only not diff- 
cult, but delightful. Οὐ yap τοῦτο ὁ ΤΠττὰκὸς ἔλεγε τὸ χαλεπὸν TH- | 
NEZOAI ἐσθλόν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἜΜΜΕΝΑΙ. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 67 


ves ὄντες ; ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀναγκαῖόν που γίγνεσθαι τούς 
γε διοικήσοντας" τὸν ἅπαντα ἐντελεχῶς᾽ οὐρανόν. 
KA. ᾿Οὕπωρ! 


5. τίνες ἢ ποϊοίτινες. ‘** Who being, or of what kind being?” In 
these two questions rivec refers to the offices the Gods are supposed 
to hold to men, and ποῖοΐ τινες to the nature of those offices, or the 
manner in which they are discharged. ‘The answer to τένες is con- 
tained in the word ἄρχοντας below. The answer to ποῖοί τινες is 
suggested in the specification of the several kinds of rulers set forth. 

6. διοικήσοντας. ‘* Who are going to administer.’”’ The future 
here is used, not in reference to the actual state of things, but sub- 
jectively, to the state of the argument. ‘‘ Who on our scheme are 
going, &c., or whom we are going to represent as actually adminis- 
tering.” So, also, the mathematician employs ἔσται and ἔσονται in 
the statement of his demonstration, although there is no sequence 
or futurity, except in the mode in which the mind conceives of the 
relations of truths, which in themselves are older than time or space. 
Subjectively, to the demonstrator, they may appear, and be stated 
as consequences yet future. 

7. ἐντελεχῶς. ‘ Actually, as opposed to potentzally.”’ Correspond- 
ing to ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ, as opposed to ἐν δυνάμει. Hence the noun év- 
τελέχεια, 80 much used by Aristotle, as contrasted with δύναμις. 
Philologists have differed much about the etymology of this word. 
The derivation, however, from ἐντελὴς, perfect, complete, and ἔχω, 
seems satisfactory, both as respects form and meaning. That which 
exists only ἐν δυνάμει is inchoate and imperfect: activity, energy (αὐτο- 
κίνησις) is its completion and perfection. The word actually, in Eng- 
lish, has come to signify not much more than ¢ruly, as matter of fact, 
and is therefore not a good representative of ἐντελεχῶς, although it 
is difficult to find any other substitute for it. There is another word, 
ἐνδελέχεια, continuance, duration, which some confound with this, as 
is done by Cicero, Tusc. Disp., 1., 22: Quintum genus adhibet, 
vacans nomine ; et sic ipsum animum ἐντελέχειαν (ἐνδελέχειαν) ap- 
pellat, quasi quamdam continuatam motionem. 'The etymology of ἐν- 
δελέχεια 15 Very uncertain. Tov ἅπαντα οὐρανόν is here put:for the 
whole universe—the Heavens and all things they contain. It-is 
very much like the Hebrew expression po:pyq 5a nm, as Job, 


XXvill., 24: He looketh under the whole Heaven, or —cp ny ony), 


the Heaven of Heavens, that is, all space—the universe. 


68 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


ΑΘ. ’AAN’ apa τίσι προσφερεῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων ; ij τίνες 
τούτοις, ὧν" δυνατὸν ἡμῖν ἀπεικάζουσι τυγχάνειν μείζοσιν 
ἐλάττονας ; πότερον ἡνίοχοί τινες ἂν εἶεν τοιοῦτοι CevyGY 
ἁμιλλωμένων, ἢ πλοίων κυθερνῆται ; τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀπεικασ 
θεῖεν στρατοπέδων ἄρχουσί τισιν. εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ νόσων πό- 
Aguov® εὐλαθουμένοις ἰατροῖς ἐοικέναι περὶ σώματα, ἢ γε- 
ὠὡργοῖς περὶ φυτῶν γένεσιν εἰωθυίας ὥρας χαλεπὰς διὰ 
ὠόῤθων"" προσδεχομένοις " ἢ καὶ ποιμνίων ἐπιστάταις. ἐπει- 
δὴ γὰρ συγκεχωρήκαμεν" ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἷναι μὲν τὸν οὐρα- 
νὸν πολλῶν μεστὸν ἀγαθῶν, εἷναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, 
πλειόνων" δὲ τῶν UH, μάχη" δή, φαμέν, ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ 


8. ὧν is genitive by reason of τυγχάνειν---ιο5 assequi possimus, ΟΥ̓ 
quorum compotes esse possimus. 

9. νόσων πόλεμον. ‘The language employed above respecting con- 
tending chariots and commanders of camps, suggested the repre- 
sentation of the physician in the same style, as carrying on a war 
with diseases. In all this, however, he has in mind the allusion 
which soon follows to what he styles μάχη ἀθάνατος, the grand and 
universal conflict between the powers of good and evil, on which 
we have dwelt at length, Note LXVI., App. EvdAabéoua. ‘ To be 
careful, circumspect, cautious.” Hence to be timid, fearful, especial- 
ly to be occupied with religious dread, to be devout towards God; al- 
though in this last sense, as Prof. Hacket, in his Notes to Plutarch, 
De Sera Numinis Vindicta, has well observed (page 92), it is seldom, 
if ever, found in classic usage. The primary conception of the word, 
from εὖ and A7j6w, λαμθάνω, is to handle carefully, to touch with caution. 

10. διὰ φόθων. An adverbial phrase similar to διὰ φιλίας, δι’ 
αἰσχύνης, &c., with fear or timidly. It sometimes has the form διὰ 
φόθου. The common reading is διὰ φόθον, which is certainly incor- 

rect. Compare the phrase δι᾽ ἀπεχθείας, AXsch., Prom. Vinc., 121. 
LL. ἐπειδὴ yap συγκεχωρήκαμεν. ‘This admission could only have 
referred to the fact of the mixture of good and evil in the world, and 
which may be regarded as expressed in what is said page 32, line 33. 
Plato has in no other part of this book, except In the present passage, 
told us which he thought had the preponderance. 

12. πλειόνων δὲ τῶν μὴ. For an extended examination of this 
passage and the doctrine contained, see Note LXV., App. 

13. μάχη ἀθάνατος. On this remarkable expression, see Note 
LXVI., App. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 69 


τοιαύτη, Kai φυλακῆς ϑαυμαστῆς" δεομένη " ξύμμαχοι δὲ 
ἡμῖν ϑεοί τε dua καὶ δαίμονες,᾽" ἡμεῖς δ᾽ αὖ κτήματα ϑεῶν 
καὶ δαιμόνων " φθείρει δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀδικία καὶ ὕθρις μετὰ ἀφρο- 
σύνης " σώζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονή- 
σεως, ἐν ταῖς τῶν ϑεῶν ἐμψύχοις οἰκοῦσαι δυνάμεσι." βρα- 
χὺ δέ τι καὶ τῇδε ἄν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἐνοικοῦν ἡμῖν σα- 
φὲς ἴδοι. ψυχαὶ δῆ τινες" ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκοῦσαι, καὶ ἄδικον λῆ- 
μα κεκτημέναι, δηλονότι" ϑηριώδεις,, πρὸς τὰς τῶν φυλά' 


14. See Note LXVI., App. 

15. ϑεοὶ καὶ δαίμονες... κτήματα ϑεῶν. See Note LXVII., App. 

1. σώζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη. See Note LXVIII., App., on the ancient 
division of the four cardinal virtues. 

2. ἐμψύχοις δυνάμεσι. ‘ Animated, spiritual, or moral powers and 
faculties,” in distinction from physical agencies, or what he else- 
where styles second working motions, or second causes. 

3. ψυχαὶ δή τινες ἐπὶ γῆς. An, as an inferential particle, relates 
back to what precedes ἐπειδὴ yap, &c. What followed came in by 
way of parenthetical ejaculation, suggested by the previous meta- 
phorical allusions and mention of πόλεμος calling up to mind the 
great conflict of the universe, as presenting a bold and striking con- 
trast with the petty conceptions of the men whose doctrine he is 
disproving. He now returns to them, and resumes the more natural 
order of the argument, which had been interrupted. ‘There are, 
then, (it seems), certain souls dwelling upon the earth,” &c., name- 
ly, such as would measure the Gods by themselves, and attribute to 
them all those imperfections and weaknesses which pertain to such 
earthly guardians and rulers as we have mentioned by way of com- 
parison. 

4. δηλονότι. This is generally given as two words, δῆλον ὅτι. 
The construction, however, seems to require that it be taken and 
written as one: d7AovoTi—as 15 clear, evidently, &c. 

5. ϑηριώδεις. ‘There should, we think, be a comma after this 
woid. The usual rendering, ferocious, would not here be in har- 
mony With such expressions as we have below—zeifovo. ϑωπείαις 
λόγων, καὶ ἐν εὐκταίαις ἐπῳδαῖς. It might much better be translated 
brutal, or, rather, brutish, referring not so much to the wildness and 
fierceness of their dispositions, as to the stupidity and beastly gross- 
ness of their conceptions. It is meant by these terms to indicate 
men who have no right notions, any more than the beasts, of their 


70 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


κων ψυχὰς ἄρα κυνῶν, ἢ τὰς τῶν νομέων, ἢ πρὸς τὰς τῶν 
παντάπασιν ἀκροτάτων δεσποτῶν προσπίπτουσαι, πείθου- 


true relations to God and the universe. Aristotle, in his Ethie. 
Nicomach., vil., 1, seems to use the term in this sense, to denote a 
state as much below what is properly human as the Divine is above 
it; although he applies the epithet to a class of men: ὥστε 7 Veia 
ἕξις av εἴη δηλονότι τῇ ϑηριωδείᾳ ἀντιθεμένη. It would seem here to 
correspond well to the Hebrew 4375, as used Psalm xlix., 11 ; 
Ixxiii.,- 225 xcir, 7. “Proverbs, ΧΙ, Ὁ xex., 2: “The sentiment, 
Psalm xcil., 7, is strikingly in harmony with the whole train of 
thought in which Plato here indulges respecting the views such 
men entertain of the Divine justice. The brutish man (nya; ϑηριώδης) 


knoweth not, and the gross man (5» D3 from 403: carnosus pinguis furl) 


understandeth not this, that when the ΡΥ Aaa at is that they may 
be destroyed forever. ‘To make ϑηριώδεις agree with ψυχὰς would be 
exceedingly harsh, not only in respect to the construction, but also 
as regard the sense. 

ἄρα κυνῶν. There is a peculiar force and elegance in this particle 
ἄρα, when thus employed. ‘The 7, which follows twice, justifies, as 
in similar cases, the supplying of another ἢ, or, rather, an εἴτε, be- 
fore it, and then it will be in all respects parallel to the Iliad, 1., 65: 


"Ex? ἄρ᾽ by εὐχωλῆς ἐπιμέμφεται, εἴθ᾽ ἑκατόμθης. 


Hogeveen styles it, in such cases, ἄρα conjecturalis. ‘This, how- 
ever, is but little, if any, significant of its real force. Even in such 
an example it does not wholly lose its power of concluding. Neither, 
as he supposes, does it denote the reason why Apollo was angry. 
That he had reason for anger was taken for granted from the fact. 
Since he was angry, therefore the prophet was to tell the cause, 
whether it was on account of a vow or a hecatomb. So, in this 
passage, we may render: ‘ Being evidently brutish, and approaching 
(or falling upon) their keepers, be they dogs or shepherds, or rulers 
of the highest grade, they would persuade them by flatteries,” &c. 
That is, sence they are brutish (therefore apa), it matters not to them 
whether they be dogs or shepherds, &c.: because they are of this 
gross and animal nature, they make no distinction between the 
highest and the lowest class of guardians, but-stupidly imagine that 
they all may be influenced alike. Thus the inferential force of ἄρα 
is felt in giving vividness and a great addition of meaning to the 
sentence, while yet it is free from the encumbrance and clogging ef- 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 7) 


au’ ϑωπείαις λόγων, Kai ἐν εὐκταίαις τισὶν ἐπῳδαῖς (ὡς ai 
φῆμαί φασιν αἱ TOU κακῶν) ἐξεῖναι πλεονεκτοῦσί σφισιν 
ἐν ἀνθρώποις πάσχειν μηδὲν χαλεπόν. φαμὲν δ᾽ εἶναί που 
τὸ νῦν ὀνομαζόμενον ἁμάρτημα τὴν πλεονεξίαν" ἐν μὲν 
σαρκίνοις σώμασι νόσημα καλούμενον, ἐν δὲ ὥραις ἐτῶν 
kal ἐνιαυτῶν λοιμόν, ἐν δὲ πόλεσι καὶ πολιτείαις, τοῦτο 
αὖ τὸ ῥῆμα μετεσχηματισμένον, ἀδικίαν. 

᾿ς ΚΛ, Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 

ΔΘ, Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν, τὸν λέγον- 
τα ὡς εἰσὶ συγγνώμονες ἀεὶ ϑεοὶ τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδί- 
κοις καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν, ἂν αὐτοῖς" τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονέ- 
μῃ, Καθάπερ κυσὶ λύκοι τῶν ἁρπασμάτων σμικρὰ ἀπονέ- 
μοιεν, οἱ δὲ, ἡμερούμενοι τοῖς δώροις, συγχωροῖεν τὰ πο- 
ίμνια διαρπάζειν. ap’ οὐχ οὗτος ὁ λόγος 6 τῶν φασκόντων 
παραιτητοὺς εἷναι ϑεούς ; 

ΚΛ. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν. 

ΑΘ. Τίσιν οὖν δὴ τῶν προῤῥηθέντων ἀπεικάζων ὁμοίους 
φύλακας εἷναι ϑεοὺς οὐκς ἂν καταγέλαστος γίγνοιτο ἀν- 
θρώπων ὁστισοῦν ; πότερον κυθερνήῆταις, λοιθῇ γε οἴνου 
κνίσσῃ TE παρατρεπουένοις" αὐτοῖς, ἀνατρέπουσι δὲ ναῦς 
τε καὶ ναύτας ; 


fect of a formal argumentative statement. This use of ἄρα, γὰρ, 
ὠλλὰ, &c., when employed with reference to what is supposed to 
exist in the mind, rather than in the expression, is one of the most 
striking beauties in the Greek language. If ϑηριώδεις here must 
have the sense of ferocious, or, like a wild beast in respect to dispo- 
sition, it should be taken in connexion with πρὸς τὰς ψυχὰς, and in 
that case would imply, that having been ferocious towards their 
keepers, they afterward seek reconciliation by flatteries, &c. Ast 
connects ϑηριώδεις With πρὸς ψυχὰς, although he gives it the com- 
paratively weak sense, agresies.. Animos igitur quosdam, &c., patet 
agrestes ad custodum animos. Whatever view, however, we may 
take of ϑηριώδεις, its relation to ἄρα will remain the same. 

6. πείθουσι. See Note LXIX., App. 

7. πλεονεξίαν. See Note LXX., App. 

8. ἂν αὐτοῖς, &c. See Note LXXI., App. 

9. παρατρεπομένοις. ‘*'Turned aside from the path of right’ The 


72 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


KA. Μηδαμῶς. 

ΑΘ. ᾿Αλλ’ οὔτι μὴν qrvioxotot” ye ἐν ἁμίλλῃ ovyTETay: 
μένοις, πεισθεῖσιν ὑπὸ δωρεᾶς ἑτέροισι τὴν νίκην ζεύγεσι 
προδοῦναι. 

KA. Δεινὴν γὰρ εἰκόνα λέγοις ἂν λέγων τὸν λόγον 
τοῦτον. 

ΑΘ. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς γε, οὐδ᾽ ἰατροῖς, οὐδὲ γε- 
ὡργοῖς '" οὐδὲ νομεῦσι UNV, οὐδέ τισι κυσὶ κεκηλημένοις ὑπὸ 
λύκων. 

KA. Evdjper." πῶς γὰρ ἄν; 

ΑΘ. ᾿Αλλ’ οὐ πάντων φυλάκων εἰσὶ μέγιστοι καὶ περὶ 
τὰ μέγιστα ἡμῖν οἱ πάντες ϑεοί ; 

ΚΛ. Πολὺ γε. 


metaphor in the word βυρσραβίβ. [η6 conception of a deviation from 
aright line. It is evidently intended to furnish a case of parano- 
masia with ἀνατρέπουσι. 

10. ἡνιόχοισί. All these datives are to be referred to ὁμοίους 
above. It is not the reinsman here who offers the prayer, but who 
is supposed to be prayed unto; and yet, although in this respect 
the cases are not similar, we cannot help thinking that Plato had in 
mind some of those prayers which Homer occasionally puts into the 
mouth of his heroes, for aid not only in the accomplishment of wick- 
ed purposes, but also in very trivial circumstances. As, when they 
pray for assistance in the games, in the horse-race, and especially 
when the goddess Pallas, in aid of her favourite knight Diomed, as- 
_ sumes the reins and overturns the chariot of Admetus. Iliad, xxiii., 
390. 

11. Εὐφήμει. A strong and earnest word of caution. ‘“ Be care- 
ful how you speak—speak words of good omen.” It was employed 
in the sacrifices to caution the people against the utterance of any 
inauspicious words during the religious rites. ‘There is a very fine 
and impressive example of its use in the Republic, lib. vi., 509, B., 
where, at the suggestion of Glaucon, that Ἡδονή, or Pleasure, might 
be The Good, Socrates cries out, εὐφήμει, ‘utter words of good 
omen, or be cautious in your language ;” intimating that there might 
be blasphemy in the very conception. The same feeling is excited 
here by the bare thought, that the course of the argument had re- 
quired him, however necessarily, to connect the mention of the 
Deity with such comparisons as had been used. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 13 


AQ. Τοὺς δὴ κάλλιστά τε πράγματα φυλάττοντας, δια- 
ψέροντάς τε αὐτοὺς φυλακῇ πρὸς ἀρετῆν, κυνῶν χείρους 
καὶ ἀνθρώπων μέσων" " εἶναι φήσομεν, οἱ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄν 
ποτε προδοῖεν ἕνεκα δώρων παρὰ ἀδίκων ἀνδρῶν ἀνοσίως" 
δεδομένων ; | 

KA. Οὐδαμῶς" οὔτε ἀνεκτὸς ὃ λόγος. τῶν τε'" περὶ πᾶ- 








12. Μέσων. “Men holding a middle rank between Gods and the 
brute animals.” Ast’s rendering, medzocribus, is a very poor one, 
because it would denote those who held a middle rank among men 
themselves, or ordinary men. Méooc, however, may perhaps have 
here the same sense with μέτριος, just, equitable, although we do not 
recollect any example of such usage. ‘This meaning of μέτριος un- 
doubtedly came from that old system of ethics founded on the say- 
ing μηδὲν ἄγαν, and which Aristotle afterward made the foundation 
of his doctrine of Ethical Means. 

13. ἀνοσίως δεδομένων. Compare Proverbs, xxi., 27: the sacrifice 
of the wicked is an abomination. 

14. τῶν τὲ περὶ πᾶσαν..... ὄντων. Ast would read τῶν ye, and 
connect this (to ὄντων) with the preceding sentence. In accordance 
with which view he renders: Neque tolerabilis est haec oratio homi- 
num in quovis impietatis genere versantium. ‘There is no difficulty, 
however, in connecting τῶν (as in the common reading) with ἀσεθῶν 
following, if we may regard the repetition as arising from the length 
of the intervening clause, and also as intended to add force and 
vehemence to the whole sentence. “ Of ail those who are con- 
versant with every species of impiety, this man who so tenaciously 
holds to this opinion would, of all wicked men, most justly seem to 
be esteemed the worst and most impious.” ᾿Αντεχόμενος, “ holding 
firmly to,’’ like one who braces himself against something for the 
purpose of giving tenacity to his grasp. ‘The word implies that men 
cling much more obstinately to this doctrine than to Atheism, or 
even the denial of a Providence. By connecting τῶν re, or τῶν ye, 
with the preceding, we should also destroy the fine effect of the pas- 
sionate burst of indignation which is so characteristic of Clinias, and 
which is so forcibly expressed by the words οὐδαμῶς, &c., when 
standing by themselves. Κινδυνεύει, inthis passage, may be regard- 
ed in the same light as at page 18 (2). See remarks on the word in 
that place. So, also, here the primary sense appears through the 
secondary. ‘ He zs in danger of being judged, he runs a risk of be- 
ing thought, or he is Jzable to the imputation,” &c. 

G 


“4 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


σαν ἀσέθειαν ὄιττων κινδυνεύει πως 6 ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἀν- 
τεχόμενος πάντων ἂν τῶν ἀσεθῶν κεκρίσθαι δικαιότατα 
κάκιστός τε εἷναι καὶ ἀσεθέστατος. 

ΑΘ. Ta μὲν δὴ προτεθέντα τρία, ϑεοί τε ὡς εἰσί, καὶ ὡς 
ἐπιμελεῖς, καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὡς παντάπασιν ἀπαραίτη- 
τοι, φῶμεν ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαί'" που. 

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ; καὶ σύμψηφοί γε τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις 
ἐσμέν. ι 
ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν εἴρηταί γέ πως σφοδρότερον, διὰ φιλονει- 
κὶαν τῶν κακῶν ἀνθρώπων. τούτου γε μὴν ἕνεκα, ὦ φίλε 
Κλεινία, πεφιλονείκηται, μή ποτε λόγοις ἡγῶνται κρα- 
τοῦντες ἐξουσίαν Eivai σφισιν ἃ βούλονται πράττειν οἱ κα- 
κοί, ἃ δὴ καὶ oa? καὶ οἷα περὶ ϑεοὺς διανοοῦνται. προθυ- 
μία μὲν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα νεωτέρως εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν γέγονεν. εἰ δέ 
TL καὶ βραχὺ προὔργου πεποιήκαμεν εἰς τὸ πείθειν πη τοὺς 
ἄνδρας, ἑαυτοὺς μὲν μισῆσαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία πως ἤθη στέρ- 
Eat, καλῶς ἡμῖν εἰρημένον ἂν εἴη τὸ προοίμιον ἀσεθείας πέρε 
νόμων. 

ΚΛ. ᾿Αλλὰ ἐλπίς " εἰ δὲ μή, TO γε τοῦ λόγου γένος οὐκ 
αἰτιάσετοι τὸν νομοθέτην. 
ates φῶμεν ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαί που. This is something like the 
math matician’s ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι, quod erat demonstrandum. - It is the 
forma) conclusion of the long argument or prearnble to the law 
which is now to follow against those impious men, who have given 
the lawgiver so much trouble. 

1. σφοδρότερον. ‘This is said in reference to the apparently harsh 
epithets which have been used in this third branch of the discus- 
sion against those who abused the doctrine of the Divine placability, 
and especially to the strong language a few lines above. The other 
parts of the argument, instead of needing apology in this respect, 
were marked by a peculiar mildness towards his supposed perverse 
opponents. 

2. ἃ δὴ καὶ ὅσα καὶ οἷα. ‘ Whatever things, and however enor- 
mous, and however bad.” “Ὅσα often, when the context requires it, 
is to be taken in a bad sense, implying not simply the number or 
quantity, but the enormity of the things referred to. So, also, ola 
not only imports quality, but sometimes a bad quality, ef whatever 
kind, that is however wicked. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. ἱ 1a 


ΑΘ. Μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον τοίνυν λόγος," οἷος av τῶν νό- 
μων ἑρμὴηνεύς, ὀρθῶς γίγνοιτο ἡμῖν, προαγορεύων ἐξίστασ- 
θαι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀσεθέσι τρόπων τῶν αὑτῶν εἰς τοὺς εὐσεθεῖς. 
τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις. ἀσεθείας ὅδε ἔστω πέρι νόμος * Ἐν 
τίς ἀσεθῇ λόγοις εἴτ᾽ ἔργοις, ὁ παρατυγχάνων ἀμυνέτω, ση- 
μαίνων πρὸς ἄρχοντας" τῶν δὲ ἀρχόντων οἱ πρῶτοι πυθό. 
μενοι, πρὸς τὸ περὶ" τούτων ἀποδεδειγμένον κρίνειν δικασ- 
τήριον εἰσαγαγόντων κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. ἐὰν δέ τις ἀκού- 
σασα ἀρχὴ μὴ δρᾷ ταῦτα, αὐτὴ ἀσεθείας ὑπόδικος γιγνέσ- 
θω τῷ ἐθέλοντι τιμωρεῖν" ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων. ἐὰν δέ τις ὄφλῃ, 
τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν ἑκάστῳ" τῶν καθ᾽ ἕν ἀσεθούντων 
τίμημα. δεσμὸς μὲν οὖν ὑπαρχέτω πᾶσι. δεσμωτηρίων dé" 


3. μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον λόγος. ‘The whole law is regarded as con- - 
sisting of three parts: the preamble or argument, the declaration or 
exhortation, and the penalty. ‘The first has occupied nearly the 
whole of the book, the second is despatched in a single sentence, 
and then all that remains is to specify briefly the several punish- 
ments for the several grades of impiety. 

4. πρὸς τὸ περὶ. Οτάο---ἐισαγαγόντων πρὸς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀποδε- 
δειγμένον κρίνειν περὶ τούτων. ‘The tribunal here referred to may be 
found described in the ninth book of the Laws, 855, D. 

5. τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ. ‘To avenge the law.’’ It sometimes has this 
same sense with the dative: τιμωρεῖν tiv, ‘to avenge any one.” 
In the middle voice, ‘‘to take revenge, or to avenge one’s self.” 
The noun τιμωρία, as well as τίσις, generally has reference to vin- 
dictive, in distinction from preventive or remedial punishment. 

6. ἐν ἑκάστῳ. Ast would read here ἕν ἕκαστον. The construc- 
tion, in the common reading, is somewhat unusual, but not suffi- 
ciently so to justify the correction proposed. Tiuyjua would mean, 
originally, an estamate, a fine; but it is applied to any species of pun- 
ishment, and may be rendered here, generally, penam or penas. 
Ordo—riwdtw τὸ δικαστήριον τίμημα ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν Kal’ ἕν ἀσεθούντων, 
equivalent to saying—zn each individual case of each, or according to 
each particular offence. 

7. δεσμωτηρίων δὲς This isthe common reading. Stephanus and 
Ast would put a comma after πᾶσι, read yé for δὲ, and thus connect 
the whole of this, down to φήμην τινά, as an appendage to the pre- 
ceding short sentence. Without this, it is said, the sense must re- 
main suspended. It may be a question, however, whether this con 


76 CONTRA ATHEOS. 
ΕΝ 


ὄντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τριῶν, ἑνὸς μέν, κοινοῦ" τοῖς πλείστοις, 
περὶ ἀγοράν, σωτηρίας ἕνεκα τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν δωμάτων, 
ἑνὸς δέ, περὶ τὸν τῶν νύκτωρ συλλεγομένων ξύλλογον, σω- 
φρονιστήριον" ἐπονομαζόμενον, ἑνὸς δὲ αὖ κατὰ μέσην τὴν 
χώραν, ὅπηπερ"" ἂν ἐ i TE Kal ὡς OTL μάλιστα ἀγριώτα- 
τος ἢ τόπος, τιμωρίας ἔχων ἐπωνυμίαν φήμην" τινά. περὲ 


sideration alone is sufficient to justify the change, although so 
slight. Such cases of suspension do occur in the Platonic writings, 
in’ places where all efforts at correction fail; and in the present case 
some might suppose even the irregularity to be more tolerable than 
the attaching so long an appendix to so short a clause, and by so” 
feeble a connective. We would suggest, moreover, whether it 
would not be better to connect this with περὶ ἀσέθειαν δὲ ὄντων be- 
low. There is, it 15 true, something awkward in making the enu- 
meration of offenders an apparent inference from the number of 
prisons, yet still there is something of a natural connexion between 
the two ideas, so that the one might easily suggest the other, al 
though in an inverted order. 

8. κοινοῦ τοῖς πλείστοις. ‘* Common to the people at large,” that 
is, to the ordinary class of offenders. Σωτηρίας ἕνεκα τῶν σωμάτων. 
This is precisely the phrase of the English common Δ law—for the safe 
keeping of the body—an corporis custodiam. 

9. σωφρονιστήριον. The police prison, or, more properly, the house 
of correction, the place where lawless people are sobered. 

10. ὅπῃπερ. ‘In the very spot in which.” ὡς ὅτε μάλιστα ἀγριώ- 
τατος. ‘These particles, thus combined, form the strongest superla- 
tive in the power of the Greek language. ‘The three are seldom 
found in this manner in one expression. It may be styled a double 
super-superlative. 

11. ἐπωνυμίαν φήμην. Φήμην here may be regarded as having the 
force of an adjective—famosam. Or it may be rendered, “ having in 
common fame (kata φήμην), or by common report, the appellation,” 
&c. The first prison was for safe custody; the second for correc- 
tion, discipline, or reformation ; the third, the prison of vengeance 
(τιμωρίας), of strictly penal restraint, intended for examples, and not 
for the good of the offender. Plato seems to have in mind the de- 
partments in Hades, which he specifies in the Gorgias, and to rep- 
resent human laws as proceeding by the same grades with their 
brethren of the other world: οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοΐ, οἱ ἐν Aidov NOMOI, 
as he styles them in the Crito, 54, C. This prison would be analo- 
gous to that division in Hell to which the ἀνέατοι, or incurable, are 


CONTRA ATHEOS. "bd 


ἀσέθειαν δὲ bvTwY,'* αἰτίαις μὲν τρισίν, αἷσπερ καὶ διῆλθο- 
μεν, δύο δ᾽ ἐξ ἑκάστης τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας γενομένων, δὲ 
ἂν γίγνοιντο, ἃ καὶ διακρίσεως ἄξια γένη τῶν περὶ τὰ ϑεῖα 
ἁμαρτανόντων, οὐκ ἴσης οὐδ᾽ ὁμοίας δίκης δεόμενα. οἷς γὰρ 
ἂν μὴ νομίζουσι ϑεοὺς εἷναι τοπαράπαν, ἦθος φύσει προσ- 
γένηται δίκαιον, μισοῦντές τε γίγνονται τοὺς κακούς, καὶ 
τῷ δυσχεραίνειν" τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὔτε τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις 
προσίενται πράττειν, τούς τε μὴ δικαίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
φεύγουσι, καὶ τοὺς δικαίους στέργουσιν - οἷς δ᾽ ἂν πρὸς TH 
δόξῃ τῇ ϑεῶν ἔρημα" εἷναι πάντα, ἀκράτειαϊ," τε ἡδονῶν 


consigned as everlasting admonitions, and spectacles of the Divine 
vengeance: ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Aldov ἐν τῷ 
ΔΕΣΜΩΤΉΡΙΩΙ, ϑεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. Gorgias, 525, C. 

12. περὶ ἀσέθειαν δὲ ὄντων. An elliptical mode of expression, which 
may be thus rendered: ‘* Those who are conversant with impiety, be- 
ing so from three causes which we have described, and there beirg 
two classes from each such cause, there would be, of those who of- 
fend against Divine things, six kinds worthy of discrimination, and 
requiring neither an equal nor a similar sentence.” 

13. τῷ δυσχεραίνειν. “ΒΥ having a disrelish for wrong doing,” 
that is, a dislike arising from habit, prejudice, or an early bias of 
the mind remaining in spite of their Atheism. 

14. ϑεῶν ἔρημα. Nothing could convey a more vivid idea of the 
horrors of Atheism than this expression. Every meaning of the 
word ἔρημα crowds at once into the serious mind; a universe de- 
serted, lonely, solitary, waste, forsaken—a wilderness full of horror and 
desolation in proportion to its boundless extent. Probably the best 
antidote to Atheism, when it happens to invade the mind, and more 
effective than any speculative argument, would be to yield up the 
soul for a season to the deep gloom of so insupportable a thought. 
Of course we mean not the hardened and scoffing Atheist, but one 
to whom the most transient shade of skepticism on this point is a 
source of pain. Τὸ quote again the line of Empedocles, we may 
well say, in reference to such a one, 

δειλὸς δ᾽ @ σκοτόεσσα ϑεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν. 

The expression ϑεῶν ἔρημα seems used here by Plato as an an- 
tithesis to that of Thales, referred to page 41, ϑεῶν εἶναι πλήρη πάντα. 

15. ἀκράτειαι. See remarks on this word in connexion with cw: 
φροσύνη ἀκολασία, &c., Note LXVIII., App. 

G2 


78 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


καὶ λυπῶν προσπέσωσι, μνῆμαΐ τε ἰσχυραὶ καὶ μαθήσεις 
ὀξεῖαι παρῶσι, τὸ μὲν μὴ νομίζειν ϑεοὺς ἀμφοῖν; ἂν Ev 
ὑπάρχοι κοινὸν πάθος" TH δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων λώθῃ, 
τὸ μὲν ἐλάττω, τὸ δὲ πλείω κακὰ ἐργάζοιτ᾽ ἄν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ 
λόγῳ" τε ἂν περὶ ϑεοὺς παῤῥησίας εἴη μεστὸς καὶ περὶ ϑυ- 
σίας τε καὶ ὕρκους, καὶ ὡς τῶν ἄλλων καταγελῶν τάχ᾽ 
ἂν ἑτέρους τοιούτους ἀπεργάζοιτο, δίκης μὴ τυγχάνων" ὁ 
δὲ δὴ δοξάζων" μὲν καθάπερ ἅτερος, εὐφυὴς δὲ ἐπικαλούμε- 
voc, δόλου δὲ καὶ ἐνέδρας πλήρης, ἐξ ὧν μάντεις τε κατασ- 
κευάζονται πολλοὶ καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μαγγανείαν κεκινη- 
μένοι." γίγνονται δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τύραννοι καὶ 
δημηγόροι καὶ στρατηγοί, καὶ τελεταῖς δὲ ἰδίαις ἐπιθεθου.- 
λευκότες, σοφιστῶν TE ἐπικαλουμένων μηχαναί." τούτων 
δὴ. πολλὰ μὲν εἴδη γένοιτ᾽ ἄν - τὰ δὲ νόμων ἄξια ϑέσεως 
δύο, ὧν τὸ μὲν εἰρωνικὸν" τὸ οὐχ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ δυοῖν ἄξια 
ϑανάτοιν! ἁμαρτάνον, τὸ δὲ νουθετήσεως ἅμα καὶ δεσμῶν 


1. ἀμφοῖν. This word relates back to the preceding sentence, not- 
withstanding it had been apparently fully closed and takes in both 
classes, as far as.they hold the atheistic sentiment in common al- 
though with different practical results. 

2. ὁ μὲν yap λόγῳ. See Note LXXII., App., on the different spe- 
cies of Atheists, according to the Platonic division. Aogd@wv.... 
εὐφυὴς. See Note LXXII., App. 

3. κεκινημένοι. ‘* Who are most strenuously and violently en- 
gaged in every species of juggling or legerdemain.”’ 

A. ἐπιθεθουλευκότες. Not simply ‘those who attempt private 
mysteries,’ mysteria privata molientes, as some render it, but, rather, 
‘“‘those who, by means of such mysteries, plot to deceive other 
men.” We would, therefore, regard τελεταῖς as the dative of the 
instrument. 

5. μηχαναὶ σοφιστῶν. The abstract is used here for the concrete. 
It is an expression equivalent to οἱ ταῖς μηχαναῖς σοφιστῶν χρώμενοι, 
‘those who use sophistical arts.” 

6. τὸ μὲν εἰρωνικὸν. See Note LXXII., App. 

7. οὐχ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ δυοῖν ϑανάτοιν. That is, either one or two deaths 
would be too small a punishment for him. No one will think this 
sentence too severe, who has carefully studied those specimens of 


CONTRA ATHEOS. “9 


δεόμενον. ὡσαύτως δὲ" καὶ τὸ ϑεοὺς νομίζειν ἀμελεῖν δύ᾽ 
ἕτερα γεννᾷ, καὶ τὸ παραιτητοὺς ἄλλα δύο. τούτων δὴ 
ταύτῃ διεστηκότων, τοὺς μὲν ὑπ᾽ ἀνοίας, ἄνευ κάκης ὀργῆς 
τε καὶ ἤθους γεγενημένους, εἰς τὸ σωφρονιστήριον O δικασ- 
τὴς τιθέμενος νόμῳ, τιθέσθω μηδὲν ἔλαττον ἐτῶν πέντε. 
ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ μηδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτοῖς ἄλλος 
συγγιγνέσθω, πλὴν οἱ τοῦ νυκτερινοῦ ξυλλόγου" κοινω- 
νοῦντες, ἐπὶ νουθετήσει TE καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρίᾳ ὁμι- 
λοῦντες.." ὅταν δ᾽ ὁ χρόνος αὐτοῖς ἐξέλθῃ τῶν δεσμῶν, ἐὰν 
μὲν δοκῇ τις σωφρονεῖν αὐτῶν, οἰκείτω μετὰ τῶν σωφρό- 





this abominable character to which we have referred, Note ΧΧΠΗ,, 
App. 

8. ὡσαύτως δὲς The doctrines, that there was no special Provi- 
dence, and that the Gods were easily propitiated, gave rise also, 
each respectively, to two species of offenders, distinguished by 
characters analogous to those above presented, and requiring each 
a different mode and gradation of punishment; the mildest form of 
which was to be imprisonment in the σωφρονιστήριον, or house of 
correction, for a term not less than five years. Such a law, among 
us at the present day, would be thought greatly to infringe on men’s 
religious liberties—on the precious right to be an Atheist or blas- 
phemer. 

9. ruxtepivod EvAddyov. See Note LXXIIL., App. 

10. ἐπὶ νουθετήσει TE Kal TH τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρίᾳ ὁμιλοῦντες. ‘* Con- 
versing with them for admonition, and for the salvation of the soul.” 
It is interesting to meet thus in a heathen writer with that very 
expression with which from infancy we have been accustomed to as- 
sociate the most sacred ideas of Christianity. We may, perhaps, have 
given it too much of a Scriptural aspect in our rendering of σωτηρία, 
—the term, as thus presented by Plato, being undoubtedly to be taken 
in a somewhat lower sense—yet still, with all qualifications, what an 
immense difference does such language, employed in such connex- 
ions, make between him and all other philosophers and legislators 
either of ancient or moderntimes. The phrase σωτηρία ψυχῆς seems 
also to have been intended by way of antithesis to the expression 
σωτηρίας σώματος, some distance back, page 76 (8). In this view, the 
σωφρονιστήριον was not only intended, in corporis custodiam ΠΟΥ the 
safe keeping of the body, but also for the well-being, health, 07 salva- 
tion of the soul. 


80 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


νων" ἐὰν δὲ μή, ὀφείλῃ δ᾽ αὖθις THY τοιαύτην δίκην, Sava- 
τῳ ζημιούσθω. ὅσοι δ᾽ ἂν ϑηριώδεις"" γένωνται πρὸς τῷ 
ϑεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν ἢ ἀμελεῖς ἢ παραιτητοὺς εἶναι, κατα- 
φρονοῦντες δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαγωγῶσι"" μὲν πολλοὺς 
τῶν ζώντων τοὺς δὲ τεθνεῶτας φάσκοντες φψυχαγωγεῖν, 
καὶ ϑεοὺς ὑπισχνούμενοι πείθειν, ὡς ϑυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς 
καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς γοητεύοντες, ἰδιώτας τε καὶ ὅλας οἰκίας καὶ 
πόλεις χρημάτων χάριν ἐπιχειρῶσι κατ᾽ ἄκρας" ἐξαιρεῖν, 
τούτων δὲ ὃς ἂν ὄφλων εἷναι δόξῃ, τιμάτω τὸ δικαστήριον 
αὐτῷ κατὰ νόμον, δεδέσθαι μὲν ἐν τῷ τῶν μεσογείων δεσ- 
μωτηρίῳ - προσιέναι δὲ αὐτῷ μηδένα ἐλεύθερον μηδέποτε, 
τακτὴν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν νομοφυλάκων αὐτοὺς τροφὴν παρὰ τῶν 
οἰκετῶν λαμθάνειν, ἀποθανόντα δὲ ἔξω τῶν ὁρίων ἐκθάλ- 
Ae ἄταφον. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐλεύθερος συνθάπτῃ, δίκας ἀσεθεί- 

11. ϑηριώδεις. See remarks on this word, page 69 (5). The man- 
ner in which it is used here seems to confirm the view that was 
there taken. In this place reference is had to the character de- 
scribed, page 78, as δόλου καὶ ἐνέδρας πλήρης, which corresponds 
poorly to ϑηριώδεις in the sense of ferocious. Guile and jugglery, 
which are the leading traits, are not in keeping with such a mean- 
ing, although perfectly consistent with such beastly views of the 
Divine nature as may be entertained by an Atheist, or a Simon 
Magus, or such a one as is described Note LXXII., App. 

10. ψυχαγωγῶσι. This term, in its primary sense, is applied to 
Mercury as conductor of the souls of the dead to Hades. In asecond- 
ary sense, it is employed of those who pretended to raise ghosts by 
magic arts: gut imprecando et cantando animas ex inferis in terram 
evocabant. A third meaning is ¢o cajole or allure the soul by flatteries 


or sophistry. It is thus applied by the buffoon Aristophanes to 
Socrates himself, in the Comedy of the Birds, 1551: 


Λίμνη τις ἔστ᾽ ἄλουτος, οὗ 
ψυχαγωγεῖ Σωκράτης. 
Plato uses the word here in both the two latter senses. 
- 11. κατ᾽ ἄκρας. Compare the Iliad, N., 772. : 
Νῦν ὥλετο πᾶσα κατ᾽ ἄκρης 
Ἴλιος ἀιπεινή. 


Sometimes it is written as one word, κατάκρας, as in Soph., Antig., 
200. 


CONTRA ATHEOS. 8] 


ας τῷ ἐθέλοντι λαγχάνειν ὑπεχέτω. παῖδας δὲ ἂν μὲν Ka- 
τωλίπῃ" τῇ πόλει ἱκανούς, οἱ τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιμελούμε- 
νοι" καὶ τούτων, ὡς ὄντων ὀρφανῶν, ἐπιμελείσθων μηδὲν 
᾿χεῖρον τῶν ἄλλων, ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἂν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῶν 
ὄφλῃ τὴν δίκην. κοινὸν" δ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτοις πᾶσι νόμον κεῖσθαι 
χρεών, ὃς ἐλάττω τε εἰς ϑεοὺς αὐτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἔργῳ 
καὶ λόγῳ πλημμελεῖν ἂν ποιοῖ, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνοήτους γίγτνεσ- 
θαι ἧττον, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξεῖναι ϑεοπολεῖν παρὰ νόμον. ἔστω 
yap νόμος ὅδε τοῖς ξύμπασι κείμενος ἁπλῶς - “Ἱερὰ μηδὲ 
εἷς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἐκτήσθω. ϑύειν δ᾽ ὅταν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἴῃ 
τινί, πρὸς τὰ δημόσια ἴτω ϑύσων" καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσί τε καὶ 
ἱερείαις ἐγχειριξέτω τὰ ϑύματα, οἷς. ἁγνεία τούτων ἐπιμε- 
λῆς συνευξάσθω δὲ αὐτός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐθέλῃ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ 
συνεύχεσθαι. ταῦτα δὲ γιγνόμενα τῶν τοιῶνδε χάριν ἔστω. 
ἱερὰ καὶ ϑεοὺς οὐ padsov ἱδρύεσθαι, μεγάλης δὲ διανοίας 
τινὸς ὀρθῶς δρᾷν τὸ τοιοῦτον " ἔθος τε γυναιξί τε δὴ δια- 
φερόντως πάσαις καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσι πάντη καὶ κινδυνεύ- 
ουσι καὶ ἀποροῦσιν, ὅπη τις ἂν ἀπορῇ, καὶ τοὐναντίον, 
ὅταν εὐπορίας τινὸς λάθωνται, καθιεροῦν τε τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ 


12. παῖδας δὲ ἂν μὲν καταλίπῃ. This to others must have been 
intended as the most.solemn and impressive part of the law, much 
more so than the casting of the unburied body beyond the boundaries 
of the state. The children of the Atheist were to become orphans 
immediately after his sentence to solitary imprisonment, that is, 
after his civil death. ‘The domestic relations were to be regarded as 
no longer existing in the case of the man who had sundered, as far 
as in him lay, his relations to God. In the language of the Jewish 
law, he was to be utterly cut off from his people. 

13. of τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι. These were to be the fifteen 
oldest Nomophulakes, who were to have the general charge of all 
matters relating to orphans, wills, wards, and wardship. They are 
mentioned book eleventh of the Laws, 924, C. They were to be 
divided into five classes of three each, to serve successively, each 
class for one year. 

14. κοινὸν ἐπὶ τούτοις πᾶσι νόμον. See Note LXXIV., App. 

15. Ἱερὰ καὶ ϑεοὺς ov ῥᾷδιον ἱδρύεσθαι. See Note LXXIV., App., 
on private innovations in religion. 


82 CONTRA ATHEOS. 


Kat ϑυσίας εὔχεσθαι καὶ ἱδρύσεις ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ϑεοῖς καὶ 
δαίμοσι' καὶ παισὶ ϑεῶν, ἔν τε φάσμασιν ἐγρηγορότας" διὰ 
φόθους καὶ ἐν ὀνείροις, ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως ὄψεις πολλὰς ἀπομνη.- 
μονεύοντας, ἑκάσταισί" τε αὐτῶν ἄκη ποιουμένους βωμοὺς" 
καὶ ἱερά, πάσας μὲν οἰκίας, πάσας δὲ κώμας, ἔν τε καθα- 
poic* ἱδρυομένους ἐμπιπλάναι, καὶ ὅπη τις ἔτυχε τῶν τοιού- 
των. ὧν ἕνεκα χρὴ πάντων ποιεῖν κατὰ τὸν νῦν λεγόμε- 
νον νόμον πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἕνεκα τῶν ἀσεθούντων, ἵνα 
μὴ καὶ ταῦτα κλέπτοντες πράξεσιν," ἱερά τε καὶ βωμοὺς ἐν 
ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἱδρυόμενοι, AdOpa τοὺς ϑεοὺς ἵλεως οἰόμενοι 
ποιεῖν ϑυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς, εἰς ἄπειρον τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐξ- 
άνοντες, αὑτοῖς τε ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ϑεῶν ποιῶνται, καὶ 
τοῖς ἐπιτρέπουσιν, οὖσιν αὐτῶν βελτίοσι" καὶ πᾶσα οὕτως 
ἡ πόλις ἀπολαύῃ τῶν ἀσεθῶν τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως. τὸν 


1. ϑεοῖς καὶ δαίμοσι καὶ παισὶ ϑεῶν. See Note LXVIL., on the doc- 
trine of the Demons or Genit. 

2. ἐγρηγορότας. When awake, vigilantes, as opposed to ἐν ὀνείροις. 
This presents a case of anakolouthon, and is to be referred to the 
datives γυναιξί and ἀσθενοῦσι above. Διὰ φόθους here, as Ast ob- 
serves, is to be taken as equivalent to πεφοθημένους, perterritos. 

3. éxdotatot. The feminine is used in reference to ὄψεις, the 
last mentioned, although the word belongs equally to φάσμασιν and 
ὀνείροις. 

4. ἔν τε καθαροῖς. Sub dio, in the open air. 

5. κλέπτοντες πράξεσιν. In this expression the verbal noun 
πράξεσιν has the force of the verb, and the participle κλέπτοντες is 
used like a qualifying adverb, as though it had been λάθρα πράτ- 
TOVTEC. 

6. καὶ πᾶσα οὕτως 7 πόλις ἀπολαύῃ. We have here the ancient 
universal doctrine of The State as an organic whole or body, witha 
national conscience, in distinction from the very modern notion of a 
mere mass or aggregate of individual wills. As an organic whole, it 
was morally responsible for every part. Crime unpunished not only 
infected the moral health, but brought also justly imputed guilt upon 
the entire corporate organization. No reader of the Old Testament 
can doubt that this doctrine was taught there in all its apparent 
severity. We need only refer in proof to the case of Achan, Josh. 
Vii., 25, and other striking examples of those who troubled, or wrought 


CONTRA ATHEOs. δὼ 


μὲν δὴ νομοθέτην ὁ ϑεὸς ov μέμψεται. κείσθω γὰρ ὁ νόμος 
οὗτος, μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ϑεῶν ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἱερά " τὸν δὲ 
φανέντα κεκτημένον ἕτερα καὶ ὀργιάζοντα πλὴν τὰ δημό- 
ola, ἐὰν μὲν ἄδικον μηδὲν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ ἀνοσίων εἰἶρ- 
γασμένος ἀνὴρ ἢ καὶ γυνὴ κπεκτῆταί τις, ὃ μὲν αἰσθόμενος 
καὶ εἰσαγγελλέτω τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν, οἱ δὲ προσταττόντων 
,εἰς τὰ δημόσια ἀποφέρειν ἱερὰ τὰ ἴδια, μὴ πείθοντες δὲ 
ζημιούντων, ἕως av ἀπενεχθῇ. ἐὰν δέ τις ἀσεθήσας μὴ 
παιδίων ἀλλ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ἀσέθημα ἀνοσίων γένηται φανερός, 
εἴτε ἐν ἰδίοις ἱδρυσάμενος, εἴτ᾽ ἐν δημοσίοις ϑύσας ἱερὰ ϑε- 
οἷς οἱστισινοῦν, ὡς οὐ καθαρὸς ὧν ϑύων, ϑανάτῳ ζημιούσ- 
θω" τὸ δὲ, παιδίων ἢ wh, κρίναντες νομοφύλακες, εἰς τὸ 
δικαστήριον οὕτως εἰσαγαγόντες, τὴν τῆς ἀσεθείας δίκην 
τούτοις ἐπιτελούντων. 





folly in Israci. The same sentiment may often be found in the 
Greek poets. Compare, especially, Hesiod, Works and Days, 223: 

Πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύγα, 

ὅστις ἀλιτραίνει καὶ ἀτάσθαλα μηχανάαται. 

τοῖσιν δ᾽ οὐρανόθεν μέγ᾽ ἐπήλασε πῆμα Κρονίων, 

λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν " ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί: 

οὐδὲ γυναῖκες τίκτουσιν " μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκοι, 

Ζηνὸς φραδμοσύνῃσιν ᾿Ολυμπίου " ἄλλοτε 0’ αὖτε 

ἢ τῶν γε στρατὸν εὐρὺν ἀπώλεσεν, ἢ Gye τεῖχος, 

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EXTENDED NOTES 


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DISSERTATIONS, 


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EXTENDED NOTES 


AND 


DISSERTATIONS. 


I, 
The Platonic View of the Parental and Filial Relations, and 
the Ancient Doctrine generally on this Subject. 


Pace 2, Line 8. τς δὲ γονέας. A misconception of 
the end and scope of the Republic, or, as it should be more 
properly styled, The Dialogue on the Nature of Right or 
Righteousness (περὶ δικαίου), has subjected the name of 
Plato to great reproach. He has been charged with main- 
taining, in the fifth book of that dialogue, sentiments which, 
if carried out, would result in the utter overthrow of all the 
domestic relations. A defence, had we space for it here, 
might be derived from the peculiar parabolical or allegorical 
nature of that work, and from the evident absence of any 
design that it should serve as the model of any actual ex- 
isting polity. Whether, however, this be regarded as a 
right view of the Republic or not, and whatever we may 
think of the justice of the charge to which he may there be 
thought to have exposed himself, there can be no doubt 
that in this treatise (περὲ vouwy), in which he means to ap- 
pear in the character of a serious legislator for a really 
practicable, if not existing state, he takes special pains to 
remove the reproach to which, even in his own day, he 
had been subjected on account of the passages referred to 
This long dialogue on legislation was the work of his old 
age, and in it he strives to set in the highest light the 
sanctity of the domestic, and especially the filial and pa- 


88 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE 


renta] relations. For the strongest proof of this, we might 
refer, among many other passages, to what is said in the 
ninth book, 881, A., and especially to that most striking 
and beautiful passage, lib. xi., 931, A., in which he speaks 
of the veneration of children towards their parents as a re- 
figious, rather than a merely moral or political duty, and 
not only this, but also as involving acts partaking of the na-_ 
ture of religious worship. We would recommend to the 
student the close study of the whole argument, not only for 
its exceeding moral beauty, but also as a most triumphant 
refutation of the charge that Plato, like some modern re. 
formers, would have destroyed the family state. Tovéwv 
δὲ ἀμελεῖν, οὔτε ϑεὸς οὔτε ἄνθρωπος νοῦν ἔχων ξύμθουλός 
ποτε γένοιτ᾽ ἂν οὐδεὶς οὐδενί. φρονῆσαι δὲ χρὴ περὶ ϑεῶν, 
k.T. A. In this passage he not only sets in the highest 
light the sanctity of the relation, and of the duties resulting, 
but would deduce from it a method of indirectly reforming 
the grossness of some parts of religious worship, by sub- 
stituting the holy feeling of filial veneration for the idola- 
trous adoration of household images of the Gods. He 
would have their plate occupied by the venerable living 
form of the aged sire or grandsire, as the household ἀγαλ- 
ua, or image of the Eternal Father. Πατὴρ οὖν ὅτῳ καὶ 
μήτηρ ἢ τούτων πατέρες ἢ μητέρες EV οἰκίῳ κεῖνται κειμή- 
λιοι ἀπειρηκότες γήρῳ, μηδεὶς διανοηθήτω ποτὲ ἄγαλμα 
αὐτῷ, τοιοῦτον ἐφέστιον ἵδρυμα ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχων, μᾶλλον 
κύριον ἔσεσθαι, ἐὰν δὴ κατὰ τρόπον γε ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ϑερα- 
πεύῃ ὃ κεκτημένος. ‘If any one hath a father, or mother, 
or grandparents worn out with age, and laid up as sacred 
relics in his house, let him never suppose, as long as he 
possesses this altar of the domestic hearth, that any other 
ἄγαλμα or sacred image is more worthy of his adoration, 
provided he knows how to worship it aright.” And again, 
931, D., ᾿Ουκοῦν διανοηθῶμεν ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸς ϑεῶν τιμιώ- 
τερον ἄγαλμα ἂν κτησαίμεθα πατρὸς καὶ προπάτορος πα- 


FILIAL RELATION. 89 


ρειμένων γήρᾳ καὶ μητέρων τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἐχουσῶν--- 
οὺς ὅσον ἀγάλλῃ τις τιμαῖς γέγηθεν ὃ ϑεός. ‘Let us, 
then, believe that we can have no religious image more pre- 
cious in the sight of Heaven than a father, or grandfather, 
or mother worn out with age, and that in proportion as we 
honour or delight in them with a religious joy (so ἀγάλ- 
An, whence ἄγαλμα, may be rendered here, as in Pindar, 
Olymp., 1., 139), in the same proportion does God himself 
rejoice.” If this is idolatry, it is certainly far more inno- 
cent than that which is practised by the professedly 
Christian Church of Rome. What a beautiful and affect- 
ing picture is here presented! ‘The aged and infirm parent 
not only revered in the secret sanctuary of the heart, but 
actually regarded, if not as the very household deity of the 
secluded domestic temple, yet, in truth, as the best visible 
representation or εἰκὼν, through whom homage was to be 
rendered to the Invisible God. Sophocles seems to have 
had in mind something of this same beautiful conception in 
the Antigone, 703: 


Ti yap πατρὸς ϑάλλοντος, εὐ Shee τέκνοις 
"ATAAMA μεῖζον ; 


There is not the same high meaning to ἄγαλμα here as 
in Plato, although in other respects the language is striking- 
ly similar. It more strongly resembles Proverbs, xvii., 6: 
ἘΞΌΝ 733 nwa» where the Hebrew word mwan has 
a striking affinity to the Greek ἄγαλμα, being like it, too, 
used in a religious sense, as in Psalm Ixxvill., 61, where 
it is applied to the ark of the covenant. 

As a consequence of this religious relation, Plato attaches 
great importance to the blessing and curse of a parent, and 
in this he is in accordance with one of the most ancient 
and universal doctrines that have ever prevailed among 
mankind. After reciting the OO a of Theseus, Bans 


and Amyntor, he thus proceeds: ἀραῖος yap γονεὺς ἐκγόνοις 
Η 2 


90 ' PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE 


ὡς οὐδεὶς ἕτερος ἄλλοις δικαιότατα, 931, C. “For the 
curse of a parent (to give a free rendering) comes loaded 
with calamity to children in a way that is true of no other 
relations.” Wherefore, as he says in another passage, 
πᾶς δὴ νοῦν ἔχων φοθεῖται καὶ τιμᾷ γονέων εὐχάς, εἰδὼς 
πολλοῖς καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιτελεῖς γενομένας, 931, A. “ Every 
one that hath reason both fears and honours the prayers of 
parents, knowing well that often, and to many, have they 
been fulfilled.” How deeply this sentiment was impressed 
upon the minds of the Grecian poets, and how important an 
element it forms of their most tragic representations, we 
may learn from the dismal effects and long train of calam- 
itous consequences which they set forth as following the 
imprecations of Cidipus upon his unnatural sons. ‘The 
sad story of Hippolytus, who, although innocent, is repre- 
sented by Euripides as perishing under a father’s impreca- 
— tion, exhibits the same doctrine, although in a most pervert- 
ed and distorted form. ‘The dying cry which the poet puts 
into the mouth of the wretched young man, 
ὦ πατρὸς ἐμοῦ δύστηνος apa, 

shows how awful was the calamity which the ancient world 
universally regarded as involved in a parent’s curse. The 
converse doctrine, namely, the importance of the parental 
blessing, is certainly one of the most clearly taught truths 
of the Old Testament. How consonant it is, both with the 
language and spirit of Scripture, no one need be told who 
recollects the value attached to the blessing of the Patriach 
Isaac, and the declarations of the dying Jacob to the twelve 
heads of Israel, besides many other passages which are . 
founded upon the same idea. 

It was a prominent principle in all the ancient systems 
of law and religion that the relation of parent and child 
gave rise to religious, rather than merely ezvdl obligations. 
Hence Aristotle says, ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκ- 
γοις ὡς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ϑεούς - τοῦ γὰρ εἷναι καὶ τραφῆναι 


FILIAL RELATION. 9] 


αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι. Ethic. Nicomach., 
viil., 12, 5. They belonged to the class of duties styled 
ὅσια, in distinction from those that were only δίκαια, and 
their violation was regarded among offences committed 
directly against Heaven. Something of this feeling has 
come down and affected even modern languages. Hence 
we speak of filial piety or impiety. On this account the 
Bible makes this relation the subject of the first command- 
ment immediately following the direct duties we owe to God, 
aud hence, too, the Jewish law punished the crime with 
such unrelenting severity, as though, if permitted to pass 
with impunity, it would be the fruitful source of every viola- 
tion, both of the laws of Heaven and Earth. ‘The filial and 
parental tie seems to have been regarded as a continuation 
of that which bound us to God, and hence, in strictest har- 
mony with this view, Plato tegards the man who had sun- 
dered the latter as having utterly annihilated the duties and 
obligations of the former. On this account, as we have 
seen in a passage on which we have already commented, 
_ page 81, the children of the Atheist were to be regarded as 
orphans, and placed under the care of the state. 

The importance of this relation in a political point of 
view, may be inferred from the fifth commandment itself. 
The promise annexed has generally been referred to indi- 
viduals. It appears to us, however, to have more of a po- 
litical aspect, and to be addressed to the nation collective- 
ly. The language certainly seems to favour this idea: 
“that thy days may be long zn the /and which the Lord thy 
God giveth thee ;” intimating that the long continuance of 
their national polity in the land of Canaan would depend, 
more than on anything else, on the preservation of this fund- 
amental conservative article ; on the reverence with which 
this duty should be regarded, as forming the connecting 
link between the civil and the more purely religious, and 
as being the source and guarantee of every inferior domestic 


92 PLATONIC DICTRINE OF TIE 


and political obligation. For undoubted examples of the 
same and similar language, used in the national instead of 
the individual sense, see Deuteronomy, iv., 26, 40; v., 30; 
ere) 2. 

In accordance with this universal sentiment of antiquity, 
Plato, in the passage at the beginning of these remarks, 
and in other places in the Laws, enumerates duties to 
parents as immediately succeeding those which are owed 
to God, and ranks their violation as next in enormity to 
public and private sacrilege. Compare the fourth book of 
the Laws, 717, B., and especially a most remarkable pas- 
sage in the ninth book, 881, A.: Πατρὸς yap ἢ μητρὸς ἢ 
τούτων ETL προγόνων ὅστις τολμήσει ἅψασθαι ποτὲ βιαζό.- 
μενος αἰκίᾳ τινί, μῆτε τῶν ἄνω δείσας ϑεῶν μῆνιν, μήτε 
τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς τιμωριῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ καταφρονῶν τῶν 
παλαιῶν καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων εἰρημένων παρανομεῖ, τούτῳ δεῖ 
τίνος ἀποτροπῆς ἐσχάτης. ϑάνατος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἔσχατον, οἱ δὲ ἐν “Αἰδου τούτοισι λεγόμενοι πόνοι, Kc. 
“Tf any one shall dare to treat with violence father or 
mother, or any one of his or their progenitors, having before 
his eyes neither the fear of the powers above, nor of the 
vengeance of the world beneath, but, despising the ancient 
and universal traditions of mankind, shall break through all 
law, for such a one there is need of some most extreme 
remedy. Death, then, is not this greatest or most extreme 
remedy, but something still beyond this, even those pains 
of Hell which are said to await these enormous offenders.” 
‘The whole passage is full of dreadful meaning, which can 
with difficulty be transferred to the English. We have no 
word which comes up to the Greek ὠποτροπῆ. It is ap- 
plied to the most solemn religious act by which we may 
avert the wrath of Heaven for some enormous wickedness, 
and hence the terms ἀποτρόπαιος, ἀποτροπιασμός, inauspi- 
cious, that which is to be averted by sacrifice, an expiation 
or turning away of the Divine wrath, and, in a secondary 


FILIAL REJL.ATION. 93 


sense, whatever 1s most odious or an uller abomination. In 
alk lists of great crimes, as presented to us by the poets, 
one of the worst abodes in ‘Tartarus is ever assigned to of- 
fenders of this description, and thus Paul classes those who 
are guilty of violence towards their parents among the un- 
holy and profane: ἀνοσίοις καὶ βεθήλοις πατραλῴαις Kat 
μητραλῴαις. 1 Timothy, 1., 9. | 

The holiness of the family relation is intimated, in the 
ancient mythology, by the worship of Vesta; and the per- 
petual cherishing of the domestic affections, as affording 
the vivifying and fructifying warmth by which all social 
and political institutions must be preserved, is represented 
in the Eternal Fire. Well did Cicero say, in aris et focis 
est Respublica. ‘This intimate connexion is set forth by the 
Greek and Latin poets in almost every form of expression. 
Virgil presents the holy alliance in one line: 


Sacra Deiim sanctique patres. 
Georg., 11., 473. 

And this seems but a reiteration of the precept, Leviticus, 
x1x., 2, and of the order in which the religious and family 
duties are there given. Speak unto all the congregation of 
Israel, and say unto them, Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord 
your God am holy. Fear ye every man his father and his 
mother. I am the Lord your God. 

The obligation of filial obedience, as the fountain of all. 
moral and political virtues, is thus beautifully set forth in a 
fragment of Euripides from Stobzus : 


Ἔγω δ᾽ 6 μὲν METIZTON ἄρξομαι λέγειν 
ἐκ τοῦδε πρῶτον " πατρὶ πείθεσθαι χρεὼν 
παῖδας, νομίζειν τ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτ᾽ εἷναι δίκην. 
Eurip. Alopa. 
So, also, in a still more striking fragment of the same 


poet, in which duties to parents are ranked next after those 
due the Gods, and before mere political obligations: 


94 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FILIAL RELATION. 


τρεῖς ἐισὶν ἀρεταὶ ἃς χρὴ σ᾽ ἀσκεῖν ὦ τέκνον, 
ΘΒΟΥΣ τε τιμᾷν, τούς τε ϑρέψαντας ΤΌΝΕΙΣ, 
ΝΟΜΟΥ͂Σ τε κοινοὺς Ελλάδος - καὶ ταῦτα δρῷν 
κάλλιστον ἕξεις στέφανον εὐκλείας ἀεί. 

Eurip. Antiope. 


We have dwelt the longer on this, because we think 
that Plato’s views here, and in many other places in the 
Laws and other dialogues, furnish a complete refutation of 
the charge, which might otherwise be drawn from the fifth 
book of the Republic; and because, at the present day, 
even with all the declarations of the Bible, the relation 
seems to be becoming divested of that sanctity which it 
anciently possessed. In the theories of some, it is placed 
even below civil duties. So far from being thought to pos- 
sess any religious character, it is denied that it forms a sub- 
ject even for political legislation. It is ranked among im- 
perfect obligations, and is never with us, except in some few 
cases of pauperism, enforced by law. Why, when so 
many inferior subjects are made matters of legislation, this 
fundamental and all-conservative relation should have so 
little space assigned to it in our jurisprudence, it would be 
difficult to say. The effects, however, which will inevita- 
bly result, in loosening the whole political structure, can be 
far more easily and with more certainty predicted. ‘The 
relation and the duties resulting are also attacked by spuri- 
ous reformers, who, under the name of a cold and heart- 
hardening universal benevolence, or dove to being in general, 
would utterly break up all the family ties, and destroy all 
the associations connected with that holy word, Our Home. 
‘These men sometimes, in their ignorance, make stale second- 
hand quotations from Plato, and we would wish to rescue 
him from their profane grasp. 


PREAMBLE, OR ADVISORY PART OF THE LAW. 95 


Il. 
The Words προοίμιον and παραμύθιον. The Preambie, 
the Advisory or Argumentative Part of the Law. 


Pace 2, Line 16. To παραμύθιον ὑποθεμένῳ ῥητέον ἃ 
δεῖ πάσχειν. “The lawgiver (νομοθέτῃ, understood) must 
declare what each one must suffer, after having put under, 
by way of hypothesis or foundation, an exhortation or pre- 
amble.” Another reading has προοίμιον, which 15 followed 
by Ficinus. ‘They both, however, would possess nearly 
the same significance. Προοίμιον would literally mean “a 
preface or preamble ;” παραμύθιον, ‘an exhortatory ex- 
ordium,” containing the ground or reason of the law. ‘This 
the philosopher deemed essentially and peculiarly neces- 
sary in those institutions that related to religion. Such an 
exhortation or argument, by way of preamble, nearly the 
whole of this tenth book may be considered, as only the 
last few pages are devoted to the preceptive declaration, 
and the penal statute founded upon it. In a more limited 
sense, however, the παραμύθιον here intended is contained 
in what immediately follows. In like manner, Cicero, in 
evident imitation of Plato, introduces in his treatise De 
Legibus a similar προοίμιον, in which he makes religious - 
belief and reverence the only true foundation of law and 
of every form of civil polity. It may be found in that noble 
passage, lib. 11., sec. vil.: Sit igitur hoc a principio per- 
suasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores 
Deos, eaque que gerantur, eorum geri judicio ac numine, 
eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri, et, qualis 
quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua 
pietate colat religiones, intueri, piorumque et impiorum 
habere rationem. His enim rebus imbuteze mentes, haud 
sane abhorrebunt ab utili ac vera sententia. Quid est enim 
verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, 
ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in celo mundoque 


96 PREAMBLE, OR ADVISORY PART OF THE LAW. 


non putet ? aut ut ea, que vix summa ingenii ratione compre- 
hendat, nulla ratione moveri putet? Utiles esse autem 
opiniones has, quis neget, quum intelligat, quam multa fir- 
mentur jurejurando, quant salutis sit federum religiones, 
quam multos Divini supplicii metus a scelere revocarit, 
quamque SANCTA SIT SOCIETAS civium inter ipsos, 
Diis immortalibus interpositis tum judicibus, tum testibus. 
Habes legis PROG®SMIUM: sic enim hoc appellat Plato. 
What a striking contrast between the sentiments of these 
noble heathen, and those of many modern political theories, 
constitutions, and boasting bills of rights, from which the 
very names of God, religion, Christianity, or the least ailu- 
sion to any bond (redigio) by which the visible state is 
connected with the invisible world, are as carefully ex- 
cluded, as though they were the deadliest foes to the po- 
litical happiness of mankind. 
~ On this subject we may compare also the sublime προοί- 
μίον in the Timeus, or the Dialogue in which Plato at- 
tempts to set forth the universal code of laws which govern 
both the physical and intelligible universe. ‘The preamble 
or προοίμιον there, is found in that remarkable passage, in 
which he divides all things into what he styles, 76 "ON 
μὲν ἀεὶ γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον " Kal TO TIVTNOMENON μέν, 
ὃν δὲ οὐδέποτε. τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, 
ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν" τὸ δὲ δόξῃ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, 
δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον, καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε 
ὄν. That which eternally IS and hath never generation, 
and that whichis ever BECOMING or being generated, and 
never truly IS; the one received by the intelligence with 
reason, always BEING in the same relations, the other re- 
ceived by opinion with irrational sense, ever becoming, perish- 
ing, and never truly, and in the highest sense, having a sub- 
stantive being.—Timeus, 27, P. ‘This he evidently intends 
as a preamble to the system of physical and psychological 
legislation contained in that wonderful dialogue; for after 


SUBJECTIVE SENSE OF THE WORD GAnOetw. 97 


dwelling upon the above distinction at some length, pre- 
paratory to the statement of the universal laws of mind and 
matter, Timzus is thus addressed by Socrates: τὸ μὲν οὖν 
IIPOOIMION Savpaciwg ἀπεδεξάμεθά cov, τὸν δὲ δὴ NO- 
MON ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε. ‘Since in such a wonderful 
way we have received from you the preamble, next in order 
propound to us the law.” ‘Timeus, 29, C. 


ΠῚ. 
Subjective Sense of the Word ἀληθεύω. 


Pace 4, Line 9. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ξένε, δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι 
ἀληθεύοντας λέγειν ὡς ἐισὶ ϑεοί; “ Does it not, then, seem 
to be an easy matter to affirm, zn all truthfulness, that there 
are Gods, or that the Gods exist?” ᾿Αληθεύω, although it 
includes in its signification the utterance of truth, and there 
are many passages in which it must be so rendered, has 
yet reference rather to truth of feeling than to truth of ex- 
pression, to that which belongs to the subjective state of 
the soul or the moral diathesis, rather than to that which is 
the result of scientific, or speculative, or casuistical argu- 
ment—what the Psalmist styles, “‘druth in the inward parts.” 
Paul seems to include much of this sense as he uses the 
term, Ephesians, iv., 15---ἀληθεύοντες ἐν ἀγάπῃ : not so 
much “speaking the truth,” as our translation has it, but 
rather, as is shown by the context, and especially by the 
word ἀγάπη, “being truthful, or of a true heart in love.” 
So, also, Galatians, iv., 16—@ote ἐχθρὸς ὑμῶν γέγονα ἀλη- 
θεύων ὑμῖν ; “ Have | become subject to your hatred while 
I am true (in heart) to you?” It may refer, in this last ex 
ample, to the declaration of truth, but even if that is sup- 
posed to be included, the subjective sense of the word is 
still predominant. Hence we may best render ἀληθεύον- 
τας, in the passage at the head of these remarks, adverbial- 


J 


98 SUBJECTIVE SENSE OF THE WORD ὠληθεύω. 


ly, thus: “ In all sincerity, in all truthfulness, in consistency 
with the truest and purest sentiments of our nature.” ‘The 
other rendering, which would refer it merely to the declara- 
tion of truth, would be comparatively tame, besides pro- 
ducing a pleonasm in λέγειν. Our translation is also in 
perfect keeping with the character of the honest and truth- 
ful Clinias, as he is, with great dramatic skill, represented 
to us throughout this whole argument. He uses the lan- 
guage of a man who never had felt a doubt on the subject. 
This is a favourite word with Plato, and frequently to be 
found in his writings in this subjective sense. For a very 
excellent example, see the Theetetus, 202, B.: ὅταν μὲν 
οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάθῃ, ’AAH- 
ΘΕΎΕΙΝ μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ᾽ 
ov. ‘The sentiment is, that the soul may be subjectively in 
harmony with the truth, so as cordially to embrace it in its 
creed before scientific knowledge, or an objective presenta- 
tion of it to the speculative reason. It may have the life 
before it possesses a clear apprehension of the doctrine. 
This may be, and often undoubtedly 15, the case in religion ; 
but those who would, on this account, undervalue logical 
and doctrinal statements, or what they rather disdainfully 
style systematic theology, are in danger either of a mysti- 
cism, in which all clear perceptions of truth are utterly lost, 
or of taking opinions upon the mere testimony of others, or 
on the credit of a blind tradition, without either light in the 
reason, or any true warmth in the affections 

We have an illustration of this truthful state of mind in 
the course which Clinias pursues in the next reply —mporov 
μὲν γῆ καὶ ἥλιος, &c. He enters upon the argument with 
all the confidence of an easy victory. He appeals at once 
to the most obvious phenomena, not so much as scientific 
proofs of the Divine existence, but rather as visible repre- 
sentations of a manifest Divine power. ‘ The Heavens de- 
clare (to all whose souls are prepared for it) the glory of 


THE ORPHIC POETRY. 99 


God.” But as though this had too much the appearance 
of speculative reasoning, he retreats again to his strong- 
hold, the feelings of his own nature, and appeals to the 
common and universal sentiments of mankind. ‘This, with 
the bare aspect of the heavens, he deems enough for those 
who were true-hearted (ἀληθεύοντες) concerning the Gods. 
We are taught in the Holy Scriptures, that not only a true 
belief, but also unbelief in respect to the Divine existence, 
has its seat primarily in the affections rather than in the 
intellect. ‘The fool hath said in his heart, there 1s no 
God.” The Hebrew word here is sometimes used for the 
understanding ; still, like the Greek φρένες, with all its 
cognates, such as φρονέω, φρόνησις, φρόνημα, &c., it gen- 
erally refers to the intellect, not so much in a speculative 
or scientific aspect, but rather as modified by the state of 
the affections or moral powers. 


ΙΝ. 
The Orpluc Poetry. 


Pace 5, Line 12. Οἱ μὲν ἔν τισι μέτροις, οἱ δὲ Kal ἄνευ 
μέτρων. ‘Some in poetry and some in prose.” It is very 
uncertain what prose writings are here referred to. ‘Those 
in poetry must have been the works of Homer, Hesiod, and 
perhaps of Orpheus. The term παλαιότατοι (most ancient) 
would seem to refer to some productions older than the 
Iliad and the Theogonia. These might be styled παλαιὰ, 
in comparison with the period of Grecian literature in which 
Plato lived, which, although many centuries posterior in 
time, was not separated from them by any distinct literary 
epoch prior to the Persian wars. They could not, how- 
ever, be well entitled to the epithet παλαιότατα, which, as 
it is introduced, and as the context shows, is meant to des- 
ignate the most remote of two distinct periods, in reference 


100 THE ORPHIC POETRY. 


to which it is intimated, there was a progression, if we may 
so style it, from the cosmological to the theogonic or my- 
thological. ‘The first, or most ancient class, were of- the 
former description. ‘They were more philosophical than 
the latter, more taken up with the origin of things, that all- 
absorbing question which so engrossed the early mind: ὡς 
γέγονεν 7 ΠΡΩΤῊ ΦΥΣΙΣ οὐρανοῦ τῶν te ἄλλων. They 
were pantheistic rather than polytheistic, manifesting a de- 
parture, but still a less departure from the primitive reli- 
gion than is denoted by the latter stage. (See Note 9, 
page 5.) All these marks correspond well with the nature 
of some of the hymns styled Orphic, under which name a 
few fragments, whether spurious or not, have survived to 
our own day. Although these are generally regarded as 
productions of a much later age, yet, from the frequent refer- 
ence made to Orpheus by the Greek poets, it would seem 
almost certain that a collection of hymns under this name 
existed in the most ancient times, forming that copious 
fund or storehouse of rich poetical appellations, from which 
Homer, and subsequently AXschylus, were supplied, besides 
being the source of whatever is pantheistical or mystical 
in the Grecian tragedies. ‘The existence of forgeries is 
evidence that there must have been originals in imitation 
of which they were composed, and an ancient philosophy 
and theology, which had once exerted great influence on 
the human mind, to serve as their plausible and probable 
foundation. 

In connexion with the passage before us, compare lib. 
iv., 716, A.: ‘O μὲν δὴ ϑεός, ὥσπερ Kal 0 παλαιὸς λόγος, 
ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα TOV ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων. 
This is almost the very language of one of the so-styled 
Orphic fragments now extant, and is directly referred to 
Orpheus by the scholiast on the place :--- Θεὸν μὲν τὸν δη- 
μιουργὸν σαφῶς, παλαιὸν δὲ λόγον Aéyer τὸν OPHIKON, 


7 3 τ 
ὃς ἐστιν οὗτος, 


THE ORPHIC POETRY. 101 


Ζεὺς ἀρχὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ᾽ ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται" 
Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος. 

Should any one say that this resembles very much the 
language of Thales, or some of the philosophers of that 
period, and that, therefore, the ignorant old scholiast had 
been imposed upon by one who had affixed a fabulous name 
and given a poetical dress to some of their dogmas,—why, 
we would reply, may not Thales and others have derived 
this peculiar mode of expression from a still earlier source, 
and why this disposition to charge the scholiasts and 
Christian fathers with combining to produce such useless 
and yet elaborate forgeries as some critics are constantly 
connecting with theirnames?. We say useless, because a 
philosophy and theology, such as appears in these hymns, 
did, beyond all question, exist at a very early period, and 
the poetical dress, had it not been real, would have added 
nothing to the argument they sought to derive from them. 
For places in the ancient writings, in which reference is 
made to Orpheus and his poems, the reader is referred to 
Plato, Ion, vol. 111., p. 134, Leip. ; Convivium, vil., 219; De 
Legibus, vi., 230; Cratylus, 11., 263; Aristotle, De Anim., 
1,8; Euripides, Rhesus, 947 ; Hippolytus, 967 ; Cicero, De 
Nat. Deor., 1., 88; Diod. Sic., iv., 25; Just. Mart., Co- 
hortat. ad Grecos, p. 17; Athenagoras, Legat. pro Christ., 
xv., 64, 65. 


12 


102 PLATO’S REGARD FOR THE ANCIENT MYTHS. 


Ve 


Plato’s Regard for Antiquity and the Ancient Mythology.— 
His Use of the Word Θεοί. 


Pace 6, Line 1. Ov ῥᾷάδιον ἐπιτιμᾷν παλαιοῖς οὖσιν. 
“Jt is hard to find fault with them, seeing they are ancient 
things.” We discover, in this and similar expressions, 
‘Plato’s conservative spirit and reverence for antiquity, 
struggling with his conviction of the importance of having 
the minds of the young imbued with higher notions of the 
Divine Nature than could be obtained from the ancient 
poets. The same feelings are manifested in that passage 
in the Republic, in which he dismisses Homer, with the 
rest of the poets, from his imaginary City of the Soul, al- 
though, at the same time, he sends him away with a garland 
of honour on his head. ‘Should such a one (he says) 
come to our city, wishing to exhibit his poems, we would, 
indeed, reverence him as something sacred, and wonderful, 
and delightfully pleasant, yet still would we say that no 
such man could abide with us: ὠποπέμποιμέν τε ἂν εἰς 
ἄλλην πόλιν, μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχέαντες Kal 
ἐρίῳ στέψαντες, and we would send him away to another 
state, having poured myrrh upon his head and crowned him 
with a wreath.” Republic, 398, A. We find, however, 
everywhere, in his works, a strong attachment to the an- 
cient myths, wherever they contained nothing gross or of- 
fensive to his views of morality ; a number of which, and 
those, too, distinguished for the feeling of awe and sublimity 
with which they inspire the reader, he has himself presente 
ed in some of the most important and philosophical of his 
dialogues. 3 

It is exceedingly interesting to contemplate the peculiar 
condition of this philosopher, endeavouring to reform what 
he felt he had no power or commission to abolish. Having 
no Divine warrant, like the Hebrew prophets or the apostles 


PLATO'S REGARD FOR THE ANCIENT MyTus. 103 


ot Christ, he did not dare to enter upon an exterminating 
crusade against all the rites, opinions, and traditions held 
sacred in the Athenian worship. ‘The Grecian reformer 
was too well acquainted with human nature not to fear lest, 
in destroying the monster Superstition, he should call up 
another of a still more horrid aspect—Atheism. He did 
not wish utterly to pull down existing institutions, while he 
had no new revelation, whose authority might replace, with 
increased vigour, the departed reverence for those ancient 
myths, the probable remains of truths once communicated 
from Heaven, yet mysteriously abandoned to all the cor- 
ruptions and distortions of the human mind. He probably 
thought that out of some of the better parts of the Grecian 
mythology there might be constructed a system, which, 
while it recoguised the One Eternal Supreme, placed at 
an immense distance from all things created by him or ema- 
nating from him, might, at the same time, admit of inferior 
powers, retaining the individual names at least, (if not the 
characters), which had been consecrated by the popular 
superstition. ‘That he did believe in such an Eternal and 
Ineffable Supreme (ὁ γεννήσας ἀΐδιος πατήρ, Timeus, 38, 
A.,—0 κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος μένων ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν TH 
αὑτοῦ μορφῇ, Rep., 381,0.,--ὁ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ 
ἰδέας ἐκθαίνων, 380, D.), every reader of his works must 
admit. He undoubtedly erred in supposing that the pure 
worship of such a glorious Being could be consistent with 
any kind of religious homage paid to inferior powers; yet 
we should remember that the same error has been com- 
mitted by the largest portion of the professedly Christian 
Church, and that we are to judge Plato, not as a Christian 
under the light of revelation, but as a heathen philosopher 
struggling with difficulties, of the magnitude of which we 
have no just conception. ‘These remarks are deemed ne- 
cessary in reply to the charge often made against Plato, of 
countenancing the polytheism of his countrymen, and which 


104 PLATO'S USE OF THE WoRD Weoi. w 


may be found set forth in its strongest light in a tract by 
Jacob Zimmerman, contained in the ninth volume of the 
Amenitates Literaria. 

A misconception in regard to the Platonic theology has 
arisen from his use of the word ϑεοὶ. The Greek writers, 
whether poets or orators, generally meant by it nothing 
more than supernatural beings of a higher order than men. 
The word, in itself, had attached to it none of those more 
metaphysical conceptions which belong to our term Divine, 
as significant of the uncreated and eternal. There was, 
therefore, no philological inconsistency in its being applied 
to those beings whom Plato elsewhere calls δαίμονες, and 
who, in his scheme, may be regarded in the same light with 
the angels or sons of God, mentioned in the Holy Scriptures. 

In respect to the objection which might be made to his 
use of the plural, it may be remarked, that throughout this 
whole argument with the atheist, ϑεὸς may be substituted 
for Yeo, without at all affecting its validity, and we should 
by so doing come nearer to the philosopher’s true meaning, 
than by retaining the common term, with the misconception 
arising from our modern notions ; that is, we should better 
translate his spirit by adopting a slight mistranslation of 
the letter. Θεοὶ is often to be taken collectively for the 
whole of the superhuman Genus, however inferior and de- 
pendent some parts of it may be in respect to another, and 
is equivalent, in the discussions which follow, to τὸ ϑεῖον 
or τὸ δαιμόνιον. Another suggestion, which it may be 
proper to make here, is, that by the phrase Yeol κατὰ νόμους, 
the writer means not directly the Theogony and worship 
established by law at Athens. (although even this. he would 
touch with the hand of a wise reformer, and not of a reck- 
less destructionist), but rather the cultus of the Supreme 
and inferior Divinities, as it should be set forth by the law- 
giver in that pure system of polity which he contemplates 
in the present treatise. 


PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS. 105 


VI. 
Philosophy and Character of Anaxagoras. 


Pace 6, Line 6. véwy....... σοφῶν. ‘ Of our modern 
wits, or wise men ;” that is, comparatively modern, although 
all to whom he refers did not live in Plato’s own time. He 
seems chiefly to have had in mind Anaxagoras, who, not- 
withstanding his speculative theism and his boasted doc- 

‘trine of the Νοῦς, was yet regarded by Plato as giving an 
atheistical tendency to the age in which he lived. In re- 
gard to his theology, Anaxagoras is best known by the po- 
sition, in which he so much gloried, “ that mind was the 
cause of all things,” and in physics, by the unpopular 
dogma, “that the sun was nothing but a mass of ignited 
stone, instead of an animated being,” as was commonly be- 
lieved, and as Plato seems to teach in this book. The 
character of this philosopher may be understood from the 
boasting he himself made, and which his friends made for 
him, in regard to the first of these doctrines ; as though, in 
this respect, he had in any way advanced beyond the more 
modest Thales, or had discovered a truth which had been 
concealed from the beginning of the world to his own day. 
Socrates seems to have had a right view of him in the 
Pheedon, where he charges him with setting out with the 
doctrine that Νοῦς was the cause of all things, as a mere 
speculative tenet, and then making no use of it in subse- 
quent parts of his philosophy; that is, never ascending 
above second causes, or rising from the physical to the 
moral (τὸ βέλτιστον), but ever assigning, as the chief mo- 
tive powers, ἀέρας τε καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα, gases, and 
fires, and fluids, as the words may be rendered in accom- 
modation to the same spirit in modern physical philosophy. 
‘Having once (says he) heard one reading a book of Anax- 
agoras, and saying, that Vows was the disposer and the efli- - 
cient cause of all things, I was highly delighted with the 


106 PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS. 


declaration, and it seemed to me to be admirably said; and 
I thought; that if Νοῦς (or Mind) thus arranged all things, 
everything must be placed in that. position in which it was 
best for it to be ; so that no other study remained for man, in 
regard to both himself and other things, but the investigation 
of that which was (morally) most excellent and best {or. τὶ 
other words, moral causes), and that this was the only true 
science cf things. But in this wonderful hope (of discover- 
ing the universal science, or science of sciences) I was 
greatly disappointed; for as I read on I find the man 
making no farther use of his boasted Nove, nor assigning 
any other cause in the disposal and arrangement of the 
world, than airs, and ethers, and waters, and other similar 
things many and strange. And he seemed to me to act 
precisely as if any one saying, that Socrates doeth whatso- 
ever he doeth by mind or reason, should then, in attempt- 
ing to assign the causes of my actions, assert that I now 
sit here for these reasons, namely, that my body is com- 
posed of bones and nerves, that my bones are solid and 
have joints, and that my nerves contract and relax ; where- 
fore that the bones being raised up in their joinings, the 
nerves, by reason of tension and relaxation, make me to bend 
my limbs, and that for this reason I now sit here: and so, 
also, in respect to our conversing, should assign other similar 
causes of the phenomena of speech, such as voices, and 
aérial vibrations, and sounds (φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς), 
and ten thousand other such agencies, all the while neglect- 
ing to assign the true reason (of reasons), that because it 
seemed good (βέλτιον) to the Athenians to condemn me, 
therefore it seemed better to me to sit here, and more just 
to submit to the sentence they had imposed. Since, as I 
verily believe, had it not been for the last-mentioned reasons, 
these nerves and bones would long before this have had me 
away to Megara or among the Beotians, being set in mo- 
tion by an opinion of the best (τοῦ βελτίστου), if I had not 


PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS. 107 


thought it more just and better to remain than to fly.” 
Phedon, 97, 98. We recommend the close study of this 
whole passage, and the admirable sketch it presents of such 
theists as Anaxagoras, to every student who wishes to 
know the essential difference, on this most vital point, be- 
tween the Socratic and other ancient systems of philosophy. 
How strongly does it remind us of many modern books of 
physical science, in which the name of God may, perhaps, 
appear in a preface or some introductory note, while all the 
rest is not merely silent, but directly adapted to produce an 
atheistic turn of thought, by suffering the mind to dwell on 
nothing else than ἀέρας τε καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα, gases, 
and fluids, and fires, or imponderable agents. The opinion 
which Plato entertained of this philosopher is also signifi- 
cantly expressed, although he does not mention his name, 
in the eleventh book of the Laws, 967, A. B.C., a passage 
which is more freely examined in Note XIII., on the athe- 
istic doctrine of φύσις, τύχη, and. τέχνη. 

The Νοῦς of Anaxagoras can hardly be regarded as a 
personal being, or as a ψυχὴ ὑπερκοσμίά, distinct from the 
world, of which it might be considered the informing law. 
The atheist may admit the dogma without changing his 
creed. La Grange undoubtedly believed that there was 
Νοῦς, or reason, in the Heavens, even a science so profound, 
that all the powers of his highest mathematical analysis 
could barely follow, the laws of motion in which it was dis- 
played; and yet La Grange was an atheist. The Heavens 
had no interest for him except as they formed a splendid 
diagram for the illustration of his calculus, and as long as’ 
the moral element was wanting it made no difference what 
name was inscribed upon it, whether Νοῦς or φύσις, or a 
God possessed of mere intelligence, to whom we were no- 
thing, and who was nothing to us, except as affording subjects 
for the exercise of the speculative intellect. This Nove of 
Anaxagoras had no respect to moral as final causes, which, 


108 PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS. 


as Socrates shows, were studiously excluded from his philos- 
ophy. It was only another name for the physical truth of 
things, in which the atheist contends there may be science on . 
his hypothesis, as well as on any other. It was an abstract 
intelligence, displayed wholly in physical adaptations, with- 
out either a general or special providence. It might be 
regarded as the instinct of the universe, working in the 
great whole, as some of its emanations in minute portions, 
blindly, unconsciously, without. personality, and knowing 
everything but itself. However incomprehensible this may 
be, it is still the highest reach of that philosophy which 
makes no account of any moral attributes in the Deity, but 
regards him as a mere impassible intelligence. We have 
no hesitation in preferring pantheism if it embrace, although 
inconsistently, that moral element, without which there can 
be no true personality, either to Nove or ψυχῆ. 

Plato evidently regarded this philosophy as no better 
than practical atheism, notwithstanding it sets out so pom- 
pously, and apparently so religiously, with the dogma afore- 
said. He seems here to condemn its medern advocates, 
the νέοι σοφοί, as he styles them, equally with that ancient 
superstition which they so much derided. Anaxagoras was 
of a spirit the very opposite of that which pervades all the 
teachings of Socrates. He was inclined rather to insult 
and shock the popular superstitions than gently to remove 
them, or turn to good account whatever of truth they might 
possess, and that, too, not in the spirit of enthusiastic reli- 
gious zeal, which we cannot help respecting even when we 
are compelled to condemn, but in the mere conceit of a 
little fancied progress in physical science. Like the 
modern Galileo, whose name is so frequently in the mouths 
of the scientific enemies of religion, he evidently rejoiced 
more in the thought, that this very small advance raised 
him somewhat above the religious notions of his country- 
men, than in any honest wish or desire to elevate those 


PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS. 109 


popular views which placed him, as he supposed, in such 
egotistical contrast. He seems to have been a regular 
priest and poet hater, and there is, therefore, no cause for 
surprise that he should have called forth the enmity and 
prejudices of those whom he had, from no higher motive 
than vanity, attacked. 

This spirit was manifested in the declaration, a few lines 
below referred to, that the heavenly bodies were only 
masses of earth and stones, and that the sun was a ball of 
melted ore. For this he was charged by the Athenians 
with atheism, and justly too; for he who assails the com- 
mon belief of any people, without putting anything better in 
its place, or who attempts to destroy false notions of the 
Deity, without teaching, as Socrates and Plato did, the doc- 
trine of the one eternal and ineffable, yet personal Supreme, 
the head of a moral government, and directing all things 
with final reference to moral ends, is in heart no better 
than an atheist, whatever refined speculative notions he 
may have in the abstract about Νοῦς or intelligence being 
the cause of all things. It is probable that the condemna- 
tion of Socrates was mainly effected in consequence of 
his views having been misunderstood by the unthinking 
Athenian mob, and confounded with those of Anaxagoras. 

Plato did undoubtedly hold that the Heavenly bodies 
were animated personal beings ; but when here and in sub- 
sequent passages he styles them ϑεοὲ, it is only in the sense 
of beings superior to men. ‘The simple doctrine, there- 
fore, for it goes no farther, that the Heavenly bodies were 
animated beings, was no great heresy either in philosophy 
or religion. (See Note XXXIV., where this subject is 
more fully discussed.) It was far better than the specula- 
tive semi-atheism of Anaxagoras, or even of some modern 
naturalists, who have only substituted for the abstract Nove 
of the Grecian philosopher the symbols and equations of 
the differential and integral calculus. One religious con: 


Ke 


110 DIVINE JUSTICE GROUND OF HUMAN LAW. 


ception of God as a moral governor, the light in which 
Plato and Socrates chiefly regarded him, and which may 
exist In connexion with the most absurd notions of the 
physical universe, does yet belong to ἃ philosophy almost 
infinitely removed above the mere scientific theism of such 
men as Anaxagoras, Galileo or La Place. 


VII. 
The Divine Justice, the Ground of Human Law. 


Pace 9, Line 1. Σχεδὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων 
τῶν νόμων κάλλιστόν τε. καὶ ἄριστον προοίμιον ἂν ἔιη. 
“For this is just the fairest and most excellent preamble to 
all laws, or to every system of law,” namely, ὡς ϑεοί τ’ 
εἰσὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί, δίκην τιμῶντες διαφερόντως ἀνθρώπων. 
“'That the Gods not only are, but that they are also good, 
and that, moreover, they have an esteem for justice beyond 
anything that is felt among men.” Yeot here, as we have 
remarked before, is used as a collective term for the whole 
of the Divine Nature, being equivalent to τὸ ϑεῖον, or τὸ 
δαιμόνιον, and should be rendered in the singular, if we 
would do full justice to the thought. See Note V. The 
sentiment is this: It is not enough simply to believe in the 
Divine existence. God 15 something more than the dynamic 
principle of the universe... Neither is it enough to connect 
with this the notion of infinite knowledge. God is some- 
thing more than the Νοῦς of Anaxagoras, something more 
than mere intelligence. The law. should present him to 
us in the far sublimer idea of a Being clothed with the 
moral attributes of justice, and of a special, or, rather, moral 
providence. It is this, and not a merely speculative or 
scientific theism, which must lie at the foundation of every 
true system of legislation. We may talk as loftily as we 
please of The Supreme Intelligence, or The First Cause, or 


UNIVERSALITY OF THE BELIEF IN A GOD. 111 


The Great Idea, it is still practical atheism, until along with 
this there is recognised ‘The Lawgiver, ‘The Judge, and ‘The 
Moral Governor, the constant and interested Witness of our 
every act, the ground and sanction of the solemn appeal of 
the oath. “That such views (says Cicero) are useful and 
necessary, who will deny, when he reflects how many things 
must be confirmed by an oath, how much safety there is in 
those religious rites that pertain to the solemnization of con- 
tracts, how many the fear of the Divine punishment keeps 
back from crime; in short, how sacred and holy a thing So- 
ciely becomes when the Immortal Gods are constantly pre- 
sented (in the Law) both as judges and witnesses.” Cic., 
De Leg., 11., vii. We would: even venture to assert, that 
a gross anthropopathy or anthropomorphism, if it retain 
such views of the moral attributes of the Deity as a God of 
Law, is every way to be preferred to the most metaphysical 
or philosophical notions of the Divine Nature and its im- 
passibility, which reject them, or do not even assign to 
them the most prominent place. 


ΨΠΙ. 
Universality of the Belief in a God. 


Pace 10, Line 10. ᾿Βλλήνων te καὶ βαρθάρων πάντων 
ἐν συμφοραῖς παντοίαις. Compare with this what Clinias 
says, page 4, line 14: καὶ ὅτι πάντες “Ελληνές τε καὶ 
Θάρθαροι νομίζουσιν εἶναι ϑεούς. By Greeks and Bar- 
barians, the former always meant all mankind, and, there- 
fore, the belief in a God is here declared to be coextensive 
with the race. If any man might rely on his own unaided 
reason, who will venture to say that Plato would not have 
been justified in thus trusting himself to it? And yet, pro- 
found as he was in the investigation of truth beyond the 
most, if not all, of his fellow-men, he never hesitates to ap- 


112 UNIVERSALITY OF THE BELIEF IN A GOD. 


peal to the common sentiments, the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι of man- 
kind, and to throw himself upon them often with a confidence 
which he yielded to no speculative argument. Hence his 
fondness for those ancient myths, under which were con- 
-cealed, in various forms, the opinions universally held re- 
specting the moral government of God and the doctrine of 
future retribution. ‘This was not, as Warburton supposed, 
a mere accommodation of himself to those vulgar dogmas, 
which he did not wish to destroy, because he deemed them 
useful. All that has been said by writers of that school, 
and by the ancient authorities on whom they pretend to 
rely, respecting the exoteric and esoteric teaching, we be- 
lieve to be wholly unsupported by any parts of the genuine 
dialogues of Plato. No man was farther from his true 
spirit than Warburton, and, without an appreciation of this, 
his learning only led him to misunderstand the philosopher 
in some of his most serious discussions. If ever Plato is 
deeply earnest, it is when he gets engaged in the discus- 
sion of a traditionary myth, which he can regard in some 
measure as standing in the place of primitive revelation, or 
can find relief from the uncertainties of his own specula- 
tions, in what he could trace as the universal voice of hu. 
manity. We need no stronger proof of this, than is found 
in the manner in which he closes the long discussion in the 
Gorgias (in some respects the most perfect and rigidly con- 
ducted argument to be found in his works), with the mythi- 
cal representation of the final judgment; as though, without 
this appeal to the authority of ancient and universal tradi. 
tion, human reason could never freely and satisfactorily 
prove that a life of sensual pleasure, or of worldly ambition, 
was not better than one spent in acts of virtue and the culti- 
vation of philosophy. He was the last man to spurn such 
aid, in order to gratify that pride of intellect, that would 
adopt no conclusions to which it had not arrived through 
the independent exercise of private judgment. He knew 


UNIVERSALITY OF THE BEFIEF IN A GOD. 113 


too well the direct tendency of such a spirit to darken the 
understanding, and to lead to error instead of truth. 

We would not, however, confound this with a modern 
affectation which has sought to support itself by the au- 
thority of our philosopher. Plato, it should be ever borne 
in mind, had no Bible, and he did well, therefore, and ex- 
ercised his highest reason in seeking for a Divine revelation 
in those universal sentiments of all people and nations, 
which were as ancient in time as they were extended in 
space, and which could most truly be said to be, semper, 
ubique, et ab omnibus. ‘This object of his reverence was 
something far different from the vox populi of the dema- 
gogue, who is often most successful when he can array the 
artificial and transient feeling of one generation, or one na- 
tion, against what he would style the antiquated prejudices 
of mankind. It was rather that vox humanitatis, which, by 
its universality at all times and im all regions, gave evi- 
dence of having been once the voice of God, remains of a 
primitive inspiration, however darkened it may have been 
by human depravity—opinions which had not been the prod- 
uct of the speculative reason, but which, under the con- 
serving influence of a higher principle, had maintained their 
ground in spite of the opposition of human depravity, and 
the consequently superinduced darkness of the human un- 
derstanding. It was this vor humanitatis to which Hesiod 
seems to allude: 


φήμη δ᾽ ov τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα πολλοὶ 
λαοὶ φημίζουσι " ϑεός νύ τις ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτή. 
Works and Days, 709. 


Compare, also, Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, i., 43: Solus 
enim videt, primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis 
eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Que est enim 
gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doc- 
irina anticipationem quamdam Deorum? que πρόληψις 


K 2 


114 ANTIQUITY OF ATHEISM.. 


appellatur, &c. Quum enim non instituto aliquo aut more 
aut lege sit opinio constituta, maneatque ad unum omnium 
firma consensio, inteJligi necesse est esse Deos, quoniam 
insitas eorum vel potius innatas cogitationes habemus. De 
quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse 
est. And again, lib. 1., 12: Itaque inter omnes omnium 
gentium sententia constat. Omnibus enim innalum est et 
in animo quasi insculptum esse Deos. 

Still more to the same effect, Tuse. Disp., 1., 30, where 
we find the best definition of the Law of Nature that has 
ever been given. Ut porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, 
cur Deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo 
omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit De- 
orum opinio. Multi de Diis prava sentiunt (id enim vitioso 
more eflici solet), omnes tamen esse vim et naturam Di- 
vinam arbitrantur. Nec vero id collocutio hominu aut 
consensus eflicit: non institutis Opinio est confirmata, non 
legibus. Omnis autem in re consensio omnium gentium 


LEX NATUR: putanda est. 


ΙΧ. 
Antiquity of Atheism. 


Pace 11, lane 12. Τίγνονται δὲ ἀεὶ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους 
τούτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες. “There have always been 
more or less who have had this disease of atheism.” It has 
been maintained that there were no philosophical atheists, 
professedly so, before Democritus and Leucippus. Plato, 
however, asserts that some such have existed from a very 
early period, and in this he is borne out by Aristotle, who 
tells us that most of the earliest philosophers, especially 
those of the Ionic school, assigned only material causes of 
the universe: TOV πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλεῖστοι 
τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει μόνον φήθησαν ἀρχὰς εἷναι πάντων. 


. ANTIQUITY OF ATHEISM 115 


Aristotle, Metaph., i., 3. A distinction, however, should 
be made between those who were professed atheists, such 
as Democritus and Diagoras, and those who were inclined 
to an atheistical mode of philosophizing, while they yet pro- 
fessed to be theists, although of an impure and inconsistent 
species. In this latter class the world has always abound- 
ed. On the other hand, it is most conclusively shown by 
Cudworth, that, although this materializing school was an- 
cient, the first philosophy was spiritual, and that the sub- 
sequent atheism arose from a perversion of the atomical 
theory, which, when truly held, and according to the views 
of those who originated it before Democritus, was not only 
favourable to, but one of the firmest supports of a pure theism. 
Plato, in this passage, styles atheism a disease, as though it 
were something unnatural, a corruption, διαφθορα (see page 
4, line 18), a departure from those innate sentiments or 77po- 
λήψεις, of the race of which he and Cicero speak so em- 
phatically.. So, also, the apostle treats it as a degeneracy 
from a primitive better state, Rom.,1., 28. He speaks ef 
this tendency as a darkness of the spirit, καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ 
ἀσύνετος καρδία αὐτῶν, Rom.,i., 21: as a reprobate mind 
or reason, ἀδόκιμον νοῦν, 28, to which men “had been 
given up, because they did not like to retain God in their 
knowledge.” We cannot read these Scriptures without 
calling to mind a similar sentiment expressed in a fragment 
of the old poet Empedocles : 

Δειλὸς δ᾽ ᾧ σκοτόεσσα ϑεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν. 

Ah wretch! whose soul dark thoughts of God invade. 

If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great ts that 
darkness ! 


116 PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 


X. 
Principle of Authority. 


Pace 12, Line 6. ὧν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, περιμενεῖς ἀνασκοπῶν 
εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, πυνθανόμενος παρά τε τῶν ἄλ 
λων, καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου. “If 
you will take my advice, you will patiently wait, repeated 
ly examining whether it is thus or otherwise, learning from 
others, and therefore, and in a most especial manner, from 
the Lawgiver.” Notwithstanding the earnest recommenda- 
tion to most diligent study and inquiry, and in perfect con. 
sistency with it, Plato holds that the acceptance of establish. 
ed opinions must go before and guide the exercise of pri- 
vate judgment; not to supersede or dispense with the ne-. 
cessity of the latter in its proper time and place, but be. 
cause the state of mind which submits to lawful authority 
affords the surest guarantee of subsequent mental independ- 
ence, instead of that counterfeit which is often nothing 
more than a slavish fear of a creed, and which loses all 
true independence, in its premature efforts to avoid what 
the best and wisest of mankind have long regarded as 
established. 

The next sentence contains a thought of the highest 
practical importance: ἐν δὲ δὴ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ pH τολμή- 
σῃς περὶ ϑεοὺς μηδὲν ἀσεθῆσαι, “ but during this, period 566. 
to it that you venture upon nothing impious or unholy.” 
That is, religious obligation must be revered, and pious 
emotions cherished, before the young soul can reason about 
them, and there is no period, however short, that we have 
a right to remain atheists until we are able to prove by in- 
duction the existence of a God. He who thus honours 
reason, by following its first dictate, submission to authority 
which God himself has established, will doubtless leave 
those who have been taught to pursue a different course, far 
behind him in all the severer and more abstruse depart. 


DEGREES OF ATHEISM. 117 


ments of philosophy and theology. ‘Throughout this whole 
treatise, it should be borne in mind that νομοθέτης means 
rather the ancient founder of a state or of a religion, than 
a temporary or subordinate magistrate; so that “to learn 
of the Lawgiver,” is to consult with deference and respect, 
as one great means of forming right opinions, the civil and 
religious constitution of the state in which we may be born. 


ΧΙ. 
Degrees of Atheism.—Pecuharity of Plato’s Style. 


Pace 12, Line 13. “παντάπασί μὲν οὖν, &c. The 
author now proceeds to the discussion of speculative and 
practical atheism in its three degrees, which may be thus 
stated : 

Ist. An absolute denial of the existence of a Deity. 

2d. The opinion that, if a Deity exists, he does not con- 
cern himself about us, or in other words, the denial of a 
Providence. 

3d. A sentiment clearly allied to the second; that if a 
Deity exists, and if he even exercises a physical care or 
providence over the world regarded as a physical produc- 
tion, still he is in a great measure, if not wholly, indifferent 
to moral conduct, and that, therefore, his displeasure, should 
it be ever excited, is easily appeased, not by repentance, 
nor by an atonement that God himself has provided, but by 
self-imposed votive offerings and superstitious services 

We expect a direct argument on the first head, conduct- 
ed in the usual manner by an appeal to evidences of design 
in the phenomena around us. ‘This mode of proceeding is 
adopted in the discourses recorded in the Memorabilia, and 
there is, also, an admirable specimen of it in Cicero’s 
treatise De Natura Deorum. Such a line of argument, 
however, although quite a favourite with modern theolo. 


118 DEGREES OF ATHEISM. 


gians, was not that which would first suggest itself to the 
ancient mind, but a more abstruse speculation, and one which 
had a more intimate relation to the great question about the 
first origin of things, the first life and motion in matter, 
whether to be regarded as eternal, or as having had a dis- 
tinct origination from some older essence. ‘This, also, we 
fully believe, is the way in which the subject would present 
itself to such a mind as Socrates, notwithstanding it is gen- 
erally considered that the plain and practical mode of 
reasoning ascribed to him by Xenophon is more in accord- 
ance with the truth, than the metaphysical character in 
which he appears in the Dialogues of Plato. At all events, 
this is the mode adopted here by the Athenian, who un- 
doubtedly represents Socrates, and he also takes a very 
peculiar method of introducing it. In the commencement 
of his reasoning on the first head, he takes his hearers by 
surprise, by suddenly suggesting that they had unawares 
fallen upon the discussion of a most important principle, 
which deserved to be disposed of before going on with 
those more popular views which had just been mentioned. 
It has, at first, the appearance of being accidental, but one 
familiarly acquainted with the Platonic method will rec- 
ognise here the usual ironical resource the author employs 
when he wishes to enter upon a discussion more than 
usually subtle—namely, the apparently undesigned eliciting 
of a question in relation to it from the one with whom the 
dialogue is maintained. The chief speaker seems, or af- 
fects, suddenly to remember something essential to the argu- 
ment, and which they were in danger of having entirely 
forgotten, although it is evident that it is the main thing 
which has been kept in view from the beginning, notwith- 
standing its seeming incidental introduction. _ Frequent ex- 
amples of this may be found in the Protagoras, Republic, 
and Theetetus, especially the last. It is, in fact, so purely 
Platonic, that it may be regarded as one of the best signs, 


ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 119 


as far, at least, as the style is concerned, by which we may 
distinguish a genuine from a spurious dialogue. 


XII. 
Ancient Doctrine of the Four Elements. 


Pace 18, Line 15. Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα. It 
is generally assumed that in the use of these terms all the 
ancient philosophers meant four simple, indestructible, and 
incomposite elements ; being the primordia, or apyat, by the 
union or composition of which all other things were con- 
stituted. Hence many a superficial sneer by popular lec- 
turers at the ignorance of the ancients in respect to chem. 
istry and the number of simple substances. ‘This view of 
the matter, however, is far from being correct. Some, it is 
true, maintained the above doctrine nearly in the terms 
which we have employed, and as it would be stated by a 
modern chemist. Among these, if we understand Aristotle 
aright, was Empedocles. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν yap τὰ μὲν σω- 
ματικὰ τέσσαρα, τὰ δὲ πάντα μετὰ τῶν κινούντων, EF τὸν 
ἀριθμόν. Aristotle, De Gen. et Corrup.,i.,1. By the two 
moving powers here are intended his poetical personifica- 
tions of Love and Discord, Ἔρως and Ἔρις, or, as they 
would be styled in the language of modern science, Attrac- 
tion and Repulsion, which, together with the four elements, 
made the number of original principles or primordia to be 
six. Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus maintained 
that the elements were infinite, not only in number, but in 
form. ᾿Αναξαγόρας δὲ ἄπειρα, Kat Λεύκιππος, καὶ Anud- 
κριτος" ταῦτα δὲ ἄπειρα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἷναι καὶ τὰς μορ- 
φάς. The doctrine which the first of these held respect- 
ing the homeomerie, or similar parts, is well known. Aris- 
totle represents him, on this subject, as in every respect the 
direct opposite of Empedocles. ’Hvaytiw¢ δὲ φαίνονται 


120 ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 


λέγοντες οἱ περὶ ᾿Αναξαγόραν τοῖς περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα. Ὃ 
μὲν γάρ φησι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν στοιχεῖα τέσ- 
σαρα, καὶ ἁπλᾶ εἷναι μᾶλλον ἢ σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τὰ 
τοιαῦτα τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν " ὃ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ἁπλᾶ καὶ στοιχεῖα, 
γῆν δὲ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα σύνθετα. De Gen., &c., 1., 1. 
“ For the latter says that fire, and water, and air, and earth 
are four elements, and more simple than flesh and bone, and 
others of the homeomeria, while the former contends that 
these are simple elements, but that earth, and air, and fire 
are compounds.” See Aristotle, De Generatione et Cor- 
ruptione, lib. 1., where there is a long, but not very clear 
account of some of the ancient opinions on this subject. 
Compare, also, lib. iii., 3. 

In general, however, we are quite satisfied that, even 
when they used the term otoryeta, most of the ancient 
writers on physics had in view elemental states of bodies, 
without reference to their composition, rather than simple 
substances or e/ements in the sense in which modern chemis- 
try would define the term—that is, as substances incapable 
of being changed, or of passing one into the other from a 
change of state. It was in this sense of elemental states 
that Parmenides held to two, πῦρ and γῆν, or the solid and 
the ethereal, regarding the flucd and the aerial as only mix- 
ed modifications: οἱ δὲ εὐθὺς δύο ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ Tlap- 
μενίδης πῦρ καὶ γῆν, τὰ μεταξὺ μίγματα ποιοῦσι τούτων, 
οἷον ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ. Arist., De Gen., &c., 11., 3. In like 
manner, Aristotle himself declares that they are not simple 
substances as actually found in nature, but ever compound- 
ed of one another, although in their ultimate state he seems 
to regard them as pure: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ TO πῦρ, Kal ὁ ἀὴρ, Kal 
ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων, ἁπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ μικτόν, Kk. τ. A 
Lib. 11., 3. 

At all events, we have no doubt, from several very de 
cided passages, as to the manner in which these terms are 
employed by Plato, whatever meaning may be attached to 


ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 121] 


them in the sentence at the head of these remarks, as the 
supposed language of the atheistical philosophers. He was 
so far from regarding them as strictly elements (στοιχεῖα) 
in the modern chemical, or even ancient Greek sense of 
the word, that he would not even rank them in that second 
stage of combination which he styles ovAAa67. See the 
Timeus, 48, B.: Τὴν δὲ πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως πυρὸς 
ὕδατός τε καὶ γῆς φύσιν ϑεατέον, καὶ τὰ πρὸ τούτων πάθη. 
Νῦν γὰρ ὡς εἰδόσι πῦρ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, 
λέγομεν ἀρχάς, αὐτὰ τιθέμενοι στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός " προσ- 
ἥκον αὐτοῖς οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐν ΣΎΛΛΑΒΗΣ εἴδεσι ἀπεικασθῆναι. 
‘‘We must contemplate the nature of fire, water, air, and 
earth, before the generation of the Heavens; for now, as 
though we spoke to those who well knew what fire is, and 
each one of the rest, we talk of principles, and regard them 
as the elements (στοιχεῖα, also used for the letters of the 
alphabet) of the universe, when they ought not to be liken- 
ed even to the species of the syllable.” It is very clear 
likewise, from other passages, that Plato views them not as 
elements, but as elementary states (καταστάσεις), in which 
all bodies must exist, however varied in other respects 
their compositions ; namely, as solzd, fluid, gas, or that fourth 
condition which the ancients generally denoted by the term 
fire (πῦρ), but which modern chemistry would style the 
class of imponderable agents. ‘These are heat, light, the 
electric, the galvanic, and the magnetic influence, which, al- 
though having five different names, are coming to be more 
and more regarded by our most scientific men as only modi- 
fications of one and the same principle. In other words, 
earth (y7), as used by Plato and many others of the Greek 
philosophers, was simply their scientific term for solid (τὸ 
στερεόν, to which it is sometimes equivalent), whether the 
substance was earth, or wood, or precious stones,—vdwp for 
liquid or fluid, &c., and πῦρ for all that modification more 
.subtle than air, of which they had some tolerably clear 
Ι, 


122 ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 


views, as the seat of higher agencies than were usually 
cognizable by the senses, and of which they regarded the 
visible fire as the lowest representative form. 

Whoever wishes to see the views of Plato on these sub- 
jects more fully stated may consult that portion of the 
‘Timzus, where he treats at great length of the primary 
constitution of bodies, and which, although erroneous in the 
details of its numerical ratios (as every a priori or theo- 
retical attempt of the kind must be), contains evidently the 
germ of the modern chemical theory of definite proportions. 
‘These four states, or καταστάσεις, with all other interve- 
ning compound modifications, were, im fact, regarded but as 
varied manifestations of one simple essence (ὕλη), which 
receives all forms, itself having no form, and is therefore 
(ἄγνωστον) unknown and incapable of being known: since 
all physical knowledge is possible only in respect to those 
things which have number and λόγος, ralio or reason ; and 
therefore elements, which are strictly such, are in their 
very nature ἄλογα; or incapable of being objects of scien- 
tific contemplation, except in their binary or trinary com- 
binations. As he says in the Theetetus, 202, B., οὕτω δὴ 
τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα Kal ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ dé, τὰς 
δὲ συλλαθὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξ- 
GOTAC. 

All modifications of this simple essence were (φαινόμενα) 
phenomena or appearances, having nothing absolute except 
in the idea manifested by them, no indestructible material 
nature of their own, but continually passing into and out of 
each other, or, in other words, ever becoming (γιγνόμενα 
καὶ γενησόμενα), instead of absolutely betng (ὄντα) in them. 
selves distinct and imperishable substances. Thus, in the 
Timeus, 49, C.: Πρῶτον μὲν ὃ δὴ viv ὕδωρ ὠνομάκαμεν, 
πηγνύμενον, ὡς δοκοῦμεν, λίθους καὶ γῆν TITNOMENON 
ὁρῶμεν - τηκόμενον δ᾽ αὖ καὶ διακρινόμενον ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, 
πνεῦμα καὶ ἀέρα" (συγκαυθέντα δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ πῦρ) ἀνά- 


ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 128 


παλιν δὲ συγκριθὲν καὶ κατασθεσθὲν, εἰς ἼΔΕΑΝ τε ἀπιὸν 
αὖθις ἀέρος πῦρ᾽ καὶ πάλιν ἀέρα ξυνιόντα καὶ πυκνούμενον, 
νέφος καὶ ὁμίχλην " ἐς δὲ τούτων ἔτι μᾶλλον ξυμπιλουμέ- 
νων, ῥέον ὕδωρ ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ, γῆν καὶ λίθους αὖθις > κύκλον 
τε οὕτω διαδιδόντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ὡς φαίνεται, τὴν γένεσιν. 
“ΒΥ, in the first place, what we call water (flu:d), when 
condensed, we behold becoming earth (or solid). Again, 
dissolved and separated, we behold this same thing becoming 
air (or gas). ‘The air (gas), heated or being burned together 
(if συγκαυθέντα be a right reading), becomes πῦρ, and πῦρ 
again having its particles more closely united and condensed 
by cold (κατασθεσθέν), departs back again into the idea of 
air. Again, we see the air, when condensed, becoming cloud 
or vapour, and from them, when still more compressed, 
converted into flowing water. Finally, from water we be- 
hold again earth or solids, thus in a circle appearing suc- 
cessively to give birth or generation to each other.” 

Of the unknown elementary ὕλη he thus speaks: διὸ 
τὴν TOV γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ MHTEPA 
καὶ ὑποδοχὴν, μήτε γῆν, μήτε ἀέρα, μῆτε πῦρ, μῆτε ὕδωρ 
λέγωμεν, μήτε ὅσα ἐκ τούτων, μήτε ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα γέγονεν " 
ἀλλ᾽ ἀόρατον εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές. μεταλαμθά- 
γον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πη τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸ 
λέγοντες, οὐ ψευσόμεθα. “ But as for the mother and re- 
_cipient of everything which becomes an object ef sight and 
sensation, let us call it neither solid, nor air, nor fire, nor 
fluid, nor anything which springs from these, nor anything 
from which these are (directly or immediately) generated, 
but the invisible species, having no form of itself, yet capa- 
ble of receiving all. Should we say that it is something 
which partakes in some most obscure way of the intelligi- 
ble, and that it is most difficult to be apprehended, we 
should not mistake.” ‘Timeus,51, A. The term ἀόρατος 
is not confined to the sense of sight, but is employed gen- 
erally for all that region which is beyond the sphere of 


124 ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 


sensation, or does not come under the cognizance of any 
of the senses. Sometimes, in its Platonic import, it is used 
for the intelligible, and is equivalent to νοητόν, but that does 
not seem to be the case here. There is, no doubt, an allu- 
sion in the above to Thales and Anaximenes, the former of 
whom held that water, and the latter that air, was this ele- 
mental principle, or mother of all things. 

The Greek philosophers and poets generally regarded 
πῦρ as a modification of matter more subtle than air, and 
nearer to that simple elementary substance or ὕλη which 
was the basis of them all. Modern chemistry has experi- 
mentally developed this a priori idea of the ancient mind, 
in the discovery of that class of agents styled impondera- 
ble. Most abundant proof could be given, that by this term 
πῦρ was not meant merely the element, as commonly un- 
derstood, which goes by that name (although this was in- 
cluded), any more than by the term y7, when thus philosoph- 
ically used, was intended only the earthy matter beneath 
our feet. Another name for this fourth modification was 
αἰθήρ. Some, indeed, made this a higher form than πῦρ, 
as the author of the treatise De Mundo once ascribed to 
Aristotle: λέγω δὲ γῆς μὲν ἐν ὕδατι, ὕδατος ἐν ἀέρι, ἀέρος 
ἐν πυρί, πυρὸς δὲ ἐν αἰθέρι, KT. A. Ch. Π|., p. 148. In 
general, however, all who held to but four modifications 
regarded the two last mentioned as one and the same. ‘The 
peculiar region of the ether or fourth state was supposed to 
be all of space above the atmosphere, although at the same 
time interpenetrating and diffused through all below it. 
There seems to be an allusion to this in A®sch., Prom. 
Vinc., 1090: 

ὦ πάντων 
αἰθὴρ κοινὸν φάος εἱλίσσων, 
where the poet clearly regards it as the source of vision, 
and seems to have held respecting it something like the 
modern undulating theory of light. At least, we can make 


ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 125 


no other sense of εἱλίσσων, which, in cormexion with αἰθὴρ 
and φάος, suggests at once to the mind that waving or en- 
larging spiral motion that the air undergoes in the propaga- 
tion of sound, and which, in the theory referred to, is sup- 
posed to take place in that universal fluid whose vibrations 
or undulations give rise to the phenomena of vision. In 
respect to the antiquity of this opinion, there is a remarka- 
ble passage in Aristotle’s Meteorologica, lib. 1., οθ. 35. On 
account of its length, we give only a very concise version. 
‘We have already (he says) spoken respecting the first 
element, what power it hath, and how that the whole uni- 
verse above us is full of that substance (ἐκείνου τοῦ owpa- 
τος). And this opinion is not only entertained by us, but 
seems to have been a very ancient supposition, and to have 
been held by the primitive men; for that which is called 
ether received of old the appellation which Anaxagoras 
seems to me to have regarded as the same with the fire. 
For he says that all the upper regions are filled with fire 
(τὰ ἄνω πλήρη πυρὸς εἶναι), and yet he calls the same 
power, or the influence which pervaded that portion of 
space, the ether. And in this he was right; for that sub- 
stance which remains forever unchanged men very natural- 
ly suppose to be a God, and Divine in its nature (τὸ yap 
"AEI σῶμα OEON ἅμα τε OHION, x. τ. A.), and they ac- 
cordingly defined such a substance by the name. αἰθήρ 
(equivalent to ἀεὶ Bede, or ἀεὶ Yeiov), as though it had no 
identity with anything that pertains tous. Thus must we 
say, that not once, or twice, or a few times, but with almost 
infinite repetitions, the same opinions come round in a circle 
(ἀνακυκλεῖν) among men.” We think little of Aristotle’ 
etymology of αἰθὴρ in this passage, but if this doctrine of 
the universal ether was, as he says, so ancient, and if it 
was held to be the cause of light and vision, it is certainly 
a remarkable confirmation of the closing sentiment, that 
this same opinion should now be becoming everywhere a 
L, 2 


126 ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 


favourite with our most scientific men, especially when 
modern wits had for so long a time made themselves merry 
with what they styled the ancient absurdities respecting a a 
plenum and a vacuum, 

There is no doubt that Aristotle himself held hght to be 
an undulating motion in a fluid affecting the sensorium of 
vision, as the undulations of the air affect that of the ear. 
This fluid he styles τὸ διαφανὲς, and says that colour af- 
fects it, οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, as the air; ὑπὸ τούτου δὲ συνεχοῦς 
ὄντος, κινεῖται τὸ αἰσθητήριον " οὐ γὰρ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγει 
Δημόκριτος, οἰόμενος, εἰ γένοιτο κενὸν τὸ μεταξὺ, ὁρᾶσθαι 
ἂν ἀκριθῶς, καὶ εἰ μύρμηξ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἴη, τοῦτο γάρ 
ἐστιν ἀδύνατον. “But by this fluid being continuous the 
sensorium is affected; for Democritus is not right in the 
supposition, that if all the intervening space were a vacuum, 
we might see so sharply as to discover an ant in the sky. 
This, however, is impossible without an intervening me- 
dium,” &c. Aristot., De Anima, ii., 7. 

In the Pantheistic Orphic hymn, quoted by the author 
of the treatise De Mundo, and by the scholiast on Plato, De 
Leg., iv., 716, A., to which we have already referred, the 
ether is represented as the seat of the Divine intellect, or, 
rather, as the Divine or universal sensorium : 

νοῦς δὲ ot ἀψευδὴς βασιλήϊος ἄφθιτος “AIOHP 
ᾧ δὴ πάντα κλύει καὶ φράζεται. 


Whether this fragment be spurious or not, it is unques- 
tionably of a very respectable antiquity. We have a simi- 
lar sentiment, although in a style less pantheistic, in that 
common Homeric line, 


Zev, κύδιστε, μέγιστε κελαινεφὲς “AIOEPI NATION, 


and which, although immeasurably inferior, ean hardly fail 
to call to mind the Scriptural declarations, Who alone dweill- 
eth in light inaccessible — Thou coverest thyself with light 
as with a garment. The sublimity of this is heightened 


ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 127 


by the thought that light, or, rather, the universal undu- 
latory «ther which causes the sensation, is itself zmvisible. 
The Greek conception has a tinge of pantheism, and of the 
doctrine of the anima mundi. ‘The Hebrew, besides its 
inexpressible sublimity, represents God as separated from 
the universe and veiled in thick darkness by the interven- 
tion of that very substance, which is the cause of light and 
knowledge to every portion of the worlds he has created. 
‘The Orphic and Homeric expressions, it is not absurd to 
suppose, arose from perversions ef that purer idea which 
we find in the Bible. Similar language is frequently .to be 
met with in the tragic poets, and sometimes a knowledge 
of its Orphic application and origin is absolutely necessary 
in illustrating passages which would be otherwise most 
obscure. As when Sophocles, in one of the sublimest 
choral edes in the Gidipus ‘Tyrannus, speaking of the an- 
tiquity of Law, represents it as born. of the heavenly ether, 
ovpaviav δι’ αἰθέρα 
τεκνωθέντες, 


or, in other words, the offspring of that universal sensorium 
or Divine Νοῦς, which, according to the Orphic hymn, 
hath its peculiar dwelling-place in the ether. From this 
manner of employing the term, it became one of the names 
of Jove himself, being regarded as his peculiar province in 
the division of Saturn’s kingdom, as to Juno was allotted 
the air or lower atmosphere, and to Neptune the water. 
᾽λήρ and αἰθήρ are sometimes confounded by the poets, 
although the distinction between them is, on the whole, tol- 
erably well observed. ’Avjp is regarded as the source of 
respiratory, and of the lowest animal life; αἰθήρ of the 
higher life of sensation, and even of the intellect—the life 
of the spirit. Hence, as the one is from dw, dnt, to 
breathe, the other is from αἴθω (old root diw), to burn, to be | 
hot ; in the same manner as the first expression of the idea 


128 ANCIENT DOUTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 


of life (Caw, ζῇν) was most naturally associated with the 
appearance of self-motion in. fermentation or ebullition. 
(See page 27, note 4, on the words cyv and ¢éw.) Hence 
we cannot help thinking that there is some connexion be- 
tween αἰθήρ, αἴθω, and the verb αἴσθομαι, αἰσθάνομαι. On 
this matter, some of the old poets and materializing philoso- 
phers may have indulged in views similar to what are now 
held by not a few modern savans, respecting the influence 
of an aethereal magnetic or galvanic fluid in the production 
of motion, sensation, and even thought. Hence Aristoph- 
anes, in the Clouds, 570, styles the ether βιοθρέμμονα : 


᾿Αἐθέρα σεμνότατον βιοθρέμμονα πάντων. 


The scholiast thinks that it is here used for ἀήρ. The 
higher sense, however, best accords with the term σεμνό- 
τατον and other expressions of this writer, who, when he 
chooses to lay aside his buffoonery, is the most philosophical 
of all the Grecian ‘poets, although much inclined to a ma- 
terializing pantheism. ‘In another place, in the style of the 
Orphic hymn and Homer, he calls it the aki «eel of 
Jove, 
Ὄμνυμι τοίνυν αἰθέρ᾽ οἴκησιν Διός. 
Thesmoph., 279. 

Αἰθήρ or πῦρ, onthe one hand, and γῆ on the other, be- 
ing the two extremes, are frequently spoken of together as 
the cogenerating causes, or male and female parents of all 
material existences... As in Ausch., Prom. Vinct., 88: 


Ὦ δῖος αἰθήρ ----τ----- 
παμμῆτόρ τε γῆ. 

So, also, in a fragment of Euripides, from the drama of 
Chrysippus, Ue 











γαῖα μεγίστη Kat Διὸς αἰθήρ. 
On like grounds, in the dissolution and death of animate 
objects, this semi-materializing philosophy and poetry 
taught that the more refined or spiritual parts returned te 


ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF THE FOUR ELEMENTS. 12% 


the higher element from which they derived their origin, 
while the denser returned to the earth The πνεῦμα 
(spiritus) ascended to its kindred αἰθήρ, the fluids and 
grosser matter sank into the bosom of their mother γαῖα, 
88 in the line of Euripides which so strongly calls to mind 
Ecclesiastes, xil., 7: 


9 ᾿ ΦῈ 


"Eaacar’ ἦδη γῇ καλνφθῆναι νεκρούς, 
ὅθεν δ᾽ ἕκαστον εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἀφίκετο 
ἐνταῦθ᾽ ἀπελθεῖν - IINEYMA μὲν πρὸς ᾽ΑΔΙΘΕΡΑ 
τὸ σῶμα δ᾽ εἰς ΤΉΝ. 
Supplices, 599. 
Compare Orestes, 1085, and Helena, 1023: 
ὁ νοῦς 
τῶν κατθανόντων ζῇ μὲν οὔ, γνώμην δ᾽ ἔχει 
ἀθάνατον εἰς ἀθάνατον AIOEP’ ἐμπεσών. 


Compare, also, the line of the fragment of the Hypsipyle 
from Stobzus, 108, in which we have the very language of 
the English Church burial service; earth to earth—dust to 
dust : 
ἄχθονται βροτοὶ 
εἰς γῆν φέροντες γῆν. 

In the case of the more gross and animal, it was supposed 
that the πνεῦμα, being borne down by the attraction and 
weight of the earthy and sensual, and being unable to ex- 
tricate itself from it, sank into still lower forms, until puri- 
fied and set free by the penetrating and cleansing fires of 
Hades. See the Phedon, 81, D. 

We cannot conclude this long and yet, as we trust, not 
altogether irrelevant excursus, without giving an extract 
from a fragment of Euripides, in which there is most beau- 
tifully expressed this departure of the elements to their 
native homes, and which we cannot help thinking to be 
genuine, notwithstanding it is strongly controverted by 
Valckenaer: 


130 ArHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF φύσις, τύχη, AND τέχνη. 


Xwpet δ᾽ ὀπίσω, τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας 
φύντ᾽ ἐς γαῖαν, τὰ δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ αἰθερίου 
ϑλαστόντα γονῆς εἰς οὐράνιον 
πόλον ἦλθε πάλιν ϑνήσκει δ᾽ οὐδὲν 
τῶν γιγνομένων " διακρινόμενον δ᾽ 

ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλου 

μορφὴν ἰδίαν ἀπέδειξεν. 

Valekenaer, Diatrib. in Eurip., Frag. 


XIII. 
Atheistical Doctrine of φύσις, τύχη, and τέχνη. 


Pacer 13, Line 16. Φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί" 
τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων. “They say that all these things 
are by nature and chance, but none of them by art.” .That 
is, these first four states, namely, πῦρ, ἀῆρ, &c., were the 
production of τύχη and φύσις, whatever meaning they might 
have attached to these terms: the second stage, which re- 
sulted in the larger compounded bodies (arising from the 
composition of these four elements, or from their mixed 
combinations, when considered as states or conditions of 
existence), was regarded as chiefly the work of τύχη. 
Τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, 7 


‘ 
” 


ξυμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, ϑερμὰ ψυχροῖς, ἢ 
ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρά, κ. τ. A. In this department τύχη was the 
presiding power, although its influence was modified by 
those adaptations which belonged to φύσις, and to which 
reference is made in the above expression, ἁρμόττοντα 
οἰκείως πως ; that is, although the original impulses and 
motions were the result of chance, a φύσις or natural neces- 
sity directed everything to its most fitting place, so that, 
after long wanderings in this wide domain of τύχη, a plenum 
at length found its rest in a vacuum, warm was neutralized 
by cold, convex adapted itself to concave, hard things found 


ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF φύσις͵ τύχη, AND τέχνη. 191 


their repose in soft, influences constantly tending on all sides 
to an equality, at last brought many bodies to a spherical 
shape and to a circular motion, until finally in this way a 
universe was formed: κόσμος ἁρμόττων τὰς δυνάμεις τῆς 
φύσεως αὐτοῦ οἰκείως πως ; these various adaptations or 
fittings, after they had once happened to take place, be- 
coming more and more stable by nature (φύσις), and a cer- 
tain habit (ἕξις), which everything had a tendency to main- 
tain when once assumed. 

After this immense region of φύσις and τύχη came the 
small province of τέχνη, or art, which was itself supposed 
to grow out of (φύεσθαι) and to be long posterior to the two 
first; according to the atheistic dogma, that mind, of which 
art or τέχνη is the offspring, is the last production of the 
generative power of the universe. Here we have the doc- 
irine of progress in all its consistency; and why might not 
a God be the last result or consummation of this ascending 
scale, instead of being the beginning, as he is im that a 
priori view, which commences with the idea of the perfect, 
and from thence descends to the lower and the imperfect ? 
We see not how, even on this scheme most ingenious as 
it is, the atheist can expect to find relief from his torment- 
ing theophobia, or escape that object of his greatest dread, 
a superhuman being, whether he styles him a God or a 
Demon. 

If nature, φύσις and τύχη, have thus, after ages spent in 
lower productions on our earth, finally worked out the soul 
of man (or whatever else they may style that peculiar mat- 
ter in us which wills, and thinks, and feels), why may not 
these agencies, during the long cycles of eternity, and in 
the infinitude of space, have given birth to a being excelling 
us In power as much as we surpass the lowest orders of 
vegetation? And what security have they as to his moral 
character, or what grounds for supposing that he would 
possess any moral character at all. The same progressive 


132 ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF φύσις, τύχη, AND τέχνη. 


influences which, on our narrow scale, have called into being 
ichthyosauri, and megatheria, and mammoth monsters, such 
as sometimes now affright us by their exposed relics, may 
have given birth, on the immense field of the universe, to 
Gorgons, Hydras, and Chimeras dire, 

to a God or Gods of a more horrid nature than ever crossed 
the imagination of the Gnostic, or than ever figured in the 
wildest legends of Thibet or Hindostan.. Indeed, we have 
every reason to believe that this monstrous Hindoo system, 
which should be styled a theogony rather than a theology, 
sprang in this very manner from an ancient atheism, which 
had been the offspring of a still earlier pantheism. It seems 
evidently to recognise such an older φύσις as Plato’s 
atheists talked about, and the history of its Gods is only a 
history of successive generations from this primeval nature, 
each of a more horrid species than its predecessor. 

We say the atheist has no security against this, unless 
he takes shelter m that a priori idea of God which comes 
from the necessities of our own minds, inseparably. con- 
necting with it the notion of goodness, and of infinite perfec- 
tion of every kind. But, then, this is a very different being 
from that dast production of nature, which can never rise 
above its parent, or possess any other than physical attri- 
butes. Should they startle at the idea of such a superhu- 
man being, whose malevolence might be commensurate 
with his power, and assert that it is improbable or impossi- 
ble, the declaration proceeds only from an instinctive revert- 
ing to those ideas which belong to a directly opposite sys- 
tem, commencing with the moral instead of the natural, and 
making the necessary idea of God the ground of all truth. 
We are confined to so minute a portion of the universe, 
that no a posteriori induction, aside from any such neces- 
sary a priori idea, or some special revelation, can ever 
produce a firm conviction or a confiding trust in the Divine 
benevolence. 


ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF Φύσις, τύχη, AND τέχνη. 133 


Neither has the atheist any security against a Hades or 
unseen world, filled with the most ghastly apparitions ; and 
it is a fact, as has been remarked by Bayle, who was him: 
self a skeptic, that many of this unhappy class have had 
most horrid fears of ghosts and hobgoblins. Their great 
champion Hobbes furnishes a noted example of this. Some 
might regard it as an inconsistency, and yet their system 
can allege nothing against the position that such appear- 
ances are not the mere fictions of a diseased imagination, 
but have a real existence in rerum natura. Who can as- 
sion any bounds to the working of φύσις and τύχη! The 
atheist cannot even be sure that he may not, on his own 
hypothesis, live again. Eternity is very long, and viewed 
in reference to it, everything ceases to be improbable, ex- 
cept what is inconsistent with the attributes of an a priori 
God. But remove this idea, and what hinders us from sup- 
posing that, im the endless changes of matter, the same 
atoms which now form the atheist’s body, and give rise to 
the energies of his soul, may again come into the same 
combinations, may recreate a brain with the same particles, 
having the same figure, site, and order, and, of course, pro- 
ducing the same thoughts and sensations, or, in short, re- 
new an existence, in all respects identical, which may rec- 
ollect all the misery of the past, and can only indulge the 
same awful anticipations for the hopeless and godless 
future. 

Plato seems to have already had in mind a class of semi- 
theists or semi-atheists, such as we have been considering, 
who might believe ina kind of Deity younger than Nature, 
and yet possessed of vast power and intelligence. After 
alluding to the common opinion that astronomers must be 
atheists, because they are so in the habit of resolving all © 
the phenomena of the Heavens into necessities (ἀνάγκαις) 
and natural laws, he mentions a class who acknowledged 
the existence of mind in the motions af the celestial bodies 


M 


134 ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF φύσις, τύχη, AND τέχνη. 


‘but who strangely regarded this mind as itself the result 
and not the author of Nature: Aéyovot τινες ὡς νοῦς εἴη ὃ 
διακεκοσμηκὼς πάνθ᾽ ὅσα κατ᾽ οὐρανόν : οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ πάλιν 
ἁμαρτάνοντες ψυχῆς φύσεως, ὅτι πρεσθύτερον εἴη σωμάτων, 
διωνοηθέντες δὲ ὡς νεώτερον, ἅπανθ᾽ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος ἀνέ- 
τρεψαν πάλιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον, kK. τ. A. ‘Some 
say that it is Nous, or Mind, that orders all things in the 
Heavens. But, then, these same persons, erring as to the 
nature of soul, in that it is older than bodies (or matter), 
and supposing it to be younger, they again, as we may say, 
upset all things, and especially themselves. For all these 
things appear to them to be full merely of earth, and stones, 
and other inanimate bodies, dividing among themselves (or 
to which they assign) the causes of the universe. ‘This is 
what has produced so many atheistic impieties, and so 
many difficulties in the treatment of these matters. Hence, 
also, have come those abusive charges which the poets 
have made against philosophers, comparing their declara- 
tions and dogmas to the confused yelping of dogs.” De 
Legibus, xii., 967, A. There is one important inference to 
be drawn from this passage. Plato evidently maintains 
that no one can be a consistent theist who does not hold 
that spirit is older than matter. The position that matter 
is eternal would be in direct opposition to this, and there- 
fore he could not himself have maintained that doctrine, 
whatever appearance of it there may be in some obscure 
passages in the Timeus.. See this more fully examined, 
Note L., on the ancient dogma, De nihilo nihil fit. On this 
subject of τύχη and φύσις, compare Aristotle, Physic. Ausc., 
lib, 11., ch. 4. 


RELIGION AND LAW, NOT BY NATURE, BUT BY ART. 135 


ALY 


Atheistical Doctrine that Law and Religion were not by Na- 
| ture, but by Art. 


Pace 14, Line 16. Οὕτω δέ kai τὴν νομοθεσίαν πᾶσαν, 
ov φύσει, τέχνῃ δέ. ‘"Fhis is simply mentioned as one of 
the inferences from their doctrine, namely, “ that legislation 
or law was not by nature, but by art.” It was, however, just 
the inference that Plato deemed of the most dangerous con- 
sequence, and against which he directs all the streneth of 
his reasoning, both here and in many other parts of his dia- 
logues. Compare the Gorgias, and especially that long 
argument of Callicles (482, C.), in which he advances this 
same doctrine, namely, that law, and right (τὸ δίκαιον), and 
religion are not by nature, but by human appointment, 
which is equivalent to what the atheist here is supposed to 
mean by τέχνη, as something junior and posterior to nature : 
ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις 
καὶ ὁ νόμος, κ. τ. A. Gorgias, 483, A. 

It is a doctrine which an all ages has had its advocates, 
and in modern times has been specially revived by Hobbes 
and his followers. It is this inference that gives atheism 
all its interest. As a speculative tenet for the intellect 
merely, it would have no charms even for the darkest mind. 
If this creed be true, then not only religion, but also all 
morality, and all right views of law, are without any founda- 
tion either in God, or in any nature of things proceeding 
from him, or in any nature at all implying a moral sanction 
and which necessarily suggests the idea of something older, 
and higher, and stronger than itself. ‘They are all, in that 
case, the offspring of Τέχνη, or Art. That is, they have 
only a human origin; since, in this creed, Art is the result 
of the junior production, Mind; or, in the language which 
Plato ascribes to the atheist, ὑστέραν ἐκ τούτων γενομένην 
ΘΝΗΤῊΝ ἐκ ONHTQN. They can, therefore, have only 


136 RELIGION AND LAW, NOT BY NATURE, BUT BY ART. 


human sanctions, and it is this conclusion which, to the 
depraved soul, gives atheism all its value, while, if the in- 
tellect alone were concerned, it would shrink from it as 
from the very ‘“ blackness of darkness”’ itself. 

The ancient atheists saw that there could be no true nat- 
ural morality without the belief in a God, and they did 
not pretend it. As in the moral and political philosophy 
of Plato, the Deity was the beginning, middle, and end: ὁ 
μὲν δὴ ϑεός (ὥσπερ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος) ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευ. 
τὴν καὶ μέσω τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων, lib. iv., 715, or, 
as he says in another place, ὁ δὴ ϑεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων μέτρον 
ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, 717; so, on the other hand, he justly rep- 
resents those against whom he is here contending, as hold- 
ing to no conscience, no law, no right and wrong, as well 
as no religion and no God... ‘They reasoned, however, like 
their modern followers of the school of Hobbes, in a vicious 
circle. From an atheistic assumption, they proved that law 
was not by nature, but by art, and then from this latter posi- 
tion, taken as established, they argued that. Divine worship, 
being enjoined by law, was also by art, and*not by nature : 
ϑεοὺς εἷναι πρῶτόν φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ οὐ φύσει ἀλλά τισι 
νόμοις. Page 14, line 20. 

We see the absurdity of the thing in the way Plato states 
their positions and their πρῶτον ψεῦδος ; yet, by conceal- 
ing this vicious and circular mode of reasoning, such writers 
as Hobbes have seemed to make out a most formidable 
argument. This atheistical dogma, that. religion is the 
creation of law and the civil magistrate, is most strikingly 
set forth in the following fragment attributed by Sextus 
Empiricus (Advers, Mathem., lib. ix., sec. 54) to Critias, 
one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, and by Plutarch (De 
Placit. Philosoph., i., 6 and 7) to Euripides, who, he says, 
utters these sentiments in the character.of Sisyphus instead 
of his own, through fear of the Areopagus. We give these 
verses in full, because of their intrinsic interest as one of 


RELIGION AND LAW, NOT BY NATURE, BUT BY ART. 137 


the most remarkable remaius of antiquity, because they set 
forth in all its strength the substance of all that has ever 
been said on this head from that time down to the present, 
and because they furnish a specimen of most finished poetry, 
of a higher stamp than atheism could have been supposed 
to employ in the utterance of its dark oracles : 


Ἦν χρόνος ὅτ᾽ ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος 
Καὶ ϑηριώδης, ἰσχύος 8’ ὑπηρέτης, 
"Ὅτ᾽ οὐδὲν ἄεθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν, 
Οὔτ᾽ αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίνετο. 
Κἀπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι νόμους 
Θέσθαι κολαστὰς, ἵνα δίκη τύραννος ἢ 
Τένους βροτείου, τήν ϑ᾽ ὕθριν δούλην ἔχῃ, 
᾿Εζημιοῦτο δ᾽, εἴ τις ἐξαμαρτάνοι. 
Ἔπειτ᾽, ἐπειδὴ τἀμφανῆ μὲν οἱ νόμοι 
᾿Απεῖργον αὐτοὺς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βίᾳ, 
Λάθρα δ᾽ ἔπρασσον, τηνικαῦτά μοι δοκεῖ 
Φῦναι πυκνός τις καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνὴρ, 
Τνῶναι δ᾽ ἔπος ϑνητοῖσιν ἐξευρὼν, ὅπως 
Ein τι δεῖμα τοῖς κακοῖσι, κἂν λάθρα 
Πράσσωσιν, ἢ λέγωσιν, ἢ φρονῶσί τι. 
Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ΤῸ OEION εἰσηγήσατο, 
‘Qe ἔστι Δαίμων, ἀφθίτῳ ϑάλλων βίῳ 
Now 7 ἀκούων καὶ βλέπων φρονῶν τ’ ἀεὶ, 
ὲ Προσέχων τε ταῦτα καὶ φύσιν ϑείαν φορῶν, 
Πᾶῶν μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούσεται, 
Ἐς δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσεται. 
᾽Εὰν δὲ σὺν σιγῇ τι βουλεύῃς κακὸν, 
Τοῦτ᾽ οὐχὶ λήσει τοὺς ϑεούς " τὸ γὰρ φρονοῦν 
Ἕν ἐστι θείων. τούσδε τις λόγους λέγων 
Διδαγμάτων ἥδιστον εἰσηγήσατο, 
Ψευδεῖ καλύψας τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγῳ. 
Ναίειν δ᾽ ἔφασκε τοὺς ϑεοὺς ἐνταῦθ᾽, ἵνα 
Μάλιστά γ᾽ ἐκπλήξειεν ἀνθρώπους, ἄγων 
“Ὅθεν περ ἔγνω τοὺς φόδους εἶναι βροτοῖς 
Καὶ τὰς ὀνήσεις τῷ ταλαιπώρῳ βίῳ, 
Ἔκ τῆς ὕπερθε περιφορᾶς, iv’ ἀστραπῆς 
Κατεῖδ᾽ ἐναύσεις, δεινὰ δ᾽ αὖ κτυπήματα 
Βροντῆς, τό τ’ ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέπας, 
Χρόνου καλὸν ποίκιλμα, τέκτονος σοφοῦ. 


M 2 


138 RELIGION AND LAW, NOT BY NATURE, BUT BY ART. 


Ὅθεν te λαμπρὸς ἀστέρας σπέρχει μύδρος, : 
OW ὑγρὸς εἰς γῆν ὄμθρος ἐκπορίζεται. 

Τοιούσδε περιέστησεν ἀνθρώποις φόθου 

Στοίχους, καλῶς τε τῷ λόγῳ κατῴκισε 

Τὸν Δαίμον᾽ ὀγκῶν, ἐν πρέποντι χωρίῳ. 


A most masterly refutation of this atheistic dogma, espe- 
cially as it was, in more modern times, advanced by Hobbes, 
may be found in Cudworth’s Intellectual System of the 
Universe, in which there is a most thorough and conclusive 
examination of the general doctrine, that morality and reli- 
gion are not by nature, or from the Divine mind, but are 
strictly conventional, that is, by human law. Plato also 
touches upon this subject in the Theetetus, 172, B., where 
he sets forth the unavoidable conclusions of that flowing 
philosophy, which, rejecting zdeas, and making man, or, in 
other words, sensations the measure of all things (μέτρον 
πάντων), utterly sweeps away all morality, all religion, all 
law, in short, all foundations whether of a civil or religious 
kind: Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν (pact), καλὰ μὲν καὶ 
αἰσχρά, δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα, καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, ola ἂν ἑκάστη 
πόλις οἰηθεῖσα (ξυμφέροντα εἶναι) ϑῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, 
ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν 
οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου, οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως 
εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις, καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνο- 
σίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν 
οὐδὲν "OY SIAN ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν, τοῦτο 
γίνεται ἀληθὲς τότε, ὅτων δόξῃ. Theetetus, 172, Β,, C. 

They assigned ἃ rather higher rank to the idea of the 
beautiful (τὸ καλὸν) than to that of the right. Kat δὴ καὶ 
τὰ καλὰ, φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα - τὰ δὲ δὴ 
δίκαια οὐδ᾽ εἷναι τοπαράπαν φύσει. Page 14, line 23. 
“ The beautiful, they said, was partly by nature and partly 
by law (that is, conventional agreement or custom), but the 
Just (or Right) had no foundation at all in nature,” or, in 
other words, was the creation alone of arbitrary enactment. 


THE FIGURE APOSIOPESIS. 139 


The doctrines of an immutable standard of morals and of 
an immutable standard of taste must gotogether. Both are 
necessarily and consistently rejected by the atheist, and 
both should be strenuously. maintained by all consistent 
theists. Physical, moral, intellectual, and religious beauty, 
although not the same, can all be traced to one common 
foundation. All are harmonies; all spring from one root, 
and all are alike unmeaning notions, unless connected with 
that idea of God in which the Beautiful, the Righteous, and the 
Good (τὸ καλὸν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δίκαιον) are all embraced 
and regarded, not only as older than human art (ϑνητὴ τέχ- 
vn), but also than φύσις, or Nature itself. Compare the 
argument of the atheist Callicles, in the Gorgias, 485: a 
φύσει μὲν OVK ἔστι καλὰ νόμῳ δέ, κ. τ. 2X. 


XV. 
The Figure Aposiopesis. 


Pace 15, Line 8. Ei μὴ φήσουσιν. ‘The apodosis here 
,is wanting, or, rather, interrupted in a manner, which, al- 
though frequent in Greek, would not be admissible in the 
English. This silent omission has sometimes a much 
more powerful effect than any expression of the apodosis, 
especially in the case of threatening and admonitions. The 
answer, in such examples, seems to be left entirely to con- 
science, as though it could not possibly mistake the proper 
response. ‘There are very powerful and numerous in- 
stances of this in the Hebrew of the Old Testament, and 
from thence in the Hebraistic Greek of the New. One of 
the most striking may be found, Luke, xiii., 9: κἂν μὲν 
ποιῆση KapTov—el δὲ μήγε. Compare, also, Luke, xix., 
42; ΧΧΙ)., 42; Acts, xxili.,9; Romans, ix., 22; John, vi., 
62. ‘There is a very fine example, Iliad, i1., 135: 


140 THE FIGURE APOSIOPESIS. 


ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθνωοι ᾿Αχαιοί---- 
εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν .... 
See, also, the ninth book of the Laws, 854, C., καὶ ἐὰν 
μέν σοι δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφᾷ τι TO νόσημα ----εἰ δὲ μὴ, &c. 
We have also an example very similar to the present in 
the Protagoras, 325, D., καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἔχων πείθηται----εἰ δὲ 
un, &c., where, in the same manner, the answer is left to 
the inward voice, and the writer hurries on to the second 
condition as the principal clause. See, also, the Republic, 
ix., 575, D., οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν ἑκόντες ὑπείκωσιν----δὰν δὲ 
μὴ, &c.; Thucydides, iil, 3, καὶ ἣν μὲν ξυμθῇ, ἡ πεῖρα ----- εἰ 
δὲ μὴ, &c.; Plato, Symposion, 220, D., ei δὲ βούλεσθε, κ. 
7. Δ. This has been most. appropriately and beautifully 
styled by grammarians aposiopesis, or an Omission arising 
from an excitement of the feelings, in which a gesture or 
a look is supposed to supply the place of the voice. ΑἹ- 
though these and similar cases:may by some be regarded 
as defects or irregularities in the Greek language, every 
scholar who has any claim to taste or philosophy must re- 
gard them as its highest beauties... It is a great pity that 
our own tongue had not more of this flexibility, and did not 
admit more licenses of a similar kind, instead of being so 
stiffly confined in that strait jacket. which has been put 
upon it in the rules imposed, for the most. part, by pedantic, 
unphilosophical, and unclassical writers on English Gram. 
mar; for such, with some few exceptions, have been the 
great mass of those who have taken upon themselves to 
lay down the laws of this science, and.to sit in judgment 
on Lowth and Murray... To. return, however, to the sentence 
before us: if 1t,.1s desired, to,avoid the aposiopesis, this may 
be done by taking all from καὶ περὶ to. “γράφων inclusive, 
as a parenthesis, and then, bringing in what follows as a 
repetition with an apodosis to εἰ μὴ φήσουσιν. The. only 
thing in the way of this is the particle dé, the insertion of 
which, however, may be regarded as occasioned by the 


ARGUMENT FROM MOTION. 141 


prodosis having been, in a measure, lost sight of in conse- 
quence of the length of the intervening parenthesis. 


XVI. 
Argument for the Existence of a God from Motion. 


Pace 18, Line 22. ᾿Αηθεστέρων λόγων. ** Unusual, or 
out of the common track.” Reference is had to those subtle 
disquisitions respecting motion which are soon to follow. 
They are so called, because differing from the common 
and more obvious arguments generally made use of, such 
as those arising from evidence of design, and the more 
striking phenomena of the visible world, to which Clinias 
had so readily alluded in the commencement of the discus- 
sion. Plato thinks it best to begin at the beginning, or, as 
he elsewhere styles it, the fountain-head of the error: τὴν 
πηγὴν ἀνοήτου δόξης. If the least power or property of 
motion is conceded to matter, or to the least particle of 
matter per se, all is given up to the atheist, at least as far 
as the physical world is concerned. ‘The whole cause is 
surrendered to the enemy. If this is granted, or not de- 
nied, then it would not be hard to admit that matter may 
also have an adaptive as well as a moving property, a 
tendency to an accommodation of itself to the circumstances 
in which it is placed, or, according to the doctrine just 
taught, a disposition to fit itself to those conditions in the 
universe into which it may be thrown by its own self- 
moving power, acting only under the direction of τύχη, or 
chance: ἡ ξυμπέπτωκεν πάντα ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, 
μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρὰ, κι τ. A. Here we are in the dark 
‘region of occult qualities, and we can as. well conceive of 
the one property as of the other. In fact, it is easier for 
the mind to admit this doctrine of an adaptive power, after 
conceding that of motion, than to receive the latter first as 


~ 


142 ARGUMENT FROM MOTION. 


an independent starting-point. In this view, then, all ar- 
guments from fitness fall to the ground, unless the first mo- 
tion is shown to be the offspring of τέχνη, and not of τύχη, 
or even of φύσις. If we only give the atheist time enough 
—and eternity is very long—he may fancy that, on his 
theory, everything will at last fall into its proper place 
(ξυμπίπτει οἰκείως πως), and commence the natural dis- 
charge of its only and long-sought appropriate office 

Plato, therefore, takes his stand on the first position, 
namely, that the mere motion of matter implies the existence 
of Spirit as an older and higher essence, or, in other words, 
that Spirit alone is se/f-moving, because it alone possesses 
that duality which resolves itself at the same time into sud- 
ject and object. The term αὐτοκίνησις is not to be con- 
fined to local motion, but may refer to any change in the 
state or condition of a thing. It may, therefore, be pred- 
icated of mind, or pure spirit, independent of space. In 
this sense volition is αὐτοκίνησις, or self-motion, even al- 
though it may never be exhibited outwardly. That matter 
cannot possess this, in either acceptation of the term, is an 
afhrmation rendered necessary by the very laws of mind. 
It is involved in the term itself, or rather in the idea of 
which the term is the real, and not merely arbitrary rep- 
resentative, and may therefore be called a logical necessity. 
Although the argument may have something of the a pos- 
teriort form, it is nevertheless strictly.a priori. Itis a con- 
clusion not derived from experience ; for in truth, aside from 
the essential idea which the laws of our minds compel us 
to create, all our mere experience of matter is directly op- 
posed to 10. As presented to our senses, it seems to be eve 
in motion, and this phenomenon exhibits itself more con 
stantly the more closely and minutely it is examined ; so” 
that if experience alone were to be consulted, or, to use the 
language of some of our Baconians, if nature alone were to 
be interrogated, motion would appear to be the law, and rest 


ARGUMENT FROM MOTION. 148 


(af absolute rest were ever to be discovered) the exception. 
Notwithstanding all this, the mind cannot divest itself of 
that idea (whether innate, or acquired, or suggested) which 
_ it hath of body, as distinguished from space ; and whenever 
this idea is clearly called out, the soul doth affirm of neces- 
sity, and in spite of all the phenomena of experience to the 
contrary, that matter cannot move itself. The same ne- " 
cessity compels it, also, to declare that matter cannot con- 
tinue motion by virtue of any inherent power, any more 
than it can commence it, and this, too, notwithstanding the 
opposing dogma so confidently laid down in all our books 
of natural philosophy. We have the constant observation 
of ten thousand motions, commenced and continued with- 
out the visible intervention of any spiritual agent, and ap- 
parently the result of innate properties, and yet, when the 
mind remains sound and true to itself, all this does not at 
all weaken the innate conviction, that every κίνησις implies 
the existence of an originating wil/ or spirit somewhere, 
however many the impulsive forces that may seem to have 
intervened between that will and its ultimate object. When 
the mind 1.5 in a healthy state, we say it is compelled to 
affirm, and does affirm this, with the same confidence as 
the proposition that the three angles of every triangle are 
equal to two right angles, or that two bodies cannot occupy 
the same space’ Even this, notwithstanding it lies at the 
foundation of mechanical and dynamical physics, is ulti- 
mately to be resolved into a /ogical necessity, that is, a ne- 
cessary affirmation into which the mind is driven by those 
laws of its own, that form not only ourthighest, but our only 
idea of truth. Hence, having the idea, or that notion un- 
der which it is forced to think of matter, the soul afhrms 
that two bodies occupying the same space are one body 
because the last differentia, or ἑτεροιότης, is destroyed. 


144 SOUL OLDEK THAN BODY. 


XVII. 
Soul Older than Body. 


Pace 19, Line 16. Σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων yevo- 
μένη. Compare with this Timeus, 34, B.: Τὴν δὲ δὴ 
ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως 
ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ ὁ ϑεὸς νεωτέραν. ov γὰρ ἂν ἄρχεσθαι 
πρεσθύτερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρου συνέρξας εἴασεν. ὃ δὲ Kal γε- 
νέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσθυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος, 
ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομένου συνεστήσατο. “God 
did not create soul, as we now speak of it (in the order of 
our argument), posterior and junior; for he would not have 
suffered an elder thing to be ruled by a younger. Where- 
fore he constituted soul, both by virtue and by birth, to be 
prior to and older than body, as the mistress and ruler 
thereof.” The term ψυχὴ is used here in a less sense 
than in the tenth of the Laws, where it includes all that is 
immaterial, and is employed in a peculiar manner for God 
as distinguished from φύσις. It, however, means much 
more, in this passage of the ‘Timzus, than the soul of man. 
The philosopher is speaking of soul collectively, the animus 
mundi, or Soul of the Universe, as distinct from, inferior to, 
and dependent upon, the Deity who had constituted it (ovy- 
εστήσατο, ἐμηχανήσατο), and yet as the source.and fountain 
from which all other souls emanate or are generated, 
whether of men or of the inferior Divinities, according to 
that verse of Pindar, Nem., Carm. vi., Σ., α., 1, 2: 


“Ev ἀγδρῶν, ἕν ϑεῶν γένος " ἐκ 
μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν 
ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι. 

If soul is older than body or matter, then the properties 
or innate powers (συγγενῆ) of the former must be also be- 
fore those of the latter. Wherefore, as he says below, 
δόξα δὴ καὶ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ νοῦς Kal τέχνη Kal νόμος (τὰ 


SOUL OLDER THAN BODY. 145 


συγγενῆ ψυχῆς), πρότερα ἂν εἴη σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ 
βαρέων καὶ κούφων (τῶν προσηκόντων σώματι). Thought, 
and providence, and reason, and art, and daw, must have 
been before hard, and soft, and heavy, and light.” It is 
evident that the term σῶμω here is not taken for organized 
substances, but is in all respects equivalent to our word 
matter ; for he mentions only those elementary properties 
which belong to it, or were supposed to belong to it as 
matter, such as hardness or resistance, weight, &c. So 
that there is nothing in this word against the inference we 
have drawn respecting Plato’s opinion on the eternity of the 
material world, whether regarded as organized or unor- 
sanized: Itseems to us perfectly clear that in every sense 
of the word, as used by the modern philosophy, he held 
matter to be junior to soul. 

The order of the argument, it should be observed here, 
is the direct. opposite of what is commonly styled the a 
posteriort.. Inthe latter, we proceed from evidences of fit- 
ness in matter to a soul or art, which, for all that this method 
can oppose to the contrary, may have been the offspring of 
an older φύσις, of whose adaptations its designs may be 
only an imperfect imitation, whether regarded as proceed- 
ing from the soul of man, or of some superhuman being. 
In the other, the older existence of. spirit is first establish- 
ed, and then it is inferred, even before experimental induc- 
tion, that there must be such evidences of design, because 
art and law, which are properties of soul, must be older 
than the material structures in which they are exhibited. 
On the scheme of the atheist, or the naturalist (the worship- 
per of φύσις), only some of the smaller and latest produc- 
tions were the work of τέχνη making its appearance in the 
latter cycles of the universe. In the other view, which the 
author here presents, Ta μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξ- 
εἰς τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο, ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ 
φύσις ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ 

Ν ; 


146 COMPARISON OF THE DANGEROUS FI.OOD. 


“The great and first works would be the works of art, 
while the things of nature, and even nature herself, would 
be posterior to, and ruled by art and mind.” 

There is likewise another view which is essential to the 
full interpretation of the passage, namely, that not only was 
it impossible that these phenomena of matter should exisr 
oljectively, without the previous existence of soul as an effi- 
cient cause of that substance of which they are phenomena, 
but also that they could not exist subjectively without a soul 
of which they constitute the sensations. In this sense, 
also, is it true that spirit must be older than hard, and soft, 
and visible, &c. Compare the passage in the Pheedon, in 
which he refutes the doctrine that the soul is only a har- 
mony, by showing that its pre-existence is essential to har- 
mony itself, and that, where the former is not present, the 
latter is nothing more than dead strings, and chords, and 
tensions, and relaxations, and vibrations of the air, but has 
as harmony no real or true being. It is clear that the same 
reasoning may be carried down through all the elementary 
properties of matter. 


XVIII. 
Remarkable Comparison of the Dangerous Flood. 


Pace 21, Line 3. Σκοπεῖτε οὖν, καθάπερ ei ποταμὸν 
ἡμᾶς ἔδει τρεῖς ὄντας διαβαίνειν ῥέοντα σφόδρα, kK. τ. A. 
‘The common reading is εἰ καθάπερ. We have ventured 
to make the change from the exigency of the place, and on 
the authority of Stephanus. “Consider, then, as if we three 
had to cross a violently flowing river,” &c. The Athenian 
here most graphically compares himself and his two com- 
panions, just entering upon this most profound and difficult 
argument respecting motion, to men who are about to plunge 
into a deep and rapid torrent, and who, therefore, need the 


COMPARISON OF THE DANGEROUS FLOOD. 147 


"- 


utmost caution in the examination of every step, lest, if at 
any point they should lose a firm foothold, they might be 
overwhelmed in floods of darkness, and carried down the 
stream of doubt, without any chance of recovery.’ The 
comparison is admirably sustained, and even when it seems 
to be dropped, does nevertheless continue to affect the dis- 
course, and tinge the style with a metaphorical hue for 
many sentences ; as in the expressions, λόγος σφοδρότερος 
καὶ abatoc—napapepouevoc, page 22, and ἐχόμενοι ὥς τι- 
voc ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος, page 23. Cicero was very fond 
of imitating Plato, and we cannot help thinking that he had 
this passage in his eye, and meant to institute a similar 
comparison in respect to himself, when placed in like cir- 
cumstances in reference to another great truth. Itaque du- 
bitans, hesitans, circumspectans, multa adversa reverens, 
tamquam in rate in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio. 
Cicero, Tusc. Disp., i., 30. 

So, also, in the Phedon, after exhausting the direct ar- 
guments for the immortality of the soul, Socrates “trusts 
himself to the best of human reasons (that is, to the old and 
unbroken tradition respecting the doctrine) as the safest 
vessel to which the soul could be committed, and on which 
alone, although in continual danger of shipwreck, it could 
be expected to outride the storms of doubt ; unless, perhaps, 
it might hereafter find a surer vehicle in some Divine reve- 
lation, or λόγος ϑεῖος, which Heaven might yet condescend to 
make known to men.” We do not know which to admire 
most, the sound philosophy, the unaffected humility, or the 
striking imagery, with which the whole passage abounds. 
Δεῖν yap περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μα- 
θεῖν ὕπη ἔχει, ἢ εὑρεῖν, ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον τὸν γοῦν 
θέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαθόντα ἐπὶ τούτου 
ὀχούμενον, ὥσπερ ἐπὲ σχεδίας, κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι 
τὸν Biov: εἰ wh τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότε 
ρον, ἐπὶ βεθαιοτέρου ὀχήματος ἢ AOTOY OEIOY τινος 


148 INVOCATION OF DIVINE AID. 


διαπορευθῆναι. Phedon, 85, E. We take ἀνθρώπινος 
λόγος, in this passage, not in the sense of reason or argu- 
ment, but rather as it is used in the Gorgias, 523, A., at the 
introduction of the mythical representation of the judgment 
after death: ἄκουε μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ pv- 
Gov, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον. In the word σχεδίας above, Plato 
seems to have had an eye to Homer’s account of the ship- 
wreck of Ulysses, in his voyage on such a vessel from the 
island of Calypso, and thus to intimate that this βέλτιστος 
TOV ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων could be regarded as at best only 
a temporary support, until the coming of that more sure 
(βεθαιότερος) word of Revelation. Can we doubt that the 
soul of our philosopher would. have rejoiced in the an- 
nouncement that there was even then in the world a “ sure 
word of prophecy, like a light shining in a dark place,” and 
that he would have surrendered all his speculative reason- 
ing for the security and comfort of such an assurance ? 


XIX. 


Invocation of the Divine Aid in the Argument: Striking 
Examples of this from other Dialogues. 


Pace 22, Line 11. “Aye δή, Θεὸν εἴποτε παρακλητέον 
ἡμῖν, νῦν ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω γενόμενον. “ If ever we ought 
to call upon God, let it be done now.” Many professed 
Christian writers, both metaphysicians and theologians, 
might here take a lesson from the heathen philosopher. 
What more sublimely appropriate than this petition for Di- 
vine aid in an argument against those who denied the Divine 
existence? The dark, violent, and almost impassable tor- 
rent upon which they are about to embark is yet kept in 
mind, and in view of this the soul is led to seek for some 
aid out of itself. There is, we think, an allusion to some 
ef those prayers which Homer puts into the mouths of his 


INVOCATION OF DIVINE AID. 149 


heroes, as they are about to engage in some arduous and 
perilous contest ; it may be to the prayer of Ajax for light 
in that desperate battle (lib. xvil., 645) in which Jove covers 
the whole field of conflict with thick darkness ; or, perhaps, 
in still greater consistency with the metaphorical imagery 
1ere employed, to the prayer of Achilles, in the twenty-first 
book of the Iliad (273), when in danger of being over- 
whelmed by the rising floods of the angry and turbulent 
Scamander : 


Ζεῦ πάτερ, ὡς οὔτις με ϑεῶν ἐλεεινὸν ὑπέστη, 
ἐκ ποταμοῖο σαῶσαι. 


Whether this be so or not, it is in this case a prayer 
which the purest Christianity need not blush to acknowl- 
edge and admire. ‘There are several interesting examples 
of similar invocations in others of the Platonic dialogues, 
either put into the mouth of Socrates or of some speaker 
by whom he is evidently represented. We have but little 
doubt, too, that in these remarkable peculiarities of charac- 
ter, Plato accurately represents the model he so closely ob- 
served, and with whom his own intellectual existence may 
almost be regarded as identified. We may note, among 
others, the invocation in the fourth book of the Laws, at the 
commencement of his system of positive legislation for the 
state ; a work which certainly, of all others, should never 
be attempted without a deep feeling of the necessity of 
Divine assistance. Θεὸν δὴ πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως κατασ- 
κευὴν ἐπικαωλώμεθα" ὁ δὲ ἀκούσειέ τε, καὶ ὑπακούσας ἵλε- 
ως εὐμενῆς τε ἡμῖν ἔλθοι, συνδιακοσμήσων Thy τε πόλιν 
καὶ τοὺς νόμους, 712, Β. ‘ Let us invoke the aid of God in 
the construction of our state. May he hear us, and when he 
has listened to our requests, may he kindly and propitiously 
come to our assistance, that he may jointly with us arrange in 
order the state and the laws.” How much higher a light 
than this is boasted of by those modern law-makers whe 

N 2 


150 INVOCATION OF DIVINE AID. 


have endeavoured, as far as they could, to banish the voice 
of prayer from our legislative halls! Compare, also, the 
Philebus, 25, B: Θεὸς μὲν οὖν (ἡμῖν φράσει) av πέρ ye 
ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος γίγνηται. Here, too, the subject, in 
the discussion of which the Divine aid is invoked, is of the 
very highest importance, being no less than a most profound 
analysis of the radical difference between physical or sen- 
sual, and spiritual pleasure ; a theme, in his estimation, so 
holy, that, when again alluding to it in the sixth book of the 
Republic, he utters the same word (εὐφήμει) which was 
employed in driving all profanation, whether of speech or 
action, from the sacrificial altar, Rep., vi., 509, B. 
Perhaps, however, the most striking example of an invo- 
cation of this kind may be found in connexion with that 
sublime procemium of the Timeus, to which we have al- 
ready alluded. That too, it should be borne in mind, is a 
treatise on law, or, in other words, the legislation of the 
physical and intellectual universe, embracing equally the 
laws of mind and matter: ᾿Αλλὰ τοῦτό ye δὴ πάντες ὅσοι 
kal κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὁρμῇ Kai 
σμικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος ϑεὸν ἀεί που καλοῦσιν" 
ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς περὶ παντὸς λόγους ποιεῖσθαί TH μέλλοντας, 
εἰ γέγονεν, ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ϑεούς ἐπικαλουμέ- 
νους εὔχεσθαι πάντας κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις μὲν μάλιστα, 
ἐπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν, 27, Ο. “Even those who have 
but little of sobriety, in the undertaking of any affair, wheth- 
er of small or great consequence, always call upon God. 
Much more, then, when about to engage in a discussion re- 
specting the universe, whether 1, 7s generated or eternal, 
ought we to invoke God by prayer, that what we say may 
be, first of all, according to his mind, and then consistent 
with ourselves.” ‘ ; | | 
Pace 23, Line 1. Σπουδῇ πάσῃ παρακεκλήσθων. The 
prayer on the present occasion has all the conciseness and 
simplicity that characterize all the recorded petitions of 


* INVOCATION OF DIVINE AID. 151 


Socrates. Compare the last he ever uttered, for an easy 
death, just before taking the cup of poison in the prison, 
Pheedon, 117, B: "AAA εὔχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς ϑεοῖς ἔξεστί 
τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ γε- 
νέσθαι" ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὔχομαί τε, καὶ γένοιτο ταύτῃ. The 
longest specimen is that remarkable prayer at the end of 
the Phedrus, or the dialogue on Spiritual Beauty, which 
we cannot resist the temptation of quoting in full: Ὦ ®IAE 
ΠΑΝ τε καὶ ἄλλοι Veoi, δοίητέ uot καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδο- 
θεν, τἄξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς Eivai μοι φίλια - πλού- 
σιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν" τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη 
μοι ὅσον μῆτε φέρειν pyre ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώ. 
ῴρων, 279, Β. “Οι thou beloved Universal Numen, and ye 
other Divinities, grant that Imay become beautiful within, and 
that whatever uf externals I may possess may be all in har- 
mony with my inward (spiritual) being. May I regard the 
wise alone as rich ; and may I have just so much of gold as 
no other would take from me but the virtuous man.” ‘The last 
sentence 1s somewhat obscure, but the whole petition ap- 
proaches the spirit of the Gospel, although lacking some of 
the essential requisites of a Christian supplication. It may 
justify us in hoping that its author, had he received the rev- 
elation for which he longed, would not have remained “ far 
from the kingdom of Heaven ;” but it furnishes no grounds 
for the extravagant language of one who said, in his enthu- 
siastic admiration of the heathen sage, sancte Socrates ora 
pro nobis. He is represented here, however, as receiving 
a strengthening of his confidence, and some degree of as- 
surance from his supplication; for he says immediately, 
“holding fast to this (that is, the hope of Divine aid) as by 
some sure cable, let us embark,” &c.; still keeping up the 
metaphor of the dangerous fiood. : 


152 THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW ! 


XX. 


The Great Question of the Ancient Schools, Do all Things 
flow? §c.; with a Sketch of some of the principal Mate- 
rializing or Atheistical Philosophers who belonged to the 
Tonic, and to the Physical School of Elea. 


Pace 23, Line 4. Karta δέ, ὦ ξένε, ὁπόταν φῇ τις, apa 
ἕστηκε μὲν πάντα, κινεῖται δὲ οὐδέν; ἢ τούτῳ. πᾶν τοὐ- 
ναντίον; For the common reading kata δὲ, established 
by the concurrence of all the manuscripts, Ast would 
substitute κατὰ τάδε, connecting it with φαίνεται in the 
preceding sentence; and in this he follows Eusebius and 
the version of Ficinus.. We think the common reading is 
correct, and that Ast and Ficinus have mistaken the spirit 
of the passage. The Athenian, entering alone in this dan- 
gerous flood, to try, as he says, its depth and strength, be- 
fore calling upon his companions to follow, assumes for a 
time the parts both of interrogator and respondent. He con- 
sequently supposes an objector from the atheistic or Ionic 
school, adopting some of the peculiar phraseology or cant 
terms of that sect, and taking him up in the midst of his 
positions in some such way as this, “ And so, then (kai εἶτα 
δὲ), answer me, if you please, one of these three questions : 
Do all things stand, and does nothing move? or is the op- 
posite of this the case, namely, that all things move and 
nothing stands? or do some things move and some things 
stand? Give me, I say, an answer to these old queries, 
which have so long perplexed our schools of philosophy.” 
‘To which supposed objector the Athenian replies by taking 
the third hypothesis as his starting position in this argu- 
ment. ‘There is much vivacity in this mode of introducing 
‘he discussion about motion, and kata (καὶ εἶτα) is the 
very particle by which it 1s best effected; it being used to 
introduce a sudden inference, and implying a previous ar- 


THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 153 


gument, in the midst of which the objection is supposed ta 
be made. If any alteration of the established text is to be 
allowed, we think it should consist in changing dé into 67. 
On the particle εἶτα, see note, page 40. 

Whatever else may be intended, there can be no doubt 
that there is here an allusion, at least, to the same ques- 
tions which are so fully discussed in the Theztetus, and 
stated there several times in nearly this same language. 
See, especially, Theetetus, 180, ἢ. ‘These were the fa- 
mous problems which so divided, first the Ionic and Italian 
schools, and afterward the physical and metaphysical 
schools of Elea ; embracing, however, a much wider 
range than the merely dynamical points to which Plato, in 
the present argument, confines himself. ‘There is an allu- 
sion to them in the Memorabilia, lib. 1., c.1., 14: καὶ τοῖς 
μὲν ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι πάντα, τοῖς δὲ οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε κινηθῆναι. 
In this language was stated the great debate between those 
who referred all things to sensation, making it the measure 
of all reality, or what Plato styles τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν 
(Theetetus, 179, C.), and those who held to a higher and 
immutable world of ideas (τὴν ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν, the immove- 
able essence), the real and only ἀληθῶς ὄντως ὄντα, while 
they regarded the objects of sense as continually moving, 
changing, never for a moment remaining the same, and 
having nothing about them (aside from the idea, or λόγος, 
which, by its connexion alone, imparted to them a temporal 
reality) that could constitute real being (οὐσίαν) in the 
highest and truest senses of the word. ‘They formed, as 
we have elsewhere observed,* the grand line of separation 
between two ever opposing systems of philosophy, and 
right views, in almost every department of knowledge, are 
more or less connected with these subtle inquiries when 
viewed in their widest relations. ‘Their odd phraseology 
may be more fully interpreted thus: What constitutes real 


* Discourse on the True Idea of The State, Andover, 1843. 


154 THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW ἢ 


ity? Are all things in a perpetual flux? Is there nothing 
in the universe but phenomenal facts and sensations, or 18 
there a world of truth and being separate from, and inde- 
pendent of, the perceived and apparent—not merely as gen- 
eralizations of the mind, but as realities, more stable than 
the earth, more permanent than the old rolling heavens— 
ideas fixed, immoveable (ἀκίνητα), eternal, which were nev- 
er born, and which can never die—the dei κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ 
ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, the ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντως ὄντα, from which 
all individual things derive reality, and by partaking alone 
of which they become the true objects of science, or émor- 
nua instead of δόξαι. 

There is quite a full account of the systems of dsaphy ; 
of which these questions were the symbols, to be found in 
the dialogue Theetetus. Plato there makes Homer (wheth 
er sportively or not, it is difficult to determine) the head 
and founder of that Ionic school which held that all things 
flowed ; and this because the poet represents Oceanus and 
Tethys as the original and mother of Gods and men. We 
ereatly doubt whether in this Homer had any philosophical 
or mythical sense at all. If, however, anything of the kind 
was intended, there would seem to be nothing more than 
an allusion to the doctrine afterward advanced by ‘Thales, 
that water was the apy7, or originating element of the uni- 
verse, and so the matter is viewed by Aristotle, Metaph., 
1.,3. ‘This doctrine of Thales was, in all probability, deri. 
ved from a corrupt and perverted tradition of the Mosaie 
account of the creation, where it is said that “ The Spirit 
of God was brooding over the waters,’ and the succeeding 
hypotheses of Anaximander and Anaximenes, one of whom 
held that air, and the other that znfinile space was thé first 
principle of the universe, were only attempts to refine upon 
what seemed to them the grosser element of Thales. 

In the later writers, however, who may be regarded as 
being in the line of this school, these speculations, and the 


THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW! 155 


phraseology employed in reference to them, assumed ἃ dif- 
ferent aspect, and were applied to the moral and mental, as 
well as the physical world. In the ‘Thetetus, Socrates 1s 
represented as thus setting forth their doctrine: ὡς ἄρα ὃν 
μὲν αὐτὸ Kab’ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν" ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς TE καὶ κι- 
νήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φα- 
μεν BINAL οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες - "EXTI μὲν yap 
οὐδέποτ᾽ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ ΤΊ ΓΝΕΤΑΙ : καὶ περὶ τούτου πάν- 
τες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοί, πλὴν Παρμενίδου, ξυμφέρεσθον, ἹΙροτα- 
γόρας τε καὶ Ἡράμλειτος kat ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς " καὶ τῶν ποιη- 
τῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας - κωμῳδίας μὲν ᾿πί- 
χαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος εἰπών, 


Ὠκεανόν τε Θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν, 


πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως, 158, A. 
‘ That there was nothing absolute, or which existed per se 
but that from impetus, and motion, and mutual mixture arise 
all things of which we predicate the verb TO BE, not cor- 
rectly predicating, because, in truth (to use terms aright), 
nothing really IS, but all things are ever BECOMING. 
And in this all our wise men successively agree except 
Parmenides, namely, Protagoras, and Heraclitus, and Em- 
pedocles; and of the poets, the chief in each kind, namely, 
Epicharmus in comedy, and Homer in tragedy, when he 
says that Oceanus is the origin of the Gods, &c., by which 
he means that all things are the offspring of flowing and 
motion.” 

‘The distinction here is clearly stated. This school very 
consistently refused to apply to things the higher term of 
being, ἐστί, but preferred the, word γέγνεται. Nothing, 
they said, really and truly IS, but all things are ever becom- 
ing ; and this was correct, if there existed nothing else ex- 
cept matter, sensation, and their joint phenomena. In an- 
other place, Theetetus, 160, D., Plato gives us more par 
ticularly their individual opinions, or, rather, the favourite 


156 THE ANCIENT QUESTION DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 


and peculiar terms in which each expressed the common 
doctrine of their flowing philosophy. In the language of 
Homer, Heraclitus, and all that Ionic tribe, πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦ- 
τον φῦλον, as Plato styles them, οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ 
πάντα, all things were ever flowing like water. Others of 
them, of whom he sportively makes 'Theetetus the repre- 
sentative, were fond of saying, αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσ- 
Gat, that knowledge and sense were the same, or only differ- 
ent names for the same thing. ‘The favourite expression 
of Protagoras was, πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον El- 
vat, that man was the measure of ail things, by which he 
meant to refer all things to sensation, or to the present feel- 
ings and opinions, or present remembrances, of the individ- 
ual man. On the other hand, Sextus Empiricus (Adv. 
Logic., 1., 8) tells us that Heraclitus was noted for taking 
the collected reason of the race (as the representative of 
the universal and Divine reason) for the criterion of truth ; 
but this is utterly inconsistent with the account Plato here 
gives, and the manner he associates him with those sensu- 
alists of the flowing school who allowed of nothing fixed or 
eternal. | 

If the account of Heraclitus, given in the Theetetus, be 
correct, he was well entitled to the appellation ‘O Σπκοτεινός, 
not for his profundity, as some would represent it, but be- 
cause he maintained the darkest system of sensual philoso- 
phy that ever shed night over the human intellect. Well 
might he weep, as Lucian represents him, over his ever- 
flowing universe of perishing phenomena, where nothing 
stood—ov0dév ἔμπεδον, GAN ὅκως ἐς κυκεῶνα πάντα συνειλέ- 
ονται, καί ἐστι τὠὐτὸ τέρψις ἀτερψίη, γνῶσις ayvwoin, 
μέγα μικρόν, ἄνω κάτω περιχορεύοντα, καὶ ἀμειθόμενα Er 
τῇ τοῦ αἰῶνος παιδιῇ. ““ nothing was fixed, but, as in ἃ mix- 
ture, all things were confounded ; where pleasure and pain, 
knowledge and ignorance, great and small, were the same ; 
where all things up and down were circling round in a 


THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 157 


choral dance, and ever changing places as in the sport of 
eternity.” Lucian, Vitarum Auctio, 303. ‘There was some- 
thing in the hard atoms and dry mechanical theory of the 
laughing Democritus which left room for a spiritual world, 
although he himself was an atheist ; but the soft, flowing, 
sentimental, and, as some modern cant would absurdly style 
it, transcendental sensualism of Heraclitus (if he is not 
grossly misrepresented), was atheism in its darkest form. 
And yet there are other accounts which make him talk 
very piously about the Supreme Numen and the immortality 
of the soul. 

Parmenides was a man of a very different stamp from 
all the others mentioned by Socrates. He, however, with 
Melissus, seems to have gone much too far in the opposite 
direction. In his famous doctrine of the one and ail, if 
Plato rightly represents him, he maintained that αἰ things 
stood. In other words, not content with saying that the 
world of immutable or ideal truth was a reality, he con- 
tended that it was the only reality, and that sense, instead 
of being knowledge, was wholly delusion; thus verging 
round to that poit where some species of sensualism and a 
hyperspiritualism apparently meet; of which, in modern 
times, we have had a remarkable example in Hume and 
Berkeley. Διισχυρίζετο ὡς Ev τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν 
αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ, Theatetus, 180, Ὁ. ᾿Αἴδιον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πᾶν 
καὶ ἀκίνητον ἀξϊξοφαίνεται Παρμενίδης, καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις 
ἐκθάλλει ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας. Euseb., Prep. Evang., i., 8. 
“For Parmenidas represents the whole as immoveable, and 
utterly banishee; he senses from the realm of truth.” 

He was a man who seems to have made a very deep im. 
pression upon the mind of Socrates when young, and to 
have exerted a strong influence over his opinions. At least, 
we may so judge from the following passage in the Thee- 
tetus, which has every appearance of truth, as presenting a 
real incident in the life of Socrates, and a real expression 

O 


158 THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW ? 


of admiration towards one whom he seems to have most 
highly esteemed: Παρμενίδης. δέ μοι φαίνεται, TO τοῦ 
Ὁμήρου," αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἅμα δεινός τε. συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ 
δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσθύτῃ, Kai μοι ἐφάνη Ba- 
θος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. ‘ Parmenides, to apply 
to him the language of Homer, seems to me at once revered 
and awful: for 1 enjoyed his company once when I was 
very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me in 
all things to possess a noble depth of soul.” Theeietus, 
184, A. This biographical incident alone seems to us suf- 
ficient proof that Plato more correctly sets forth the philos- 
ophy of his master than Xenophon, notwithstanding the 
general opinion the other way; and that the most. meta- 
physical dialogues of the former give a truer representation 
of the mind and manner of Socrates, than the more plain 
and practical Memorabilia. We infer this on the ground 
that there could not have been so warm, so unaffected, and 
so long-cherished an admiration, had there not been a great 
congeniality of soul; and we have, therefore, every reason 
to believe, that much of what formed the peculiar features 
of the mind of Socrates may perhaps be traced to the deep 
impression made upon him by the idealistic and metaphys- 
ical Parmenides. Compare, also, the Sophista, 237, A., 
where he styles him Παρμενίδης 6 μέγας, ‘The Great Par- 
menides. In a similar manner, in the beginning of the Ce- 
betis Tabula, he is ranked with Pythagoras, and his name 
is used as descriptive of the profoundest wisdom : ἔμῴρων 
καὶ δεινὸς περὶ σοφίαν λόγῳ τε Kal ἔργῳ Πυθαγόρειόν τινα 
καὶ Παρμενίδειον ἐζηλωκὼς βίον. From this passage in 
the Theztetus some have inferred that Plato was guilty of 
an anachronism in the circumstances mentioned in the be- 
ginning of the dialogue Parmenides. A careful examina- 


.----- πτ 





* Jhiad, iil., 172: 


Αἰδοῖός τέ μοί ἐσσι, φίλε ἑκυρέ, δεινός Te. 


THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW? 159 


tion, however, will show, as we think, that such an infer- 
ence is without any real foundation. 

We would remark generally respecting some of the phi- 
iosophers of the Ionic school, that we cannot accurately sit 
in judgment on their doctrines, or decide whether they were 
really, and in the grossest sense, atheistic materialists or 
not, unless we can determine what they included in their 
term πάντα, when they said that all things flowed. If they - 
merely meant thereby that the material world was ever 
flowing, this might have been consistent with a pure the- 
ism, and they might have even drawn arguments from this 
view of things in favour of a higher attention to the spirit- 
ual and supernatural. Such may possibly have -been tlie 
case with Heraclitus. ‘The sophist Protagoras, we have 
reason to believe on other grounds, was an unqualified athe- 
ist. Of Empedocles, who is also in Plato’s list, we hope 
better things, judging from many of the fragments of his po- 
etry that have been preserved, and especially that line which 
we have already referred to, pages 77, 115. 

They have doubtless suffered in the extravagances of 
their followers, some of whom carried their doctrines to a 
most ridiculous extent. One of them, as we are told by 
Aristotle (Metaph., 111., 5), heraclitized (ἡρακλειτίζειν) to 
such an extent, that he denied that any one could leap twice, 
or even once, over the same stream, or that it was possible 
to speak the truth in any case whatever, because the terms 
of every proposition were changing and becoming false in ~ 
the very process of articulation. Hence he finally conclu- 
ded not to open his lips, but, to every question, made no 
other reply than simply to move his finger: ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον 
οὐθὲν ᾧετο δεῖν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον. 
Some, on the other hand, carried the propositions that sense 
was knowledge, and that man was the measure of all things, 
to such an extreme, as to aflirm that everything was true, 
and that there could be nothing false; the seeming oppo- 


160 THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW ἢ 


site of the former, but, in reality, only the same absurdity 
in another shape. This last extravagance, however, brought 
its own antidote along with it; for, if all things were true, 
the proposition which denied this dogma was equally true 
with all the rest, and so, like the famous syllogism respect- 
ing Epimenides the Cretan, the result was an everlasting 
circle of alternate contradictions. See Aristot., Metaph., 
111. (iv.), ὅ. Cicero, Academ. Posteriorum, 1., 12. 

This school of sophists, as Socrates tells us in the Thee- 
tetus, were likewise famous for a quibbling and eristic logic, 
yet had a great aversion to that sober and truth-evincing 
system of dialectics which was carried on by question and 
answer. A somewhat ludicrous account of this may be 
found page 180, A., B., &c. Their logic was like their 
philosophy, ever flowing, and incapable of being reduced to 
any firm and fixed conclusions. “ You can do nothing with 
them (says Socrates), nor can they among themselves ar- 
rive at anything certain and satisfactory, but take special 
care that, neither in their language nor in their philosophy, 
shall there be anything which has firmness or stability 
(στάσιμον) ; but against this they are continually warring, 
and, as far as they can, would banish all rest from the uni- 
verse.” This, although not the same, has some resem- 
blance to the modern doctrine of eternal progress, which, 
of course, is eternal imperfection, and which allows of no- 
thing fixed or established, any more than the ancient tenet 
that all things flowed, and that nothing stood. This phi- 
losophy, too, like some of the sophisms of our own day, had 
‘a wonderful alacrity at sinking” down into the vulgar 
mind, and of inspiring ihe masses with the most exalted 
opinicn of the doctrine and its teachers ; “so that the very 
coblers (of σκυτοτόμοι), when they had imbibed or become 
inspired with this profound system of fluxions, abandoned 
at once that foolish old notion, that some things stand (é7av- 
σαντο ἠλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι 


THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLow?! 16] 


τῶν ὄντων), and when they were told that all things were 
moving, they greatly honoured those who taught them this,” 
as being a most comforting and democratic doctrine. See 
Theetetus, 180, A., B., &c. 

In the Cratylus, which, although, in the main, a sportive 
jeu Vesprit, does yet abound in very many most important 
and serious views, Plato dwells at some length on two the- 
ories of language which may be derived from these two 
systems of philosophy, in one of which the idea of motion, 
and in the other that of rest, are made respectively the ba- 
sis of an inquiry into the primitive etymological structure 
of words. After most ridiculously deriving οὐσίαν (ὠσίαν), 
or essence, from τὸ ὠθοῦν (pushing or impulse), because, 
on this hypothesis of Heraclitus, τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα 
καὶ μένειν οὐδὲν, “all real existences were ever moving 
on, or pushing ahead, and nothing stood still” (401, C.), he 
comes to speak of Kronus and Rhea (péa), when Socrates, 
in his old ironical method, suddenly affects that in this 
name there is suggested to him this whole flowing philos- 
ophy. “ΟἿ, my good sir (he exclaims), 1 have just dis- 
covered a whole hive of curious lore, σμῆνος te codiac— 
Λέγει yap που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μέ- 
VEL, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει, ὡς δὶς ἐς 
τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμθαίης, κ. τ. λ. “ Heraclitus 
somehow says that. all things are moving, &c., and, in his 
comparison of existences to the course of a stream, he even 
says that one could not twice enter into the same river.” 
Do you suppose, then, that he who originally gave names 
to Rhea and Kronus, the progenitors of the other Gods, had 
any other philosophy than this of Heraclitus? or do you 


* He would seem to mean something more here than a mere illus- 
tration. Since all being is compared to one ever-moving stream, 
the expression, that we cannot twice enter the same river, would 
signify, that neither our own personal identity, nor the identity of 
the universe, can remain for two consecutive moments. 


O 2 


162 THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLOW ἢ 


think that through mere accident he gave these-flowing 
names to both? Just as Homer makes Oceanus and Te- 
thys the original and mother of the Gods, and 1 think He- 
siod also. But Orpheus surely says, 


᾿Ωκεανὸς πρώτιστα καλίῤῥοος ἦρξε γάμοιο" 
ὅς ῥα κασιγνήτην ὁμομήτορα Τηθὺν ὄπυιεν. 


See how all these things accord with one another, and how 
they tend to these doctrines of Heraclitus.” Craty/us, 402, 
A., B. | 

At the conclusion of the first part of this etymological 
excursus, in which he sportively finds the origin of so many 
words in this ancient flowing theory, he assigns as the 
cause of it all the want of stability im their own brains (to 
adopt a modern phrase), which they mistook for the ever- 
lasting change of things and truths themselves. “TI think 
(says Socrates, with grave irony) that [ indulged in no bad 
surmise, when 1 just now supposed that the very ancient 
men (οἱ πάνυ παλαιοί), who gave names to everything, 
just hke many of our modern wits (τῶν νῦν cody), in 
consequence of their getting frequently turned round in their 
search into the real nature of things, became dizzy, and 
then things themselves appeared to be whirling around, and 
to be borne in every direction. Wherefore they blame not 
the internal state of their own souls as the real cause, but 
say that this is the very nature of things, that there should 
be nothing firm or stable, but that all things flow (πάντα 
ῥεῖν), and are full of motion, change, and generation.” 
Cratylus, 411, C., D. And again, 439, C., he thus char- 
acterizes the whole school under an ironical allusion to the 
old authors of language: ‘‘’They seem to me to have thus 
thought (namely, that all things are in motion), but, in real- 
ity, it is not so. For the fact is, that they themselves are 
utterly confounded, like men who have fallen into a whirl 
pool, and would wish to drag us in after them. For con 


THE ANCIENT QUESTION, DO ALL THINGS FLow! 163 


sider this, O most excellent Cratylus, of which I am often 
dreaming,* can we in truth affirm that there are such real- 
ities as the Beautiful, the Good,” &c.2? ὃ ἐγὼ πολλάκις 
ὀνειρώττω, πότερον φῶμέν TL εἷναι αὐτὸ TO KAAON καὶ 
ἌΤΑΘΟΝ καὶ ἕν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὄυτως 

In this philosophy, too, he shows that there could be no 
true moral or political science, no law, no real State, no so- 
cial or civil rights, with their corresponding obligations. See 
the Theetetus, 172, B., and the remarks thereupon, page 
138. ‘There could be no science, he affirms, of any kind, 
for it must necessarily be grounded on the eternal and im- 
mutable. Αἴσθησις would take the place of ἐπιστήμη, and 
nothing could be really known: ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ av γνωσ- 
θείη ye ὑπ᾽ οὐδενὸς οὐδέν - ἅμα yap ἂν ἐπιόντος τοῦ yVvw- 
σομένου ἄλλο καὶ ἀλλοῖον γίγνοιτο" καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ 
λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ γνωσθησόμενον ἂν εἴη. 
Hence he draws the sublime conclusion, that, since the very 
laws of our being compel us to affirm the real, and not mere- 
ly relative existence of these ideas, therefore there is some- 
thing which is eternal and immutable, or, in the language 
of the ancient schools, αὐ things do not flow, but some things 
stand. Hi δὲ ἔστι μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνῶσκον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ 
γιγνωσκόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ΚΑΛΟΝ, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ΑἸΑΘΟΝ, 
ἔστι δὲ TO AIKAION, ov μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια ὄντα 
poy οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φορᾷ. “ But if there is something which 
eternally knows, and something which is eternally known—tf 
thereis THE BEAUTIFUL, and THE GOOD, and THE 
JUST, then things do not all seem to me to be similar to mo- 
tion or a flowing stream.” Cratylus, 440, B. 

* ὀνειρώττω. No word could better express that peculiar state of 
mind in which Socrates (or Plato) often contemplated his favourite 
doctrine of ideas. Sometimes he seems to be perfectly assured of 
the real existence of the καλὸν, &c., the Fair, the Just, and the 
Good. Again, he appears perplexed with doubt, and, at other times, 


seems to have but a glimpse, as in a dream, af some such bright rem- 
iniscences of a better state. 


164 MATHEMATICAL USE OF THE WORD λόγος 


ΧΧΙ. 
Mathematical Use of the Word λόγος. 


Pace 24, Line 6. ἀνὰ λόγον. The common reading is 
ἀνάλογον ; the other, however, is unquestionably to be 
preferred. It would signify here proportionally, certa qua- 
dam‘ratione. ‘This is called in Latin ratio, and in Greek 
λόγος (especially in all mathematical writings), because a 
simple quantity or magnitude, irrespective of the relation it 
bears to another as a multiple or a divisor, cannot be an ob- 
ject of science, or be contemplated by the mind. It remains 
only an object of sense, αἰσθητόν, being, to the intellect, 
ἄλογον, and therefore ἄγνωστον. See the Theetetus, 
- 202, B. It is this relation or ratio which becomes the true 
νοητὸν, or real object of the mind, while the sensible figure 
serves only as the diagram by which it is exhibited. 
Hence it is styled the λόγος, ratio, or reason. It is that 
which is predicated of its subject, and hence is its λόγος, 
or word, as well as reason; because, when viewed as sim- 
ple quantity or magnitude, nothing can be said about it, no 
truth affirmed respecting it. 

This λόγος, or reason, ever implies a third thing or mid- 
dle term, namely, the common measure or divisor to which 
both quantities must be referred, and by which we are ena- 
bled to predicate the one as a part, or multiple, or any cer- 
tain ratio of the other. ‘The λόγοι or ratios are absolute 
and immutable verities of science, as all νοητὰ must be, 
while the αἰσθητὰ by which they are suggested are muta- 
ble, flowing, and without anything which can be styled ab- 
solute. They likewise are capable of being compared 
among themselves, and thus give rise to others—ratios of 
ratios, ad infinitum. In modern works the simple radical 
meaning of the term is lost sight of, because we use the 
Latin ratio without any reference to its primary sense, as 


MATHEMATICAL USE OF THE worD λόγος. 165 


the same with the Greek λόγος, and hence the great vague- 
ness which prevails in most minds respecting this plain 
mathematical idea. In some of our older mathematical 
works, such as the English editions of Euclid’s Elements 
by Dee and Barrow respectively, our own word reason is 
everywhere properly employed instead of ratio. By this 
means the metaphysical notion of ratio is kept before the 
mind as the intelligible, by which what would otherwise be 
merely, as magnitude, an object of sense, becomes known 
to the intellect as an object of science. See Proclus, Com- 
mentary: on Euclid’s Elements, lib. 1. 

All mathematical truths, and especially the geometrical, 
are ultimately to be resolved into a comparison of ratios. 
For even parallelism, and other properties which would 
seem to have no connexion with it, do, after all, depend 
upon certain equalities or correspondences, from which 
they derive their λόγος, notion, or definition. So that all 
mathematical science is finally brought down to those in- 
nate ideas of the τὸ ἴσον, &c., which are discussed in the 
Pheedon, and of which visible magnitude is only suggestive. 
Even a straight line involves this idea of the τὸ ἴσον, or 
simplest ratio. It is that which lies evenly, equally, or, as 
it is expressed by Euclid, ἐξίσον, between its extreme 
points ; that is, having nothing capable of being predicated 
of the one side and not of the other. Playfair and others 
seem to have entirely misunderstood the expression, and to 
have greatly bungled in their efforts to amend, by substitu- 
ting a far more complex idea for this old and perfect defini- 
tion of Euclid. Any one who is capable of consulting his 
own consciousness, must acknowledge that the language of 
Euclid best expresses that innate idea of straightness, which 
we ever apply, as the perfect ideal exemplar, to the deter- 
mination of visible figure. 

From this use of the word λόγος it is, that those magni- 
tudes and numbers whose ratio cannot be expressed by 


166 PARADOX OF CIRCULAR MOTION. 


other numbers—that is, which have no common divisor by 
which one may be predicated as any arithmetical part or 
multiple of another—are called ἄλογα, and in modern 
works, irrational. ‘Two magnitudes, however, may be 
arithmetically incommensurable or irrational, like the side 
and diagonal of the square, the circumference and diameter 
of the circle, or what are styled surds among numbers ; and 
yet, in all these cases, there may be, and often is, a geomet- 
rical representation which renders them rational, and may 
be styled the expression of the ratio, λόγος, or reason, just 
as well as though they were embraced by some common 
numerical divisor. 

Much on this subject of quantities, styled ἄλογα, or irra- 
tional, may be found in Euclid’s Laws of the Musical Can- 
on, as contained in Meibomius. All concords, let it be re- 
marked, are founded on rational numbers, while the irra- 
tional ever produce discords under all circumstances. The 
first have ἃ λόγος or reason, and the soul, when the sounds 
suggest it, perceives this reason in its supersensual being, 
although unconscious of the intellectual process on which 
it depends; and hence a delight which mere sense could 
never furnish. Where this process is made objective, and 
thus presented to the mind, it is called sctence.. It would 
not be difficult to refer to the same ideas of equality and 
ratio all the fundamental elements of the beauty of figure 
and motion. 


XXII. 


Paradox of Circular Motion. 


Pace 24, Line 8. Διὸ δὴ τῶν ϑαυμαστῶν ἁπάντων πηγὴ 
γέγονεν. This is stated as a sort of strange paradox, that 
one motion should be at the same time greater and less, or 
should give rise to different velocities, according as the rev- 


THE WoRDS φθίσις, γένεσις, πάθος, AND φθορά. 167 


olution was nearer to, er more remote from, the centre, 
while there was but one impulse distributing itself propor- 
tionally, ἀνὰ λόγον, to every part. ‘The paradox, however, 
arises from confounding circular, or angular, with rectilineal 
motion. The idea of the latter arises from a compound 
comparison of two elements, namely, the space passed over, 
and the time employed in the passage. Hence, there being 
no absolute measure of space, there can be nothing absolute 
about rectilineal motion. The other must be always refer- 
red to the centre of motion, and the time occupied in one 
revolution; or, in other words, one must be referred to 
space and time, the other to time only. The latter may 
also be said to have something absolute about it, since there 
is an absolute standard of angular space. Hence the mo- 
tions of the inner concentric circles of the same great cir- 
cle, moving on one centre, identical with the centre of the 
circle, are all the same when thus measured, although va- 
rying infinitely when referred to other points. The veloci- 
ty of the hour hand of a watch, that revolves once in twen- 
ty-four hours, is the same with that of the earth on its axis. 
If the same hour hand could be conceived of as extending | 
to the moon, the tangential velocity of its extremity would 
be greater than the orbit motion of that body—exceeding 
many thousand miles a minute—and yet its absolute velo- 
city, taken as a whole, would be that same slow and almost 
imperceptible motion which apvears in our timepieces. 


XXIII. 
The Words φθίσις, γένεσις, πάθος, and φθορά. 


Pace 25, Line 5. φθίνει... ἀμφότερα ἀπόλλυται. This 
word φθίνει (φθίσις) is applied to a diminution of the num- 
ber of parts or particles of which a body is composed, with- 
out a change of the essential idea, law, or nature. It is 


168 THE worps φθίσις, γένεσις, πάθος, AND φθορά. 


the opposite of αὐξάνεται, αὔξησις. ᾿Απόλλυται is used 
where the very law, nature, or idea of a thing (that which 
makes it what itis) is taken away. It is the opposite of 
γίγνεται. ‘The one would express the difference between 
a fat man and a lean one, the other between ἃ living man 
and a dead body. Φθένω is generally intransitive, but is 
sometimes used in a transitive sense, as im the Iliad, vi., 
407: 
Δαιμόνιε φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένος. 

Φθίνω and φθίμενος are applied by the poets to the dead, 
but more in a metaphorical than a strictly philosophical 
sense. When thus poetically used, they still retain some- 
thing of their primary meaning, and suggest the conception 
of the wasted, the emaciated, the weak (ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα), as 
though the ghostly state were but a diminution of their for- 
met life. In the same manner the poets use καμόντες, the 
wearied, the deceased. 'The Hebrews seem to have had 
something of the same metaphorical conception in their 
word ἘΞ ΝΘ 

Mere increment or diminution is ei to take place as 
‘long as the καθεστηκυῖΐα ἕξις, the constituting state, remains 
(διαμένῃ, continues through, or survives the change). But it 
may be destroyed both ways (ἀμφότερα), that is, by φθίσις, 
or αὔξησις, when carried so far that the law of the body 
becomes affected.. No increment or decrement which does 
not take away that ἕξις, or state, which makes a thing what 
it is, can ever amount to that great change denoted by φθορὰ, 
and the verb ἀπόλλυμι. Until this takes place, the real or 
essential identity remains, although that phenomenal iden- 
tity may have been affected, which depends on the numer- 
ical sum or aggregate. So that we may say, that, if every 
particle of matter has been removed and replaced by others, 
still, if during the process the καθεστηκυῖα ἕξις is preserv- 
ed, it is the same body, although not the same matter ; and 
if, on the other hand, no single material particle be lost, yet 


THE worps φθίσις, γένεσις, πάθος, AND φθορά. 169 


if, in any way, this ἕξις has been destroyed, it is no longer 
the same, but there has taken place the γένεσις of some- 
thing else, having a different name, a different law, and a 
different identity, or, as is said a few lines below, μεταθα- 
λὸν sic ἄλλην ἕξιν διέφθαρται παντελῶς, “ passing into 
another state, it is utterly destroyed ;” the thing which be- 
fore was, no longer is, whatever may have taken its place. 
See Note XXV., on the difference between γένεσις and 
ἀλλοίωσις. 

The next question is, What is γένεσις, or generation? It 
is rather abruptly put by the supposed interlocutor, yet still 
is naturally enough suggested by what precedes : Dvyverae 
δὴ πάντων γένεσις ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν τί πάθος 7; to which the suc- 
ceeding answer is given: Δῆλον ὡς ὁπότων ἀρχὴ λαθοῦσα 
αὔξην, Kk. τ. λ., “It is evident (that generation takes place, 
or that the peculiar πάθος under which it takes place is) when- 
ever a principle (apy7, here put for the originating zdea, the 
principium, or law of life to anything) receiving growth, 
(that is, being developed in the outward or material) passes 
into the second change, and from this into the next, and so 
on, until, coming as far as to three, it arrives at such a state 
as to become an object of sensation.” This is certainly 
rather obscure, but perhaps as well expressed as was pos- 
sible, in the attempt to set forth the transition from the law 
of life to its material organic development. Τριῶν would 
seem to refer to the three mathematical dimensions, length, 
breadth, and thickness, which every object of sense must 
possess in some degree ; or it may be intended as an in- 
definite number, representing the stages, be they more or 
less, through which the thing generated must pass, until it 
become an object of sensation, visible, tangible, &c. 


Ρ 


170 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB fo be. 


XXIV. 
Philosophy of the Verh TO BE. Platonic Use of εἰμέ and 
γίγνομαι. 

Pace 25, Line-11. Μεταθάλλον μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ μετα- 
κινούμενον γίγνεται πᾶν. ἔστι δὲ ὄντως ὃν ὁπόταν μένῃ" 
μεταθαλὸν δὲ εἰς ἄλλην ἕξιν διέφθαρται παντελῶς. ‘The 
tenses here are emphatic, and must have their precise 
meaning. ‘ While thus changing and moving, it is in the 
act of being generated. It really 7s, when it becomes fixed 
and stands; but after it has passed into another state, it 
(that is, the former thing) is uttetly destroyed.” Mévy is 
to be taken here in its philosophical sense, as opposed to 
μεταθάλλει, and for ἕστηκε, in the language of the schools, 
as opposed to κινεῖται, or to that which is in a constant flux 
or motion. ‘This, however, can only strictly be applied to 
the law or idea, and in this sense it includes what Plato so 
often expresses by the phrase ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτά, &c., as that 
which remains unaffected amid the material mutations to 
which it is constantly subject. 

It may be, however, that ὄντως ὃν is not to be taken here 
in the highest philosophical sense, as opposed to yryvoue- 
vov, but more according to the vulgar usage of the substan- 
tive verb, as signifying the real being, not simply of the 
law or idea, but of the generated material object itself, du- 
ring that period in which it suffers no πάθος, or change of 
state. It is because they are always suffering change or 
flux, like a river ever passing away, and never for two suc- 
cessive moments preserving the same numerical or aggre- 
gate identity, that even some of the ancient philosophers 
who were theists denied that generated material things 
were at all entitled to the epithet ὄντως ὄντα. Plato, how- 
ever, clearly regards their identity as not depending upon 
number and the aggregate mass ; but as long as they suffer 


PLATONIC USE OF εἰμί AND γίγνομαι. 17] 


no πάθος by which ἡ καθεστηκυΐα ἕξις is taken away, he 
does not hesitate to apply to them this higher substantive 
verb, although entitled to it only by partaking for a time of 
that idea, to which it truly and in itself belongs. Modern 
scientfic men seem to be making rapid advance to this 
position of some of the ancients, that, in the material world, 
all things are ever flowing, and nothing stands. Would - 
that we could say, that they all held as firmly as Pythago- 
ras, Plato, and Parmenides, to a higher and far more real 
universe of truth, in which all was stable, immutable, and 
eternal as the throne of God. 

There is a most important distinction between the verbs 
ἐιμί and γίγνομαι, on which we would here dwell at some 
length, although almost every page in Plato’s dialogues 
might have given occasion for such an excursus. In fact, 
many portions of this writer are not fully comprehensible, 
in their highest intended meaning, unless the philosophical _ 
distinctions between these words are kept constantly in 
mind. ‘They are often emphatic, and used antithetically, 
when the careless reader little suspects it; and thus sen- 
tences most pregnant in meaning seem frequently to con- 
tain mere trulisms, or propositions of a most unmeaning 
character. In defining the Platonic sense of these words, 
we rely directly on the authority of the philosopher him- 
self, in the Timeus, 27, P., 28, A. From this passage 
alone, had there been no other, we are justified in saying, 
that εἰμί, in its highest sense, expresses essential, eternad. 
necessary, self-existent, independent, uncaused being or es- 
sence, having no dependence on time and space. ‘The other, 
γίγνομαι, expresses phenomenal, temporal, contingent, de- 
pendent being, generated in time and space. 

This philosophical distinction is more clear in Plato than 
in any other Greek writer, because the subjects he discuss- 
ed led him to be more precise in the application of those 
primary meanings of the terms in question, which grew not 


P72 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB fo be. 


out of philosophy, but must have been coeval with the first 
roots of this most spiritual language. Whatever his nom- 
inal themes may be, whether ethical, wsthetical, physical, 
or metaphysical, they are, in his treatment, almost always 
made ultimately to turn, in a greater or less degree, on the 
distinctions in the modes of being expressed by these two 
verbs. However he may commence, the argument seldom 
proceeds far before we are engaged in the consideration of 
the eternal, the immutable, the one in the many (τὸ ὃν ἐν 
πολλοῖς), the ἀεὶ ὄντα, in contrast with the temporal, the 
changeable, the individual, and the generated. ‘The differ- 
ence between the classes of ideas expressed by these two 
verbs must be kept in mind everywhere in reading his more 
serious dialogues; and in many parts it may be said to 
form the key to some of his most valuable thoughts. ‘The 
key passage, in which they are placed in most remarkable 
contrast, is one which we have already partly quoted for 
another purpose (page 96), but whose importance will jus- 
tify its being presented again. In the Timzus he defines 
the two grand departments into which all being or substance 
is divided, namely, on the one hand, the sensible world, with 
its phenomena, and, on the other, the intellectual world, in- 
cluding soul as the oldest essence, and also those eternal 
truths, ideas, or principles, which Plato seems to have re- 
garded as entitled to the name of entities—as existences, in 
fact, even more real than matter itself, although their dwell- 
ing was not in the world of time and space: Ἔστιν οὖν 
δὴ πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε" τί τὸ ὋΝ μὲν ἀεὶ, ΓΈΝΕΣΙΝ 
δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ TIFNOMENON μὲν, ὋΝ δὲ οὐδέπο- 
τε" τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν, ἀεὶ κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ ὋΝ. πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ᾽ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι. παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γέ- 
νεσιν σχεῖν. And again, in continuation of the same dis- 
tinction: Σκεπτέον οὖν δὴ περὶ παντός, πότερον "HN ἀεὶ 
γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν ἢ TETONEN ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς 


PLATONIC USE OF εἰμί AND γίγνομαι. 179 


τινος ἀρξάμενος. Timaeus, 28, A.,C. In another part of 
this same passage he contrasts οὐσία (or essence) with yé- 
γεσις, as knowledge with opinion, 29, C. It must not be 
expected always to find these two verbs used with this phil- 
osophical precision even in Plato. in mere narration, con- 
fined simply to the assertion of facts, without reference to 
the nature of the objects, ἦν and ἐγένετο are often con- 
founded, and used one for the other. In such cases the 
substantive verbs simply perform the office of an asserting 
copula, without any respect to the mode of being. Even 
here, however, we often find in careful writers a marked 
difference in their application. ‘The plain historian He- 
rodotus, whenever his subject requires it, presents the con- 
trast strongly, as in lib. 111., 53: ἔνθεν δὲ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος 
τῶν ϑεῶν, εἴτε δὲ det ἧσαν. In the dialogues of Plato, 
however, the distinction, whenever important, is ever care- 
fully preserved ; and we may say, generally, from a review 
of the Platonic writings, that in all cases which require 
care in the use of terms, ἐστί is the appropriate word to ex- 
press that which IS necessarily, such as the existence and 
attributes of the Deity, the indepenfent existence of incor- 
poreal substance, the eternal truth of,moral distinctions. 
Thus, for example, the sentence ἔστε τὸ ἀγαθόν, would 
imply far more than simply the assertion of a fact. In this 
expression, when used with philosophical strictness, ἐστί 
performs the office of a predicate as well as of a copula, and 
that predicate, moreover, includes the mode as well as the 
fact of being. There is expressed by it, without the aid 
of any other words, a general and most important proposi- 
tion, namely, that the idea of goodness is not merely rela- 
tive or accidental, or the result of the mind’s generalization 
from outward acts, but an absolute, eternal verity; that it 
has an absolute existence in the Divine mind, and that 
there is a fixed foundation for the absolute, and not merely 
relative nature of moral distinctions. In the sciences, this 
ΡΥ 


174 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB ἔθ be. 


term would be peculiarly appropriate to the enunciation of 
the truths of geometry and numbers. In mathematical prop- 
ositions the ideas of cause and effect have no place. ‘There 
is no γένεσις. One truth is essentially connected with an- 
other, or, rather, seen in it as eternally abiding. The ap- 
pearance of sequence arises from the necessities and im- 
perfections of our own minds, compelling us to state them 
in time; and yet it is strictly true, that every property of 
every mathematical figure, and every corresponding mode 
of generating, contains in itself every other property, and 
that, as far as theory, irrespective of convenience, is con- 
cerned, any one of them might, with equal truth, be made 
the fundamental λόγος, or definition from which all the rest 
should be evolved. Mathematica] propositions, strictly 
speaking, have no relation to time, being eternally true, 
without past, succession, or future. We may, without con- 
tradiction or absurdity, conceive of a period when it may 
cease to be true, that bodies attract in the inverse ratio of 
the squares of their distances, but never when it shall be no 
longer a truth, that the square of the hypotenuse is equal 
to the’sum of the squares of the two sides. ‘To make use 
of the verb yiyvouat, therefore, in the enunciation of a 
mathematical theorem, would be introducing a foreign and 
altogether heterogeneous idea. ‘This latter substantive verb 
would be most appropriate to physics or natural philosophy, 
to the ever-moving phenomena of nature regarded as under 
the law of cause and effect, as having ἃ beginning and an 
end, as γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ; although even these 
may be stated as absolute truths, and, generally, are thus 
stated when the mind conceives of them as involving ulti- 
mately something that is necessary and eternal. It is by 
reason of some such ἃ priori conception, whether it be cor- 
rect or not, that the primary laws of physics come to be ex- 
pressed in the same language with the axioms of the pure 
mathematics. 


PLATONIC USE OF εἰμί AND γίγνομαι. 175 


Even the etymological origin of these two verbs may, 
without any extravagance of fancy, be supposed to betoken 
the vast difference between them. ‘The primary elements 
of the one (ew 8 et) are found in the most ethereal of the 
vowels. The other (yaw y) has for its ultimate radical the 
hardest, and, we might almost say, the most earthly of the 
guttural mutes; for it is the origin of the term for earth 
(γῆ), and, of all letters, is most easily associated with the 
conceptions of the sensible or tactual. Plato, although a 
very poor philologist, seems to recognise the connexion: 
γῆ yap γεννήτειρα av εἴη ὀρθῶς κεκλημένη, ὥς φησιν Ὅμη- 
ρος" τὸ γὰρ γεγάασι γεγεννῆσθαι λέγει. Cratylus, 410, 
D. Τῆς γλώττης δὲ ὀλισθανούσης ἀντιλαμθάνεται ἡ τῦυ 
T δύναμις. 10., 427, B. 

These distinctions clearly exist, and are probably coeval 
with the first elements of the language. They do not, how- 
ever, as we have remarked, appear so obvious in ordinary 
use; their full power being evinced only in the discussion 
of those truths, in which are involved the very ideas that 
are radical in the words themselves. On this account they 
are so distinctly marked in many passages in Plato. ‘The 
spirit of the difference, however, is diffused throughout the 
Greek literature, and is probably to be found, to some ex- 
tent, and under various forms of expression, in almost every 
known language. May we not believe that, in this way, 
God, who may be regarded as the author of language as 
- well as of everything else, has provided an antidote against 
that materialism to which our depraved nature is so contin- 
ually tending. It is surely no small protection against this, 
that there are to be found (and perhaps in every tongue) 
terms which, whatever may have been their origin, must 
ever be irreconcilably at war with the sensual or atheistic 
hypothesis. 

The great truth of the real existence of incorporeal sub- 
stance, as something independent of, and not posterior to, or 


176 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB Zo be. 


a result of matter, lies at the foundation of all faith and all 
religion. We verily believe, too, that whosoever will care- 
fully examine his own consciousness must admit, that ἃ 
latent doubt of this lies at the bottom of all skepticism, in 
all its various forms. It is all to be resolved into material- 
ism, a system into which such a verb as ἐστί, in its purest 
philosophical sense, could not consistently enter. The ex- 
istence of an Eternal Spirit, independent of the organization 
of the world by which he manifests himself—the real ex- 
istence of our own souls as something in the order of na- 
ture, if not of time, prior to, and independent of, the organi- 
zation of our bodies; the consequent immateriality and im- 
mortality of the soul ; the eternal existence of all which are 
styled necessary truths ; the eternity of moral distinctions ; 
the existence of moral attributes as the highest part of the 
Divine character, and the solemn verities of the Christian 
faith and the Christian redemption, as flowing necessarily 
from the above truths in their relation to man—all these are, 
in every thinking and well-balanced mind that has receiv- 
ed a religious or Christian education, parts of one system ; 
all are inseparably connected together, so that a doubt of 
one is a doubt of all, and a firm conviction of one brings 
with it a satisfactory belief in all the rest. The prime ele- 
ment which runs throughout, is a firm faith in the reality of 
incorporeal substance, or that there is something in the uni- 
verse besides the sensible world and its phenomena, some 
other God or soul than that pantheistic power which is only 
another name for their combined manifestation—in short, 
some ψυχῆ ὑπερκοσμία, as the origin and cause of the ψυχὴ 
éykoopuia, aS well as of the material world in which its en- 
ergies are displayed. Yet it must be confessed, that there 
is a downward tendency in our fallen race to atheism. We 
do not like to retain God in our knowledge. We find this 
tendency (unless checked, as it ever has been, by Divine 
interpositions at special times of grace) gradually infecting 


PLATONIC USE OF εἰμί AND γίγνομαι. 177 


individuals and nations,’ giving an atheistic tinge to lan. 
guage, and corrupting and finally destroying religious belief. 
There is, at the beginning of this, the opposite of the con- 
viction before mentioned—a secret and almost unconscious 
skepticism, a suspicion, a fear, and in some, perhaps, a 
hope, that all is nature, that all is generation (γένεσις), or 
the mere succession of phenomena; that there is nothing 
καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν, absolute, necessary, eternal, self-existent, or, 
in other words, ὡς οὐδὲν ἕστηκε, that nothing stands. 

Now we cannot help indulging the thought, however ex- 
travagant it may appear to some, that the Divine Author of 
our race, “who careth for us,” and who arranges all things 
to bring about his own eternal decrees, does exert a provi- 
dential control over so important an instrument as speech, 
and that in these two substantive verbs, so distinctly mark- 
ed in their primary sense, their philosophical applications, 
and their numerous derivative and kindred terms, he has 
stamped upon the noblest language of earth, an indelible im- 
pression of the eternal distinction between the classes of 
substances denoted by them, and of the real existence of 
those great truths so fundamental to all others, the chief of 
which is, ‘that HE IS, and that he is the rewarder of those 
who diligently seek him.” Especially would this seem to be 
a sober conclusion, when we consider how, in the provi- 
dence of God, this same language was intended to be the 
medium of a Divine revelation, and the teaching of a wide- 
spread Christian theology. The modern tongue which 
comes the nearest to it in this respect is the German. And 
may we not regard this, too, as intended, by its high spirit- 
ual character, to resist effectually the neology and natural- 
ism which have been attempted to be conveyed through it? 
May we not hope, that, after all the extravagances of the 
German mind, the conservative, religious, and spiritual in- 
fiuences which in this and other respects exist in their na- 
tive Teutonic, will yet hold them firm to those great truths 


178 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB fo be. 


which are the foundation of all faith. Materialism can a 
best only babble in other languages: it cannot speak at all 
in Greek or German, without the use of words which must 
continually remind it of its absurdities and contradictions. 

The English, and most of the modern languages of Eu- 
Ope, are very deficient in the expression of the distinction 
conveyed by these verbs. Words, it is true, may be found, 
which may be forced into a sort of awkward correspond- 
ence; but they want that unction, that naturalness, that di- 
rect and easy contrast: with the opposing terms, which 
would show that they are in harmony with the genius and 
spirit of the language. Hence the almost impossibility of 
a faithful and yet lively translation of Plato into the French 
and English. If we needed proof how poorly the Latin is 
‘.uapted to this purpose, it may be found in the version of 
the 'Timzus by Ficinus, and even in the translation of the 
same dialogue by Cicero, of which a large fragment yet 
remains.* 

We may trace the distinction between εἰμί and γέγνομαι, 
even where we may not suppose it to have been directly in 


* Among all modern authors, there is no one in whose writings 
these Greek words seem more wanted than in those of the English 
Plato, Ralph Cudworth. He often seems to labour with the stiff 
Latin, and the still more clumsy English, when the Greek εἰμί and 
γίγνομαι would have helped him at once out of all difficulty.” As, 
for example, when speaking of the eternity of truth, and of its inde- 
pendence even of the creating or generating power of the Divine 
will, he says, that “1 cannot be made, but zs ;’ he means just what 
Plato'would have expressed by the words, οὐδέποτε ἐγένετο ἡ ἀλήθεια, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἀεί ἐστι. Intellectual System of the Universe, vol. ili., p. 376, 
Eng. ed. And again, vol. iil., p. 405, where he wishes to tell us in 
English, that “the perfect triangle, &c., really 15, although it never 
yet existed, and never may exist in rerum natura.’ As we feel for 
our imperfect language, and for the difficulties of our most admira- 
ble author, we cannot help thinking how easily the Greek enables 
Aristotle to express the same thought by the same words, ἀεί ἐστε, 
οὐδέποτε ἐγένετο. 


PLATONIC USE OF éipé AND γίγνομαι. 1179 


the mind of the writer, but to have arisen (perhaps uncon- 
sciously) from its adaptedness to the truth intended to be 
conveyed. ‘Thus, for example, in the first verses of the 
Gospel of John, the one is applied to the Eternal Λόγος, the 
other to the sensible world, which derived its γένεσις from 
him. We might, in defence of this position, say at once, 
that the terms were specially suggested by the Holy Spirit, 
theweal author of the passage, without supposing John him- 
self to have had any acquaintance with the Platonic wri- 
tings, or to have intended any philosophical contrast. But 
without this, we can recognise the distinction as growing 
directly out of the genius of the language, although, in the 
expression of truths in which it did not enter, either verb, 
or both, might have been used, without anything special to 
attract observation. But John was treating of a subject 
which, of all others, called for the contrast; and that, too, 
whether λόγος is used here for a personification of the Su- 
preme Reason, or for the Eternal Son of God, the second 
Person in the ‘Trinity. There is, then, no absurdity and no 
extravagance in supposing that the words are here used, 
not in their ordinary narrative sense, but with special re- 
gard to their primary differences, when employed in phil- 
osophical strictness. ‘This may be more clear of one of 
them-than of the other. "Hv or ἐστί may be applied to the 
lower class of existences—and it is this that has rendered 
necessary the qualifying adverb, ὄντως, which we find so 
frequently in the Platonic phrase, ὄντως 6v—but ἐγένετο 
cannot well be used for the higher. One the least familiar 
with the genius of the Greek language must feel the impro- 
priety of the expression, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐγένετο ὁ Θεός ; unless it 
had been actually intended to teach the fabulous generations 
of such gods as Hesiod treats of in his Theogonia, who all 
came from an older φύσις, and were generated out of Chaos 
and the broad-bosomed Earth: 


180 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB to be. 


Ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος TENET”, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα 
Tai’ εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί. 
Hesiod, Theog., 117. 

A much more clear and striking example from the Scrip: 
tures may be found John, vi., 58. Here we have the 
most remarkable antithesis, and here we feel confident in 
saying, not only that the philosophical distinction was in- 
tended, but that, without it, the designed idea could not have 
been expressed: ᾿Αμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν πρὶν ᾿Αθραὰμ TE- 
NEXOAI ἐγώ EIMI.—Before Abraham came into being, ΟΥ̓ 
received his γένεσις, | AM, eternally and essentially AM, 
WAS, and ever SHALL BE: for εἰμί, here, like the He- 
brew mn, Exodus, 111., 14, seems to include all tenses. 
To be convinced that this juxtaposition of words was not 
accidental, or used merely for the sake of variety, let us 
compare the other modes that might seem to be equivalent, 
namely, πρὶν ᾿Αθραὰμ εἷναι ἐγώ εἰμι, or πρὶν ᾿Αθραὰμ ye- 
νέσθαι ἐγὼ ἐγενόμην ; and the difference is not only to be 
perceived, but felt. In consequence of our using the soli- 
tary verb to be for both modes of existence expressed by 
εἰμί and yiyvouat, the English fails, and ever must fail, in 
setting forth the truth in all its fulness. It is not extrava- 
gant to suppose that our Saviour here intended, and the 
Jews understood, a direct reference to Exodus, 11]., 14—I 
AM that 1 AM—where the Septuagint employs. the partici- 
ple of εἰμί as a name or personal appellation of the Deity, 
corresponding to the Hebrew mnx, or nim, namely, ‘O 
ΟἾὮΝ hath sent me unto you. There seems, also, good rea- 
son for the opmion that this term, ‘O “QN, may, in some 
other passages, have the force of a descriptive appellation 
(as one of the Divine names), instead of being a mere par- 
ticipial copula. As in the noted passage, Rom., ix., 5—‘O 
"QN, ἐπὶ πάντων ϑεὸς, εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς ai@vac.—Of 
whom, according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα), was Christ, The 
Fehovah, God over all, blessed forever. ‘The Hebraism, 


PLATONIC USE OF εἰμί AND γίγνομαι. 181 


κατὰ σάρκα (wan 59)» is the only form of expression in 
that language, which at all corresponds to the Greek κατὰ 
γένεσιν ; and, by keeping this in mind, we find that there 
is the same contrast, Rom., ix., 5, as in John, i., 1, 2, 14: 
καὶ 0 λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. ‘Transfer the Hebraistic idiom 
to more philosophical Greek, and this contrast would be 
thus set forth: κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἣν ὁ λόγος---κατὰ γέ. 
νεσιν, σὰρξ ἐγένετο. Compare, also, Rev.,1., 8, ᾿Εγώ εἰμι 
ὁ ὧν καὶ ὁ ἦν. We are aware of the objections to all this, 





and have no expectation that it will have much force with 
those who entertain different views in theology ; but some 
such impression of a reference to Exodus, 111., 14, is very 
naturally left on the mind of one who believes, on other 
grounds, in the Divinity and eternal self-existence of the 
being here styled The Logos. This impression receives 
strength, also, from the supposition that the language of the 
Septuagint version of Exodus, ili., 14 (ὁ ὧν), had already 
passed into a descriptive appellation, and been ranked 
among the Old ‘Testament names of the Deity. 

Should ff be thought that we are too much inclined to 
represent Paul and John as. Platonizing, or as indulging in 
the use of philosophical language, we would simply refer, 
in the case of the former, to Acts, xvii., 28: "Ev αὐτῷ yap 
ζῶμεν, Kal κινούμεθα Kai ἐσμεν .--- In him we live, and 
move, and are.’ ‘The allusion here, as well as in other 
parts of that chapter, to the language of the Greek schools 
is too plain to be mistaken; and it does not seem extrava- 
gant to suppose, that the Apostle had in mind the Greek 
and Hebrew names respectively of their Supreme Deity 
The etymology of Jehovah is suggested at once by Exodus, 
ili., 14. It may be called the proper name of God, or, as 
he styles it himself, his memorial to all generalions—'The 
Essentially Existent one (6 dv); the Being who has life in 
himself, and who is the source of existence to Rhine 
else. In spiritual substances, /ife and beimg are the same. 


Q 


182 PHILOSOPHY OF THE VERB to le. 


The two roots in Hebrew expressive of these two ideas, 
namely, m:n aud mn, are so nearly alike, that they may be 
regarded as from one source, and, in some cases, as nearly 
synonymous. Hence the appellation so common in the 
Old ‘Testament, The Living God. 'To say that this is in- 
ended merely to distinguish the God of the Jews from the 
dead idols of the Heathen, or from their deified dead men, 
is not to give it half its meaning. None of the Heathen 
nations, any more than the Romanists of modern times, 
were ever so besotted as to worship their idols without re- 
garding them, in some measure, as the representatives of 
living and immortal beings. The epithet, therefore, must 
have had a higher significance, and seems to refer to this 
name Jehovah—The Being that not only exists, but exists 
necessarily—who has life in himself, unoriginated and un- 
caused—that Divine existence which the mind is compelled 
to admit a priori, as the ground of the belief in all other ex- 
istences, or as a necessary truth, the contrary of which, 
when fairly presented, cannot be admitted without bringing 
darkness over every other truth. Hence the appeal so oft- 
en found in the Old Testament, “‘ As J live, saith the Lord,” 
is used to denote the highest ground of certainty. Gese- 
nius and other German critics, indulging their propensity 
ever to undervalue the testimony of the Scriptures, and to 
lessen our reverence for their antiquity and sacred author- 
ity, assign an Egyptian origin to this name, and deduce it 
from an inscription upon the temple at Sais, as given by 
Plutarch: ᾿Εγώ εἰμι τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὃν καὶ ἐσόμενον .--- 1 
am that which has been, is, and shall be.” This 1η5011Ρ- 
tion, although, perhaps, itself comparatively modern, may 
have contained an old Egyptian sentiment; and yet such 
an admission would not militate at all against the pure He- 
brew origin of the name, and its derivation from ideas ex- 
isting fic patriarchal ages, or in that common early the- 
ology which was transmitted pure to the Jew, while it was 





* 


PLATONIC USE OF εἰμί. AND γίγνομαι. 183 


corrupted by every other nation. ‘To the same early source 
must we look for the notion on which was grounded the 
etymology of the Greek Ζεύς, and which presents so strong 
a contrast with the corruptions of the subsequent mythology. 
Although it may not be precisely the same with the prim- 
itive idea of the Hebrew term, there certainly seems some 
approach to it. ‘There is no need of travelling, as some 
have done, to the Sanscrit for the origin of this term. It 
seems as purely Greek as Θεὸς and Δαίμων, and nothing 
can be more simple, or less liable to the charge of being 
forced, than the etymology which Plato gives us in the Cra- 
tylus. He derives Ζεύς, Ζῆνα, from ζῇν, to live: Ov yap 
ἔστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὕστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον 
τοῦ ζῇν ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν TaVTWY.—* For to 
us, and to all other beings, there is no one who is more prop- 
erly the cause of life than the ruler and king of all things.” 
At all events, it is suflicient.for our present argument, that 
this was the received and probably well-known philosoph- 
ical etymology in Paul’s time, and we have every reason, 
therefore, to suppose that he alludes to it in this famous 
passage of his sermon at Athens. In the words ζῶμεν and 
ἐσμέν, we have the radical Greek and Hebrew ideas com- 
bined in one description, composed of terms severally sig- 
nificant of motion, life, and essence; as though Paul had 
said, he is our Ζεύς and our Jehovah: * For in him we live 
and are, as some of your own poets have said,” &c. We 
are no more required, by this view, to suppose that the Apos- 
tle meant to exercise any false liberality towards the cor- | 
rupt polytheism or idolatry of Athens, than that his most 
evident allusion to the language of their schools was de- 
sioned as any sanction to the follies and monstrosities of 
some parts of their philosophy and poetry. 

For some of the more striking of the many passages in 
Plato’s dialogues, in which there is this marked antithesis 
between eiué and yiyvouat, see the 'Theetetus, 153, E., 


184 ANCIENT DIVISIONS OF MOTION. 


155, A., 157, D.: λέγε τοίνυν εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἰ- 
ναι, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν, &c.; Republic, 
525, C.: φιλοσόφῳ δὲ, διὰ τὸ τῆς ὌΥΣΙΑΣ ἁπτέον εἶναι, 
ΓΕΝΈΣΕΩΣ ἐξαναδύντι : δ2θ0, Ρ,,. 527, A., δ27,.Β., τῆς ἀεὶ 
ὌΝΤΟΣ γνῶσίς ἐστι ἡ γεωμετρικῆ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦ ποτέ τι 
TITNOMENOY, 508, E.; Ρ.; Parmenides; 138, E., 141, 
C., 154, C., D., 161, 162, Αἱ, Bus Philebus, 53, C., where 
he defines physical pleasure, or the pleasure of sense, as 
ever γένεσις, but never οὐσία: ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία 
δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοπαράπαν ἡδονῆς ; Phedrus, 247, C., D., E.; 
Hippias, Maj., 294, Β. C.; Timeus, 28, A., B., &c., 29, 
37, C., D., E.; together with passages from the Sophista, 
too numerous for citation, and the Phedon, everywhere 


XXV. 


Ancient Divisions of Motion. According to Plato. Accord- 
ing to Aristotle. Distinction between Τένεσις and ’AAAoi- 
woic.. The Atomic Theory more favourable to Theism 
than the Doctrine of Occult Qualities. 


Pace 25, Line 22. "Eoro τοίνυν ἡ μὲν ἕτερα δυναμένη 
κινεῖν κίνησις, ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἀδυνατοῦσα ἀεὶ. μία τις. He 
speaks now of the two orders οἵ motion, taking the word 
κίνησις in its most extensive sense, as including all the spe- 
cies before alluded to, namely, cercular, rectilineal or τοπικῆ, 
separation, concretion, augment, diminution, generation, and 
corruption ; or, generally, all that is expressed by the word 
μεταθολή, or change, internal or external, according to that 
definition of Aristotle, πᾶσα κένῃσις ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἐστὲ 
μεταθολήῆ, καὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ ὡσαύτως, Arist., Metaph., 
x. (xi.), 12. From this it may be seen how much more 
extensive it is than the corresponding English term. ‘The 
two kinds of motion here spoken of are not so much to be 
regarded as species distinct from the others, but rather as 


ANCIENT DIVISIONS OF MOTION. 185 


two general ideas, each embracing all the specific varieties 
mentioned. Plato here, however, must be regarded as un- 
usually careless in his specifications, since, according to 
the fair import of the language, these two must be consid- 
ered as species reckoned with the rest, and yet it is evi- 
dent that this was far from being his intention. 

Pace. 26, Ling 2. ἐνάτην. It is not obvious, at first, why 
this 1s called the ninth, since there are but six mentioned 
just before it. It would, however, be the ninth according 
to the following enumeration, taking opposites together : 


“Περιφορά. 


1 2. Τοπικὴ μετάθασις. 

9. Σύγκρισις. 4, Διάκρισις. 

δ. Αὔξησις. 6. Φθίσις. 

7. Τένεσίς. 8, Φθορά. 

9. Κώησις ἕτερον κινοῦσα καὶ 10. Κίνησις ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσα καὶ 
ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου κινουμένη. ἕτερα. 


The last two, however, as we have remarked, are not strict- 
ly species, but genera, including, respectively, all the rest ; 
and so, in what follows, the writer proceeds to regard them. 

Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh., Hypotyp., 111., 8, ὃ 64, enu- 
merates but six species: 1. τοπικήῆ μετάθασις (localis trans- 
itus) ; 2. φυσικὴ μεταθολῆ (naturalis mutatio), or ἀλλοίωσις ; 
3. αὔξησις (augmentum) ; 4. μείωσις (decrementum) ; 5. yé- 
veowe (generatio); 6. φθορά (corruptio). Compare Aris- 
totle, Phys. Auscult., vii., 2, where he enumerates three 
genera, which he afterward divides into a great variety of 
species, many of which have hardly any other differences 
than their names: "Ered δὲ τρεῖς εἶσι κινήσεις, ἣ TE κατὰ 
τόπον, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ 
τὰ κινούμενα τρία. Ἢ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τόπον, φορά" ἡ δὲ 
κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, ἀλλοίωσις " ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, αὔξησις 
καὶ φθίσις. ‘Since, then, there are three causes of motion, 
namely, in respect to space, in respect to quality, and in re- 
spect to quantity, there must be three corresponding mo- 
tions or movements. ‘The first of these is called φορά, the 


Q 2 


186 DISTINCTION BETWEEN γένεσις AND ἀλλοίωσις. 


second, ἀλλοίωσις (or change), the third, increment aud 
diminution.” “The scholiast on the passage of Plato before 
us has a much better division; first, into corporeal and 
psychical, and then into the subdivisions of space, quality, 
quantity, and essence, on the one hand, and into the last 
two enumerated by Plato, and here called the ninth and 
tenth, on the other: Τῆς κινήσεως ἡ μὲν σωματικῆ, κατὰ 
τόπον, κατὰ ποιότητα, κατὰ ποσότητα, κατ᾽ οὐσίαν" ἡ δὲ 
ψυχική, ἢ ἄλλο κινοῦσα UT’ ἄλλου δὲ κινουμένη, ἢ ἑαυτήν 
τε κινοῦσα καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη. Compare, also, Aristotle, 
Phys. Auscult., v., 3, vill., 7; De Generat. et Corrup.,i., 1, 4. 

In this last-cited treatise Aristotle endeavours to present 
the distinction between γένεσις and ἀλλοίωσις. His gen- 
eral statement is clear enough: ᾿Αλλοίωσις μέν ἐστιν, ὅταν 
ὑπομένοντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, αἰσθητοῦ ὄντος, μεταθάλλῃ 
ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσιν: οἷον τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει καὶ πάλιν 
κάμνει, ὑπομένον γε ταὐτό" καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς στρογγύλος, ὁτὲ 
δὲ γωνιοειδὴς, ὁ αὐτός γε ὦν. ὅταν δὲ ὅλον μεταθάλλῃ, μὴ 
ὑπομένοντος αἰσθητοῦ τινος, ὡς ὑποκειμένου τοῦ αὐτοῦ, 
ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ, ἢ ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ, τοῦ μὲν ἤδη γέ- 
νεσις τὸ τοιοῦτον, τοῦ δὲ φθορά, μάλιστα δὲ ἂν ἡ μεταθολὴ 
γίνεται ἐξ ἀναισθήτου εἰς αἰσθητόν. “« Alloiosis takes 
place when the subject (some object of sense) remains the 
same, while there is a change in its passions. As, for ex- 
ample, the body is healthy, and again is sick, yet remains 
the same body; or the brass is at one time round, and at 
another angular, yet still the same. But when there is an 
entire change, the subject no longer remaining the same, 
but it being as though from water air, or from air water 
snould arise, such a change is, in respect to the one thing, 
a generation, and, in respect to the other, a φθορά, or cor- 
ruption,” &c. 

In applying this, however, it will be found to be only a 
matter of degrees, unless it is determined what constitutes 
totality, or an entire change, as also what is meant by ποι- 


DISTINCTION BETWEEN γένεσις AND ἀλλοίωσις. 187 


ότης, properly, or quality. ‘This must be viewed in refer- 
ence to two theories, one of which, or the atomic, considers 
all ποιότητας, or qualities of bodies, as arising from the site, 
ficure, motion, and order of the atoms of which they are 
composed (ὡς Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππός φασι, ϑέσει καὶ 
τάξει τούτων ἐξ ὧν εἰσι, Arist., De Gen. et Cor., i., 1), and 
the affections they produce in us ; according to which, all 
change of quality is ultimately to be resolved into topical 
motion, producing a change in the situation, order, and nu- 
merical combination of the particles ; such as modern chem- 
istry shows when, the constituent atoms remaining the same 
in kind, a new substance arises from the difference in their 
arrangement and proportion; so that, for example, what 
once was common atmospheric air becomes nitric acid, &c. 
The other was the theory of occult qualities, in which Aris- 
totle was a believer. This maintained that the figure, site, 
motions, and order of parts or particles remaining the same, 
or being identically the same in two respective bodies, they 
might differ greatly in their properties ; and there being no- 
thing in the matter in respect to locality, number, propor- 
tion, magnitude, motion, or any sensible phenomena, to 
which this difference could be assigned, it was styled oc- 
cult. Hence, in one place, Aristotle endeavours to show 
that two bodies might both be absolutely full, or a plenum, 
and yet one might have a property of heaviness or weight, 
the other of lightness; one might have a property of hard- 
ness and the other of softness, and that the one might even 
be compressible while the other was incompressible ; since 
the phenomena of thinness (μανότης) or density (πυκνό- 
τῆς) were no proof of a vacuum, or the contrary. 

In this view, ἀλλοίωσις and γένεσις can only be regarded 
as differing in degree, κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, unless γένεσις is ta- 
ken for the change κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, or a change of the oc- 
cult quality itself, which was entirely independent of the 
disposition and motions of the parts of the matter. On the 


188 ATOMIC THEORY. 


other theory, there is a marked distinction between them, 
as the one (ἀλλοίωσις) would refer to such a change of par- 
ticles as would only affect the aggregate sum, the other (yé- 
veotc) to such a change in site, order, motion, and combi- 
nation, as would destroy the former ἕξις, and give rise to a 
new one, constituting a new law or nature. ’AAAoiwotc 
would be a change in the αἰσθητά, addressing itself solely 
to the sense; γένεσις, a change in the νοητόν, or idea, ad- 
dressing itself to the intelligence, and constituting the ob- 
ject of science. : 

The atomic theory has been charged with being atheist- 
ical, because atheists have held it. Cudworth, however, 
very conclusively shows that it is, on the contrary, most 
favourable to theism, because, allowing to matter nothing 
but atoms, figure, site, &c., the mind that thinks rigidly is 
compelled to bring in something to set these atoms in mo- 
tion, and, since it discards all occult qualities as unmean- 
ing, it is obliged to resort to Spirit as the direct author of 
all those original impulses of matter which are generally 
styled properties. See The Intellectual System, chapter i., 
38-45. On the other hand, this other doctrine, which, at 
first view, Seems more spiritual, as apparently maintaining 
the existence of a secret something besides the matter, and, 
therefore, as more favourable to religion than the dry theory 
of atoms, is, in reality, the great hot-bed of atheism, ever 
dispensing with the presence of the Deity, as long as these 
blind occult qualities can be brought in to justify what would 
fain seem a jealous reverence for the Divine honour. 

Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus. 

This doctrine seems to have given rise, in the minds of 
Aristotle and others, to this distinction between τοπικὴ με- 
ταθολῆ, local change, or change in space, and μεταθολὴ κατὰ 
ποιόν, or change of quality, as the two great and distinct 
orders embraced under the term κίϑησις, or motion in its 
largest sense; whereas, if the other view be correct, the 


DOCTRINE OF OCCULT QUALITIES. 189 


second is asynuch local motion as the first, that is, local 
motion internally, although there may be no departure from 
the circumscribing space in which the whole body is con- 
tained; so that all change would be motion in the modern 
sense of the word, and there would remain only the two 
genera which Plato numbers as the ninth and tenth, and 
which the scholiast has styled σωματική and ψυχική ; all 
the rest being mere differences arising from direction, de- 
gree, separation, or concretion. Plato’s division, although 
somewhat affected by this doctrine of occult qualities, is far 
less dependent upon it than the others we have mentioned, 
and what he says of the καθεστηκνυῖα ἕξις and its change 
savours most strongly of the other theory. On other 
grounds, we are persuaded that Plato’s view was more in 
accordance with the atomic doctrine, which resolved all 
ποιότητας into the motions, figures, sites, &c., of ultimate 
particles. ‘This seems to agree best with the spirit of the 
Timeus ; and, indeed, there aré some parts of that dialogue 
which are unintelligible on any other supposition. Cud- 
worth maintains that Plato, as well as Aristotle, was a be- 
liever in the occult theory ; and that he was led to adopt it 
because he saw that the other had been held by atheists. 
We are satisfied, however, from a very careful examination, 
which cannot be. here: presented, that this is a mistaken 
view of his philosophy. It is sufficient to say, that nothing 
would be so fatal to his main argument in this very treatise, 
as the admission of any occult quality, which is neither to 
be resolved into the combination and disposition of the par- 
ticles, nor into the higher power of spirit ultimately moving 
upon them, The atheist would ask for no better auxiliary, 
to resist successfully all that might be advanced about the 
necessity of that older and self-moving essence, soul. “Give 
me a place to stand,” said Archimedes, “ and I will move the 
world.” “Give me oecult qualities,” the atheist might say, 
‘and I ask the aid of no God in constructing a universe.” 


190 SELF-MOTION OF SOUL. 


is 
XXVI. 

Αὐτοκίνησις, or Self-motion of Soul. Energy or Action be- 
longs to the Eissence of the Deity. Whether on this View 
God must have created Worlds from Eternity. Aristotle’s 
Misrepresentations of Plato on this Point. His own Doc- 
irine. 


Pace 26, Line 9. Πασῶν ἐῤῥωμενεστάτην καὶ πρακτι- 
κὴν διαφερόντως. Such strong expressions as these gave 
occasion to Aristotle to assert, that Plato taught the doc- 
trine that the first cause was an eternal energy or activity 
ever employed, that is, ἐνέργεια, in distinction from δύνα- 
puc. He even most unjustly seeks to confound Plato’s 
Eternal Spiritual Mover with the everlasting agitation of 
the self-moving atoms of Democritus and Leucippus: Διὸ 
ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος Kai Πλάτων. 
ἀεὶ γὰρ εἷναί φασι κίνησιν " ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, καὶ τίνα, οὐ λέ- 
γουσιν. “Some make it an everlasting activity, as Leucip- 
pus and Plato. For they say that there is an eternal mo- 
tion, but by reason of what, and what, they do not tell us.” 
Aristot., Metaph., xi. (xii.), c. 6. This disparagement of 
Plato, by associating him with the atheists, Leucippus and 
Democritus, is merely done to set off his own dogma, that 
“the first essence was immoveable :” ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἷναι ἀΐ- 
διον τινὰ οὐσίαν, ἀκίνητον ; in which proposition, taken in 
its true sense, we shall see that Plato most fully agreed 
with him. In another part of this same chapter, he infers, 
that if there be an eternal κένησις, its very essence must be 
activity (ἐνέργεια), in distinction from power (δύναμες) : ἘΠ 
yap μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις " ἔτι οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἐνεργήσει, 
ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις " οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀΐδιος " ἐν- 
δέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὃν, μὴ εἶναι. Δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν 
τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια----“ For if it should not ener- 
gize, there will be no motion; neither if it should energize, 


ARISTOTLE MISREPRESENTS PLATO. 191 


while yet its essence was only (δύναμις) power or poten- 
tiality. Even in that case, there will be no eternal motion ; 
for that which exists, ἐν δύναμει, in potentiality, admits of 
not-being. Therefore there must be some such principle, 
whose very essence 1s energy.” 

In stating the objections to the doctrine, he misrepresents 
Plato in his usual manner, by drawing the unsound infer- 
ence, that the First Cause must have been ever engaged, 
from its very nature, in the work of creation, and that, there- 
fore, the universe must have been eternal: ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἣν 
ἄπειρον χρόνον χάος ἢ VLE, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀεί, ἢ περιόδῳ, 
ἢ ἄλλως, εἴπερ πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως. εἰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ 
ἀεὶ περιόδῳ, δεῖ TL ἀεὶ μένειν Evepyovv-— So that there 
could have been no chaos or night for an infinite (or indef- 
inite) time; but the same things must have been ever taking 
place, either in a circuit or in some other manner, if activ- 
ity (ἐνέργεια) is older than δύναμις. But if the same eter- 
nally took place in a circuit, then there must have ever been 
something continually energizing, or putting forth active 
power.” Metaph., xi. (xii.), c. 6. 

Aristotle was never careful to do Plato justice ; although 
it would be easy to show—the modern declamation to the 
contrary notwithstanding—that their philosophy was sub- 
stantially the same; the main difference arising from the 
Stagyrite’s studious care to adopt, in many cases, a different 
phraseology, for the purpose of creating the appearance of 
a wider disagreement than really existed, and from his con- 
tinual disposition to pervert and misstate Plato’s real mean- 
ing. His misrepresentation here, whether wilful or not, 
arises from his utterly confounding the two. aspects under 
which our philosopher defines his tenth species of κένησις, 
as ἑαυτήν TE κινοῦσα---καὶ ἕτερα δυναμένη. In the first only 
did he hold it to be eternal and essential. In this respect, 
too, however much it may be above our comprehension, he 
regards it as purely spiritual, or, as the scholiast defines it, 


192 IN GOD, THE VERY ESSENCE IS ENERGY. 


psychical, in distinction from topical motion ; as something 
ever energizing within itself, and only presenting the sec- 
ond aspect when exercised, κατὰ τόπον, in the generation, 
creation, and changes of the topical universe. What Plato 
meant was this, that the First Cause was something more 
than δύναμις ; an eternal activity constituting its very es- 
_ sence, yet by no means necessitating it to act out of itself, 
until, by an exercise of will, it should give rise to an out- 
ward universe, which, although actuated by, remains clear- 
ly distinct from, this everlasting energy. 

We have likewise’ an example of the gross manner in 
which Aristotle misstates Plato, in another assertion of this 
same chapter, wherein he charges him with inconsistency 
in respect to his first Mover or Eternal Soul: ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν 
οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί ye οἷόν τε λέγειν ἣν οἴεται ἀρχὴν εἶναι évi- 

τε τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν. ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ 
ἡ ψυχή, ὥς φησι---“ But, surely, neither is Plato able to 
tell us what he means by that which he sometimes thinks 
to be the first. principle, namely, his self- -moving power ; for 
soul, he says (in a certain place), is cotemporary with the 
heavens, er the material universe.” Aristotle undoubtedly 
would convey the inference, that this is imconsistent with 
the doctrine of the Eternal Spiritual Mover as laid down in 
the tenth book of The Laws. The position which he cites 
is from the Timeus, but the careful reader can hardly fail 
to see that there, by ψυχῆ, Plato means the anima mundi, 
which he expressly represents as the direct production of 
the Eternal Father, who formed it together with the body 
of which it was to be the plastic power; whereas through- 
out this book, and especially the present argument respect- 
ing motion, he employs the term soul for the immaterial 
principle which was prior to all creation and generation of 
matter—in fact, as another name for the Eternal Deity him- 
self—and this wide difference could hardly have been un- 
known to one, who must have been familiar with the dia- 


ARISTOTLE'S IMMOVEABLE ESSENCE. 193 


logues of Plato, especially such important portions of them 
as the Timezus and this argument* against the atheists. 
One cause of Aristotle’s misconception may have been 
his own unsound definition of motion, which necessarily 
excluded this tenth species, which Plato makes the ground 
of all the rest: πᾶσα yap κίνησις ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἐστὶ 
μεταθολήῆ. Metaph., x. (Χ1.), ο. 12. In other places, how- 
ever, he seems to mean the same with our author, and even 
to go beyond him in the sublimity of some of his ideas re- 
specting the first Mover. Compare, for this purpose, the 
last chapter of the last book of Physics, and the seventh 
chapter of the eleventh book of the Metaphysics. ‘The 
First Cause he styles ἀκίνητον, not, as we think, in the 
sense of inactivity or quiescence, but as incapable of being 
moved, or of deriving its motion from anything external or 
antecedent. ‘This, instead of being δύναμις alone, he him- 
self describes as essentially an Eternal Energy: ἐπεὶ δὲ 
ἔστι τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν, μέσον ἐστί TL, ὃ οὐ κινούμε- 
γον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον, καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα. Metaph., 
ΧΙ. (Χ11.), c. 7. He sometimes even transcends Plato, and 
seems to intend the energy of νοῦς as something higher 
than a merely psychicalt first mover, if he does not rather 
mean an ἀρχῆ, or principle of a still higher nature even 
than this, namely, the moral and final cause of the heaven- 
ly motions. We allude especially to that most remark- 


* There cannot be a doubt, that, in the passages we have quoted, 
Aristotle has reference to this tenth book of The Laws ; for nowhere 
else does Plato talk in the same style about motion and the first mo- 
ver, unless it be in some of the subsequent books of this very trea- 
tise. In the Timezus, the argument is conducted in a manner alto- 
gether different. This, then, together with other references which 
Aristotle makes to the Laws, as a production of Plate well known 
in his day, ought to be conclusive evidence of their genuineness. 

+ Plato, however, in this argument, evidently uses ψυχή for all that 
is incorporeal, including intellect (νοῦς) as well as life and motive 
power. * 


5 R 


194 MORAL REASONS, THE FIRST OF MOVING CAUSES. 


able passage, where he says “that this ἀρχῆ, or First 
Cause, moves the heavens, as being loved—xuvei δὲ ὡς ἐρώ. 
μενον," c. 7. By this, Cudworth supposes that he meant to 
represent a second moving power, or soul of the world, 
which, “ enamoured with this supreme, immoveable Mind, 
did, as it were, in imitation of it, continually turn round the 
heavens.” Intellectual System, vol. i1., p. 818, Eng. ed. 
We cannot, however, discover any solid grounds for this 
opinion, and would rather regard this as a mode of expres- 
sion, by which the Stagyrite would give the first place in 
the series of moving causes to moral reasons—what he 
himself so tersely styles, τὸ ev καὶ καλῶς, or the well and 
fit, and what Socrates was fond of denominating τὸ βέλτισ- 
Tov, the best. It was this principle which produced that 
motion of the Highest Heavens or sphere, on which all in- 
ferior motions depend: ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ 
οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. In this language we think there can 
be discovered some allusion to Homer’s golden chain ; and, 
indeed, the whole style and sentiment of the passage seems 
far more in accordance with the semi-poetical philosophy 
of Plato than with that of the dry and rigid Aristotle. No- 
thing could be more Platonic than this conception of the 
universe eternally moving on through love of "The -First 
Fair and The First Good, attracted, rather than impelled, 
and ever tending to the object of its admiration, as though 
it were striving to develop, in the harmony of its varied 
physical influences, that all-perfect. idea with which it was 
enraptured. 

We may compare with all this a splendid passage from 
the Phedrus, of which Cicero has given a version in the 
first book of the Tusculan Disputations, sect. xxui.: “ All 
soul is immortal, for that which ever moves must be eter- 
nal; while that which moves another, and yet is moved by 
something else, since it hath cessation of motion, may have 
cessation of life. But that alone which moves itself, seeing 

* 


THE WorDs λόγος, εἶδος, AND ἰδέα. 195 


that it never leaves itself, not only never ceases energizing, 
but is also the fountain and beginning of motion to all other 
things. This can never either be born or perish, or all the 
heaven and earth collapsing must stand still, and never 
again find a renewed source and origin of motion. For, 
since it is evident that that which is self-moving is eternal, 
we need not fear to say that this is the very essence and 
reason (λόγος) of soul, or, in other words, its very nature,” 
ὡς ταύτης οὔσης φύσεως ψυχῆς. Phedrus, 245,D. We 
need not remind the reader that in this passage, as well as 
in the tenth of The Laws, the term soul is taken collective. 
ly for the oldest soul, as the source of all animation, and in- 
cluding all other souls as in some way: proceeding from it. 


XXVII. 
The Words λόγος, εἶδος, and ἰδέα. 


Pace 28, Line 9. “Ev μὲν, τὴν οὐσίαν" ἕν δὲ, τῆς οὐσίας 
τὸν λόγον: ἕν δὲ ὄνομα. One thing the essence, one 
the Adyoc, reason, definition, or notion of the essence, and 
one the name.” Λόγος, when rendered reason, is not to be 
taken for the faculty of the mind to which we give that ap- 
pellation. It more properly signifies the reason of a thing ; 
the reason as existing in a thing, perceived, or, rather, un- 
derstood by the mind, or the rationale. It is not the reason 
why the thing exists, or the final cause, as we often use the 
term, but, rather, the constituting cause, what Aristotle calls 
τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι, that which makes anything what it is; a 
particular modification of the general idea of existence. The 
λόγος is that which is the object of the mind’s intellection 
(notto) ; that which binds together (primary sense of λέγω) 
or gathers into a unity for the soul’s contemplation—that to 
which alone the ὄνομα, or name, belongs, and without which 
the thing itself is only an object of sensation. 


196 DISTINCTION BETWEEN A0yo¢ AND ὄνομα. 


In reading Plato, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between Adyoc, εἶδος, and ἰδέα. The conclusion to which 
we have arrived, but which we would state with some de- 
gree of hesitation, is as follows: Λόγος is the notion or 
reason of a thing viewed in relation to the mind contem- 
plating it, yet having an existence separate from such a 
mind ; εἶδος, the notion in reference to the thing itself—as 
the ὃν ἐν πολλοῖς, or one in many, residing in it; ἰδέα, the 
same, regarded as self-subsisting, apart from mind, and also 
from the individual things through which it is manifested. 
The absolute existence of the last is the great question in 
philosophy. In respect to the second term, which is the 
one Aristotle is most fond of using, there 1s no real dis- 
agreement between him and Plato. If we reject the third 
hypothesis, there is still a wide difference between that 
philosophy which was common to Aristotle, Plato, and Ba- 
con, and that which is now styled the system of Locke. 


XXVIII. 


Distinction between λόγος and ὄνομα. 


Pace 30, Line 3, Τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν φὴς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν 
αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ἥνπερ τοὔνομα, ὃ δὴ πάντες, ψυχὴν προσα- 
γορεύομεν. ‘The order of this rather complicated sentence 
would seem to be this: φὴς τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν (καθ᾽) ἧνπερ 
τὸ ὄνομα προσαγορεύομεν, ὃ δὴ πάντες (προσαγορεύουσι) 
ψυχὴν, λόγον ἔχειν---τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν. ‘ You say, then, 
that that very essence, of which we predicate that name 
which all men predicate, namely, ψυχῆ, or soul, hath for 
its λόγος self-motion, or αὐτοκίνησις." See the notes and 
explanations accompanying the text. ; 

It may, perhaps, be objected, that Plato is resting these 
important positions on mere words, to which he assigns his 
own atbitrary definitions or notions. But what is meant by 


DISTINCTION BETWEEN λόγος AND ὄνομα 197 


the sneering expression, mere words, which is such a fa- 
vourite with a certain class of modern declaimers?. What 
are words—we speak not now of sounds or articulate enun- 
ciations, ὀνόματα or ῥήματα, but of the higher term λόγοι 
—what are words, in this sense, but outward expressions 
of the inward logical necessities of our own minds? And 
what can be higher proof for us than those affirmations, 
which the immutable laws of our own souls compel us to . 
make, in respect to what is included or not included in a 
certain idea? Whatever belongs to the idea is necessary ; 
so, on the other hand, whatever is necessary pertains to 
an idea, and the exclusion of any part involves, for our 
minds, a logical contradiction. 

The naming of them, therefore, cannot be arbitrary, ex- 
cept so far as the mere outward sound is concerned. ‘There 
are certain ideas which are not dependent on language, as 
some of the nominalists of the school of Locke would hold, 
but language on them. So far, human speech may be re- 
garded as something supernatural, although its outward 
dress or vocal forms may have been the result of conven- 
tional or accidental usage, instead of any natural adapted- 
ness of sound to sense. We may give to the λόγος, or no- 
tion, any ὄνομα we please. We may call it ψυχῆ, πνεῦμα, 
nay WH animus, anima, Geift, or soul; we may etymolo- 
gically associate this ὄνομα with any such sensible phe- 
nomenon as we may fancy comes the nearest to the con- 
ception, such as air, breath, fire, ether, &c.; and in this 
way the ὄνομα may continually change; but the λόγος is 
not conventional. In all languages, even from the earliest 
periods, it has had a distinct vocal sign—as much so as 
that of body—and we expect, as a matter of course, to find 
it in every tongue we may investigate. ‘The idea which 
calls for the name is implanted by God as one of the fixed 
parts of our being. The metaphysical notion of soul is 
self-motion, self-energy, αὐτοκίνησις. Of this notion we 


R 2 


198 DISTINCTION BETWEEN λόγος AND ὄνομα. 


cannot divest ourselves. Hence, after proving, even from 
physical premises, that there must be somewhere se/f-mo- 
tion, the mind attaches this λόγος to its ὄνομα, and affirms 
that this self-motion is soul, ψυχή, Geift, &&c.—being the 
same unchanging notion, whatever be the name—and that 
this name, although affixed to the flowing and varying sen- 
sible phenomenon from which it may have been etymologi- 
cally derived, ultimately represents the immutable λόγος 
of which that sensible* phenomenon is the symbol. 


* To dwell on this distinction between ὄνομα (or ῥῆμα) and λόγος 
at greater length, we may say, that the former simply represents a 
sensible perception or action (αἰσθητόν), or what Plato sometimes 
calls εἴδωλον ; the latter, a thought, an idea (ἰδέα), the intelligibile, in- 
tellectum, or νοητόν, being no part of the sensible image or action, 
but suggested or symbolized by it. All words, being a communica- 
tion from mind to mind, through matter, must array the thought, du- 
ring its passage, in the garments of the flesh, or, in other words, 
must originally represent something sensible. ‘The ὄνομα, then, in 
reality, goes no farther than this sensible image or action, which it 
primarily presents. ‘There are but two stages in the process. The 
λόγος, on the other hand, goes beyond this, and represents the intel- 
ligibile, or νοητόν, of which that image, action, or αἰσθητόν, is but the 
symbol. Here, then, are, in fact, three stages, and the εἴδωλον, or 
action, which the word, as ὄνομα, presents, does itself re-present 
something still behind it. The life of language is gone, when, With 
respect to abstract terms, the primary sensible images have faded 
away and become unknown, or, in other words, when this second 
stage in the process has been left out, and the word stands for the 
thought, in the same way that x and y represent quantities in algebra. 

The same term may be regarded both as ὄνομα and λόγος. For 
example, the word circle, as a name, merely presents that round, 
sensible image, which, as far as the εἴδωλον is concerned, is the same 
to the vision of an animal as of a Newton; as λόγος, it suggests that 
cardinal idea, involving all the properties of the figure, which is pres- 
ent to the mind of the mathematician, and of which this εἴδωλον is 
itself the word or representative. ‘This cannot be better expressed 
than in the language of Plato himself, if the Epistles can in any way 
be regarded as genuine: κύκλος, τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἴσον 
ἀπέχον πάντη, AOTOS dv εἴη ἐκείνου ᾧπερ στρογγύλον Kal περιφερὲι 


DISTINCTION BETWEEN λόγος AND ὄνομα. 199 


It is not a vain support to rely upon language. We may 
say, in the words which Plato puts into the mouth of Cra- 
tylus, Οἶμαι μὲν μείζω τινὰ δύναμιν εἷναι ἢ ἀνθρωπείαν, 
τὴν ϑεμένην τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν. Cratylus, 
438, C. As is shown in this last-cited dialogue, it follows, 
in its origin and progress, an inward necessity, and must, 
therefore, possess inward truth and necessary correctness.” 
It is a striking proof of its Divine origin (we mean in the 
bounding, defining, classifying, and combining of ideas, and 
not in the outward vocal sounds affixed to them), that the 
atheist or materialist cannot use it as 10 is, but must change 
the meaning of its terms to suit non-existent notions, to 
which it never has been and never can be adapted, without 
introducing confusion extending far beyond the particular 
cases of ameudiment. He must have an entire new dialect, 
and that, too, one which will ever destroy itself by the con- 
tradictions, discords, and jarring inconsistencies which must” 
exist between its parts, in every attempt to express the doc- 
trine of death in words necessitated to glow with a life which 
no efforts can wholly quench. 

It has been well observed, that there is no language un- 
der heaven in which the atheist, the pantheist, or the man 
who denies the reality of moral distinctions, can talk five 
minutes without a logical contradiction, or, in other words, 
a war of ideas. Should they form anew one, and take the 
utmost pains to adapt it to their philosophy of darkness, it 
will be found to be built on a disarrangement of the neces- 
sary and logical elements of speech, and must soon perish 
by reason of its own innate contradictions. No such Babel, 
formed in opposition to the high decree of Heaven, can ever 
ὄνομα καὶ κύκλος. ‘*' The word circle, representing the idea of equal- 
ity in every direction, from extremities toa central point, is the A6- 
γος of that to which roundness, and periphery, and circle, are the 
names.” Plat., Epist., vii., 342, B. Compare, also, the Theete(us, 
201, 202; Sophista, 221, A. 

* See Schleiermacher’s Introduction to the Cratylus. 


200 DISTINCTION BETWEEN λόγος AND.Ovoya. 


stand. ‘The ideas of incorporeal substance, of eternal ves 
ities, of moral distinctions, cannot be separated from lan 
guage. ‘The proof of soul and of God is stamped upon it as 
indelibly as it is written on the firmament of heaven itself. 

Some of the views we have been endeavouring to set 
forth may be found admirably stated in Varro’s account of 
the Platonic or Socratic philosophy, especially in respect to 
the importance it attached to mnate notions and words as 
representatives of them, in Cicero, Acad. Poster., viii. : 
Tertia deinde philosophie pars, quee erat in ratione et in 
disserendo sic tractabatur ; quanquam oriretur a sensibus, 
tamen non esset judicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem 
(νοῦς) volebant rerum esse judicem: solam censebant ido- 
neam cul crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper es- 
set, (τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα), simplex et unius modi (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ 
καὶ ὡσαύτως) et tale quale esset. Hane illi cdeam appella- 
bant, jam a Platone ita nominatam: nos recte speciem (εἷ- 
δος) possumus dicere. Sensus. autem omnes hebetes et 
tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo eas res 
que subjecte sensibus viderentur, que essent ita mobiles 
(ῥέοντα) et concitate, ut nihil unquam unum esse constans, 
ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent om- 
nia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem (dogao- 
τόν) appellabant. Scientiam autem nusquam esse cense- 
bant nisi in animi notzonibus atque rationibus (λόγοι), qua 
de causa definiliones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de 
quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. Verborum explicatio pro- 
babatur, qua de causa quzeque essent ita nominata, quam 
etymologiam appellabant.. Argumentis et quasi:rerum notis 
ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id quod 
explanari volebant, in qua tradebatur omnis dialectice dis 
ciplina, id est, orationis ratione concluse. 


\ 


IMPASSABLE CHASM BETWEEN SPIRIT AND MATTER 20] 


XXIX. 


Infinite Distance between Self-motion and Motion by Impulse. 
Impassable Chasm between Spirit and Matter. The Word 
πολλοστῆ. Principle of Euphonic Attraction. 


Pace 30, Line 13. *Ap’ οὖν οὐχ ἡ δι᾽ ἕτερον... . πολ- 
λοστήν, κ. τ. A. This is a very complicated and awkward 
sentence, with several anomalies, although the general 
meaning is quite clear. ‘The following is a very free ren- 
dering: “Is not that motion, which takes place in one 
thing by reason of another, but which never effects that 
anything shall have motion in itself, by itself—is not such a 
principle of motion, we say, justly styled second, and even 
the most remote in degree of all such numbers, however 
great, as any one might choose to use in the computation ? 
being, in truth, that kind of motion or change which is pe- 
culiar to a soulless body.” The order of the latter part (in 
which, however, we are compelled to use πολλοστή for 
πολλοστῆν, in consequence of the change of position) would 
be as follows: δευτέρα τὲ καὶ πολλοστὴ τοσούτων ἀριθμῶν 
ὁπόσων τις ἂν βούλοιτο αὐτὴν ἀριθμεῖν. The general 
sense is, that motion by impulse, or the motion of matter, 
although it may be next in order (δευτέρα), is yet almost 
infinitely removed from self-motion, or the motion of soul ; 
that is, by a distance greater than any limit assignable in 
numbers. 

It is another mode of saying that there is an impassable 
chasm between them, by which they are forever parted and 
assigned to two distinct worlds of being. Materializing 
naturalists have ever been striving to fill up or bridge this 
chasm, either by a direct connexion through some most sub- 
tle matter, or imponderable agent, or occult quality, or by 
some tertium quid which might identify in one common es. 
sence these two motions, or, rather—the great object οἵ all 


202 IDEAS OF CHANGE, CAUSE, AND SPIRIT, INSEPARABLE, 


their strivings—to make the higher a result of the lower 
These efforts, however, from the days of Plato to the pres- 
ent, have been all in vain. ‘The distance between the nat- 
ural and the supernatural, or between the spiritual and ma- 
terial, must ever remain impassable by any uniting essence. 
The most ethereal motions of matter, even of that class of 
substances which the ancients included under the general 
names πῦρ and αἰθήρ, and which the moderns have styled 
imponderable agents, make no approach to the self-motion 
or αὐτοκίνησις of Spirit. However subtile and attenuated 
they may be, yet, as matter, and falling under that one idea - 
of matter to which we have before alluded (page 142), the 
laws of our minds (from which we cannot escape, and aside 
from which there is, to us, no such thing as truth) compel 
us to regard them as destitute of all motion and all property 
of motion in themselves—in fact, as much so as the most 
ponderous mass of lead or iron. Plato was deeply sensible 
of the importance of this fundamental position, and there- 
fore he labours so earnestly, even at the hazard of being 
thought tedious and prolix, to maintain it. We have made 
the remark before, and yet its importance and its adapted- 
ness to our present subject will justly warrant its repetition. 
This point being conceded to the atheist, namely, that self- 
motion may in some way be an occult property of matter in 
itself, or that the least and most ethereal atom in the uni- 
verse could ever get in motion without the aid of that older 
and higher something to which he has here assigned the 
λόγος and the ὄνομα ; or that there is the distance of a hair’s 
breadth between the ultimate ideas of change, cause, and 
the action of spirit—this, we say, being conceded to the 
atheist, allis lost. If this can be conceived of, or is not at 
war wih the idea, or λόγος, of matter, as given ug by the © 
laws of our own minds, then may it also be conceived of as 
having an occult adaptive property, and the conclusion can. 
not be resisted, which would alike establish materialism in 


ERUPHONIC ATTRACTION. 2038 


respect to man, and pantheism (which is, in fact, the same 
doctrine) in respect to the universe. 

Πολλοστῆν, as it appears in this sentence, is a very pe- 
culiar word. It signifies one of many, a fraction whose de- 
nominator is a very large number, and hence its name—an 
infinitesimal part. Compare the Philebus, 44, P.: τὰ πολ- 
λοστὰ σκληρότητι; where it is put in direct contrast with 
oKAnpotata, as an infinitesimal fraction opposed to a su- 
perlative. ‘There is also a peculiar grammatical anomaly 
in this word. According to the order of its eonstruction in 
the sentence, it should be πολλοστῆ, since it regularly re- 
fers to δευτέρα, and must be taken in connexion with it. It 
is, however, made accusative, in consequence of its position 
after the infinitive, ἀριθμεῖν, and by the attraction of αὐτήν. 
This differs from the ordinary case of attraction which ex- 
ists between the relative and antecedent. It may be styled 
euphonic, because it seems to affect words solely for the 
sake of euphony, or, rather, homc@ophony, and on the mere 
ground of contiguity in location, although very remotely re- 
lated in all other respects; so much so, that, in this way, 
great violence is sometimes done to the true grammatical 
construction. ‘There is no need of resorting to any various 
reading, or to any conjectural emendation. We have no 
doubt, from the location of the word, that Plato wrote πολ- 
λοστῆν, however harsh the construction may appear to us. 

The position of τοσούτων also seems very awkward, and 
yet (although we ‘cannot well keep it in that place when 
we adopt the order for a literal translation) it is easy to see 
that, by standing where it does, it has a much stronger em- 
phasis than though it had occurred in the beginning of the 
clause; as though we should thus paraphrase it in English: 
However great the number, carry 1, as high as you please, 
still by so much (tooovTwy) is it remote,’ &c. ‘This princi- 
ple of local or euphonic attraction, although it sometimes 
interferes with grammatical smoothness, is undoubtedly in 


204 ATHEISTIC ARGUMENT AGAINST DESIGN. 


accordance with the genius of the language; and no true 
scholar can endure the attempts which are sometimes made 
to divest it of this peculiarity by means of pretended emen- 
dations. Oy 


XXX. 


Argument of Ancient Atheists, that Apparent Evidences of 
Design were only Evidences of Subsequent Accommodation. 
Things (they said) older than gineiegee of Things, and 
therefore older than Soul. 


Pace 31, Line 8. Τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις Kat 
λογισμοὶ πρότερα σωμάτων, K.T.A. ‘The full force of this 
~unnot be appreciated unless we keep in mind the objection 
ugainst which it was directed. The ancient atheists said 
that soul was the offspring or result of matter, and conse- 
quently younger. Hence what theists would call evidences 
of design, or of mind’s preceding matter, they would regard 
as merely subsequent accommodations to an accidental ex- 
isting state of things, which, had it been any other, would, 
in like manner, have drawn after it the only uses and ac- 
commodations to which it could be adapted ; and which, in 
that case, would have carried with them lke appearances 
of previous design, or, as Lucretius has most concisely ex- 
pressed it, 

Nil adeo natum est in corpore, ut wii 


Possemus, sed quod natum est, id procreat wsum. 
Lucretius, iv., 832. 


Thus, for example, they would say, in accordance with 
their theory, that teeth were not made of a certain shape 
with the previous design that the animal should eat herbs, 
but that, because they happened to be of a certain form (and © 
there was no reason in themselves why they should be of 
one form rather than another), therefore nature applied them 


> 


ATHEISTIC ARGUMENT AGAINST DESIGN. 205 


to the use, and the only use, adapted to their accidental 
structure. Again, if certain bodies had, in the course of 
ages, received from τύχη elongated projections from the 
main trunk, or an attenuated and flexible shape, or a round- 
ed form, in all these cases, they would have said, and did 
say, that that animation residing in them (which was itself 
but a junior art, the production of an older φύσις), when it 
found itself thus circumstanced, made the best of its condi- 
tion, by accommodating the one to a walking, the other to 
a crawling, and the other to a rolling locomotion. So, also, 
had they been acquainted with some of the arguments of 
our modern natural theology, they would have denied that 
the revolution of the earth on its axis was adjusted to twen- 
ty-four hours, with any design that such a period should 
correspond to designed circumstances in the alternating 
changes which occur in the economy of the animal and 
vegetable tribes. On the contrary, they would have con- 
tended that, in the eternal and fortuitous dance of τύχη, the 
earth having received such an accidental impulse as just 
produced the aforesaid period, nature, in time, accommoda- 
ted to it the intervals for the exercise and relaxation of hu- 
man bodies, together with .all the periodical vicissitudes 
which seem to have relation to such a revolution ; and that, 
had this accidental period been of any other length, the 
same adapting φύσις and τύχη would, long before this, have 
brought all the earthly economy into perfect harmony with it. 

This argument, of which we have given an imperfect 
outline, they carried to great length, and it is easy to see 
that itis capable of a most extensive and subtle application. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, for any one who admits the 
doctrine of occult properties to any extent in matter, to give 
a direct answer to the objections drawn from it ; and yet we 
believe that not a vestige of any skeptical doubt which it 
may produce can remain upon the mind, after reading Pa- 
ley’s most valuable work on natural theology. As a specu- 


δ 


206 THINGS OLDER THAN KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS. 


lative argument, this doctrine of subsequent accommodation, 
as opposed to a previous designed use, may have a formi- 
dable appearance, but it vanishes on a close observation of 
nature, because the soul, in such observation, instead of re- 
ally relying on a posteriori facts, cannot divest itself of that 
a priort view which believes in design, and looks for de- 
sign, and carries along the preconception of design as in- 
volved in those ideas of God and truth with which it enters 
upon the investigation. 

Plato, as we have seen, overcomes the difficulty by be- 
ginning with motion instead of evidences of design ; thence, 
from this more remote point of view, proving the higher an- 
tiquity of soul, then of the acts or exercises of soul, one of 
which is βούλησις, purpose, or design. 

Another subtle objection from this same school was, that 
knowledge, being the knowledge of things, must, therefore,. 
have been posterior to things ; hence that mind was young- 
er than matter. In this they, of course, rejected the doc- 
trine of any other knowledge than that of things, or that the 
mind or intellect contained, in any sense, its own ideas or 
inlelligibles (vonrd); making it to be all from without by 
way of impression from the external world.* If this be 


* Should it be said that the objection may be stated in the same 
Way in respect to ideal or eternal truth, and that there must have 
been νοητά before νοῦς, or truth before knowledge, the only reply is, 
that God is at the same time, and from eternity, both νοῦς and νοητόν, 
intelligens and intelligibile, or intellectum. It is the absolute neces- 
sity of some such view which suggested to the most profound 
minds of antiquity the idea of a plurality in the Divine nature, a dis- 
tinction of two hypostases, at least, with a third, ψυχή, to which 
they were related, and in which they were united. Instead of being 
contrary to reason, it was the highest result to which she arrived 
(if the truth was not rather obtained from some primitive revela- 
tion), as her only refuge against the cheerless and incomprehensible 
conception of an eternal, solitary monadity, or the equally difficult 
conception of a necessary, eternal, outward universe, towards which 
the Divine love and the Divine intelligence might be directed. 


PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. {C7 


atheism, as it most assuredly is, when held in relatien to 
the Divine Mind, what shall we think of the corresponding 
doctrine when applied to the human soul? If we start from 
the conclusions to which such inquiries lead us, it should 
be borne in mind, that the only possible defence against 
them must be found in that ideal philosophy which supposes 
a knowledge belonging to mind, as mind, whether it be Di. 
vine or human, entirely independent of things, or of any out- 
ward world. The above atheistic objection is also express- 
ed by Lucretius, with far more of poetry than piety : 

Exemplum porro gignundis rebus, et ipsa 

Notities hominum Divis unde insita primum, 

Quid vellent facere, ut scirent, animoque viderent ? 

Quove modo est unquam vis cognita principiorum, 


Quidnam inter sese permutato ordine possent, 


δὲ non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi? 
Lucretius, lib. v., 182. 


XXXI, 


Platonic Doctrine of the Evil Principle. Of ᾿Ανάγκη, or 
Necessity. 


Pace 32, Line 2. Δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶ- 
μεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξερ.- 
γάζεσθαι---- Nothing less than two, at least, the one that 
does us good, and the one that is able to do the contrary.” 
We have here presented, in the most unequivocal terms, 
that grand defect in Plato’s theology, which occasionally 
mars, by its presence, almost every part of his otherwise 
noble system. Itis most clear, from this and other passages 
in his dialogues, that he held the doctrme of two uncreated 
principles or souls, one good (or the benefactor, as he styles 
him), the other evil. Neither Plato, however, nor Zoroas- 
ter, can be charged with the absurdity of believing in two 
Supremes. They avoided this by running into the incon. 


208 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 


sistency of supposing that the evil principle, although un- 
created, was under the dominion of the good, constantly 
controlled, and ultimately to be completely conquered by it. 
This doctrine, likewise, made harsh discord with almost 
every other part of his philosophy, especially his views of 
the origin of the universe, as set forth in the Timeus, where 
no mention is made of a distinct evil sow/; and yet, when 
we examine the matter closely, it is difficult to see how he 
could have come to any other conclusion. Plato had no 
other guide than reason, aided, perhaps, by a dim and cor- 
rupted tradition of primitive truth; and reason can account 
in no other way for the existence of evil, without charging 
it upon God as its immediate author. It is evident, from 
the manner in which he ever speaks on this subject, that 
he had a deep conviction of the essential goodness of the 
Deity, and that he felt himself sorely pressed by the diff- 
culty of reconciling with this goodness the evil which he 
saw everywhere existing in the world. On this point, 
compare what he says in the second book of the Republic, 
379, B., C.: οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὅ ye ϑεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε, καὶ λεκ- 
τέον ovtw—* Wherefore is not God really good, and must 
we not thus ever affirm?” “O dé γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, 
οὐδ᾽ av τινος εἴη κακοῦ "᾿ΔΙΤΊΟΝ. οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτι- 
ον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν Ev ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ 
κακῶν ἀναίτιον. οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ὁ ϑεὸς ΤΑΝΤῺΝ ἂν εἴη "ΑἸΤΙΟΣ, 
ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν " ἀλλ᾽ ὀλέγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 
αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος " πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν 
κακῶν ἡμῖν ---- But he doeth nothing evil (evidently taking 
κακὸν here in the sense of physical evil), nor could he be 
the cause of anything evil. ‘The Good cannot, then, be the 
author of all things, but only of those that are good, while 
he is never the author of the bad. God cannot, therefore, 
be the author of all things, as the many say, but only of 
few things is he the cause to men, &c., for our good things 
are much fewer in number than our evil things.” He does 


PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 20S 


not, in this place of the Republic, directly speak of the evil 
principle, but leaves it to be plainly inferred: Tov δὲ κα- 
κῶν ἄλλα ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ᾽ ob τὸν ϑεόν--- 
*“ Of the evils, then, must we seek some other cause, and 
not the Deity.” After this, he proceeds to censure Homer 
for his myth of the two casks which he in the court of Jove, 
one filled with good and the other with evil, from which he 
dispenses to mortals severally as he will.* When we read 
the impressive application of this great truth which Achilles 
makes to the case of Priam, we cannot heJp recognising 
the poet as far more orthodox than the philosopher, and as 
coming much nearer to the true teaching of revelation. He 
was so, however, because, instead of yielding his mind to 
the perplexing and insurmountable difficulties which attend 
every merely speculative view of the matter, he simply 
gives utterance to one of those universal and unvarying sen- 
timents of the human soul, which could have come from no 
other source than a tradition of the primeval fall and the 
woes consequent upon it. 

Revelation removes this difficulty respecting the origin 
of evil, not by solving the mystery, and bringing it down to 
the level of our understandings, but by imposing silence 
upon reason, in her attempt to vestigate a subject alto- 
gether beyond her powers. The Bible does not shrink 
from the solemn declaration, I form the light and I create 
the darkness; I make peace and I create evil; I the Lord 
do ALL. these things ;} and yet, at the same time, it sternly 


Δοιοὶ yap τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει, 
δώρων, οἷα δίδωσι, κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ, ἐάων. 
ᾧ μέν κ᾽ ἀμμίξας δοίη Ζεύς, κ. τ. A.—LIliad, xxiv., 527. 


t Isaiah, xlv.,'7. There can be no doubt, from the mention here 
of the ght and the darkness, and from the connexion of this remark- 
able declaration with the prophecy respecting Cyrus, that there must 
have been intended a special reference to the Zoroastrian or Persian 
doctrine. 


© 2 


210 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 


forbids the impious thought, that the Divine Essence can 
hold any communication with sin. Thou art of purer eyes 
than to behold iniquity. Evil shall not dwell with thee. The 
caviller may say that this is cutting, instead of untying the 
Gordian knot; and that, according to this, revelation teach- 
es the apparent contradiction, that God creates evil, and yet 
is not the author of sin, without which there could be no 
evil, It is even 80. There zs a contradiction to our un- 
derstandings, but it is a contradiction to which we must 
submit, or receive all the contradictions, mysteries, absurd 
ities, and total darkness of atheism. It has been well ob- 
served, that this great difficulty lies, in some form, at the 
very threshold of every system which has the least title to 
be styled religious, in order to teach us that some things 
must be received as matters of faith. This, instead of be- 
ing at war with reason, 15, in fact, its highest dictate. It 
presents an incipient faith as the only condition on which 
everything else is to be understood, and declares that we 
are shut up to it by something higher and stronger than 
reason itself, even the necessities of our moral being. 

Let those who, in such a-case as this, will not take the 
Bible as their only guide, devise, if they can, a better sys- 
tem than the one which Plato and Zoroaster felt themselves 
compelled to adopt, although they must have been well 
aware of the difficulties, and war of ideas, or first princi- 
ples, in which it involved them. ‘They could not believe 
in two Supremes on account of the logical contradiction, 
and yet, if they held that the evil soul was inferior to, and 
capable of being controlled by, the Good (as they unques- 
tionably did), the same old objection comes back with all 
its force. The position to which our philosopher manifests 
so strong a repugnance is only so changed as to make God 
the permissive, instead of the positive author of evil. Small 
consolation in this; especially when taken in connexion 
with that melancholy declaration just quoted by us from the 


PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 21] 


second book of the Republic, that ‘our good things are 
much fewer in number than our evil things.” | 

It should be remarked, however, that Plato’s evil princi- 
ple differed, in some most important respects, from the evil 
spirit made known to us in the Bible. The former, al- 
though recognised by him as a ψυχῆ, or soul, was not so 
much a moral or spiritual, as a physical power. It was 
the dark, foolish, disorderly, intractable, chaotic, evil spirit 
of matter (if we may use so paradoxical a term), on which 
the Good God was ever exerting an influence, in bringing 
it from chaos into harmony, although that influence was 
ever resisted, and sometimes exercised with great difficulty. 
It is to this he alludes in the ‘Timeus, although in this lat- 
ter work we find no trace of that animation and personality 
which is assigned to the evil principle in the tenth of The 
Laws. In the Timzus, too, although possessed of motion 
and a sort of blind activity, itis a hinderance, or an obstacle, 
rather than an enemy: Βουληθεὶς yap ὁ ϑεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν 
πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἷναι, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἣν ὁρα- 
τὸν παραλαθὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον" πλημ- 
μελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, κατὰ δύναμιν εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν 
ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. Θέμις γὰρ οὔτ᾽ ἦν οὔτ᾽ ἔστι ΤΩΙ ᾽ΑΡΙΣ- 
ΤΩΙ δρᾷν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ ΚΑΛΛΙΣΤῸΝ ---ἰΞ For God, wish- 
ing that all things should be good, and that there should be 


* On this and some few similar expressions in the Timeus has 
been grounded the argument for the common position, that Plato 
held to the eternity of matter, and that it possessed a principle of 
its own, independent of the creating and constantly energizing pow- 
er of the Deity. Should it be admitted that our philosopher is justly 
chargeable with inconsistency, still we contend that the positions 
assumed in the Laws in respect to the inertness of matter, and the 
superior antiquity of soul, should have the greater weight, inasmuch 
as the extracts from the Timzus are merely incidental declarations, 
whereas the latter form the very heart and substance of one of his 
most studied and elaborately-prepared arguments. See farther, on 
this subject, Note L., On the Ancient Doctrine, De Nihilo Nihil fit. 


212 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 


nothing bad, thus taking in hand the visible (or material), 
never at rest, but ever moving about in a strange and disor- 
derly manner, as far as he could reduced it from disorder 
to order. For it is not permitted (οὐ ϑέμις, it is morally 
impossible) for the Best Being to do anything else than the 
best.” Timaus, 30, A. So, also, in that trinity about which 
so much has been said, and which but faintly appears in 
any parts of his authentic dialogues, the ψυχή, or third hy- 
postasis, seems to be rather a benign physical influence, 
than to make any approach to that renovating moral power 
which is revealed in the Scriptures. If we should dare to 
institute any comparison, we would say that it has more 
resemblance to the ΠῚ of Genesis, i., 2, and Psalms, civ., 
30, than to the πνεῦμα of Paul and John. 

The truth is, that, on this great and difficult subject of 
the existence and origin of evil, the mind of Plato seems to 
have wavered, and to have had different opinions at differ- 
ent times. Here he very briefly, yet very distinctly, avows 
his belief in a personal evil soul. In the Republic he leaves 
it as a matter of inference, contenting himself with the dec- 
laration, that God is the author of good, and of good only, 
while, at the same time, he asserts that the evil predomi- 
nates, at least in the present state. In the Timzus, it is a 
lower order of being, the dark and chaotic principle of mat- 
ter, possessing something of a positive character, yet still 
without anything psychical or animate in its nature. In the 
Politicus, or Statesman, there is a view, in some of its fea- 
tures, allied to this, yet capable of being resolved into what 
modern theologians would call a mere permission of evil, 
as a negative principle, deriving its power from occasional 
withdrawals of the Divine presence and. superintendence. 
This we gather from that most singular myth, in which he 
represents the universe as subject to alternate revolutions 
of immense length, during one of which good and perfection 
predominate, while, in the other, although the good, for a 


PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 213 


long time, exerts an influence, through habit, even after the 
withdrawal of the Divine Presence, yet evil and disorder, 
being introduced by degrees, increase more and more, until, 
finally, Old Chaos comes again, and total destruction would 
ensue, did not God once more resume the long-abandoned 
helm. It is a portion of Plato’s works on which but little 
attention has been bestowed, and yet, in consequence of its 
always having seemed to us to possess a deep theologital 
interest, we give the passage to our readers at some length, 
and m a very free version: ‘‘ God himself, at one time, 
guides this universe (ξυμποδηγεῖ), and turns it round. 
Again, he abandons it to itself, when the periods of its des- 
tined times have received their full complement ; when, be- 
ing animate, and having had wisdom implanted in it from 
him who harmonized it at the beginning, it commences of 
its own accord to move in a contrary direction; and this 
tendency to a retrograde motion 87.565 from an innate ne- 
cessity of its nature. Tor to be ever in the same relations 
(κατὰ ταὐτὰ), and uniform, and the same, pertains alone to 
those things which are most divine; but the nature of mat- 
ter has no share in this dignity. What we name, therefore, 
the heavens or the universe (οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον), hath par- 
taken of many blessed things or qualities from him who 
generated it; still, it has communion with matter, and, on 
this account, it is impossible that it should be altogether 
exempt from change, although, as far as it is capable, it 
moves on in one regular course, in the same and according 
to the same relations. It is in this way that it gets this 
property of unrolling, or rolling back, consisting, at first, in 
the slightest conceivable change or parallax of its previous 
motion. For anything always to turn itself is impossible, 
except for Him who is the supreme controller of all moving 
things ; but for this Being to act in a changeable manner, 
or to turn things, now in this direction, and now in the con- 
trary, is impossible (οὐ ϑέμις, ts morally impossible).. For 


214 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 


all these reasons must we say, that the world neither turns 
itself forever, nor that it is forever turned by God in con- 
trary circuits. Neither must we suppose that two Gods* with 
opposing purposes conduct its revolutions (μήτ᾽ αὐτὸν στρέ- 
ev ἑαυτὸν ἀεί, μήτ᾽ av ὅλον ὑπὸ ϑεοῦ στρέφεσθαι ἀεὶ διτ- 
τὰς καὶ ἐναντίας περιαγωγάς, μήτ᾽ αὖ δύο τινὲ ϑεὼ φρο- 
νοῦντε ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντία στρέφειν αὐτόν), but, as has been 
said (and which, in fact, is the only supposition left), that, 
at one time, it is guided by a Divine cause ; during which 
period it receives again the acquired power of life, and an 
immortality not innate, but imparted to it from the Demiur- 
gus; and then, again, that it goes by itself, being abandon- 
ed so long, that even many ten thousand years may be oc- 
cupied in the revolution.” Politicus, 269, P. 

The myth then proceeds to describe the alternate pe- 
riods. ‘The first, or that which is under the direct care of 
the Deity, is represex‘ed as the golden age, during which 
time the earth produces all things spontaneously, without 
cultivation, and, in general, the order of all things is from 
death to life.t ‘This was the reign of Saturn. Good was 


* This is in direct opposition to the doctrine laid down in The 
Laws, where he maintains that there are at least two souls, one 
good and the other bad, occupied in the movements of the universe. 
Here, however, he seems to be very much averse to such an opin- 
ion, as inconsistent and unnatural. Some would say that this fur- 
nishes conclusive evidence that the one or the other, or both of 
these dialogues, are spurious. If such an argument could be held 
legitimate, the conclusion would certainly be against the Politicus, 
since the doctrine of The Laws was followed by all the subsequent 
Platonists, and regarded as an undoubted position of their master ; 
but, in truth, instead of invalidating either, it only shows how a great 
mind wavered on the deepest question in philosophy and theology. 

+t It might, however, seem, to some, to be rather a species of in- 
verted death, as during this period the order ofall things is so chan- 
ged, that the old commence a process of return to the vigour of mid- 
cle age, manhood returns to youth, youth to boyhood, boyhood to - 
infancy, infancy to entire disappearance from the stage of life. In 


PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 215 


predominant, although there is no little confusion in the ac- 
count which this splendid myth, in other respects so clear, 
gives of this period. It at last, however, comes to an end, 
and when the complement of the times had been filled up, 
and the change must take place, then, it is said, the Divine 
Pilot, letting go the helm, retires to his secret place of obser- 
vation, and destiny and innate tendency are left to turn back 
the revolutions of the world: τότε δὴ τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν Kv- 
θερνήτης, οἷον πηδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέμενος εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ 
περιωπὴν ἀπέστη" τὸν δὲ δὴ κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν 
Hiwappévn τε καὶ ξύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία, 272, τὰ. Atthe same 
time, the other Δαίμονες, to whom, as presiding divinities, 
or angels,*-the various parts of the universe had been al- 
lotted in subordination to the Supreme Ruler, hear the sig- 
nal, and retire from their respective provinces. ‘Then com- 
mences the predominance of evil. Nature, through all her 
works, gives signs of wo. First, a strange tremour or com- 
motion (σεισμὸς πολὺς) is felt in every part of the aban- 
doned world. After a while, however, to employ Plato’s 
imagery, the vessel ceases from the tumultuous surging 
which at first ensues, and enjoying a calm, gets at length 
into the new course in which it is destined to proceed. 
The world goes on for a season with some degree of regu- 
larity, in consequence of influences being yet exerted by 
those laws and principles to which it had been accustomed 
in that previous state when it was directly under the Divine 


continuation of the same wild and strange fancy, the dead are said 
to come out of their graves, and thus to be born again from the 
earth: ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ad, κειμένων δὲ ἐν γῇ, πάλιν ἐκεῖ ξυνισ- 
ταμένους καὶ ἀναθιωσκομένους, ἕπεσθαι τῇ τροπῇ---συνανακυκλουμένης 
εἰς τἀναντία τῆς γενέσεως. We can hardly help thinking that in this 
Singular myth may bé traced the rudiments of an ancient doctrine 
of a resurrection. The general idea intended by Plato is clear 
enough, and yet so much confusion rests upon the details, that it 
᾿ sometimes is difficult to decide to which period they in fact belong. 
* See Note XXXIV., on the Platonic Doctrine of the Animation of 


216. PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 


care.* By slow degrees the former motion, with the order 
and harmony by which it was accompanied, is diminished, 
until, having passed the minimum point, it makes a transi- 
tion to the contrary direction with a constantly accelerated 
momentum. | 

It is then that the greatest deteriorations and corruptions 
take place; first, of the vegetable, next, of the animal 
world, and, finally, of the human race, until here and there 
a small and wretched remnant alone survive. The old har- | 
mony, the remembrance of which had. not before been en- 


,tirely quenched, is now utterly extinct. The former laws 


of nature are all reversed, until, finally, when on the very 
verge of utter ruin—r67’ ἤδη ὁ ϑεὸς, καθορῶν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀπο- 
ρίαις ὄντα, κηδόμενος ἵνα μὴ χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς δια- 
λυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα τόπον δύῃ.Ἷ 
πάλιν ἔφεδρης αὐτοῦ τῶν πηδαλίων γιγνόμενος, τὰ νοσή- 
σαντα καὶ λυθέντα στρέψας, κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν, ἀθά- 
νατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρω ἀπεργάζεται----“ God, beholding it 
in great extremity, and being concerned, lest, being over- 
whelmed in disorder and utterly dissolved, it should plunge 
again into the limitless, formless region of dissimilitude and 
chaos, once more seats himself at the helm (from which he 
had before returned to his secret place of observation, εἰς τὴν 
αὐτοῦ περιωπῆν), and having arrested its weak and dissolv- 
ed parts in their course to ruin, arranges it again in order, 
rectifies it, and thus renders it immortal,” 273, D. 

the Heavenly Bodies ; and Note LXVII., on the Platonic Doctrine of 
the Demons or Genit. 

* Or, in the expressive language of the original, τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς δι- 
δαχὴν ἀπομνημονεύων εἰς dbvautv— Still, as well as it could, remem- 
bering the teaching of its father.” ‘The allusion seems to be to the 
fable of Phaéton striving in vain to remembegand follow the direc- 


tions given him by his father, when he so rashly undertook to drive 
the chariot of the Sun. 

+ Lest it should plunge again into the limitless place of dissimilitude. 
That is, back again to old chaos. The language strongly calls to 
mind the 3775) sin of Genesis, 1. 2. 


OF ἀνάγκη, OR NECESSITY. 217 


We find occasionally in Plato, especially in the Timeus, 
mention made of ἀνάγκη, or necessity, a8 some strong and 
apparently opposing power, on which the Divine energy 
was constantly exercised, not so much in directly overcom- 
ing, as in controlling and directing it to the accomplishment 
of the Divine purposes. ‘Thus, in the Timeus, 48, A., he 
speaks of the generation of the world having proceeded 
from the combined operation of νοῦς and ἀνάγκη, mind and 
necessity. "ΓῸ the former, however, he ascribes a species 
of authority, yet of a persuasive rather than of a violent na- 
ture: Nov δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος, τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν TOV 
γιγνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτῃ OV 
ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος, οὕτω ξυνίστατο 
τόδε τὸ πᾶν ---» But, since Mind rules Necessity, by per- 
suading her to bring to the best results the most of things 
as they are generated ; thus, in this way, through necessity 
overcome by rational persuasion, this universe received its 
construction.” 

By ἀνάγκη, here, Plato does not mean his evil soul, nei- 
ther does he generally intend any physical necessity ari- 
sing from motion as a property of matter (although he and 
the Greek poets* do sometimes apply the term to what we 
style the laws of nature, and it has something of this aspect 
in the present passage from the Timzus), but rather a met- 
aphysical or logical necessity, a necessity existing in the 
idea of a thing, in its constituting cause, ὅτ a which makes 
it what it is—in its λόγος, or notion—in short, a necessity 
of the mind, by which it is compelled to include certain 
principia in the very definition of any existing or conceiv- 
able thing; and hence he employs in respect to it such 
terms as πείθειν, and πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος, words which would 
have little or no meaning as applied to a purely physical 
necessity. 


r= 





* As, for example, Euripides, Troades, 893 : 


Ζεύς, εἴτ᾽ ἀνάγκη φύσεος, εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν. 


ἐν 


vie 


218 OF Gvaykn, OR NECESSITY. 


For example, in the idea of matter, or rather body, im- 
penetrability necessarily enters. Hence, also, the impos- 
sibility that two bodies should ever occupy the same space ; 
which we have shown (page 143) to be more of a logical 
than a physical necessity. God cannot make matter with- 
out this. It is no more irreverent thus to speak, than to say 
that God cannot make matter or body, which is not body, 
or im any case go contrary to the idea of anything, and yet 
have it remain the same. Motion is not a necessary prop- 
erty of matter; and when we say this, we mean that there 
is no law of our minds, as in the above cases, which com- 
pels us to predicate it of matter. Other species of logical 
necessity (that is, a necessity in the ideas of things) are the 
mathematical ἀνάγκαι. Hence, the laws of motion, being 
partly mathematical and partly physical, are necessary, so 
far as they partake of the former character. It is not ne- 
cessary that bodies should attract each other in the inverse 
ratio of the squares of their distances: had it been the or- 
dinance of God, it would have been in the ratio of their 
cubes. When, however, the Deity establishes such a mo- 
tion as a_fact, it must conform to all the necessities of num- 
bers involved in, and which grow out of, the first simple 
formula or statement of the law. So, also, in morals, the 
idea of good.may, perhaps, necessarily include the contin- 
gency of evil; sin may be necessarily associated, in idea, 
with misery. In"alk-such cases, Plato would speak of the 
Deity not as violently overcoming necessity, but as ruling, 
directing, controlling it, to bring about the purposes of his 
moral government, or, in other words, using towards it “a 
kind of rational persuasion.” 


MOTION OF νοῦς COMPARED TO THAT OF A SPHERE. 219 


AXXI. 


Platonic Analogy between the Motion of Νοῦς and Ψυχή ana 
that of a Sphere, or of the Heavens. 


Pace 34, Line 5. Ei μὲν ἡ ξύμπασα οὐρανοῦ ὁδὸς ἅμα 
καὶ φορὰ νοῦ κινῆσει καὶ περιφορᾷ καὶ λογισμοῖς ὁμοίαν 
φύσιν ἔχει καὶ ξυγγενῶς ἔρχεται, κ. τ. }.---ος 1{τἢ 8 whole 
way and course of the heavens hath a nature similar to the 
course, and period, and reasonings of mind, and proceeds 
in a kindred manner, we must certainly affirm that the best 
soul (τὴν evepyétida) takes care of the universe.” We 
may compare with this the expressions, περίοδος νοῦ----πε- 
ρίοδος ψυχῆς, which occur so frequently in the Timeus: 
Tac τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίῤῥυτον 
καὶ ἀπόῤῥυτον σῶμα. Τιηιαιιδ, 48, A. So, also, 39, where 
there is the same allusion in the expression, 7) τῆς μιᾶς καὶ 
φρονιμωτάτης κυκλήσεως περίοδος. 

After the description of the visible animal (ζῶον ὁρατόν), 
or material universe in which the new-created soul of the 
world was to reside, he thus says: κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν 
αὐτῷ τὴν TOV σώματος μάλιστα οἰκείαν, TOV ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ 
γοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν. διὸ δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ, ἐν 
τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ περιαγαγὼν αὐτό, ἐποίησε κύκλῳ 
κινεῖσθαι στρεφόμενον----“ For he gave to it a peculiar mo- 
tion of its own, namely, that one of the seven which has 
the nearest relation (or analogy) to mind and wisdom. 
Wherefore, guiding it so as to move always in the same 
relations, in the same place, and within itself, he made it 
revolve in a circle.” Timaus, 33, P. We have the same 
idea a little farther on in this tenth book of The Laws, page 
35, line 15: Τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ δήπου καὶ ὡσαύτως Kal ἐν τῷ 
αὐτῷ, καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτά, καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτά, καὶ ἕνα λόγον 
καὶ τάξιν μίαν ἄμφω κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, νοῦν, THY τε ἐν 
ἑνὶ φερομένην κίνησιν, σφαίρας ἐντόρνου ἀπεικασμένα φο- 


220 MOTION OF νοῦς COMPARED TO THAT OF A SPHERE. 


paic, οὐκ ἄν ποτε, κ. τ. A.—“If we say this, namely, that 
mind and motion in one, &c., being both of them capable 
of being likened to the revolutions of a sphere, do both of 
them ever move kata ταῦτά, preserving the same relations, 
im a uniform manner, in the same, around the same, and 
according to one analogy and one order, we should not in- 
stitute an inferior or imperfect comparison.” 

This was one of the favourite speculations of Plato, and 
is kept prominently in view in the 'Timeus; so much so, 
that, without attending to it, it is impossible to understand 
many passages in that most profound, yet strange and difh- 
cult dialogue. He there describes the soul of the world as 
being constituted of two essences—rij¢ ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ 
κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας Kal τῆς av περὶ τὰ σώματα. 
γιγνομένης μεριστῆς---ἰῃ 6 one conversant with eternal, un Ὁ 
changeable, and necessary truth, νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περι- 
ληπτόν ; the other, with facts or phenomena, or, as he here 
styles them in The Laws, the second-working motions of 
matter, physical laws, or second causes. Corresponding to. 
these, he frequently speaks of two periods, which, in very 
strange phraseology, he describes as ἡ τῆς ταὐτοῦ φύσεως 
καὶ τῆς Tov ἑτέρου. ‘The first he likens to spherical or 
circular motion (φερομένην ἐν Evi), and finds its symbolical 
expression in the steady, unvarying, and eternal revolution 
of the sphere of the fixed stars or highest heavens (wheth- 
er regarded as phenomenal or not makes, in this respect, no 
difference). ‘The other, which he elsewhere styles a bas. 
tard reason (νόθος λογισμός), is conceived as represented 
by the irregular, variant, and sometimes retrograde motions 
of the lower bodies, and especially of the terrestrial phe- 
nomena. Matter and the external world being in a con- 
tinual flux, he regarded sensation, and that exercise of rea- 
son which takes sensation and phenomenal facts for its 
necessary hypotheses, as partaking of all the instability of 
its ever-flowing foundation. See the Timeus, from 28, A., 
to 43, B. | 


MOTION OF γνοὺς COMPARED TO THAT OF A SPHERE. 221 


There are many things which would.suggest this com- 
parison to such a mind as Plato’s, combining so much of 
the imaginative and poetical with the philosophical; and 
there are also some things to justify it to the soundest rea- 
son. Above all other figures, the sphere, in itself, may be 
regarded as the symbol of perfection, unity, immutability, 
and eternity. Complete both in sensible and intellectual 
beauty, its form delights the eye, while its zdea perfectly 
satisfies the mind. In the contemplation of its motion we 
find the analogy still more striking. If regarded as repre- 
senting the psychical self-energy of soul, or of God, it pre- 
sents a perfect resemblance in the fact, that it is motion or 
energy, without any change of the place which it occupies 
as a whole, or, in other words, combining simultaneously 
and harmoniously the opposite phenomena of motion and 
rest—rest relative throughout, or taken as a whole, and rest 
absolute in the centre, while yet it is the source from which 
motion is diffused.outward through every part; as Aristotle 
describes it, διὸ κινεῖται Kal ἠρεμεῖ πως ἡ σφαῖρα. Physic. 
Auscult., vill., 9. 

By a higher and more perfect analogy, it may be regard- 
ed as representing the intellectual energy of νοῦς, or reason, 
when engaged in the contemplation of immutable truth. 
Both may be perfectly described by those favourite terms 
of Plato which occur so often in the Phedon, and that, too, 
without being regarded as tropical in the one case more 
than in the other. The everlasting, unchanging motion of 
the ‘old rolling heavens,” like the perfection, uniformity, 
and immutability of the eternal ideas, may also be said to 
be, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτά---ὡσαύτως---ἐν TO αὐτῷ---περὶ TA αὐτά 
--πρὸς τὰ αὐτά---ἕνα λόγον καὶ μίαν τάξιν ἔχουσα. The 
argument here is, that that motion of the heavens, which in 
so many points is analogous to the intellectual energy of 
the best soul, must have been its direct and first production, 
and the object of its continual care. When stripped of its 

T 2 


222 MOTION OF γνοὺς COMPARED TO THAT OF A SPHERE. 


sublime imagery (if we may so regard it), the sentiment is 
equivalent to that of the Timeeus, already quoted: ‘O μὲν 
yap (μόσμος οὐρανὸς) κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δὲ 
(ϑεὸς) ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων. Θέμις δὲ οὔτ᾽ ἣν οὔτ᾽ ἔστι τῷ 
ἀρίστῷ δρᾷν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον. So, also, in the 
same dialogue, he represents the soul-of the world, after its 
creation by the “ Everlasting Father,” as commencing its 
spiritual and rational life (ἔμφρονος βίου) with the revolu- 
tion of the heavens: Ἢ δὲ ἐκ μέσου πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον οὐ- 
ρανὸν πάντη διαπλακεῖσα, κύκλῳ τε αὐτὸν ἔξωθεν περικα- 
λύψασα, αὐτῆ τε ἐν αὑτῇ στρεφομένη, ϑείαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο 
ἀπαύστου καὶ ἔμφρονος βίου πρὸς τὸν ξύμπαντα χρόνον. 
After this follows that most sublime passage which sets 
forth the delight of the Eternal Generating Parent at be- 
holding this glorious work of his hands, the ζῶον ὁρατόν, 
or visible universe, with its informing soul, living and mo- 
ving on in the most perfect harmony, and the celestial revo- 
lutions taking place with all the order and exactness of a 
creation fresh from the hands of its Maker; at sight of 
which he is said to have admired, even with astonishment, 
this image of the eternal powers, and to have rejoiced in it 
as exceedingly fair and good: ‘Q¢ δὲ κινηθέν Te αὐτὸ Kal 
ζῶν évevonoe TOV ἀϊδίων ϑεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα Ὁ TEN- 
ΝΗ͂ΣΑΣ ΠΑΤῊΡ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς ἔτι δὴ μᾶλ- 
λον ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ἐπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι. 
On reading this passage, one can hardly help feeling that 
some of the Christian fathers were right in supposing that 
Plato, in his travels, had had access to the books of Moses ; 
so strongly does it call to mind the declaration, Genesis, 1., 
31: And God looked upon all which he had made, and behold, 
it was good, very good. Perhaps in some such view as. 
this may we take that remarkable expression of Aristotle, © 
κινεὶ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον, on which we have remarked, page 
194. Ifthere were any proof that he held to Plato’s soul 
of the world, we might, with Cudworth, suppose him to 


MOTION OF νοῦς COMPARED TO THAT OF A SPHERE. 223 


have meant that ‘The Eternal Nove turned round the heav- 
ens, not by a direct action upon them, but by virtue of some 
sympathizing attraction of a pervading plastic soul by which 
their motions were regulated. 

On this subject we may compare what is said by Proclus 
in his commentary on the ‘Timzus: ὁ γρόνος διὰ τὴν πρὸς 
TOL αἰῶνα μίμησιν κυκλεῖσθαι λέγεται, ὡς καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς 
διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν Νοῦν μίμησιν opatpOobac— Time, by 
reason of its imitation of eternity, is said to move if ἃ cir- 
cle, as the heaven, on account of its imitation of mind, is 
spherical, or moves in a sphere.”* In this he is comment- 
ing on the same analogy presented by Plato, Timeus, 37, 
P., where he tells us that as the visible rolling heavens 
correspond to that soul of the world of which it is the out- 
ward εἰκών, or image, so is time an image of eternity. As 
the revolving mirror seems to set in motion the heavens, the 
earth, the trees, and all the objects of the really immove- 
able landscape, so time is a revolving image or reflection of 
the fixed eternal state, and so also the visible moving heav- 
ens are the sensible and temporal representative of the 
Eternal Mind: Eixova δ᾽ ἐπινοεῖ κινητήν τινα αἰῶνος tro 
ἥσαι, καί διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανόν, ποιεῖ, μένοντος αἰῶνος 
ἐν ἑνί, κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὃν δὴ 
χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν ---- He thought to make a moving image 
of the fixed eternity ; and as he arranged the heavens, eter- 
nity itself remaining forever in unity (that is, without suc. 
cession), he made an image of eternity to proceed by num- 
ber, the same which we call time.” In the same way, 
while the Eternal Mind or Reason remains in everlasting 
unity (ἐν ἑνὶ), the visible rolling universe, proceeding by 
number, may be regarded as its temporal and moving im- 


* This comparison of mind to a sphere seems to have been an an- 
cient Egyptian notion; as Iamblichus tells us that they pictured 
God sitting upon the lote-tree, because its leaves and fruit are round 
lake the motion of intellect. 


924 MOTIONS OF THE EVIL SOUL IRREGULAR. 


age: εἰκὼν χρονικῆ. καὶ κινητὴ τοῦ αἰωνίου καὶ ἐν Evi μέ- 
γοντος Nov. From some such idea as this came probably 
the Latin scholastic term uni-versum, involving the ideas 
of totality and unity, of motion in every part, and yet rest 
in the centre and as a whole. So, in another place, speak- 
ing of the motion of the stars, Plato says, doa δι’ οὐρανοῦ 
πορευόμενα, ἵνα τόδ᾽ ὡς ὁμοιότατον ἢ TO TEAEWTATY, καὶ 
NOHTQI ζώῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως 
Timeus, 39, ἘΣ. 


XXXII. 


The Motions of the Evil Soul Irregular and Disorderly. The 
nearer an Approach to the Pure Reason, the more of Fix- 
edness and Uniformity. Atheistic Objection from the Un- 
varying Regularity of the Heavens ; from whence was in- 
ferred the Absence of Will and Reason. 


Pace 386, Line 4. Οὐκοῦν av ἥ ye μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως, 
μηδὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, μηδὲ EV TAVTO, .. . μηδὲ Ev τινι λόγῳ 
κίνησις, ἀνοίας ἂν ἁπάσης εἴη ξυγγενήῆς. As uniform, reg- 
ular, immutable, spherical motion, is akin to mind, truth, 
and wisdom, so the opposite of all these (that of which, a 
short distance back, it is said, μανικῶς Kal ἀτάκτως ἔρχε- 
Tat) is allied to that error, folly, and disorder, which, in 
Plato’s view, were the chief characteristics of the dark and 
evil soul. How admirably does he, in the Phedon, teach 
this same doctrine in respect to the human spirit, although 
in somewhat different language, and with different imagery. 
How strikingly does he describe it as reeling and stagger- 
ing like a drunken man (πλανωμένη καὶ ταραττομένη καὶ 
ἰλιγγιῶσα ὥσπερ μεθύουσαν) while occupied solely with the 
animal life of the visible world ; until it withdraws from the 
turbulence of sense, and becomes assimilated (τῷ Vetw, καὶ 
ἀθανάτῳ, καὶ νοητῷ, καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ) to the 


HEAVEN, A STATE OF ETERNAL REST. 225 


Divine, the immortal, the intelligible, the moniform, the in- 
dissoluble, the ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως Kal κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ; 
or, in other words, that state of everlasting energy, yet ever- 
lasting rest, of ever-active contemplation, yet eternal quiet- 
ism, which is reserved for the just in the spiritual world. 
In this, Plato most certainly agrees with the Scriptures. 
He differs, however, from no small portion of the modern 
Christian Church, with whom it is a favourite theory, that 
the future condition of the saved soul will present a scene 
of activity in almost every respect similar to the present, 
and who would transfer to the heavenly state all the bustle, 
all the action, and even all the physical science of this 
lower world. One of our most popular religious writers 
indulges, at great length, in a consideration of the superior 
advantages which the celestial world will present for the 
study of the sciences of astronomy and trigonometry ; as 
though the healed spirit could find its everlasting rest in 
those pursuits that even here had failed to yield it any solid 
and permanent satisfaction. ‘This modern doctrine would 
carry all the mutations of sense into that fired and eternal 
state of which time is but the moving image. We cannot, 
however, find it in the Scriptures any more than in Plato. 
The ideas which revelation most prominently presents of 
the heavenly world, and which, we also think, must be most 
precious to the truly pious soul, are those of repose from 
the agitations of the present scene of probation ; of assu- 
rance, of light, of absolute certainty or freedom from all 
doubt, of eternal rest ; and yet all this in perfect consistency 
with the most intense moral emotion and the most energetic 
contemplation of fixed and everlasting truth. We may be- 
lieve in a progress of the soul, but in a very different sense 
from that in which the doctrine is commonly taught, and 
which holds out an ever-restless, never-satisfied accumula- 
tion of outward knowledge, as the spirit’s employment 
throughout eternity ; a progress which seems to necessitate 


226 CONSTANCY IN THE CELESTIAL MOTIONS, 


eternal doubt and eternal imperfection, and in which, after 
all, no real advance is ever made, because the position of 
the soul in regard to the highest truths remains as unchan- 
ged as in the present flowing world. We find but little, if 
any, trace of this doctrine of progress in the Scriptures. 
Revelation seems rather to intimate that, instead of this 
eternal moving on in the acquisitions of science, the per- 
fection of the soul will rather consist in the beatific vis- 
ion of those fixed, established truths, which are fundamental 
in the scheme of our redemption, and in the swelling moral 
emotions of the heavenly d@yadm7—that charity to which all 
mere γνῶσις holds only the relation of a means which is to 
vanish away, and to be regarded as naught when its great 
end shall be accomplished. Nothing seems more clearly 
taught m the Bible than that one of the essential elements 
of the eonian state is fixedness and certainty. ‘‘ Now we 
see through a glass darkly, but then face to face.” 

In the Divine Soul these two apparently opposite ideas 
of repose and energy meet in their highest perfection; and 
whatever may be thought of the philosophical truth of Pla- 
to’s comparison, it must certainly be admitted that there is 
a sublime, and even an almost divine beauty in thus taking 
as the symbol of the Eternal Mind the steady revolution of 
the “ old rolling heavens,” ever presenting to us the images 
of power, of calm yet resistless motion, of an ever-wakeful, 
ever-energizing Providence, and of everlasting rest. 

Plato, in the Epinomis, or Appendix to his dialogue on 
Laws, adverts to a very common prejudice, which would 
draw an atheistic objection from the unvarying regularity of 
the celestial courses. ‘‘It should be proof to men,’ he 
says, “that the revolutions of the heavenly bodies are un- 
der the direction of reason, because they ever do the same, 
even those things which had been planned and counselled 
ages beyond our conception. Yet the many think different- 
ly, and infer, from the fixedness and uniformity of their mo- 


NO PROOF OF THE ABSENCE OF WILL AND REASON. 227 


tions, that they have not soul; and so they come to think 
that the human is rational and animated, because they ob- 
serve in it variant and irregular motions (which seem to be 
the result of will), but that the divine is destitute of reason, 
because it ever abides in the same fixed courses: ἄφρον ὡς 
μένον ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς φοραῖς. And yet on this very account 
should we believe that there is a rational nature in the stars, 
because it ever doeth the same, and in the same manner, 
and preserving the same relations: τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ 
ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πράττει ἀεί." Epinomis, 982, D., E. 
In this passage, of which we have given a very free ver- 
sion, he seems to be aiming to show that the stars them- 
selves are animated, yet still the argument is independent 
of that particular hypothesis. It is equally valid, whether 
they are regarded as under the control of the Supreme or 
subordinate intelligences; and the remarks apply with all 
their force to the position we have in hand, namely, that 
soul and reason must be steady, uniform, and immutable, in 
proportion as they are above the turbulence and irregulari- 
ties of the sensible world; and that this, instead of being 
hostile to the doctrine of a minute and special providence, 
is absolutely essential to its perfection. ‘This sublime and 
beautiful view of the everlasting constancy of the heavenly 
motions, as representative of the calmness, immutability, 
and absolute certainty in the operations of that Divine Will 
which is ever one with the Divine Reason, is thus admirably 
presented by Balbus the Stoic, in Cicero’s second book De 
Natura Deorum, sec. 22: Nulla igitur in celo nec fortuna 
nec temeritas nec erratio nec varietas inest ; contraque om 
nis ORDO, VERITAS, RATIO, CONSTANTIA. Que- 
que his vacant ementita et falsa plenaque erroris, ea circum 
terras, infra lunam, que omnium ultima est, in terrisque 
versantur. . 

In the Timezus, Plato gives us a most vivid picture of 
the converse of this truth, namely, the turbulence and rest- 


928  sTRANGE COMPARISON FROM THE TIMAUS. 


lessness of the soul under the overpowering influence of 
the world of sense and matter. We refer to that remark- 
able passage in which he represents the inferior divinities, 
or sons of God, first introducing into the ever-flowing mate. 
rial universe those newly-formed human spirits which had 
just been generated from the anima mundi ; if, rather, some 
parts of the description do not better apply to the infant soul 
of the world itself: Καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ (ὁ ἀΐδιος πατὴρ) ταῦτα 
πάντα διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἤθει. μένοντος δὲ, οἱ 
παῖδες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν νοήσαντες, καὶ λαθόντες ἀθά. 
vatov ἀρχὴν ϑνητοῦ ζώου,. . . τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς 
περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίῤῥυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόῤῥυτον---- 
“And he (the Eternal Father) having arranged all these 
things, abode in his accustomed place (or mode of being). 
“ut the sons, having observed the method of the Father, 
and having taken the immortal principle of the mortal ani- 
mal, bound the periods of the immortal spirit into the zn- 
flowing and outflowing body.” Timeus, 42, P. This world 
of sense he compares to an ever-moving river, or, rather, to 
a wild and stormy torrent (κατακλύζον καὶ ἀποῤῥέον κῦμα), 
ever ebbing and rising, agitated by tempestuous winds (ζάλῃ 
πνευμάτων ὑπ᾽’ ἀέρος φερομένων, constantly surging, and 
bearing about with all violence the young spirit doomed to 
commence upon its ever-restless billows the morning of an 
eternal existence. 

In this condition, while the infant soul is the almost pass- 
ive subject of impressions, which, through this sea of mat- 
ter, invade it from without, it is tossed about—rtoré μὲν 
ἐναντίας φορὰς, τοτὲ πλαγίας, τοτὲ ὑπτίας, ἀλόγως, ἀτάκ- 
TwWc—‘* sometimes in an adverse direction, sometimes ob- 
liquely, now erect, now supine, and, again, like one stand- 
ing upon his head (οἷον ὅτων τις ὕπτιος ἐρείσας τὴν κεφα- 
λὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, τοὺς δὲ πόδας προσθαλὼν ἄνω), and 
seeing all the phenomena of nature strangely inverted, with- 
out reason and without order; until (as is the case with 


ANIMATION OF TITLE HEAVENLY BODIES. 229 


some), through the exercise of the rational principle con- 
᾿ stantly gaining the victory, and aided by right instruction— 
ἐὰν μὲν ἐπιλαμθάνηταί τις ὀρθὴ τροφὴ παιδεύσεως---ἰῖ ac- 
quires calmness, abstraction, and stability ; and having thus 
escaped from this most fearful disorder, comes at length un- 
der the abiding influence of immutable truth as exhibited in 
the eternal ideas of which matter presents only the flowing 
and varying diagrams. ‘The whole passage is too long for 
insertion continuously, and some parts are quite difficult. 
We would, however, earnestly recommend its perusal to 
the student, not only for its most sublime imagery, but also 
for the profound philosophy of human nature which is con- 
tained beneath it. See the Timeus, from page 42, P., to 
page 44, D. 


XXXIV. 


Platonic Doctrine of the Animation of the Heavenly Bodies. 
Ancient Belief that each Nation had its own peculiar 
Guardian Demon or Genius. 


Pace 38, Line 6. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄσ- 
tpa. ‘The next question, after deciding the nature of the 
governing soul, is, whether it is one supreme, or many sub- 
ordinate (uiav ἢ πλείους), engaged in these offices. Here 
is another point in Plato’s theology which has given offence 
to some of his warmest admirers. It has also been the sub- 
ject of peculiar animadversion by Warburton and others, 
who have been as far as possible removed from the Platon- 
ic spirit. "They would charge our philosopher here with 
an absurd polytheism,’ in making each one of the heavenly 
bodies either a divinity in itself, or, at least, under the con- 
trol of a separate divinity. If by this is meant that he did 
not, believe in one Supreme Ineffable Power, the generator 
and creator of all other existences, whether divine (in the 


τὴν 


230 ANIMATION OF THE HEAVENuY BODIES. 


Greek sense of Yeoi, as we have explained it, page 104) or 
human, the answer is found in places of his dialogues too 
numerous to mention; and especially might we refer to the 
remarkable passage in the Timeus (41, A.), in which the 
Eternal Parent thus addresses the inferior divinities to 
whom he had given being: Θεοὶ ϑεῶν ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς 
πατήρ τε ἔργων, kK. τ. A. His great object here is to show, 
in opposition to the atheist, that soul, or ψυχή, instead of 
τύχη, guides the motions of the heavenly bodies. Indeed, 
throughout the whole argument, he evidently regards the 
being of a God, and of soul generally, distinct from, and not 
a result of, bodily organization, as facts which involve each 
other, and which are shown by similar and equivalent 
proofs. He appears to have considered even a belief in 
the real entity of the human soul as inseparable from an 
acknowledgment of the Divine existence; so that the one 
was, as it were, the ground and guarantee of the other. In 
this respect, the lanouage of the Hebrew oath, “as the Lord 
liveth, and as thy soul liveth,’ expressed the true spirit of 
his philosophy. In consequence, therefore, of his constant- 
ly using these terms for each other, we cannot be certain, 
when he speaks of soul or souls as guiding the motions of 
the heavenly bodies, whether he means that this was done 
by the direct agency of the Supreme Soul, or whether it 
was delegated to inferior spirits ; and whether these dele- 
gated conducting powers resided severally in the bodies as 
an animating life, or were separate from them. All these 
are points which do not affect his main argument. With- 
out making a division into those distinct hypostases which 
appear in the Timets, he here uses ψυχή as a general col- 
lective term for all that is immaterial, or, at least, as a name 
for the Deity, and all celestial or superhuman powers deri- 
ved from, and dependent upon, him. ‘This was enough for 
his argument, without any farther precision or explanation, 
when dealing with the atheist, who denied all powers above 
man, be they one or many. 


ANIMATION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 231 


We may even go still farther in our apology, and main- 
tain, that if he did hold that the heavenly bodies were ani- 
mated, or that they were severally under the care of dis- 
tinct spirits, there was, in the latter opinion at least, no se- 
rious error, even when viewed in the light of revelation it. 
self. ‘The Bible not obscurely teaches that the personal 
destinies of individual men are, in a measure, under the di- 
rection and guardianship of supernatural beings. Churches 
are said to have their guardian angels, according to Reve- 
lations, 11., 1, which we prefer to take im this literal sense, 
rather than to adopt any other interpretation which has been 
forced upon it in the controversy respecting ecclesiastical 
government. The same doctrine is pretty clearly intimated 
in respect to nations, Daniel, x., 20,21, where Greece and 
Persia are said each to have their invisible champion, 
whether of a good or of an evil nature. ‘There is also a 
remarkable passage, Deuteronomy, xxxu., 8, which, if taken 
according to the Septuagint version, would directly estab- 
lish the same doctrine: When the Most High divided the 
nations, when he separated the sons of Adam, he appointed 
the bounds of the people according to the number of the chil- 
dren of Israel, “γ᾽ 513. 8D), as it is in the Hebrew, but, 
according to the number of the angels of God—kaTa ἀριθμὸν 
ἀγγέλων Jeov—as it stands in the Greek of the Septuagint. 
We cannot account for the difference, but it certainly seems 
as though the Greek version was more consonant with the 
context which follows, and which asserts that /srael is the 
Lord’s peculiar inheritance, in distinction from the other na- 
tions, who seem to have been left to the subordinate care 
of other directing powers. This very passage, too, it should 
be remarked, is quoted by Eusebius, Prep. Evang., xi., 26, 
to prove that Plato obtained his doctrine of the pani: 
from Moses. That such an idea prevailed among the 
heathen nations, especially the Persians, is evident from 
Herodotus, vil., 53: ϑεοὶ τοὶ Περσίδα γῆν λελόγχασι. 


232 ANIMATION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 


The Bible teaches us also that even the ordinary courses 
of physical events are under the controlling agency of an- 
gelic beings. He maketh his angels winds, his ministers a 
flaming fire ; as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews 
renders it. Science, with all its modern boasting, can af. 
firm nothing in opposition to this... It.is a view which in- 
terferes not at all with the regularity and the apparent laws 
of physical phenomena, and, as we have seen, the Bible 
quite plainly reveals it. Nay, more, may there not be 
found some countenance there to this very doctrine of Pla- 
to? If individuals, and churches, and nations, and every 
department in nature, have their presiding invisible powers, 
why not the heavenly bodies? Why not an angel of the 
sun, of the moon, and of each planet? Did the ancient 
Hebrew writers mean only physical instead of psychical 
powers, when they spoke of the hosts of heaven, and used 
that most sublime epithet, ni say nin, Jehovah Tsebhaoth, or 
Lord of Hosis? The Septuagint, by rendering it κύριος 
δυνάμεων, have seemed to refer it to physical rather than 
to spiritual agencies ; but it is a serious question, whether 
much more than this is not contained in the Hebrew. Was 
it simply a sublime personification, when it was said, He 
bringeth out their host by number; he calleth them all by 
name ?* or when we are told that, at the creation of our 
earth, the stars of the morning sang together, and all the sons 
of God shouted for joy 2] We have no hesitation in prefer- 
ring this, extravagant as it may appear, to that modern ex- 
treme, which would leave such an immense, unanimated 
solitude between man and the Deity, instead of filling it up, 
as the old Patristic theology did, with δαίμονες, angels, 
thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers: 

With helmed Cherubim, 
And sworded Seraphim, 


and all that array of invisible beings, whose existence the 


.--- ὕὄὕ 





* Isaiah, Χ]., 26. + Job, xxxviii., 7. 


ANIMATION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 235 


Bible does seem to take for granted, although some, in for- 
mer times, may have carried it to an extravagant extent. 
Surely we may still mamtain the precious Protestant 
doctrine, that no one but the Supreme Lord of Hosts is en- 
titled to any the least species of religious adoration, and yet 
believe in many an order of being, which, although of far 
higher rank, yet constitute, with man, an immense brother- 
hood of created intelligences, all intended for the manifest- 
ation of the glory of Him, by whom, and for whom, all 
things were created, whether visible or invisible, whether 
in the earth or in the heavens. ‘There is some reason to 
fear that Protestants, under the guise of a hyperspirituality, 
have gone too far in the opposite direction, to what is real- 
ly a materializing and physical hypothesis. When we dis- 
cover a disposition to banish in our minds all intermediate 
spiritual agencies, and, by magnifying natural causes, to 
place the Deity at the most remote distance possible, it 
does really seem as though, if we could or durst, we would 
dispense with his presence also in the regulation of the 
universe. In all ages, a tendency to that sadduceeism 
which barely saves the doctrine of the soul’s existence in 
another state, has been held, and justly held, to be near of 
kin to infidelity, if not to downright atheism. Far better to 
believe too much on this subject than too little, even if we 
cannot agree, with Plato, that there is a presiding spiritual 
superintendence assigned to each celestial body. 


XXXV. 
Three Hypotheses in respect to the Animation of the Heavenly 
Bodies. 


Pace 39, Line 7. Ὡς ἢ ἐνοῦσα ἐντὸς τῷ περιφερεῖ τού- 
τῳ, kK. τ. Δ. We have here three hypotheses. The first 
would make the sun itself an animated being; the second 


U 2 


934 ANIMATION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES. 


would regard it as under the direction of an external angel, 
or Δαίμων, having a material yet highly athereal body, and 
making use of a sort of impulsive motion; the third would 
represent it as under the care of a pure, unimbodied spirit 
or intellect (ψιλὴ σώματος ovoa), either the Universal Nu- - 
men, or some delegated power specially assigned to that 
office. If by the last is meant only a particular exercise of 
the energy of the Universal Soul (which view is perfectly 
consistent with his present argument against the atheist, 
although it does not fully agree with some things he says 
elsewhere), there would be no need of any defence of Plato 
against: the charges to which we have referred. ‘The sec- 
ond, however, as we have seen, may be held by a firm be- 
liever in the Christian revelation. ‘The first is only the 
doctrine of the anima mundi applied to particular parts of 
the universe. It may be maintained, as Plato did maintain 
it, in perfect consistency with a pure theism, or a recogni- 
tion of an Eternal Spirit, not only above the anima mundi, 
but regarded, also, as its creator and constant guide. ‘There 
is most abundant proof of this in the Timeus, and, indeed, 
we have every reason to believe that Plato meant no more 
by his soul of the world, whether in respect to the universe 
or to particular parts, than Cudworth intends by his famous 
Plastic Nature, to which, in some places, he seems inclined 
to ascribe a species of obscure animate existence.* In fact, 
some such hypothesis must be adopted by those who would 
make nature a distinct thing from the Deity, or a subordi- 
nate cause under the Divine reason and wisdom; as all 
must do who are averse to the doctrine that God does all 
things by his own immediate agency, or the systematic in- 
tervention of angelic or spiritual beings. ‘The only escape 
from one or the other of these is in that philosophy of oc- 
cult qualities, which is a mere play upon words, a mere 
apology for ignorance, and which, when carried to its le- 


---.-.-... 


Cudworth’s Intellectual System, vol. i., page 346, Engl. ed. 


γῆς ὄχημα, OR VEHICULUM MUNDI. 935 


eitimate results, is, as we have seen, the most favourable be 
all hypotheses to atheism. 

The independent, unoriginated essence (αὐτόθεος), which 
is above nature and above the soul of the world, is called, in 
the Timeus, ’Aldto¢g ἸΤατήρ, and represented as the genera- 
tor of ψυχῆ, and even of Νοῦς. Elsewhere, and especially 
in the Republic, Plato is fond of styling him To ’Aya@or, 
The Good. 





| XXXVI. 
Γῆς Ὄχημα, or Vehiculum Mundi. Examination of a Re- 
markable Passage from Euripides. 


Pace 39, Line 17. ἐν ἅρμασιν ἔχουσα ἡμῖν ἥλιον. This 
cannot be rendered, having the sun in a chariot or vehicle ; 
for the sense evidently requires that the sun itself be re. 
garded as the vehiculum of the indwelling spirit. Ἔν here 
is equivalent to in loco—év ὥἅρμασιν----ὡς dppata—in loco 
currus—for a vehicle.* By asimilar phraseology, the body 
is elsewhere styled ὄχημα, vehiculum; as in the Timeus, 
41, C.: ἐμθδιθάσας ὡς εἰς ὄχημα. In that place, however, 
Plato has reference, not to the animating souls of the heav- 
enly bodies, but to human souls, placed, or, as he says, 
sown there previous to their more intimate connexion with 
matter in their earthly existence, that they might learn those 
universal truths which were to be recalled to recollection 
in their subsequent stage of being.T 

In the Troades of Euripides the same term is applied, in 
a manner directly the opposite of this, to signify, not the 
corporeal vehiculum, but the animating, moving power. On 
account of its deep, intrinsic interest, we give the passage 
in full, and dwell upon it at some length: 

* So, also, Laws, xi., 913, C.: ἐν οὐσίᾳ κεκτῆσθαι. 

t+ Compare Origen contra Celsum, ii., 60. From this came those 
doctrines which Origen held respecting the pre-existence of souls. 


236 γῆς ὄχημα, OR VEHICULUM MUNDI. 


Ὦ γῆς ὄχημα, κἀπὶ γῆς ἔχων ἕδραν 

“Ὅστις πότ᾽ εἶ σὺ δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι, 

Ζεύς, εἴτ᾽ ἀνάγκη φύσεος, εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν, 

Προσηυξάμην oe: πάντα γὰρ δι’ ἀμψόφου 

Βαίνων κελεύθου, κατὰ Δίκην τὰ ϑνήτ᾽ ἄγεις. 

O Thou who guid’st the rolling of the earth, 

And o’er it hast thy throne, whoe’er thou art, 

Most difficult to know—the far-famed Jove, 

Or nature’s law, or reason, such as man’s— 

I thee adore, that, in a noiseless path, 

Thy steady hand with justice all things rules. 
Euripides, Troades, 890. 


We do not know which to admire most, the philosophy 
or the poetical beauty of these remarkable lines. The ex- 
pression, κἀπὶ γῆς ἔχων ἕδραν, relieves them, in our view, 
from all liability to the charge of pantheism. These words, 
in the connexion in which they appear, are only applicable 
to what Plato styles ψυχῆ ὑπερκοσμία; a soul which, al- 
though pervading, is also, at the same time, above, and dis- 
tinct from, the world or universe which it moves; for γῆ 
here is evidently to be taken in this large sense. ‘The last 
line, also, can only be referred to a moral power, not only 
far above pantheism, but also that view which delights in 
contemplating a God of mere intelligence. It indicates a 
special moral providence, looking to ends and varied by 
events, yet at the same time general, administered by un- 
broken and harmonious laws, pervading all nature, silent in 
their operation, traversing a noiseless path (δι᾽ ἀψόφου Bai- 
γων κελεύθου) ; the universal moving power of earth (mun- 
di vehiculum); influencing and controlling all things, and 
yet in its secret springs unsearchable (δυστόπαστος eidé- 
vat); ruling in the earthquake, the fire, and the tempest, 
yet, in itself, not the earthquake, nor the storm, but the s¢z// 
small voice of mind, specially and for special ends control- 
ling matter. 

So Plutarch, writing of the Divine Logos, ar Reason, in 


SECOND PART, DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE. 237 


the government of the world, uses almost the very words of 
Euripides, if he did not rather intend a quotation: φωνῆς 
yap ‘O ΘΕΤΟΣ ΛΟΙῸΣ ἀπροσδεῆς ἐστι καὶ δι’ ἀψόφον Bai- 
νων κελεύθου τὰ ϑνητὰ ἄγει κατὰ δίκην. Plutarch, De 
Iside et Osiri. We may compare with this a passage from 
Seneca, Nat. Q., lib. i1., 14: Deum illum maximum poten- 
tissimumque, qui ipse vehit omnia (mundi vehiculum), qui 
ubique et omnibus presto est. Compare, also, a passage 
of one of the lost tragedies of Euripides, as it is quoted by 
Eusebius, Prep. Evang., xiil., page 681: 

Σὲ τὸν αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ 

Ῥύμθῳ πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξανθ᾽. 

Thou self-sprung Being that dost all anfold, 

And in thine arms heaven’s whirling fabric hold. 


The idea expressed by such phrases as those on which we 
have been just commenting, may have been more ancient 
than Plato or Euripides, and may have given rise to the 
mythological representation of the chariot and horses of the. 
sun. .It is more likely, however, that the poetical repre- 
sentation may have suggested the language here employed. 
We have also in the Phedrus (246, A.) this same compar- 
ison, by which man, in his compound. being, is likened to a 
chariot and horses, with their charioteer, representing re- 
spectively his animal and_his rational nature. 


XXXVII. 


Second. Grand Division of the. Argument... Doctrine of a 
Special Providence. Mistake of Cudworth. 


Pace 42, Line 10. Τὸν δὲ ἡγούμενον μὲν ϑεοὺς εἶναι, 
μὴ φροντίξειν δὲ, κ. τ. Δ. We come now to the second 
grand division of the subject, and one, the treatment of 
which will probably be more satisfactory to the reader, pre 


238 SECOND PART, DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE. 


senting, as it does, less of subtle physico-metaphysical dis- 
cussion, and more that is in strictest harmony with the Holy 
Scriptures. ‘The author is now to prove the doctrine of a 
special providence against those who speculatively admitted 
the existence of a Deity, and yet could not believe that he 
concerned himself with the ordinary affairs of human life ; 
especially, what seemed to them of so little consequence— 
human sins. Cudworth asserts that ‘ Plato, in his tenth 
book of Laws, professedly opposing the atheists, and under- 
taking to prove the existence of a Deity, does, notwithstand- 
ing, ascend no higher than to the Psyche, or Universal 
Mundane Soul, as the self-moving principle, and the imme- 
diate or proper cause of all the motion which is in the 
world. And this (he says) is all the God he there under- 
takes to prove.” ‘This very learned man must have strange- 
ly overlooked the latter part of this book, upon which we 
are now entering, or he could not have made so incorrect 
an assertion. It is true, that all which his previous argu- 
ment has required as yet has been the existence of such a 
Psyche; but he now advances not only above self-motion, 
or psychical power, to the second hypostasis of intelligence, 
or Νοῦς (as it may be regarded when viewed according to 
the statements and divisions of the ‘Timeus), but also to 
that still higher degree which is above mind or intelligence, 
and which he elsewhere styles To ’Aya0ov; including, in 
the idea, all moral attributes—justice and severity, as well 
as benevolence and compassion. 

It is of this higher degree, or hypostasis, as we think it 
may be styled, that Plato, or some later Platonist, thus 
speaks, in that remarkable passage, contained in what is 
styled the second epistle to Dionysius, 312, E.: Περὲ τὸν 
πάντων βασιλέα πάντ᾽ εστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα" Kal 
ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν" δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ 
δεύτερα, καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ Tpita—* All things relate to 
the King of all, and on his account are all things, and he is 





GREEK WORDS FOR BLESSEDNESS, HAPPINESS, EI'C. 239 


the cause of all things beautiful; but the second honours 
pertain to the second, and the third to the third.” In other 
words, He is the final, or moral, as well as the designing, 
and the efficient or psychical cause of all things (ἕνεκα ov 
πάντα); for the manifestation of whose moral glory all 
things are created, moved, and constantly governed. 

Every reader must admit that the admirable arguments 
which follow in the remainder of the book are generally in 
strict accordance with the Holy Scriptures, and that Plato 
even reasons on this part of his subject. in a more religious 
manner than many nominally Christian writers; much of 
whose theology and science might fairly be ranked with 
the very atheism with which he is here contending. 


XXXVIUII. 
The Greek Words for Blessedness, Happiness, Fortune, &c. 


Pace 42, Line 14. ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις 
δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι, κ. τ. A. The words εὐδαίμων, εὐδαι- 
μονία, do not refer simply to a state of present pleasure or 
enjoyment; for, in that sense, the poets and others were 
right in asserting, and the philosopher could not deny, that 
wicked men are often happy. Evdaiwwyr, in its primitive, 
etymological import, has a much higher sense than this; a 
sense derived to it at that time, when Aaiwwy remained un- 
impaired in its significance as one of the Divine names, 
and had not yet been corrupted into that atheistic sense of 
Fortune which it subsequently acquired in the natural de- 
generacy of man and of language. From ev and Δαίμων, it 
would etymologically signify one who had ihe favour of 
Heaven; and its purest meaning would be best expressed 
by our good old Saxon word blessed. It refers not simply 
to a man’s present state of feeling or enjoyment, but to the 
whole of his being and his relation to the whole ; so that 


240 GREEK WORDS FOR BLESSEDNESS, HAPPINESS, ETC. 


one in the midst of the most acute pain, like the martyrs in 
the flames, might be εὐδαίμων ; while another, in the pres- 
ent enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, might be ἄθλι- 
o¢: as Socrates, in the Gorgias, describes the life of the 
sensualist as δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος, and asks if any 
one would dare to call such εὐδαίμονας, or blessed, ἐὰν 
ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν déovtrat—* even if they have in the 
greatest abundance all that their souls may desire.” Gor- 
gias, 494, E. ‘This is also the meaning of Solon in that 
most celebrated account which Herodotus gives of his in- 
terview with Creesus; although he sometimes uses ὄλθεος 
instead of εὐδαίμων, out of accommodation to the language 
of the sensual Phrygian. 

Plato himself clearly gives this as the radical idea of the 
word, and seems evidently to allude to its etymology when 
he says, ov γὰρ "ANEY TE OEQN μήποτέ τις εὐδαίμων 
éotiv—* Without the Gods no man can be called εὐδαίμων, 
blessed, or happy.” So, also, in the Timeus, 90, D.: Δεῖ 
δὲ ϑεραπεύοντα τὸ ϑεῖον, ἔχοντά τε "EY μάλα κεκοσμημέ- 
νον τὸν AAIMONA ξύνοικον ἐν αὑτῷ διαφερόντως ἜΥΔΑΙ- 
MONA εἶναι--- He must be blessed beyond all others who 
cultivates the divine, and who has ever in harmony within 
him the indwelling God.” ‘The juxtaposition of terms here 
leaves no doubt that there was intended an allusion to the 
radical sense and etymology of the word. There is the 
same allusion in the Orestes of Euripides : : 

Ὅταν δ᾽ ὁ AAIMQN *EY διδῷ τί δεῖ φίλων ; 

ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸς Ὃ ΘΕΟΣ, ὠφελεῖν ϑέλων. 

When God his blessing grants, what need of friends? 

A friend above supplies the soul’s desire. 

! Euripides, Orestes, 660. 

These lines are quoted by Aristotle in the discussion of the 
question, πότερον εὐδαίμων δεήσεται φίλων ἢ uh; Ethic. 
Nicomach., ix., 9. Even this cold and passionless writer 
tells us that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is a divine thing (ϑεῖον. 


GREEK WORDS FOR BLESSEDNESS, HAPPINESS, EB? 94] 


τι), and without the favour of Heaven cannot grow on the 
soil of earth: Ei μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ϑεῶν ἐστι δώρημα 
ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ϑεόσδοτον εἶναι 
—‘“Tf, therefore, there is any other thing which is the gift 
of the Gods, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is 
Heaven’s own peculiar boon.” Εἰς. Nicomach., lib. 1., 9. 
For similar passages, the reader is referred to his Ethic. 
Eudem., lib. i., 8; Ethic. Nicomach., lib. 1., 12; and espe- 
cially to lib. x., 8, where, treating of εὐδαιμονία in its other 
aspect, as an active exercise of the soul, instead of simply 
a state of well-being, he defines it to be ὦ contemplative 
energy—Vewpntikn évépyeca—such as we have supposed 
(page 225) to form the chief element in the bliss of the 
heavenly world. It is this which, in his view, constitutes 
the happiness of the Deity, and of that human state which 
is nearest to the divine. In proof of it, he asserts that no 
one of the inferior animals can ever be styled εὐδαίμων, be- 
cause the term implies a state possible only in relation to a 
religious and rational being, or one who could be sensible 
of the blessedness of the Divine favour: Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ϑεῷ 
πᾶς ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων " τοῖς δ᾽ ἀνθρώποις ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ὁμοίωμά 
τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει" τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων ζώων 
οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμοῦ κοινωνεῖ ϑεωρίας " καὶ ᾧ 
μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ ϑεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Wherefore, 
as he says in what follows, every such a one is ϑεοφιλέσ- 
τατος, or most beloved of Heaven. It will be seen how 
visibly, in all these extracts, can be traced the radical, ety- 
mological idea of the term, as it was exhibited in the most 
primitive Greek, and how very similar it is to the corre- 
sponding one presented in the Bible, although the former 
may not be taken in so elevated a sense, and perhaps nev- 
er comes up to the full etymological import which may 
fairly be supposed to be contained in its component parts. 
The Scriptures speak of it as the blessedness of that man 
who enjoys the Divine favour: Blessed ts the man (or pec- 


Χ 


242 GREEK WORDS FOR BLESSEDNESS, HAPPINESS, ETC. 


ple) whose God is the Lord; blessed are they who dwell in 
thy house ; who remain in the secret place of the Most High ; 
who abide under the shadow of the Almighty. . Thy favour is 
life, and thy loving kindness is betler than life. 

Δυσδαίμων and δνσδαιμονία as clearly express the oppo- 
site view, namely, not merely present misery, but the state 
of one visited by the displeasure of Heaven. It is thus re- 
peatedly used by Gidipus, in the Pheenissz of Euripides, 
when lamenting his wretched condition as one pursued 
from his earliest years by the wrath of the Gods, on account 
of his own sins and his father’s impious disobedience to 
the oracle : | 

ἌΡΑΣ παραλαθὼν Λαΐου καὶ παισὶ δούς. 
οὐ γὰρ, . .. 
ἄνευ ϑεῶν του, ταῦτ᾽ ἐμηχανησάμην.. 
elev: τί δράσω δῆθ᾽ ὁ ΔΎΣΔΑΙΜΩΝ ἐγώ. 
Phenissa, 1626. 

In its later applications, εὐδαιμονία loses much of its old 
religious sense, and degenerates into ἃ synonyme of εὐτυ- 
via, or good fortune, losing almost entirely its etymological 
reference to the favour of an overruling divinity. In this it 
shares the corruption of its principal component part, dai- 
μων. For a most striking illustration, however, of the rad- 
ical primitive difference between εὐδαίμων and εὐτυχής, 
we may refer to Euripides, Medea, 1225: 

Θνητῶν yap οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν "EYAAIMQN φύσει" 
ὄλθου δ᾽ ἐπιῤῥυέντος, ΕὙΤΥΧΕΣΤΕΡΟΣ 
ἄλλου γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἄλλος, ’EYAAIMQN © ἂν οὔ. 


By nature none of mortal race are blessed. 
When wealth flows in, one man may be more happy 
Than others of his race, but none are blessed. 


The contrast between this beautiful Greek word and the 
one by which it is generally rendered in our own tongue is 
very striking. The Saxon happiness is from hap, signifying 
luck, fortune, or chance ; a sense to which the Greek, as we 


ARGUMENT FROM THE PROSPERITY OF THE WICKED. 243 


have seen, subsequently degenerated. ‘The true etymolo- 
gical meaning, therefore, of happy, is that given by Web- 
ster, namely, ‘“‘recezving good from something that comes to 
us unexpectedly, or by chance, that is, fortunate, or lucky.” 
The same lexicographer says afterward, that “he only can 
be called happy who enjoys the favour of God ;” but this is 
an idea which was subsequently ingrafted on the pagan 
root by the Christian theology. ‘The original Saxon word 
had nothing of the τὸ ϑεῖον or divine about it. 


XXXIX. 


Atheistic Argument against Providence drawn from the Pros- 
perity of the Wicked. Plato’s Language compared with 
that of the Scriptures. 


Pace 43, Line 3. Ἢ καὶ πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνοσίους ἀν- 
θρώπους ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γηραιούς, κ. τ. λ.--“ When you 
behold men growing old, who continue unholy even to 
the very end of life, leaving children and children’s chil- 
dren in the highest honours—then are you disturbed at the 
sight,” &c. In what striking language is this same diffi- 
culty set forth in the Holy Scriptures, not only as perplex- 
ing the mass of mankind, but also as occasioning, at times, 
painful doubts even to the acknowledged people of God. 
Compare the complaint of Asaph in the Ixxiii. Psalm: 
But as for me, my feet were almost gone, my steps had well- 
nigh slipped. For I was envious at the foolish, when I saw 
the prosperity of the wicked. Wherefore his people backslide ;* 


* We prefer this rendering for the Hebrew 5 y)», as it may mean 


to turn back, as well as to turn to, or return; although the latter is 
the most usual sense in this conjugation. It may also mean, they 
turn themselves with astonishment and perplexity, as to some wondrous 
spectacle; in which sense it would well correspond to the Greek ra- 
υάττη, as used here by Plato. 


244 ARGUMENT FROM THE PROSPERITY OF THE WICKED. 


and they say, Doth God know? And is there a providence 
in the Most High? So, also, Job, with still more resem- 
blance to the passage before us: Wherefore do the wicked 
live, become old, yea, are mighty in power? Job, xxi., 7. 
The sentiment may be frequently met with in classic an- 
tiquity. It has formed the constant complaint of the virtu- 
ous when desponding, and the standing objection of the 
skeptic. As in Cicero, De Natura Deorum, lib. iii., 33-36, 
where the doubting Cotta goes into a long enumeration of 
the virtuous men who had been neglected of Heaven, and 
of the impious who had been blessed, apparently, with the 
highest prosperity. Speaking of the tyrant Dionysius (sec. 
35), he says, Hunc igitur nec Olympius Jupiter fulmine 
percussit, nec /Esculapius misero diuturnoque morbo tabe- 
scentem interemit. Atque in suo lectulo mortuus, in rogo 
illatus est; eamque potestatem quam ipse per scelus erat 
nactus, quasi justam et legitimam, hereditatis loco, filio tra- 
didit.. In the same strain, sec. 32: Dies deficiat, si velim 
numerare quibus bonis male evenerit, nec minus si comme- 
morem quibus improbis optime. And then he proceeds to 
relate the cases of Marius, Cinna, Dionysius, together with 
the saying of the snarling Diogenes respecting Harpalus : 
Diogenes quidem cynicus dicere solebat, Harpalum, qui 
temporibus illis predo in Pamphylia felix habebatur, contra 
Deos testimonium dicere, quod in illa fortuna tam diu vive- 
ret. Cic.,; De Nat. Deor., 111., 34. | 
Some minds, otherwise serious and thoughtful, have been 

almost driven to atheism by it; as is represented in those 
desponding lines with which Claudian commences one of 
his poems : 

Sepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem, 

Curarent Superi terras, an nullus inesset: 

Rector, et incerto fluerent mortalia casu. 

Nam cum dispositi quesissem feedera mundi, 

Prescriptosque mari fines, annisque meatus, 

Et lucis noctisque vires: tune omnia rebar 


THE WORD ἀποδιοπομπέομαι. 245 


Consilio firmata Dei— 

Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi 
Aspicerem, leetosque diu florere nocentes, 
Vexarique pios, rursus labefacta cadebat 
Religio.—Claudian. in Rufinum, 1., 12. 

But, while it has disturbed the pious in their desponding 
moods, it has formed the standing jest of the scoffer; as in 
the story of the atheist Diagoras, Cicero, De Nat. Deor., 
111., 87: At Diagoras quum Samothraciam venisset, Atheos 
ille qui dicitur, atque ei quidam amicus, “Τα, qui Deos pu- 
tas humana negligere, nonne animadvertis, ex tot tabulis 
pictis, quam multi votis vim tempestatis effugerint in por- 
tumque salvi pervenerint?” Ita fit, inquit. Illi enim nun- 
quam picti sunt qui naufragia fecerunt, in marique perierunt. 
So, also, that malignant buffoon Aristophanes puts a similar 
profane jest in the mouth of the travestied Socrates : 

καὶ πῶς ὦ μῶρε ov Kal Kpoviwy ὄζων καὶ βεκκεσέληνε, 

εἴπερ βάλλει τοὺς ἐπιόρκους, πῶς οὐχὶ Σίμων’ ἐνέπρησεν ; 

οὐδὲ Κλεώνυμον, οὐδὲ Θέωρον ; καίτοι σφόδρα γ᾽ Eto’ ἐπίορκοι. 

ὠλλὰ τὸν αὑτοῦ γε νεὼν βάλλει, καὶ Σούνιον ἄκρον ᾿Αθηνέων, 

‘Kal τὰς δρῦς τὰς μεγάλας " τί μαθών ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ δρῦς ἐπιορκεῖ. 

Nubes, 398. 

If either Xenophon or Plato are entitled to the least credit, 
nothing could be more directly opposed to his real and most 
cherished sentiments. 


XL. 
The Singular Word ᾿Αποδιοπομπέομαι, and the Remarkable 
Use made of it by Plato. 


Pace 44, Ling 9. AAA’ ἐάν πως οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήῆσασ- 
θαι. ‘This is a very peculiar and significant word, used by 
Plato, in the few cases in which it occurs, to express the 
strongest abhorrence, and generally employed in reference 
to some wickedness of peculiar enormity. It signifies, ta 

X 2 


246 THE WORD ἀποδιοπομπέομαι. 


avert the Divine wrath by expiatory sacrifices or religious 
rites of the most solemn kind ; from ἀπό, Διός, and πομπή, a 
solemn religious procession. In accommodation to the lan- 
guage of a later age, it might be rendered, to exorcise ; since 
this term also comes from another part of a similar cere- 
mony, performed for a similar purpose, namely, to avert, or 
send away, evil. We may compare with this the derivative 
noun, ἀποδιοπομπῆσεις, as used, Laws, lib. ix., 854, B., C. 
That passage is deserving of attention, as being, in some 
respects, one of the most deeply impressive, for its moral 
bearings, of any to be found in the Platonic dialogues. The 
subject is sacrilege, and during the discussion the legislator 
introduces a law against it with this most solemn προοίμιον, 
or preamble: ‘One conversing with, and exhorting the 
man, whom some evil desire, enticing by day and exciting 
by night, was tempting to the commission of this horrid 
crime of sacrilege, might thus say—Q, sir, it is no evil mere- 
ly human, nor any temptation sent from Heaven, that urges 
you on to this sin, but @ certain innate phrensy which grows 
um men from old and unexpiated sins (οἷστρός τις ἐμφυόμενος 
ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων), 
ever restless (περιφερόμενος ἀλιτηριώδης), and calling for 
vengeance on iself.” He seems to have had in view a class 
of men who would be styled, in modern phraseology, given 
over—almost, if not wholly, past their day of grace, or the 
reach of any reforming means—men in whom sin had be- 
come an οἶστρος, a raging disease,* or phrensy, urging them 
on by a sort of maddening impulse, without the ordinary 
inducements of gain or sensual pleasure—men under the 
goadings of a keenly-sensible, yet utterly-depraved con- 
science, which could only find ease in the commission of 
greater and still greater enormities drowning the recollec- 

* Such as, in the Gorgias, he styles ὕπουλος, namely, apparently 


healed upon the surface, but ulcerating in the bones below—an old 
and neglected sore. 


THE WORD ἀποδιοπομπέομαι. 247 


trou of the lesser, as though driven to wander about (ἀλετη. 
ριώδης) by an ever-restless internal Erinnys. 

To such a one he gives this. most earnest and solemn ad- 
vice: Ὅταν oot προσπίπτῃ TL τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων, ἴθι 
ἐπὶ τὰς ᾽᾿ΑἈΠΟΔΙΟΠΟΜΠΉΣΕΙΣ, ἴθι ἐπὶ τῶν ϑεῶν ἀποτρο- 
παίων ἱερὰ ἱκέτης, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ξυνου- 
σίας, τὰς δὲ τῶν κακῶν φεῦγε ἀμεταστρεπτί, κε. τ. λ.---- 
“When even such a thought should invade your mind, be- 
take yourself at once, to the most solemn modes of expia- 
tion (ἀποδιοπομπήσεις) ; go as a suppliant to the shrines of 
the wrath-averting divinities ; resort, without-delay, to the 
assemblies of the good; and fly, without turning or looking 
back, from al! the associations of the bad; if, peradventure, 
thy wretched disease may be rendered lighter.” Qne is 
strongly remiided of the angel’s urgent and alarming ex- 
hortation to Lot and his family, when he bids them fly from 
the impending doom of Sodom: Up! get thee out of this 
place ; escape for thy life; look not behind thee ; tarry not in 
all the plain; haste to escape, lest thou be swept away. 

We may compare, in respect to this most impressive 
word, another passage in the ninth book, 878, A., where 
the legislator is speaking of a house that has been defiled 
with murder, and of the restoration of a family that has, in 
consequence, been rendered childless : τοῦτον πρῶτον μὲν 
καθήρασθαι καὶ ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι τὸν οἶκον χρεὼν ἔστω 
κατὰ νόμον. See, also, the Cratylus, 896, E.: αὔριον δὲ 
ἀποδιοπομπησόμεθά τε αὐτὴν, καὶ καθαρούμεθα, ἐξευρόντες 
ὕστις τῶν ἱερέων Ta τοιαῦτα δεινὸς καθαίρειν. It is ap- 
plied by Plutarch to an obnoxious person whom they would 
wish to send away—to exorcise as a troublesome spirit. 
This strong language Cesar is represented as using in ref- 
erence to Cato: Κάτωνος μὲν ov παρόντος " ἐπίτηδες γὰρ 
αὐτὸν εἰς Κύπρον ἀπεδιεπομπήσαντο. Plutarch, Ces., 21. 

The verb ἀποπομπέω has the same meaning, and trom 
this we have a similar word, with the same solemn reli- 


248 THE WORD ὠποδιοπομπέομαι. 


gious import, which is used by the Septuagint to translate 
the Hebrew ΠΝ}, or scapegoat. ᾿Αποπομπαῖος signifies a 
victim to be sent away, with solemn religious rites, as an ex- 
piation ; and is very similar to ἀλεξίκακος and ἀποτρόπαιος, - 
which are the more common terms in classic Greek. See 
Leviticus, xvi., 8: κλῆρον Eva τῷ Κυρίῳ καὶ κλῆρον ἕνα τῷ 
ἀποπομπαίῳ ; so, also, in the tenth verse of the same chap- 
ter: Tov ἐξιλάσασθαι ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὥστε ἀποστεῖλαι αὐτὸν εἰς 
τὴν ἀποπομπῆν. Clemens Alexandrinus uses it in the 
same peculiar sense: ἐπὶ μόνῃ τῇ διοπομπήῆσει τῶν κακῶν, 
Strom., vil., 850. 

Plato could not have selected a stronger word to express 
his utter abhorrence of atheism. By such language, he 
represents it as that abominable. spirit of all evil (if we may 
use the word spirit in so strange a connexion), which he 
had been endeavouring to averruncate, or exorcise, from. the 
souls of the young persons whom he fancies himself so ten- 
derly, yet solemnly, addressing. . Some of the expressions 
used in this passage, and in the parallel place quoted from 
the ninth book, would almost come up to the Scripture doc- 
trine of demoniacal possession or Satanic influence upon 
the soul. The word προσιὸν, which almost. immediately 
follows, preserves the metaphor contained in, ὠποδιοπομπή- 
σασθαι, and is in admirable keeping with the spirit of the 
whole passage. It suggests here the idea of sudden evil, 
violently invading, and which can only be prevented by the 
most speedy and efficacious remedies. Viger and Ast 
would, most absurdly, substitute προϊὸν for προσιὸν, thereby 


* It is thus defined by Timeus in his Lexicon of peculiar Platonie 
phrases :, ἀποπέμπεσθαι καὶ διωθεῖσθαι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, συμπράκτορι 
χρώμενος τῷ Διί. The latter part of the compound may have the 
general sense of πέμπω, but more probably has reference to πομπῇ 
as significant of a solemn religious procession, or ceremony, by 
which evil was supposed to be averted, and which is alike common 
to paganism and a corrupted species of Christianity. 


PLATO DEFICIENT IN THE DOCTRINE OF EXPIATION. .249 


utterly spoiling the metaphor, and weakening the force of 
the whole declaration. One proof that προσιὸν is the prop- 
er reading here may be derived from the parallel passage 
in the ninth book, where we have the same image convey- 
ed by a very similar word: ὅτων oot προσπίπτῃ τι τῶν ToOL- 
ούτων δογμάτων---“ when any such thought shall znvade 


you,” &c 


XU. 


Defect of Plato’s Theology in regard to the Doctrine of Atone- 
ment and the Necessity of Expiation. 


Pace 51, Line 3. παραιτητοὺς. The true sense of Plato 
here, and in the subsequent argument, wherever this word 
is used, is best given by rendering it easi/y propitiated, as 
though it had been εὐπαραιτήτους. In translating an au- 
thor, we must take into view not only the peculiar circum- 
stances by which he was surrounded, and the peculiar phi- 
losophy and theology by which his mind was influenced, 
but we are bound to consider, likewise, how far modern 
philosophy and theology have affected certain terms in our 
own tongue, which otherwise would have been true repre- 
sentatives of his meaning, instead of conveying—as, under 
such circumstances, they will be very likely to convey—an 
idea which was never intended. A due regard to this will 
sometimes require what may, perhaps, seem a paradox, 
namely, a slight mistranslation of the letter in order to do 
justice to the spirit; or, in other words, to depart a little 
from the etymological sense in order to preserve the sub- - 
stance of the writer’s thought. ‘Thus, here, for example, 
we shall certainly do Plato injustice, if we carry our Chris- 
tian theology along with us in the interpretation, and give 
to παραιτητοὺς that sense which, standing alone, it would 
‘suggest to a Christian mind. The philosopher knew no. 


250 PLATO DEFICIENT DN THE DCCTRINE OF EXPIATION. 


thing of that great atonement which forms the basis of the 
Christian scheme. His argument is therefore directed 
against those who held that the Divine displeasure, even 
for the greatest offences, could be averted by sacrifices, 
processions, vows, andthe mere ritual performances of re- 
ligion, without repentance, or (which is of still greater mo- 
ment) without any sense of that need of expiation which 
was signified by the sacrifices they blindly offered. This 
feeling of the need of expiation was in some obscure way 
expressed in all the religions of antiquity. ‘The true and 
perfect mode forms that peculiar doctrine of Christianity © 
which distinguishes it from all others, and the belief of 
which, either in the substance or the type, has been, in all 
ages, the essential element of the Hieghianesnat) which is by 
faith. 

Could we trace anything of this in the lives or writings 
uf Plato and Socrates, we should indulge more hope of 
their salvation from it than from any of those moral lessons 
—truly beautiful. and sublime as they are —which have 
been left to us in their immortal dialogues. We are told, 
both by Plato and by Xenophon, that Socrates advised his 
friends to be diligent in offering their sacrifices upon the al- 
tars of their country’s religion. For this he has been gen- 
erally condemned (at least by Christian writers), as giving 
a sanction to idolatry; but we have no hesitation in ex- 
pressing the opinion, that in no part of his philosophy did 
he come nearer to Christianity and its central truth, and 
that on no other grounds could we entertain such hopes of 
his salvation; provided we can only believe that, in giving 
᾿ς this advice, he had even the most faint allusion to the great 
and saving doctrine which all sacrifice was κα μονας ων in- 
tended to represent. 

We find, however, but little reference to this need of ex- 
piation in the writings of Plato, except, it might be, in the 
case of such great and almost incurable sinners as are mens 


PLATO DEFICIENT IN THE DOCTRINE OF EXPIATION. 25] 


tioned in the passage lately quoted (page 247) from the 
ninth book of the Laws. A life of ascetic virtue was the 
remedy which he would in general propose ; although, in 
the pride of philosophy, he was but little aware how utterly 
defective is any thing which bears the name of human 
virtue, when laid by the side of that Holy Law which 
“‘ pierces even to the dividing asunder of the soul and the 
spirit, and is a discerner of all the thoughts and intents of 
the heart.” Το a Christian mind this silence in regard to 
an atonement is the second great fault in Plato’s theology. 
The other is his doctrine of an original independent evil 
principle. ‘This being closely connected with the dogma 
of the innate evil of matter, through which the soul was 
tainted, led him naturally to teach an ascetic mode of puri- 
fication to the exclusion of any external, forensic, and vica- 
rious atonement. He preached much and most eloquently 
against the lusts of the flesh as the cause and essence of all 
depravity ; but his philosophy contains but slight recogni- 
tion of those sins of the spirit in which the much-denounced 
body has no share, and which may be supposed to belong 
to a purely spiritual being as well as to one who is enclosed 
in the grossest robes of matter. Hence it is easy to see 
how these two errors, although apparently so remote, have 
a common origin and a common seat in depraved and blind- 
ed human nature ; and how all, whether out of the Church 
or in the Church, who have endeavoured to rectify it m a 
manner different from that pointed out in the Bible, have 
ever stumbled on this same point, namely, the teaching of 
an ascetic mode of purification, through the penances and 
mortification of the flesh, not as auxiliary and disciplinary, 
but as remedial and saving. 

In respect to the doctrine of an atonement, the Greek 
poets are more often im accordance with the Bible, and 
those traditions which had come down from a remote an- 
tiquity, than our philosopher. Even in the very practices 


252 PLATO DEFICIENT IN THE DOCTRINE OF EXPIATION. 


whose superstitious observances he condemns, and justly 
condemns, there may be manifested that deep sense of the 
need of expiation which has been felt in all ages—which 
has formed a part of all false religions, and of all corruptions 
of the true—and which only finds repose in a believing and 
intelligent view of the doctrme of the cross. His argument, 
however, is sound, as directed against some of the practices 
which prevailed in the Greek religion, and which operated 
equally with atheism in encouraging the most abominable 
licentiousness ; for their great design was not so much to 
take away sin, or the consciousness of sin, as to avert its 
consequences.* μα 8 

It is the glory of the Gospel that God is παραιτητός--- 
that he can be propitiated; while the awful sacrifice by 
Ὁ ‘uich it is accomplished levels in the dust all the pride of 
human virtue, and all the lofty aspirations of human philos- 
ophy. It relieves the penitent and believing spirit from 
that gloomy sentiment of the Grecian poet, which has ever 
weighed so heavily on the dark heathen mind— 


Διὸς yap δνσπαραίτητοι φρένες --- 


while yet it gives no countenance to that false, presumptu- 
ous belief in the Divine placability, against which Plato is 
here contending, and on which some in our own day would 
lay so much stress. With such, whether ancient or mod- 
ern, it is not the Divine mercy which they would exalt— 
for that has no meaning separate from the Divine justice— 
but, rather, that idol attribute of their own imaginations, 
which is so well expressed, in this very argument, by the 
Greek word ῥᾳθυμία; that sluggish indolence, indifference, 
or good-nature, to use a common expression, which con- 
stitutes the prime attribute of the Deity of the ancient Ep. 
icurean and the modern sentimentalist. 





* See remarks on this distinction, note 1, page 4. 
οἴ ZEschylus, Prom. Vinct., 34. 


HIGHEST PROOF OF THE DIVINE GOODNEss. 253 


XLII. 
- Highest Proof of the Divine Goodness, the a priori Conviction 
ae has of the Moral Sense. 


Pace 51, Line 13. ᾿Αγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρίστους. ‘The ap. 
peal is here directly to the moral sense. ‘The intelligence 
and power of the Deity may be matters of inductive reason- 
ing, although even for these, and especially the former, 
there may be as good a ground of belief in the a priori con- 
viction which every man possesses. But we may safely 
say that no one really ever resorts to external induction for 
his own private individual satisfaction in the belief that God 
is good ; although on other grounds, and from other motives, 
it may sometimes be made the subject of speculative argu- 
ment. We cannot bear the contrary opinion. Just as by 
the laws of our minds we are compelled to assert that mat- 
ter has in itself no inherent property of motion, notwith- 
standing all mere inductive experience of an ever-restless, 
ever-moving world is in opposition to such an a@ priori con- 
viction ; so, likewise, are we compelled to believe and feel 
that God is good, however much inductive argument from 
all the facts around us, in this world of disorder, might go 
towards maintaining the contrary dogma. Even those who 
assert most strenuously that the Divine benevolence is 
proved from the observation of external nature carry along 
with them this a priori conviction, without, perhaps, being 
aware of the fact, that from it is derived, to their own minds 
and the minds of others, the main force of every argument 
by which they would sustain their preconceived hypothesis. 
Let this innate conviction be utterly banished from the soul, 
and we might then see, if it were possible to put ourselves 
in that condition, what is the real strength, or, rather, real 

weakness of the a posteriori proof. Should even the great 


mass of facts which fall within the sphere of our observa: 
Y 


254 HIGHEST PROOF OF .THE DIVINE GOODNESS. 


tion be favourable to such a position, yet what right would 
we have to extend this to the immense:scale of the uni- 
verse, unless impelled to it by the unconscious working of 
this innate law of our moral nature? If this world were ° 
filled with happiness to overflowing, how could so narrow 
an induction dare to step beyond its limits? What is our 
position, with infinite space all around us, and two illimita- 
ble eternities, before and behind us, that we should draw 
any inferences from a mere induction of facts as to the moral 
attributes of the Deity, unless in the soul itself there. is 
some sure foundation for faith in their existence? If, how- 
ever, on the other hand, we are actually compelled to re- 
verse the picture, and to assert that misery, in our world at 
least, forms the rule, and happiness the exception—if the 
Bible tells us that man is born to sorrow—if Plato. declares 
that our good things are much fewer m number than our evil 
things—and if the true voice of humanity has responded in 
all ages to these assertions both of profane and Holy Writ 
—on what ground can we yet cling to the belief in the Di- 
vine benevolence, except by relying on the deep conviction 
of that moral sense, which tells us, and, even though worlds 
on worlds should exhibit facts to the contrary, would still 
tell us, that God 15 good. | 

If no induction can prove it, neither can any induction 
strip us of the belief as long as the soul remains true to her- 
self. There is within us something higher than the spec- 
ulative or the inductive reason, which exclaims, as the 
spontaneous sentiment of the soul, which she can neither 
demonstrate nor reject, If there be a God, he must be good, 
and must delight in goodness. The Judge of all the Earth 
must do right. In proof of this, Plato does not hesitate to 
appeal here to the consciences even of his supposed oppo- 
nents, and therefore he says, πέντε évtec—all five of us, 
namely, the three parties to the dialogue, and the two ima- 
ginary disputants who speculatively deny a providence ; as 


STYLE OF THE BIBLE ABOVE THAT OF PHILOSOPHY. 255 


much as to say, Here we all agree—here there is no need 
of argument; we all admit that, if there is a God, he must 
be good, however much we may differ as to that in which 
his goodness consists. 


XLII. 


Sublime Mode in which the Bible represents ihe Divine Prov- 
idence and Omniscience as contrasted with all mere Philos- 
ophizing on these Attributes. Analysis of the Greek Word 
᾿Ανδρεία, as denoting one of the Cardinal Virtues of Soul. 


Pace 52, Line 2. Δειλίας yap ἔκγονος, κ. τ. Δ. By con- 
necting this with what is said, page 46, line 10, ἀρετῆς μὲν 
ἀνδρείαν εἷναι, δειλίαν δὲ, κακίας, we get the whole argu- 
ment, which may be thus stated: We admit the Gods to be 
good: ἀνδρεία is a part of virtue; δειλία is its opposite ; 
ἀργία is the offspring of δειλία : therefore it cannot be through 
ἀργία and ῥᾳθυμία that the Gods neglect the affairs of men. 
He had before proved that it could not be from want of 
power. ‘This is conclusive. As a matter of reasoning, it is 
admirably stated, and is in itself unanswerable. And yet 
in a manner how different from all this parade of argument 
do the Scriptures treat this subject of the Divine providence 
and omniscience. How sublimely do they assume all these 
positions, without reasoning at all about them. The Lord 
looks down from heaven. His eyes behold, and his eyelids try 
the ways of the children of men. He knoweth our sitting down 
and our rising up. He understandeth our thought afar off. 
He never slumbereth nor sleepeth that keepeth Israel. As the 
mountains are round about Jerusalem, so the Lord is round 
about his people from henceforth and for evermore. The eyes 
of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the good. 
This is the style worthy of a Divine revelation; and how 
poor aoes our cold philosophizing, even in its best, and loft- 


256. THE WORD ἀνδρεία, AS APPLIED TO THE DEITY. 


iest, and most religious efforts, appear in the comparison. 
Who can turn from the Grecian poets and philosophers, 
with all their acknowledged excellences—yea, even from 
the almost divine Plato himself—to the Holy Scriptures, 
without feeling, for the time, a conviction amounting to the 
full assurance of absolute certainty, that the latter is indeed 
from Heaven—the voice of God, and not of man? 

The term ἀνδρεία, here used, would seem, if etymologi- 
cally considered, to be improperly applied to the Deity. 
This objection, however, is entitled to but little weight. 
The word is applicable to spiritual energy of any kind, as 
well as to that which is properly human. It denotes, strict- 
ly, energy of soul, or strength of will; not merely in the 
sense of physical power, outwardly to execute its volitions, 
but rather as a pure, internal, spiritual force, by which one 
man or one being may differ from another. ‘There may be 
a good will, yet weak ; but when this moral strength is add- 
ed to the other cardinal virtues, the manly character is said 
to be complete, and hence the name. It is what the Apos- 
tle means by the word ἀρετή (the same with the Latin vir- 
tus, from a similar etymology), when he says, Add 10 your 
faith virtue. In the Laches, 192, D., Plato defines it as 
καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς. Elsewhere, connecting it with all 
the virtues, he describes the truly brave man as one who 
fears nothing which ought not to be feared, while, at the same 
time, he fears everything which ought to be feared ; thus view- 
ing it as in unison with the highest wisdom, and as utterly 
opposed to that blind, counterfeit foolhardiness which has 
no relation to the rational soul, but belongs as much to the 
beast as to a human being. Hence he shows that “the 
truly brave, since he must know what is truly good, must 
necessarily partake of righteousness, temperance, and holi- 
ness; because to him alone it pertains, by reason of this 
virtue, to have a true fear in regard to God and man, so as 
to fear what ought to be feared, and to be ever bold when 


» 


THE WORD ἀνδρεία, AS APPLIED TO THE DEITY. 257 


engeged in right and duty” (vide the Laches, 199, D.) ; thus 
making ἀνδρεία the support and life of all the other virtues, 
according to a favourite theory, that they are all, when gen- 
uine, essentially connected ; that, where one exists, all exist 
in a greater or less degree ; and that, where one 15 want- 
ing, all are to be suspected of spuriousness. 

In this sense of energy of will* it is properly applied to 
the Deity, notwithstanding the apparent etymological incon- 
sistency. It strikingly suggests that definition of the Divine 
nature which Aristotle ascribes to Plato, namely, “ that 
whose very essence is energy’—7 ἀρχὴ ἧς οὐσία ἐνέργειά Eo- 
τιν; that which must act with an intensity of energy pro- 
portioned to an infinite nature, ever in harmony with itself, _ 
and ever in the most vehement and burning opposition to all 
that is unlike. See remarks on this passage of Aristotle, 
page 190. 

Δειλία is the opposite of ἀνδρεία. In some respects it 
is nearly synonymous with ῥᾳθυμία, easiness, fickleness, or 
weakness of will. Tpvdn, effeminacy, the result of sensuality. 
No terms, certainly, could be more remote from any right 
conception of a spiritual God. To such as those with whom 
Plato supposes himself contending, and to all who deny a 
special providence (although they may not see the logical 
consequences as the philosopher has analyzed them), may 
be applied the language of the Bible: Ye thought that I was 
altogether such a one as yourselves. And yet men of this 
description often assume to be under the teaching of a high- 
er philosophy than those weak and simple ones, who ima- 
gine that their smallest sins and their lightest cares are the 
objects of God’s special regard. 

_ Philosophical theism often seems to talk very piously, 


* We would ever use the term will, in such a connexion as this, in 
its highest import, as distinguished from animai wilfulness, or mere 
volition, and as ever conjoined with reason ; or, as Cicero defines it, 
Voluntas est que quid cum ratione desiderat. 


YZ 


258 THE PIETY OF EPICUREANISM. 


and to claim the merit of being very religious, because .< 
graciously admits the Divine existence and intelligence. 
while yet it denies everything which could make that ex- 
istence an object of love, or fear, or of any interest of any 
kind beyond what might be felt in the contemplation of a 
mathematical theorem. The ancient Epicureans some- 
times affected this kind of sentimental religionism,* some 
specimens of which we find admirably set forth, in all their 
~ hollowness, in Cicero’s treatise De Natura Deorum, lib. 1., 
s.41: Ac etiam de sanctitate, de pietate scripsit Epicurus. 
At quo modo in his loquitur? Ut Coruncianum aut Scevo- 
lam pontifices maximos te audire dicas: non eum, gu? sus 
tulerit omnem funditus religionem? Quid est enim, cur 
Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, quum Dii non modo ho- 
mines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant? 
Sec. 42: Horum enim sententiz omnium non modo super- 
stitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis Deorum; sed 
etiam religionem, que Deorum cultu pio continetur. © Sec. 
43: Epicurus vero ex animis hominum ewtraxit radicibus 
religionem, quum Diis immortalibus et opem et gratiam sus- 
tulit. Quum enim optimam et prestantissimam naturam Dei 
dicat esse, negat idem esse in Deo gratiam. ‘Tollit id quod 
maxime proprium est optime prestantissimeque nature. 
How well, also, might what follows apply to those sen- 
timental followers of Spinoza, who, rapt in philosophical 
adoration of “the holiness of nature and of the awe of the 
infinite,” do yet, in their high and transcendental spiritual- 
ity, so vehemently condemn the sensual philosophy of Epi- 
curus. At enim liber est Epicurei de sanctitate.. Ludimur ab. 
homine non tam faceto, quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. 
Que enim potest esse sanctitas, si Dit humana non curant ? 


* This word cannot probably be found in any English dictionary, 
and yet nothing seemed so well adapted to the idea we wished to 
express, namely, that species of scientific piety which abounds soa 
much in such modern books as Nichols’s Architecture of the Heav- 
ens, and m the rectures of Dr. Dionysius Lardner. 


RUE DIGNITY OF MAN HIS RELIGIOUS NATURE. 259 


XLIV. 


The True Dignity of Man his Religious Nature. Analysis 
of the Words Σέθας, Kvoébera, &c. 


Pace 53, Line 2. Οὐκοῦν δὴ Taye ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα 
τῆς TE ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ ϑεοσεθέστατον, κ. 
7.4. This is said by way cf magnifying the importance 
of man; although, even when regarded as one of the least 
parts of the universe, he would not, as has been shown, be 
beneath the care of a special providence. ‘Two things are 
said to enhance his dignity. He partakes of an animated 
nature, and he is of all animals the most religious. Com- 
_ pare the Protagoras, 522, A.: ᾿πειδὴ dé ὁ ἄνθρωπος ϑείας 
μετέχει μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ THY τοῦ ϑεοῦ ξυγγένειαν, 
ζώων μόνον ϑεοὺς ἐνόμισε, καὶ ἐπιχεῖρει βωμούς τε ἱδρύεσ- 
θαι καὶ ἀγάλματα ϑεῶν»---.“ And since man shares in the 
divine, he alone, of all animals, through his relationship to 
the Deity, believes in the existence of Gods, and undertakes 
to establish altars in their honour.”” Compare, also, Ovid, 
Metamorph., lib. 1., 70 : 

Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius alte 
Deerat adhuc— 
Pronaque quum spectant animalia cetera terram, 


Os homini sublime dedit, ccelumque tueri 
Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus. 


᾿Ανθρώπινα πράγματα is equivalent here to οἱ ἄνθρωποι ; 
the form of the words being probably affected by the neuter 
ζῶον. For the same reason we have αὐτό instead of αὐτός 
which we should have expected. It is by the attraction of 
ζῶον, understood or implied in ζώων. See remarks on this 
peculiarity of the Greek language, page 203. It is, how. 
ever, to be used here as if connected with ἄνθρωπος : and 
is the same as though we should say in English, the animai 
man itself is the most religions, &c. 


260 TRUE DIGNITY OF MAN HIS RELIGIOUS NATURE. 


The words ϑεοσεθέστατον, ϑεοσέθεια, are etymologically 
formed on the same idea with the Hebrew phrase, ney 
mim, the fear of the Lord, which is the Old ‘Testament 
term for religion or prety. Δεισιδαιμονία contains etymolo. 
gically the same radical conception, but is almost always 
used in a lower and somewhat bad sense, as, for example, 
by Paul, Acts, xvul., 22. It partakes of the degeneracy of 
its component, δαίμων ; and as that became only another 
name for Fortune, so this sinks down into superstition, or 
that fear and worship of Fortune, Destiny, and other ima- 
ginary personifications, which is closely allied to atheism. 
Δεισιδαιμονία is seldom, if ever, taken for the pure and 
reverential fear of God; while, on the other hand, ϑεοσέ- 
θεία, or its equivalent, evoébera, is made the parent of all. 
the other virtues, and the first in the estimation of Heaven. 
Thus Plato speaks of it in the Epinomis, or whoever was 
the author of that dialogue: μεῖζον yap μόριον ἀρετῆς μη- 
᾿ δεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτε πείθῃ τῆς εὐσεθείας TO ϑνητῷ γένει. Epi- 
nomis, 989, Β. ‘To the same effect Sophocles, in the Phi- 
loctetes, 1442: 

Εὐσεθεῖτε πρὸς ϑεούς" 

ὡς τἄλλ᾽ ἅπαντα δεύτερ᾽ ἡγεῖται Πατὴρ 

“εύς. οὐ γὰρ ἠὐσέθεια συνθνήσκει βροτοῖς" 

κἂν ζῶσι, κἂν ϑάνωσιν, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται ; 
or, in other words, all virtues arising out of mere earthly re- 
tations are temporary, and must perish. Piety alone survives 
the grave. The primary root, oé6a¢, signifying wonder, as- 
tonishment, awe, 1s sometimes used for the very Numen or 
Divinity himself, examples of which are frequently to be 
found in Pindar, and A%schylus... The verb.is sometimes 
apparently employed for τιμᾷν, to signify reverence towards 
human magistrates. . This, however, is only a secondary 
sense, and the primary still holds its place in the ancient 
idea that magistrates represented the Divine authority, and 
that judges stood to us in the place of the Elohim. The 


MEN COMPARED TO SHEEP OF THE DIVINE PASTURE. 261 


ultimate radical may be the Hebrew yaw, juravit, and this 
perhaps remotely connected in meaning with yaw, the sa- 
cred number seven. 


Ea 


Men compared to Sheep of the Divine Pasture. Language 
of Plato on this Subject in Harmony with the Scriptures. 


Pace 53, Line 6. Θεῶν ye μὴν κτήμωτά φαμεν εἷναι, kK. 
τ. Δ. This comparison is quite a favourite with Plato. 
Thus Socrates says in the Phedon, 62, B.: ᾿Αλλᾶ τόδε 
γέ μοι δοκεῖ eb λέγεσθαι τὸ ϑεοὺς εἷναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμε- 
Aovpéevove, καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἕν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς 
ϑεοῖς eivatc—'lhis seems to me to be well said, that the 
Gods are our keepers, and that we are among their flocks 
or possessions ;” from which he deduces an admirable ar- 
gument against the lawfulness of suicide. It is worthy of 
note, too, that this is evidently referred to as a saying which 
had come down from the olden time; and in this light it 
furnishes a pleasing evidence of the piety and sound reli- 
gious philosophy of the primitive or patriarchal ages. The 
same comparison may be found in Plato’s romance of At- 
lantis, where he speaks of the care which the Gods took of 
the inhabitants of that blessed isle, and in which he repre- 
sents them as forming a perfect theocracy : καὶ κατοικίσαν- 
τες οἷον νομεῖς κτήματα Kal ποίμνια καὶ ϑρέμματα ἑαυτῶν 
ἡμᾶς ἔτρεφον. Critias, 109, Ὁ. Compare the present trea- 
tise, page 69, line 2: ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν Yeot te Gua καὶ 
δαίμονες - ἡμεῖς δ᾽ αὖ κτήματα Sedv Kai δαιμόνων---" The 
Gods and Genii are our helpers, for we are the flocks or 
possessions of the Gods and guardian divinities.” 

Whatever may have been the origin of the sentiment and 
of the expression, it is, with the exception of the use of the 
plural Gedy, not only purely Scriptural in its conception, 


262 PECULIARITY OF NEGATIVE FORMS OF GREEK VERBS, 


but also in the very language. For proof of this, compare 
Psalm ο., 8: For we are his people and the sheep of his pas- 
ture. He hath made us, and his are we; as the Hebrew, 
nis 1% in accordance with the Keri, should be translated. 
He will feed his flock like a shepherd. Isaiah, xl.,11. From 
this ancient idea of the resemblance which the Divine ag 
well as kingly authority bore to the pastoral relation, came 
the noun ποιμήν, in that frequent Homeric meaning of rule 
or shepherd of the people— 

᾿Αγαμέμνονα ποιμένα Aa@v— 
as also the verb ποιμαίνω, in that sense of ruling which we 
find in the Septuagint version of Psalm 11., 9; Matthew, ii., 
G: ev, 11. 24. Vile Ley Sly ee cee 


XLVI. 
Peculiarity of certain Negative Forms of Greek Verbs. 


Pace 55, Lines 1,2. ᾿Επιμελουμένῳ.... ἀμελοῦντι. Why 
does the positive, in this word, take the middle or deponent, 
and the negative or privative the active voice? It may be 
difficult to explain the philosophy of this and of maay other 
matters in the Greek, yet we would simply advert to the 
fact, that this is the case with avery large number of verbs ; 
and even to such an extent as to entitle it to be justly re- 
garded as one of the peculiarities, or well-settled idioms of 
the language. Indeed, we seldom, if ever, find a word 
strictly negative or privative of the middie form. The ac- 
tive form of the privative, it is true, sometimes slightly va- 
ries from what would be the analogical active of the middie 
or deponent positive in use; yet still, not to such a degree 
as to affect the principle to which we have adverted. ‘The 
former is generally in ὦ pure, while the middle or deponent 
may be in owat; and sometimes the latter is compounded 
with a preposition, while the former has only the simple 


PECULIARITY OF NEGATIVE FORMS OF GREEK VERBS. 263 


radical. Sometimes the positive is strictly deponent, while 
in other cases it has an active voice in use; but even then 
the privative form in w is the privative, not of the active, 
but of the middle; as, for example, πείθω, to persuade ; 
πείθομαι, to obey or trust ; ἀπειθέω, to be disobedient. 

In illustration of this peculiarity, we may mention, as 
some of the most usual cases, although by no means the 
whole, πείθομαι, to obey, ἀπειθέω (not ἀπείθομαι), to be 
disobedient ; ἥδομαι, to be glad, andéw, to feel disgust, or 
displeasure ; ϑυμέομαι ἐνθυμέομαι, to be angry, or under 
mental excitement, ἀθυμέω, to be without spirit, or discour- 
aged; Kjdopwat, to be concerned about anything, ἀκηδέω, to 
be careless or unconcerned ; κοσμέω, to put in order, to regu- 
late, Koopéowat, to Keep one’s self in order, or to act ina 
comely manner, Gkoowew, the negative, not of the active, 
but of the middle or passive, namely, to be without order, or 
to act in a licentious or disorderly manner; ἔλπω, to raise 
hopes, ἔλπομαι, to hope, ἀέλπω, or ἀελπτέω, to despair ; 
μέλομαι, or μελέομαι, ἐπιμελέομαι, to take care of, or be con- 
cerned for, ἀμελέω, to neglect ; μηχανάομαι, or μηχανέομαι, 
to plan, to invent, ἀμηχανέω, to be without plans, to be at a 
loss; βούλομαι, to be willing, ἀθουλέω, to be uinwilling, or 
refuse—although this word has oftener, perhaps, the sense 
of inconsiderateness, or want of reflection, as though it were 
the privative of βουλεύω---τρομέομαι, to tremble, ἀτρομέω, 
or ἀτρεμέω, to be undisturbed ; φείδομαι, to spare, ἀφειδέω, 
to be lavish, or prodigal. Compare, also, yapiGouat, aya- 
proréw—revoomal, ἀψευδέω, ἀψευστέω---δύναμαι, ἀδυνα 
τέω---σέθομαι, ἀσεθέω, ἄτα. 

It may be observed, that in most of these cases the form 
with ὦ privative is not the direct negative either of the ac- 
tive or the middle; that is, is not simply the denial of a re. 
flex action, but expresses rather a negative state of mind. 
As, for example, ἀπειθεῖν, besides being wholly different 
from μὴ πείθειν, is not even equivalent to μὴ πείθεσθαι, to 


264 GREAT THINGS CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT SMALL. 


which it seems to have the nearest alliance, but expresses 
rather that positive condition of the soul from which all acts 
of disobedience do proceed. So, also, in the passage from 
the text, ἀμελεῖν is not the same as μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, but 
rather expresses that sluggish, indifferent, careless disposi- 
‘ion, which is so utterly opposed to all right views of the 
Divine nature. M7) ἐπιμελεῖσθαι may or may not involve 
criminality, as may be seen from the manner in which it is 
used page 50, lines 8, 10. It may result from want of pow- 
er, or a variety of other justifying reasons. ᾿Αμελεῖν al- 
ways implies fault, and is always to be taken in an unfa- 
vourable sense. So, also, μὴ πείθεσθαι, or μὴ πιστεύειν, 
may be consistent with freedom from all blame, according 
to the presence or absence of other circumstances ; but. 
ἀπειθεῖν must always be associated with condemnation, as 
implying an unbelieving and guilty condition of the soul. 
This is the force of the word as used by our Saviour, John, 
lii., 836: ὁ δὲ ἀπειθῶν οὐχ ὄψεται Gohv—The unbelieving 
shall never see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him. 

For these reasons, perhaps, these verbs fell into an in- 
transitive sense, leaving the denial of the action of the pos- 
itive form to be expressed by the negative particles. And 
perhaps,also, because they differ somewhat from the mere 
negation of the reflex action of the middle, they retain, for 
distinction’s sake, the active form; although, at first view, 
such privative words would seem, of all others, the most 
foreign to the ordinary use of that voice. 


XLVII. 


Great Things cannot Exist without Small. Application of 
the Maxim to the Doctrine of a Special Providence, Edu- 
cation, and to Politics. 

Pace 55, Line 5. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κυθερνήταις, οὐδὲ oTpa- 
τηγοῖς οὐδ᾽ αὖ πολιτικοῖς χωρὶς TOY σμικρῶν μενάλα. οὐδὲ 


GREAT THINGS CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT SMALL. 265 


yap ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους 
εὖ κεῖσθαι---“ Neither to pilots, nor to commanders, nor to 
political men, can great things exist without small things ; 
for, as the stone-masons say, neither do large stones lie 
well together in a structure without the small.” ‘This max- 
im is capable of the widest range. It is not only applica- 
ble to stone-masons, and politicians, and to the sublime ar- 
gument of Plato here in favour of a special providence, but 
is also of the highest importance in respect to education, 
and well worthy the attention of all teachers of youth. For 
want of a patient and laborious care in respect to what may 
seem the more minute elements of science, a structure is 
often erected without cohesion or symmetry, and destined. 
through the looseness of its parts, to fall to pieces almost 
as soon as completed. 

As Plato applies the maxim here to politicians, so, also, 
Aristotle, in his Po/itica, lib. 11., 2, institutes a similar com- 
parison in respect to government, and shows that it is es- 
sential to the very constitution of a sound and healthy state 
that its individual elements should be small things mingled 
with great, in such a way as to give coherence and sym- 
pathy to the whole. In pursuance of this same idea, he 
condemns those theorists who, even in his day, advocated 
the impracticable doctrine of perfect equality, and charges 
them with being the greatest enemies to that very idea of 
unity which they would be thought so zealously to main- 
tain. The levelling dogma, he admits, is plausible, and ap- 
parently most philanthropic—evrpdownoc¢ καὶ φιλάνθρωπος 
ἂν εἵναι dogevev—but, in the end, instead of being produc- 
tive of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, it is 
fraught with the seeds of all evil both to individuals and to 
the state. As unity implies plurality and variety, so, he de- 
clares, there can be no true unity in sameness. There can 
be no binding sympathy except in a community of higher 
and lower, lesser and greater interests. As well might one 


4s 


966 GREAT THINGS CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT SMALL. 


attempt to construct a wall with round, smooth pebbles, all 
of the same size and fashion, or produce harmony from 
strings all of the same length and tension; which, as he 
justly remarks, might furnish an insipid homophony, but 
never a true symphony: ὥσπερ κἂν εἴ τις THY συμφωνίαν 
ποιήσειεν ὁμοφωνίαν, ἢ TOV ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν. Politica, 
ΠΡ 
‘There is a singular passage in the Ajax of Sophocles, in 
which we think there is had in view this same comparison 
of great and little stones, although the word is not expressly 
mentioned in the Greek. He also applies it, in the same 
manner, to those wild and disorganizing doctrifies of gov- 
ernment, which would destroy all confidence and all mutual 
support, by exciting an unholy jealousy between the rich 
and the poor. ‘The passage is interesting, if for no other 
purpose, to show how precisely the same, in temper and in 
areument, have been the demagogues of all ages: 
Πρὸς yap τὸν ἔχονθ᾽ ὁ φθόνος ἕρπει. 
καίτοι σμικροὶ μεγάλων χωρὶς 
σφαλερὸν πύργου ῥῦμα πέλονται. 
μετὰ γὰρ μεγάλων βαιὸς ἄριστ᾽ ἄν, 
καὶ μέγας ὀρθοῖθ᾽ ὑπὸ μικροτέρων. 
"AAW οὐ δυνατὸν τοὺς ἀνοήτους 
τούτων γνώμας προδιδάσκειν.---- Ajax, 151. — 
Which we would thus attempt to render, by way of improve- 
ment on Potter’s version, in which, we think, he has over- 
looked the implied simile, and thus failed to bring out its 
principal beauty : 
Thus envy secretly assails the rich. 
And yet small stones, unmingled with the great, 
Build up a dangerous tower—a frail defence. 
The high and low in mutual sympathy 
Sustain each other; yet this truth is one 
Which fools can never learn. 


No one, we think, can fail to admire the still higher and 
yet most just application which Plato makes of this striking 


GENTLENESS OF PLATOS MODE OF ARGUMENT. 267 


comparison to the government of the Divine Architect, and 
to the doctrine of a special providence. 


XLVIII. 


Gentleness of Plato’s Mode of Argument, and its Peculiar 
Adaptation to the Minds of the Young. 3 


Pace 57, Line 2. Τῷ ye βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, κ. τ. λ. 
The propriety of this word will best appear in a paraphrase 
of the spirit of the whole passage. . It suggests some such 
train of thought as this: ‘‘ We have now addressed his rea- 
son, and by a summary yet conclusive syllogism, forcibly, 
as it were, compelled him to admit the incorrectness of his 
positions. Still, although his reason is silenced, his feel- 
ings or imagination may yet refuse to surrender, and may 
revolt at the idea that the Deity is concerned in all the ap- 
parently trivial and minute operations of the universe. 
There seems, therefore, in addition, to be need of some 
soothing charms (ἐπῳδῶν), some gentle persuasions, to 
overcome those prejudices or distastes which will not 
yield to reason.” 

"Eraderv (ἐπῳδὴ), with its derivatives, is a favourite 
word with Plato. What a sublime beauty does it possess 
in the Phedon, where Socrates, after having gone through 
the strongest and most recondite arguments that reason 
could array for a future life, makes, as his ground of con- 
fidence, the cheering hope which the belief produces in 
the soul, and those sweet persuasions of a moral kind, 
which surpass in power all the deductions of the intellect ; 
‘for noble is the prize (he says), and great the hope”—xa- 
λὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον Kai ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη. And then, after 
having gone through the mythical representations of the 
unseen world, he tells us that the soul must ever chant 
these to itself as some soothing incantation (τοιαῦτα χρὴ 


268 PHYSICAL EVENTS CONTROLLED BY SPIRITUAL AGENTS. 


ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ, Phed., 114, D.), and like the dying 
swan, to which, in another part of this dialogue, he com- 
pares himself, sing this song of immortality more sweetly 
and more clearly the nearer it approaches that period which 
is to test the great question forever. 

Nothing can be more admirable than the tender care 
which, throughout this discussion, the Athenian is made to 
exercise towards his supposed youthful disputant. The 
philosopher knew that very often little direct influence of 
a moral kind was produced by means of dialectical argu- 
ment, however excellent it might be as preparatory to the 
application of other remedies. He knew that, even where 
it silenced, it not unfrequently hardened the vanquished 
disputant to a more tenacious hold upon former prejudices. 
He therefore, in what succeeds, endeavours to make him 
feel that this is no matter of mere speculation, like any mere 
scientific theorem, but that he has a deep personal interest 
in the great arrangements of Providence, and to impress 
him with the fact, that as a part (although a very small one) 
of an immense whole, the importance and dignity of his own 
position, instead of being diminished, is magnified by this 
very circumstance. See remarks, notes 11 and 12, page 11; 
also, explanation of the word δυσχεραίνειν, note 3, page 8. 


΄ 


ΧΙΙΧ. 


The Machinery of Physical Events controlled by Invisible 
Spiritual Agencies. The Doctrine of Plato and of the 
Bible. 


Pace 57, Line 12. “Apyoyte¢ προστεταγμένοι. The 
form and gender of the word ἄρχοντες will not permit us 
to regard it as referring to any inanimate influences. It 
can only mean beings of a higher order than man, to whom 
the lower parts of the universal administration were thought 


PHYSICAL EVENTS CONTROLLED BY SPIRITUAL AGENTS. 269 


to be committed. ‘This doctrine, somewhat modified, we 
believe to be taught in the Holy Scriptures, without suppo- 
sing that the Jewish writers, any more than Plato, did not 
firmly hold to that regular and orderly succession of events 
and phenomena which we style the laws of nature. ‘They 
manifestly believed in a connexion of cause and effect, ex- 
tending in a chain from the throne of God to the minutest 
operations of the visible world ;* and yet all along dewn 
this golden chain of celestial influences, and in all its vibra- 
tions throughout its immense extent, they constantly recog- 
nised the control and guidance of supernatural or angelic 
beings. 

Besides revealing the doctrine, the Scriptures sometimes, 
as matters of historical fact, draw aside the veil from the 
invisible world, and lay open to us this constant supernatu- 
ral agency ; as in the account of the angel who descended 


* We find this idea in Hosea, ii., 23, which is commonly thus ren- 
dered: And τὲ shall come to pass in that day, Iwill hear, saith the Lord, 
LI will hear the heavens; and the heavens shall hear the earth, and the 
earth shall hear the corn, and the wine, and the oil; and they shall hear 
Jezreel. The word 13), here used, means, in its primary sense, ἐδ 
sing. Hence, secondly, to pronounce with a measured and solemn 
voice ; thirdly, to respond ; fourthly, to hear ; having, however, no ref- 
erence to the auricular sensation, which is expressed by another 
word. It resembles the Greek μέλπω, μέλπομαι, or, rather, ἀμείθο- 
pat, and conveys the idea of responsive or choral singing. Hence 
the passage would be more literally, and at the same time more ex- 
pressively, rendered thus: And it shall come to pass in that day, I 
will sing, saith the Lord, I will sing to the heavens ; and the heavens 
shall sing (or respond) to the earth; and the earth shall respond to the 
corn, and the wine, and the oil ; and they shall respond to Jezreel. There 
seems here a reference to that doctrine of the choral harmony of 
nature, with which the ancient mind was so filled; as though the 
touching a chord in heaven, when the great Coryphzus or leader of 
the universal orchestra gives the starting tone, sounds and vibrates 
down through all the compass of the notes, until it makes its closing 
cadence in the end designed to be accomplished. 


Z 2 


270 PHYSICAL EVENTS CONTROLLED BY SPIRITUAL AGENTS. 


into the pool of Bethesda, or of the destroying-angel that 
appeared with a drawn sword standing over the devoted 
city of Jerusalem, 2d Samuel, xxiv., 16, 17. In this latter 
instance, there is no intimation that it differed in any way 
from the ordinary method by which God sends pestilence 
upon the earth, except that here the curtain is withdrawn 
and the supernatural machinery disclosed. No doubt, sec- 
ond causes were here also at work, and the philosopher of 
that day, had there been any such to investigate the ante- 
cedents and consequents connected with the event, might 
have bid the Jew ἊΝ 
Take heart and banish fear ; 

yet still, all this would not change the fact, so clearly re 
vealed, that behind them all, however far they may have 
extended beyond the utmost bounds of scientific research, 
there stood the spiritual power of God, and his delegated 
minister, directing them, without any violation of their vs- 
ible order, to the production of the decreed result. Let 
science cease her babble. We all know, the most igno- 
rant as well as the most learned, that second causes are 
employed in these visitations. ‘The writers of the Bible 
were no more ignorant of this, as a general principle, than 
our most scientific savans, although they may have known 
less of the steps of the process in its minute details. Even 
here we surpass them only in having traced a few more 
links in a chain, in which what is yet unknown sinks all 
differences of the known into insignificance. These links, 
in the series of natural sequences, may reach back to any 
«xtent short of the infinite, and yet leave on the other shore 
room enough for the supernatural, in perfect consistency 
with them. We have, therefore, no reason at all for infer- 
ring that the Scriptures meant to represent this as a mirac- 
ulous intervention. In every case of pestilence, they would 
have us believe that the destroying angel is abroad in the 
air, but in this one, for special reasons, the eye of man was 


PHYSICAL EVENTS CONTROLLED BY SPIRITUAL AGENTS. 271 


permitted to behold him.* He maketh his angels winds, his 
ministers a fiery flame, as the inspired Apostle renders it, 
Heb., i., 17; ax.d not, as it would be explained by the ra- 
tionalizing interpreter, he maketh the winds his messengers, 
and the flaming fire his servants. 'The angels of the Lord 
are ever encamped round about the righteous, although we 
have but one example in the Bible of the glorious vision 
being revealed to mortal eyes. See 2 Kings, vi., 17. 

The great objection to this view, as it would present 
itself to some minds, would spring from the prejudice to 
which Plato alludes in the Epinomis, 982, D., E.., and on 
which we have remarked, pages 226, 227. Men are so 
much inclined to associate undeviating regularity and con- 
stancy in physical motions with a nature implying the ab- 
sence of a special will and reason; as though an animated 
personal agency must necessarily be sometimes freaky and 
capricious in its operations as evidences of the exercise of 
a personal volition. One answer to such an objection is 
furnished at once by maintaining that all such intermediate 
spiritual powers are under the constant control of the Su- 
preme Will and Reason, producing the regularity of natural 
sequence, not as though it needed such sequences at all as 
indispensable helps to itself, but for our sakes, that by means 
of them, as signs, we might be able to exercise faith in the 
general constancy of the Divine operations, and regulate our 
own conduct in accordance with it. When, however, this 
feeling becomes practical atheism, prevailing to any great 
extent among mankind, we have reason to believe that God" 
will come forth, as Plato says in the Politicus, from his re- 
tired place of observation, break up the long repose of nat- 


* There are also in the Bible intimations that evil supernatural 
agents, under the dominion of the Prince of the Powers of the Air, 
‘are sometimes permitted to exercise a physical influence in the af- 
fairs of our globe, and thus to afflict men with disease both of mind 
and body. See Luke, xiii, 16; Job, i., 12; il., 6, 7. 


272 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 


ural laws, and again astonish the world, as in the early 
times, by displays of super-natural power. 

Nemesius, in his treatise on the Nature of Man, alluding 
to Plato’s doctrine of providence, describes it as recogni- 
sing three divisions. ‘The first province is assigned directly, 
or without media, to the Deity himself, or, as he styles him, 
the first God. ‘This has respect to the world of ideas, and 
the general care of the universe as ἃ whole—mponyovpévwe 
μὲν τῶν ἰδεῶν ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμπαντος τοῦ καθόλου κόσμου. 
The second department is given in charge of the second or 
inferior divinities, and has relation to those things which 
are said to be under the law of generation and corruption— 
πάντων τῶν EV γενέσει Kal φθορᾷ----ΟΥ, in other words, or- 
dinary physical events. ‘The third relates to the conduc‘ 
of life, and to the distribution. of what he styles organic 
good and evil. Nemesius, De Nat. Hom., p. 345. We 
know not in what part of Plato’s dialogues authority can be 
found for this precise division, as Nemesius states it, al- 
though for the second some warrant may be discovered in 
the passage which has furnished the ground of this excur- 
sus. For farther information on the ancient views in re- 
spect to a special providence, we may consult Cicero, De 
Leg., ii., 7; Plutarch., De Fato, 572, E.; Eusebius, Prep 
Evang., 630. 


L. 
The Ancient Maxim, De Nthilo Nihil 


Piccss 58, Line 2. ὡς γένεσις. ἕνεκα. ἐκείνου γίγνεται 
πᾶσα ὅπως, κ. τ. λ.---ἰς That all generation, or every gener- 
ation, takes place for this purpose, and in such a way,” 
é&c. This argument would be better accommodated to mod. 
ern ideas, and, at the same time, lose none of its force or 
intended meaning in this place, by rendering γένεσις cre 


THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 273 


ation. According to the view we have taken of this word, 
page 187, it would always signify the bringing into being 
of what did not exist before, so far as the law or idea was 
concerned; as when from a different disposition of the 
same matter an entirely new substance is produced—nitric 
acid, for example, from what before was atmospheric air. 
Here there is the creation of a new being, although not of 
any new matter. It would not, however, be quite fair to 
regard it, in this way, as synonymous with our phrase, cre- 
atton out of nothing. ‘The word γένεσις, it is true, does 
generally imply, in Greek writers, a production in some 
way out of something pre-existent ; and yet this something 
is not necessarily, or 6 vi terminorum, to be regarded as pre- 
existent mailer. Many held to a metaphysical phantom 
which they styled hyle (ὕλη), and which the more spiritual 
philosophers may have adopted to save their favourite max- 
im, de nihilo nihil. From some such idea as this the Sep- 
tuagint gave the name Τέγνεσις to that book which treats of 
the generations of the heavens and the earth; and in this 
they had some countenance from the Hebrew word ni3)in- 
Gen., ii., 4. Thus, also, they render the Hebrew substan- 
tive verb "7°, in the account of the origin of light (Gen., i 
3), not ἔστω φῶς, but Selden φῶς. In the same aay, 
Psalm xc., 2---πρὸ τοῦ ὄρη yevnO7jvar—although, in this 
case, it is no more than a faithful rendering of the Hebrew 
172"; a word of precisely similar paral eres successive 
23m) Υ 72inm1—before the mountains were embed and 
the earth was born or brought forth. In this way do the 
Scriptures, both Greek and Hebrew, speak of the formation 
of the present as or of what may be styled the Mosaic 
creation. 

In regard, however, to that originating act which took 
place in the beginning, mentioned Gen., i., 1, a different 
language is employed in many parts of the Bible. It is 


274 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 


represented as proceeding from a word or fiat—a calling of 
something from a state of non-existence both in respect to 
matter and form—as Romans, iv., 17: καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ 
ὄντα ὡς ὄντα; where there seems to be areference to Isa- 
lah, xlviu., 14—19M sty? =a ἊΝ syp—My hand hath 
founded the earth, and my right hand hath spanned the heav- 
ens ; when I called to them they stood up. So, also, Isaiah, 
xli., 4—wxip nisin x7p—who called the generations from 
the beginning. ‘To such passages we may trace the similar 
language of Philo, De Creat., 728: τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐκάλεσεν 
εἰς τὸ εἷναι. Notwithstanding the clear declarations of the 
Bible, the Greek ideas of origination, connected with the 
words γένεσις and ἐγένετο, maintained their ground for 
some time, and continued to affect the expressions, if not 
the intended meaning, of some of the earliest fathers. Even 
the Jewish Philo, at times, uses language which seems to 
imply the eternity of matter, if not of the organized world. 
As when he gives us this account of what he styles the 
philosophy of Moses, in his treatise De Mundi Opificio, page 
2, B.: “Moses, who had attained the highest summit of 
philosophy, knew that it was most necessary (ἀναγκαιότα- 
Tov) that in existing things (ἐν τοῖς οὖσι) there should be, 
on the one hand, the efficient (δραστήριον), namely, the 
universal mind, most pure and unmixed with anything else, 
and, on the other hand, something inert, passive, or passible, 
destitute of soul and motion (ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον), which 
when moved, endowed with form, and animated by the mind 
aforesaid, should be converted into this most perfect work, 
the world.” Although in this very argument he is dispu- 
ting against the eternity of the world, yet he seems to re- 
gard the ultimate element of matter as one of the two ne. 
cessary existences, almost as much so as mind itself; and 
his language greatly resembles that in which Cicero de- 
scribes the doctrine of one of the ancient schools: De nat- 
ura autem ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in res duas: ut 


* 
THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 255 


altera esset-efliciens,-altera autem quasi huic se prebens, 
eaque efliceretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse 
censebant: in eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quam- 
dam: in utroque tamen utrumque. Neque enim materiam 
ipsam coherere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque 
VIM SINE ALIQUA MATERIA. Cic., Acad. Post., 6. 
In other places, however, he contends clearly and strongly . 
that even the hyle, or unformed principle of matter itself, had 
been created in the beginning by the direct act of God. 

In general, the Christian fathers, with some wavering 
arising from the systems of philosophy in which they had 
been first instructed, assert pretty clearly an absolute cre- 
ation from a state in which there was no pre-existent mat- 
ter (which we prefer to the expression, out of nothing) ; al- 
though, in stating the Scriptural doctrine, they often use lan- 
guage which was more congenial with the opposite system. 
The words γένεσις and γενητόν were employed for cre- 
ation, and ἀγένητον was used as synonymous with ἄκτισ- 
tov. In consequence, however, of discussions growing out 
of the Nicene controversy, and the doctrine of the eternal 
generation of The Son, they made a distinction between 
γενητός and γεννητός, and ἀγένητος and ἀγέννητος, which 
is far from being so evident in classical Greek as in the Pa- 
tristic writings. Christ, they said, was γεννητός, but not 
γενητός ; or, in other words, he was ἀγένητος and ἄκτιστος, 
but not ὠγεννητός. So, also, the first progenitor of any or- 
ganized species was ἀγέννητος, although nothing was ayé- 
γητος which was. beneath the Divine hypostases. Vide 
Cyril. Alewand., De Sancta Trinit., 8, page 37. 

The Greek philosophers. have been, almost all of them, - 
charged with teaching the eternity of matter, and of having 
been universally agreed in the tenet, that nothing could be 
created or generated out of nothing, or, as it is expressed 
by Lucretius, 


De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti. 


ΕΣ 
276 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 


No duubt this was the doctrine of many, if not®ost of them, 
even in the modern acceptation of the terms; that is, they 
believed in no creation or generation except from pre-exist- 
ent matter with all the properties of matter as it now exists ; 
or, in other words, the visible material universe was eter- 
nal, whatever changes or modifications it might in the lapse 
of ages have undergone. It was thus held by the Ionic 
school in all its branches, by some of the Italian, and by 
all who were atheistically inclined. It was also maintain- 
ed, however inconsistently, by some who were undoubted 
theists, as by Plutarch, and a few others who have been 
styled Platonists. 

We cannot, however, charge any of them with these 
consequences simply from the language of the maxim, as it 
zuay be taken in different senses; in some of which it is 
not only consistent with the purest theism, but absolutely 
essential to its proper explanation and defence. It is by no 
means clear that the eternity of matter was ever held by 
Plato; and, although some things in the ‘Timeus may look 
that way when only partially considered, yet are they all 
capable of a consistent interpretation on a different hypoth- 
esis. His doctrine of the inherent evil of matter does not 
at all, by any necessity, involve its eternity. It was not 
connected with any necessary ewislence of matter, but with 
certain necessary properties which it must possess if cre- 
ated—without which it could not be matter, and without 
which God could not cause it to exist. Vide remarks on 
the Platonic doctrine of ἀνάγκη, pages 217, 218. In The 
Laws, as we have seen, his evil principle is spiritual, and 
has, therefore, nothing to do with the dogma against which 
we are defending him. Even if he had held it, it would 
not have been a heresy fatal to his claim to be regarded as 
a pure theist, although an inconsistent one; and the cir- 
cumstances in which he was placed would have presented 
the same palliation as we have offered for his doctrine of 


THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. PAT is | 


evil. But, indeed, we know of no system of philosophy to 
which the tenet in question, in this gross form, would have 
been more foreign. ΤῸ have allowed any necessary self- 
existence to matter would have been directly in the face of 
some of his most favourite notions, and especially opposed 
to that grand division in the Timeus, in which, under the 
general name τὸ ὁρατόν, it is expressly excluded from the 
class of the τῶν ὄντως ὄντων, and assigned to that of the 
γιγνομένων καὶ οὐδέποτε ὄντως ὄντων. Vide page 172, 
and the remarks on the distinction between the verbs εἰμί 
and γίγνομαι. Nothing can be more express than the dec- 
laration that matter—not as organized, but in the most ex. 
treme or lowest state in which it can be matter, or, as he 
defines it in the most general terms, the tangible, the visi- 
ble, the extended—belongs to the class of generated, in dis. 
tinction from eternal existences: ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἁπτός τε καὶ 
σῶμα ἔχων γιγνόμενος καὶ γενητὸς ἐφάνη. Tim., 28. And 
when we connect this with another proposition in the same 
passage—mrav δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ᾽ αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης yiyveobar—* that everything which is γιγνόμενον 
must have been produced by some cause”—it seems impos- 
sible any longer to maintain that Plato regarded matter in 
any state as belonging to the world of necessary entities ; and 
if not necessary, then not eternal in its nature ; for he ever 
uses the two terms as mutually implying one another. It 
would also be in opposition to that high and even hyper- 
spirituality which runs through all his writings, and which 
would warrant us in giving to them collectively, as their 
compendious title, “ The SOUL, its elernal nature ; its infi- 
nite value ; its superior antiquily to matter ; the immense pre- 
eminence of incorporeal when compared with corporeal sub- 
stances, and the utler worthlessness of the whole material unt- 
verse in itself, or when not viewed as subservient to the higher 
wants of the spirit.” 

It is true that, in conformity with this ancient maxim, 

AA 


278 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 


De nihilo nihiti—we οὐ δύναται οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γε- 
véo0at—which, as it stands in the Greek, unmarred by any 
attempt to transfer it to a more imperfect language, is one 
of the clearest axioms of reason—he held to an elementary 
principle, or ἀρχῆ, more ancient than matter, even in its 
lowest organized state, and which he and others styled hyle 
(ὕλη). Although he sometimes seems to use this term in 
the sense of material or source, yet he could not have meant 
by it matter itself as something solid, extended, or resisting, 
since he expressly denies to it any of these properties, or, 
indeed, any connexion in itself with the sensible world; 
regarding it, in fact, as belonging to the νοητά, rather than, 
in any sense, to the αἰσθητά. No sublimation or refine- 
ment of the conception of resisting substance, even when 
carried to its most ethereal limits—not even the nebular 
star dust™ or rudimentary fluid of the universe, which some 
modern writers find so convenient an aid in the construc- 
tion of planetary systems—-made the least approach to it ; 
for it was not a mere difference of degree, but a metaphys- 
ical entity altogether distinct. It is very difficult to under- 
stand precisely what idea Plato and other Greek philoso- 
phers attached to this elementary hyle, without form, exten- 


* This is a favourite term with those scientific men who are ever 
talking about the progression of the universe from the lower to the 
higher, from the imperfect to the more perfect, from the unorgani- 
zed to the organized, and, as they ought to say if they would consist- 
ently follow out their theory, from matter to mind, and, finally, to a 
God. But, on another hypothesis of occasional retrogradations 
(which no one who considers the vast extent of the universe can 
deny to be possible, probable, and in perfect consistency with some 
unfathomable designs of its Eternal Author), the peculiar celestial 
appearances indicated. by this phrase may be, in fact, the floating 
remains of worlds going out, and in the last stages of their approach 
to inanity. We are too much in the condition of the fly on the Pyr- 
amids, to determine with any satisfaction, unless we resort to rea- 
sons drawn from revelation, which theory is correct, or whether we 
are physically nearer our descending or ascending node. 


THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 279 


sion, parts, or divisibility. Some apy7 or principle seems 
to have been in his ‘mind as the origin of matter, which 
was not matter; and yet something separate from the Deity, 
and existing with him before the formation of the outward 
material universe.* We are confident, for the reasons as- 
signed, that he did not hold to its necessary eternity, but it 
is not easy to determine whether he regarded it as an em- 
anation, a generation, or a creation, In the more modern 
sense of the word. Whether it was merely space regarded 
as an ἀρχῆ, or first principle, like the ἄπειρον, or infinite of 
Anaximander; or something similar to the unextended 
points in the modern theory of Boscovitch ; whether it was 
the manifestation of the Divine power in space, so that vis- 
ible outward matter would be only those impressions upon 
soul, of resistance, figure, &c., which are the result of the 
action of the Divine immaterial principle—a theory which, 
although ridiculed as Berkleian and absurd, gives us all the 
results or properties of matter, which is matter enough for 
all substantial purposes, while yet it leaves spirit, in reality, 
the only ovoia, or essence in the universe—or whatever 
else we may suppose, it is certain that Plato did not teach 
the necessary self-existence of matter according to the 
common idea, that is, as a substance composed of solid, ex- 
tended parts or particles, whether regarded as existing in 
an organized or a chaotic state. 

The axiom De nihilo nthil, or others similar to it, may be 
found in his writings and those of Aristotle. They both 
regarded it as a self-evident truth ; and the latter, in the first 
book of his Physics, c. 4, asserts that it was the common 

* In the passage of the Timzus which we have cited page 123, he 
uses Janguage which seems to describe it as the matter or material 
from which matter was formed, yet still without any of its sensibie 
properties. He also styles it there the mother of the sensible world, 
as though it were the passive or negative principle, while God was 


the father, or positive povver, which produced its manifestations in 
time and space. 


᾿ . 


280  #THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 


opinion of all the ancient naturalists, that nothing could come 
into being from that which was ποί--- κοινὴ δόξα τῶν φυσι- 
κῶν, ὡς οὐ TITNOMENOY οὐδενὸς ἐκ tov μὴ ὌΝΤΟΣ. 
This is capable, it 15 true, of being taken in the atheistic 
or materializing sense by those who lay no emphasis on 
the contrast between the two substantive verbs, or who re- 
gard the latter, in this expression, as significant of the ma- 
terial, or of the terminus a quo. If, however, we keep in 
mind the radical distinction between εἰμί and γίγνομαι, as 
explained page 171, and which is generally maintained by 
Plato in all important propositions, we shall find this sen- 
tence divested at once of all objectionable features, and 
presented, as it really is, as one of the clearest dictates of 
reason. ‘This language may be, and has been, used by the 
atheist ; but it is capable of being employed with far more 
power against him. Aristotle gives us the key to this high 
er sense in another place, where he says, with his usual 
conciseness, ὥστε ἔσται πρὶν yevéoOar—that essential or 
necessary being must be before generation; or, in other 
words, that there must be a being before a becoming. Vide 
Arist., Phys. Ausc.,1.,9. ‘The position, thus understood, 
is that which forms the very soul of Plato’s philosophy, 
namely, the superior rank and antiquity of Incorporeal sub- 
stance in respect to all derived or generated things. It is 
the very position which he so strongly maintains in this 
tenth book of ‘The Laws, to wit, “‘that soul (in its largest 
sense, and including the Divine Soul, as the source from 
whence all other spirits proceed, and in which they may 
be said to pre-exist) must, of necessity, have existed eter- 
nally, or that mind is necessarily older than matter.” In- 
stead of being favourable to atheism, it is, when thus held, 
the grand conservative principle which ever stands in di- 
rect opposition to it. ‘The English fails properly to express 
the axiom, in this sense, from the want of two words ex- 
actly corresponding to εἰμί and γίγνομαι ; and when care- 


° » 


HE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 281 


lessly rendered it seems to favour the eternal existence of 
matter. ‘The Latin has the same defect; and hence the 
atheistic perversion by Lucretius to a purpose so different 
from that intended by Plato and the Grecian theists. This 
a1ises from referring the term ὄντος, as well as γιγνομένου, 
to generated and phenomenal being, to which, when used 
in this higher sense, and especially when placed in such 
direct antithesis, it has no application ; and we are thus led 
into the mistake that all the ancient philosophers taught 
that matter could only proceed from pre-existent matter. 
The idea conveyed by the proposition, οὐδὲν ἐκ Tov μὴ 
ὄντος γενέσθαι, or, if the positive form is preferred, πάντα 
Ex τοῦ ὄντος γενέσθαι, may be shown to be very similar to 
that of the Apostle, Hebrews, xi.,3: By faith we understand 
that the worlds were made by the Word of God, so that the 
things that are seen were not made (γεγονέναι) from things 
which do appear, ἐς φαινομένων. There is another reading 
given by Griesbach, namely, ἐκ μὴ φαινομένων ; on what 
authority, however, we know not. ‘This would change the 
sentence to the positive form, and bring it nearer to the 
Greek maxim when taken in the higher sense to which we 
have alluded, but would not essentially vary its meaning. 
It would then be rendered, By faith we understand that the | 
worlds were formed, so that the things which are seen were 
made from things which are not seen ; or, in other words, that 
the visible or phenomenal was made.from the invisible. A 
slight attention will show a resemblance to the Greek maxim 
which does not at first sight appear, and that the language of 
the Apostle is im several respects similar to the Platonic. 
Besides the distinctions so frequently conveyed by ὄντα 
and γιγνόμενα, the same ideas are variously expressed in 
Plato by the terms ὁρατά or φαινόμενα (the visible, or phe- 
nomenal), used in place of γιγνόμενα ; and ἀόρατα, ἀειδῆ, 
or μὴ φαινόμενα, used as synonymous with τὰ ὄντα. By 
these and kindred terms he ever opposes the visible to the 
Aa2 


202 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 


invisible, the phenomenal to the essential, the ever-chan- 
ging objects of sense (τὼ αἰσθητάλν to the νοητά, or those 
necessary, eternal things which are the objects of the in- 
tellect alone. It is not supposed that Paul had any direct 
reference to Plato or to Platonic language ; but we cannot 
doubt that he uses these words in a similar philosophical 
sense, especially when we compare the many coincidences 
of expression, and remember that, although originally deri- 
ved from Plato, these terms, in the Apostle’s time, had be- 
come a part of the current scholastic phraseology, with 
which he must have been familiar. So, also, the words 
τὰ μὴ βλεπόμενα (the unseen things), which we find He- 
brews, xi., 1, and which are equivalent to μὴ φαινόμενα in 
the third verse, are elsewhere used by the Apostle to ex. 
press the same class of substances which are so frequently 
styled by Plato, τὰ ὄντα, τὰ ὁρατά, τὰ ἀειδή, τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα. Compare 2d Corinthians, iv., 
18: μὴ σκοπούντων ἡμῶν τὰ βλεπόμενα ἀλλὰ τὰ μὴ βλε- 
πόμενα" τὰ γὰρ βλεπόμενα πρόσκαιρα, τὰ δὲ μὴ βλεπό- 
μενα aiwvia—while we aim not at the things which are seen, 
but at the things which are unseen; for the things which are 
seen are temporal (belong to time) ; the things which are un- 
seen are eternal. 'The striking resemblance which this 
bears to some passages in the Phedon cannot be mistaken : 
Θῶμεν οὖν δὴ δύο εἴδη, TO μὲν ὁρατὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδές - Kat 
τὸ μὲν ἀειδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέ- 
ποτε κατὰ TavTd— Let us lay down two classes of being, 
the seen and the unseen: the unseen, eternal in their rela- 
tions ; the seen, never the same, but ever changing.” Phe- 
don, 79, A. The terms are nearly, if not quite, synony. 
mous. Πρόσκαιρα is that which exists in time, temporal, 
or, rather, temporary—liable to change—the opposite of dec 
κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχοντα. On the other hand, αἰώνια is that 
which is eternal, not simply in duration, but in its very na- 
ture, as not belonging to time—fixed, unchangeable, and ne- 


THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 283 


cessary—del κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα. In these passages, nei- 
ther Paul nor Plato mean by the unseen things a mere ne- 
gation of sense, namely, that which is simply concealed 
from view as a present fact, or not seen because belonging 
to a future untried state of existence; but rather those 
things that are in their very nature invisible, that is, which 
belong not to the sensible world—either the present or any 
one to come—the νοητά as distinguished from the αἰσθητά, 
or the objects of faith and reason as distinguished from the 
objects of sense. See, also, Rom., 1., 20. 

We find the doctrine of the hyle in the apocryphal book 
entitled ‘The Wisdom of Solomon, ch. x1., 18: καὶ κτίσασα 
τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου vAno—* having built the earth out 
of the unformed, or, rather, formless hyle.” Compare, also, 
the Septuagint version of Genesis, i., 2: ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρα- 
τος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος. ‘The word ἀόρατος here could 
only have been used in reference to the Greek doctrine, 
which represented the hyle not only as invisible, but as 
incapable of being seen; in fact, as not belonging at all to 
the sensible world, even if it could not be ranked among 
the νοητά. It may be doubted whether we ever ought, in 
translating the more strict philosophers, to render ὕλη by 
our term matter, unless we can conceive of it as an essence 
abstracted from qualities, figure, and extension. ‘That God 
may have created such an essence we have no right to 
deny, merely because our minds can form no conception of 
it; and if it may exist as the originally created ground of all 
subsequently generated or created material things when 
manifested in time and space and clothed with qualities by 
that Eternal Spirit, which, we are told in Genesis, hovered 
over the chaotic deep, then may the doctrine of Plato and 
of the more spiritual writers of the ancient world be in ac- 
cordance with the philosophy of Paul, Hebrews, xi., 3. 

Our only safety here is in clinging to the Bible, and to 
the fair interpretation of Genesis, 1., 1. Human reason left 


284 THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 


to itself, finds tremendous difficulties in both views; and 
when she rejects the aid of revelation, must shrink from 
taking a decided position on either. ‘The belief that mat- 
ter in any form, as an independent principle, is eternal, or 
that anything is such apart from God, carries us to atheism, 
although it may be maintained by an honest yet inconsist- 
ent theist. On the other hand, the doctrine that God once 
existed alone, or that there was a time when God was ail, 
seems to draw after it the strange consequences that he 
never could have ceased to be all, or have become less than 
all, and that therefore creation is but an extension of his 
being; or, in other words, we are in danger of a pantheism 
seemingly more philosophical, yet less favourable to piety 
than the inconsistent theism which we have condemned, 
Reason reels and staggers here like a drunken man, and if 
she will walk alone, finds a dark abyss on each side of her 
narrow path, into which she is perpetually in danger of 
stumbling. ‘There may possibly be a way between these 
two conclusions, but her eyes are too dim to discover it. 
The Scriptures most solemnly declare that God did call 
into being things that were not, and yet denies the conse- 
quence which reason, if she will trust herself alone, can 
hardly avoid deducing from it. We must, therefore, on 
this subject, as on the doctrine of evil, keep close to reve- 
lation, ready at a moment’s warning, and without a mur- 
mur, to give up our most darling philosophy, if it comes at 
all in collision with any truth which a sound and unforced 
interpretation. would elicit.. Neither should we be afraid 
for our Protestantism, even if we are reluctant to adopt any 
interpretation which differs from that long received by the 
Church; by which we ever mean that line of the good, and 
pious, and learned in the Scriptures, in all ages, which no 
spiritually-minded reader of ecclesiastical history can ever 
fail to trace. In such a case as this, too, we should feel 
that the most pious interpretation is most likely to be true, 


THE ANCIENT MAXIM, DE NIHILO NIHIL. 285 


oven if it should not seem to be the most philosophical. If 
we cannot comprehend a positive enunciation of the great 
truth, we must be content with a negative one, better adapt- 
ed, perhaps, to the present state of our faculties, and believe 
by faith that the worlds were not made of things which do 
appear. 

‘There is a passage in the Sophista in which Plato speaks 
plainly of a creation by the direct act of God, and that, too, 
from things which before were not. It is very much in 
the style of the Scriptures, and no better refutation of some 
of the charges against him could be given than this clear 
declaration from this undoubted dialogue: Ζῶα δὴ πάντα 
ϑνητὰ Kal φυτά, ὕσα τ᾽ ἐπὶ γῆς EK σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν 
φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ ξυνίσταται---μῶν ἄλλου τι- 
νὸς ἢ ϑεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον ΓΊΓΝΕΣΘΑΙ 
πρότερον οὐκ ὌΝΤΑ ---]ὴ regard to all mortal animals 
and plants, whatever things grow from roots and seeds, 
whatever inanimate organizations exist in the earth—can 
we say that from any other cause than the creating God 
they come into being which before were not?”  Sophista, 
265, B. 

Pace 58, LIne 3. ὅπως ἢ ἡ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχου- 
σα εὐδαίμων ovoia— All generation, or every generation, 
is taking place in such a manner that the essence which 
pertains to the universal life (or life of the whole) may be 
blessed.” ‘This is the best rendering we can give of this 
obscure passage. Ast translates it, ut universe vite felix 
obtingat status. It is not clear what Plato means by the ex- 
pression, 7) οὐσία ὑπάρχουσα τῷ παντὸς βίῳ ; whether the 
life of the universe taken collectively as the sum of all 
which exists—in which case it would seem that βίος τοῦ 
παντὸς would have been suflicient—or whether he intends 
by οὐσία something higher than this, namely, that essence 
from which the life of the universe proceeds, or, in other 
words, the Universal Numen or Deity himself. If the last 


286 DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 


view be the true one, Plato approaches a higher doctrine 
than has ever been supposed to be taught in his pages. 


LI. 


Doctrine that the Parts are made only for the Whole, as set 
forth by Plato, and as viewed by Modern Rationalists and 
Semi-infidels. The Converse Doctrine, that the Whole is 
also for the Parts, examined with reference to the Mutual 
Harmony of both. 


Pace 58, Line 4. ove ἕνεκα σοῦ γιγνομένη, σὺ δὲ ἕνεκα 
ἐκείνου. ‘The doctrine that the parts are made for the 
whole is unquestionably true, especially when viewed in 
reference to physical ends alone. It is, however, only a 
portion of the truth, and when, as in Pope’s Essay on Man, 
and in the writings of many scientific religionists, it is un- 
qualified by any other views of the system of the universe, 
it may be very far from any true religious tendency. In. 
deed, in some minds, it might easily coalesce with atheism ; 
and although its advocates may sometimes séem to talk de- 
voutly, it has much more of the appearance of philosophy 
than of piety about it. It is a speculative tenet, not much 
dwelt upon in the Scriptures, and, instead of being directly 
expressed there, is rather implied in a higher truth, to 
which, as we have intimated, Plato might have been darkly 
aiming in the language referred to in the close of the pre- 
ceding dissertation, namely, the doctrine that the whole zt- 
self, with all its parts severally and collectively, is made, not 
for itself, but for a manifestation of the Divine glory and 
blessedness ; a doctrine, the object of most bitter dislike to 
the frigid rationalist, but which contains an inexpressible 
moral sublimity to the mind that will have no philosophy 
which is not in accordance with the teachings of the Sacred 
Volume. 


DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 987 


Irrespective, however, of this higher truth, the proposi 
tion here set forth has a converse which is also equally 
true, namely, that the whole 1s made for the parts. ‘This is 
not the opposite of the other, for in that case they could not 
both be true, but, as we have styled it, its converse. It might 
be maintained even on physical grounds. ‘An organized 
product,” says Kant, “is that in which all the parts are mu- 
tually ends and means,” that is, not merely in respect to 
those below them in the scale, but each severally and re- 
ciprocally in respect to all the rest. In a much higher 
sense is this true of that organized product so appropriately 
styled by the scholastic name The Universe. Even on 
physical grounds, then, may we say, that the whole is as 
much necessary to make each part what zt zs, and without 
which it could not have been what 7 zs, as the parts are 
for the completion and harmony of the whole. 

It is chiefly, however, in a moral point of view that this 
converse doctrine assumes a most glorious and thrilling in- 
terest. ‘There are some seemingly most inconsiderable 
portions of the creation for which we are assured that all 
things are working together for good: τοῖς ἀγαπῶσι τὸν 
Θεὸν TIANTA συνεργεῖ εἰς ἀγαθόν. Romans, viii., 28. 
So, also, 1 Corinthians, 111., 21, 22: TIANTA ὑμῶν ἐστιν 
-——ALL things are yours ; whether THE WORLD,* or life, 
or death, or the present, or the future, ALL are yours—rav- 
Ta ὑμῶν ἐστιν. ‘There are again, on the other hand, other 
parts, of no higher rank, for which all things are working 
together for evil. ‘If nothing else,” says one of the ablest 
writers of modern times, “if nothing else, our sins shall 
give us consequence.” Although the other doctrine may be 
speculatively correct, yet these latter are the views which 
have the greatest prominence given to them in revelation. 
The Author of the Bible does not intend that man shall hide 
himself in an affectation of insignificance, or cover up his 


* Here κόσμος must certainly. be taken in its largest sense. 


288 DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 


individualism in what the sentimental humility of his phi- 
losophy might style his subserviency to the interests of the 
universal life. ‘The proposition, against the abuse of which 
we are contending, might seem, at first view, to be ground- 
ed on more enlarged and comprehensive notions of exist- 
ence. It has so much to say of the great’ whole, and of a 
kind of Strauss-ian immortality, which belongs to the race 
rather than to the individual parts. It is, however, mainly 
true in a physical aspect; and when it occupies the mind 
alone, or the moral importance of the individual is not held 
up as a corrective, it becomes a cold and speculative fatal- 
ism—a physical fatalism, in the worst sense of the term, 
which would bind both matter and spirit, not by the decrees* 
of a moral governor, founded on moral reasons, but in the 
adamantine chain of law viewed as something apart from 
God—a fatalism which would regard even the Deity him- 
self, should it graciously admit his existence, as included 
in the machinery of the universe. Such a doctrine pos- 
sesses but little, if any, superiority over the creed of the 
atheist. 

Akin to this is that profession of abstract benevolence 
which loses sight of individuality in the contemplation of 
masses or of the great whole, and affects to regard individual 
happiness only as contributing to the general happiness of 
the universe. ‘This, although it may be agreeable to the 
speculative intellegt, or to those whose theology is but a 
philosophy, is nevertheless most chilling to all the moral 
and religious affections. Its concrete selfishness is only 
hardened and rendered darker, while, at the same time, it 
is more and more concealed from the conscience, by the 
false warmth and glow of an abstract benevolence. Its 
love to God is only a pantheistic rapture, instead of a feel- 
ing of gratitude to a personal Redeemer. Its affection to 
man is not that love to one’s neighbour which the Bible en- 


* This unquestionably was the primitive sense of the word fatum. 


DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 9 


joins, commencing with the domestic and social relations, 
from whence, as from a centre, it radiates on every side, 
ever filling, but never attempting to overflow the limits of 
its practical capabilities for good. ‘Those of whom we are 
speaking—and these declaimers on the greatest good of the 
greatest number are becoming quite numerous—have really 
no neighbour, no vicinus, no vicinage. ‘The word is alto- 
gether too narrow in its meaning to suit their expanded 
views. ‘The individual man who fell among thieves would 
have been too small and too contiguous an object for such 
as can only aim at promoting some great scheme for higher 
developments of the race. Children, family, home, coun- 
try, friends, all are but fetters to that reforming zeal which 
leads them to pant so earnestly and so incessantly for the 
welfare of being in the abstract. Such a philosophical the- 
ology may make a selfish mystic or pantheist, luxurlating 
in some fancied vision of universal good; it may make, 
under certain circumstances, a raving fanatic, furious in de- 
nunciation in proportion to the self-righteousness of his ab- 
stract philanthropy ; but it never has produced, and never 
will produce, an humble, devoted, and warm-hearted Chris- 
tian. 

Plato does, indeed, teach this doctrine of the parts for the 
whole, and we have admitted it to be true when rightly 
qualified by its converse. Other writings, however, of our 
philosopher, furnish most abundant evidence that he did 
hold this converse proposition as equally sound with the 
one he is now presenting, and which was called forth by 
the peculiar nature of the objection against which he is here 
contending. He tells the profane scoffer that this Special 
Providence will not overlook him, because, though small, 
he is yet important as a part of the great whole. When 
presenting, however, in other places, the moral aspect of 
the doctrine, he adopts a very different line of argument. 
Poverty, sickness, health, life, death, ALL THINGS, he 

BB 


290 DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 


tells us, are for the righteous man beloved of Heaven. His 
language possesses a striking resemblance to some parts of 
the Scriptures : Τῷ dé ΘΕΟΦΙΛῊΣ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν ΠΑΝ 
ΤΑ γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστα; Οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον 
περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρὸς ἐάν τε ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται ἐάν τε 
ἐν νόσοις ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν" ὡς τούτῳ 
ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. 
οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τἀναντία τούτων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι. 
Republic, 613, Α., B. Physically, he would teach us, man 
is but an atom, subserving the interests of the great whole ; 
morally, all things, even a universe of mind and matter, is 
working together for his individual exaltation or degrada- 
tion. Instead of dwindling into the insignificance of an in- 
finitesimal, he rises in proportion to the magnitude of that 
universe of which he is a member, or, in other words, be- 
comes of the greatest individual importance as a rational 
part of the greatest whole. 

These apparently opposite yet strictly consistent views 
are likewise equally true in science. ‘The whole cannot 
be fully understood without the parts, and it is an axiom no 
less important, that some a priori knowledge of a whole as 
a whole, that is, as a unity, and not merely an arithmetical 
sum, is necessary to an understanding of the parts. It is 
by the mutual action, reaction, and introaction of such a 
mental synthesis and analysis, that any true progress is 
made in science. When either is neglected, or the balance 

destroyed, science becomes, on the one hand, an ἐμπει- 
. % ἄλογος, an irrational empiricism, or evaporates, on the 
uther, into empty a priori speculation. 

Pace 58, Line 5. Πᾶς yap ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δη- 
μιουργὸς. ‘The comparison adopted shows that Plato views 
the doctrine which the present state of his argument re- 
quires him to advance, namely, that the parts are made for 
the whole, rather in its physical than its moral aspect. It 


* Gorgias, 464, Ὁ. 


DOCTRINE OF PARTS FOR THE WHOLE. 291 


is not the κυθερνήτης, the στρατηγός, the commander, the 
governor, the pilot—comparisons so often employed by him 
in illustration of moral and political relations—but the phy- 
sician, the artist, all of whose efforts are directed to the 
physical perfection of the work in which they are engaged, 
or that physical harmony which consists in the subservien- 
cy of the parts to the whole irrespective of any moral con- 
siderations. ‘This is the order of physical production, and 
of those arts and sciences that copy from it—pépoc¢ ἕνεκα 
ὅλου. It forms the parts for the whole, and not the whole, 
in any sense, for the parts. 

Laine 6. πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντεῖνον βέλτιστον. Ast and 
Stephanus would both read ξυντείνων in this place, and 
refer it to the artist. The common reading, however, al- 
though the literal version in English is very harsh, seems, 
on the whole, to be deserving of preference. It more prop- 
erly has for its subject the work than the workman; as in 
the example a few lines back—pdpiov εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει. 
It may here be taken with βέλτιστον, and the sentence 
would be freely translated, doeth all things for the whole, in 
respect to that best end which aims at the common good ; that 
is, in this case, the physical good, the good of the machine 
or structure as a structure, moral reasons, strictly such, not 
being here brought into view. ‘The argument, then, when 
carried no farther, would be this: God will not overlook 
you; his special providence is ever directed towards you, 
because, however insignificant you may be, physically, in 
yourself, you are wanted to fill up some place or some va- 
cancy in the great structure, for which nothing else is so 
well adapted. You may therefore seem to be laid aside, 
but you are not forgotten—his eye is upon you. 

ΤΙΝῈ 8. ἀγνοῶν ὅπη τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ ξυμ- 
θαΐνει καὶ oot. It is somewhat uncertain whether ἄριστον 
here is to be taken with τὸ περὶ σὲ, or with τῷ παντὶ, or 
Evubaiver. Zvubaiver, however, may be rendered, to con 


292 OBJECTION FROM THE EXTENT OF THE UNIVERSE. 


tribute to the good of anything, or to the accomplishment of 
any purpose, without any such qualifying word as ἄριστον. 
It makes but little difference, in the general sense, what 
view we take of it, and, on the whole, we prefer the follow- 
ing version: You are vexed, not knowing how that, in relation 
to yourself, which is best for the whole, contributes also to your 
_ own good ; or, if we connect ἄριστον with ξυμθαίνει, it may 
be read, not knowing how that which relates to thee best con- 
tributes to the good both of the whole and of thee. At the 
hazard, then, of a little repetition, we would give the fol- 
lowing free paraphrase of the substance of the whole pas- 
sage ; the latter part, however, or converse doctrine, being 
rather implied than expressed, although it may be clearly 
found ia other parts of the Platonic dialogues: Physically, 
thou art but an insignificant pebble in the great κτίσμα, or 
building of the universe (see the comparison of the λέθοι 
and λεθολόγοι, page 55), yet forming a necessary part in 
the joinings and compactness of the whole, even absolutely 
essential to the whole as a whole, and which the builder 
and keeper cannot neglect without risking the ruin of the 
whole: morally, the great universe is also all made for 
thee, and reciprocally for each of its rational parts; it was 
intended, with all its other parts, to have a bearing upon thy 
blessedness or misery, according as thou violatest or re- 
mainest in concord with its moral harmony ; its physical 
harmony thou shalt ever subserve, whatever may be thy 
condition or thy course. 


LI. 
Atheistic Objection drawn from the Extent of the Universe. 
Pace 59, Line 6. ‘Hutep ἂν ἔχοι λόγον ῥᾳστώνη ϑεοῖς 
. ὧν πάντων, ταύτῃ μοι δοκῶ dpdcecv-—* I think that I am 
explaining in what way ease in the administration of the 


Φ 


OBJECTION FROM THE EXTENT OF THE UNIVERSE. 299 


Divine providence may have reason, that is, may be shown 
to be in accordance with reason.” ‘The Epicureans and 
semi-atheists, in all ages, have been much concerned les: 
the physical and moral government of the universe should 
be burdensome to the Deity. Lucretius was unable to see 
how it could consist with the happiness of the Gods. He 
therefore most reverently relieves them of all share in so 
troublesome 2 business, and, with pious concern for their 
ease and quiet, commits the world into the hands of Nature: 


Que bene cognita si teneas, Natura videtur 

Libera continuo, dominis privata superdis, 

Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia Diis agere expers. 

Nam, pro sancta Deim tranquilla pectora pace 

Que placidum degunt z2vom, multumque serenum ! 

Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi 

Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas ? 

Quis pariter ccelos omneis convortere, et omneis 

Ignibus etheriis terras subfire feraceis ; 

Omnibus inve locis esse omni tempore presto, 

Nubibus ut tenebras faciat, coelique serena 

Concutiat sonitu? tum fulmina mittat, et edeis 

Ipse suas disturbet ; et in deserta recedens 

Seviat, exercens telum ; quod sepe nocenteis 

Preterit, exanimatque indignos, inque merenteis ? 
Lucretius, lib. il., 1089. 


Horace entertained the same very elevated notions in re- 
gard to-natural laws and the abstraction of the Deity from 
all the concerns of this world, until he was frightened into 
a little unphilosophical piety by happening to hear it thun- 
der on a clear day. See Ode xxxiv. of the first book, com- 
mencing 

Parcus Deorum cultor et infrequens, 


Insanientis dum sapientize 
Consultus erro— 


He seems to have been brought by his fright into quite a 
religious fit, and the sentiment with which the ode con- 


cludes is not only a devout acknowledgment of a special 
BB2 


294 EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 


providence, but is expressed in language bearing a striking 
resemblance to some of those many passages in the Bible 
which speak of depressing the proud and elevating the 
lowly : 
Valet ima summis 
Mutare et insignem attenuat Deus, 
Obscura promens: hine apicem rapax 
Fortuna cum stridore acuto 
Sustulit ; hic posuisse gaudet. 


His use, however, of the word Fortuna shows that he could 
hot altogether divest himself of his old atheistic habit, even 
when he attempts to talk religiously. Some of our modern 
scientifico-religious works occasionally exhibit a similar 
mixture of the Jew’s language with the dialect of Ashdod. 


LILI. 


Explanation of a Difficult Passage. Remarks on those Views 
which resolve Morality into an Obedience to Physical Laws, 
and regard all Punishment as Consequential instead of 
Penal. 


PacE 59, Line 7. Ei μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, κ. τ. A. 
This obscure passage may be thus paraphrased: “ For if 
any Power, having constantly regard only to the whole, 
should ever fashion his work by suddenly transforming all 
things—as, for example, by forming at once frozen water 
from fire—and should not* proceed by (analyzing) many 
things out of one, or (compounding) one thing out of many, 
so that they might thus partake of a first, a second, and 
even a third generation—in that case, the transformations 
of each displaced arrangement would be infinite in number ; 
but now (that is, in the actual established course of things) 


* Ast, by taking, in this place, ἢ for the common reading, μὴ, has 
completely changed and perverted the whole meaning of the passage. 


EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 205 


there is a wonderful ease in the administration of the Uni- 
versal Guardian.” 

We will proceed to give what seems to us the general 
sense of the passage, and of what follows it for some dis- 
tance, before going into any particular comment on words 
and phrases. It seems to be this: the speaker 15 showing 
that the Divine administration, even when extended to the 
most minute particular, is conducted with ease, in conse- 
quence of being a special superintendence carried on by 
general laws or media, whatever they may be, or by the in- 
ternal operation of powers which he has implanted in things 
themselves ; so that there is no necessity for supposing any 
great or general change, or sudden transformation in the 
state of things (what would be called, in modern phraseol- 
ogy, a miracilous interposition), for the rectification of nat- 
ural or the punishment of moral evil—a transposition which, 
if it took place in every case, would call for an infinite 
number of changes, differing in every instance, and as mi- 
raculous as the immediate production of cold water* or ice 


* In the text, we have given ὕδωρ ἐμψύχον. The common read- 
ing is ἔμψυχον, and those who maintain it would render ὕδωρ ἔμψυ- 
yov, aquam animatam; to make any sense of which they refer us to 
the doctrine of Thales and Heraclitus, that water was the first prin- 
ciple of all things, and who also said something about fire, changed 
into water, being the universal semen. What is told us here about 
the changes and transformations of matter has, it is true, some little 
resemblance to the flowing philosophy of Heraclitus. Still, this re- 
semblance is only verbal. The illustration would be too far-fetched 
and obseure to suit the present place, in which the Athenian is la- 
bouring to give his hearers as clear an idea as possible of this diffi- 
cult position. It would also be giving a sanction to Heraclitus which 
Plato could never have intended ; and besides all this, it is very dif- 
ficult to perceive how it would present any illustration at all of the 
subject he has in hand. We therefore altogether prefer the other 
reading, which only requires the change of an accent, and which has 
some authority of manuscripts in its favour. ᾿Εμψύχον would be a 
participle of the verb ἐμψύχω, to cool, to freeze, and may be taken as 


296 PUNISHMENT OF SIN IIOW FAR CONSEQUENTIAL. 


from fire, without any of the intervening generations; thus 
giving to rational beings no grounds for physical science, 
or a knowledge of the Divine operations, and making every 
act of Providence, instead of moving in harmony with, tc 
jar and displace every preceding and temporary arrange- 
ment. Instead of this, as we are told in what follows, he 
has so constituted things, not by any innate necessities of 
physical laws, but by his own absolute fiat, that good and 
evil will find in themselves, both in this world and in the 
pre-arrangements of Hades, their appropriate reward, and 
will each seek and find its proper place and level; namely, 
vice will diverge, at first slightly, from the level plane, and 
thence descending with constantly-accelerated velocity (εἰς 
βάθος), will find its ultimate place in the terrors of Hades ; 
while virtue, mingling with the Divine nature, will ascend 
to a purer region, and through different degrees of blessed- 
ness will at last arrive at a perfectly holy or separate state, 
τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον. r 

This doctrine of Plato, and the mode in which he states 
it, is indeed sublime. Still, it needs a qualification similar 
to the one we applied to a previous view—a qualification 
for which there may be found abundant support in other 
portions of his writings where he maintains the: strictly 
penal nature of punishment, as in the close of the Gorgias 
and the Republic. ‘The doctrine which seems to be here 
presented is the truth, but not the whole truth. Standing 
thus alone, and without the corrective influence of any high- 
er views, it is a favourite scheme with many of our modern 
semi-infidels, who would resolve all morality into an obe- 


equivalent to the adjective frigidus. We doubt if Plato meant any- 
thing more by it than a strong example derived from substances ap- 
parently so remote, although capable of passing into each other 
through a succession of physical media and generations. ‘The other 
and more common reading probably arose from some ignorant tran- 
scriber, who did not understand the passage, and to whom ἔμψυχον, 
animatam, appeared more philosophical. 


PUNISHMENT OF SIN HOW FAR CONSEQUENTIAL. 29% 


dience to, or a co-operation with, physical laws, and all 
punishment into natural consequence. We do not wonder 
at the partiality with which it is entertained by such. 
They feel that it has no terror for a sinning soul, and that 
it utterly takes away all the moral power which belongs te 
the ideas of penalty and retribution. At the same time, they 
are pleased with it as a wonderful discovery of the nine- 
teenth century, when, in fact, they have merely revived a 
doctrine of some of the old heathen philosophers, who held 
that it was the great duty and chief end of man 10 live ac- 
cording to nature— Vivere secundum naturam. Vide Cicero, 
De Finibus, v., 9. 

With writers of this stamp it is the whole. When em- 
ployed by Plato and Bishop Butler, it is only held in sub- 
serviency to higher qualifying views of the Divine govern- 
ment, with which it is entirely consistent. Those to whom 
we allude would confine the maxim, vivere secundum natu. 
ram, entirely to the nature without us ; whereas, in obedi- 
ence to the law of a higher nature, man is often called to 
contend with the external world. The perfection of his 
moral being requires that he should often contemn the law 
of gravitation, and sometimes even submit that most exqui- 
site handiwork, his body, with all its most wonderful nat- 
ural laws, to be disfigured, ruined, and utterly broken up in 
the flames of martyrdom. Still, there is a truth in this mo- 
‘rality of nature, and it is only by refusing to associate with 
it any higher principle that such writers convert it into a 
most pernicious falsehood. 

So, also, may we admit, that the doctrine, that the pun- 
ishment of sin is the physical consequence of sin itself, is 
found in the Bible. “ What a man soweth, that shall he also 
reap.” ‘‘ He that soweth to the flesh, shall of the flesh reap 
corruption: he that soweth to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit 
reap everlasting life.” Revelation declares all this, but it 
also teaches with much more frequency and with more sol. 


298 PUNISHMENT OF SIN HOW FAR CONSEQUENTIAL. 


emn emphasis, that the punishment of sin is, in the strictest 
sense, a penalty pronounced by a sovereign judge. “‘ The 
wicked shall go away into everlasting fire, PREPARED for 
the devil and his angels.” Physical consequences, even 
when they are strictly such, may be regarded as but pre- 
appointed executioners, deriving their powers, and their 
connexion with the sin, from no inward necessities, but 
from the sovereign pre-arrangements of God; while the 
law of which they may thus form the penalty is anterior, 
both in the order of nature and of time, to all the laws of 
the natural world. The great absurdity of this scheme, 
when it thus stands alone, consists in this, that it is the 
penalty which creates the sin. It is wrong to eat too much, 
because it will be followed by a pain in the stomach; and 
men are punished with a pain in the stomach, because they 
have been guilty of a breach of its physical law. Remove 
the pain, and you remove the sin. Can any one bring him. 
self to feel that anything like this would be true in regard 
to a breach of the law of charity, or that malevolence would 
change its moral character, though it could be followed by 
an eternity of pleasure? If the violation of a physical law 
proceeds from a disposition to contemn a known arrange- 
ment of God, whatever may have been the object of that 
arrangement, it belongs to another department, and must be 
transferred to a tribunal higher than the natural. 

It is by overlooking the nature of punishment as strictly 
retributive, notwithstanding the mode of its infliction, that 
this doctrine of consequential suffering strips the Divine 
law of all its majesty, and becomes such a favourite with 
infidels and neologists. There is no terror in it; and when 
employed, as it sometimes is even in the pulpit, without the 
qualifications to which we have adverted, its immediate ef- 
fect is ease and stupefaction of the conscience, rather than 
any alarm or true conviction of sin. There is, however, no 
inconsistency in the belief of both views. The punishment 


PUNISHMENT OF SIN HOW FAR CONSEQUENTIAL. 299 


inflicted by human government would be no less the retrib- 
utive penalty of positive law, although its preordained ar- 
rangements were such, that the path of every transgressor 
was literally beset with snares, or that it finally brought 
_ him, without arrest or the aid of the executioner, directly to 
the prison or the gallows. 

Pace 59, Line 7. πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἀεὶ BAETWY—“ Looking 
continually to the whole.” ‘There is implied here a nega- 
tive assertion. It is equivalent to saying, “and having no- 
thing else in view.” ‘The meaning seems to be, that the 
process here mentioned might perhaps be adopted, if no re- 
gard was had to the parts, as parts, or except in their rela- 
tion to the whole. In that case, the Divine administration 
might perhaps proceed by these sudden transformations. 
But as in each act of Providence a vast number of purposes, 
direct and collateral, are to be kept in view, and no one to 
be effected by disturbing or displacing another, there is 
need of an arrangement that shall be carried on by media, 
so that one move on the great chess-board (see note 6, p. 
59) may accomplish many ends, instead of requiring separ- 
ate transpositions in every case. 

‘The philosopher evidently perceives a great difficulty at- 
tending any explanation that can be given. We can never, 
perhaps, fully understand the harmonious connexion be- 
tween a providence carried on by general laws, operating, 
in the main, with uninterrupted regularity, and a minute at- 
tention to those individual cases which may be made the 
subjects of special prayer and special judgments. It be- 
longs to that same class of mysterious truths, and presents 
the same apparent contradictions, as the doctrine of the Di- 
vine foreknowledge or foreordination, when viewed in con- 
nexion with the freedom of the human will, or of the Divine 
eoodness, when attempted to be reconciled with the exist- 
ence of evil. Why should men be so clamorous for the 
rights of reason in religion, when, in so many cases, she 


300 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ὠνώλεθρος AND αἰώνιος. 


herself declares her own insufficiency as the highest lesson 
she can teach us, and delivers us over, either to total skep- 
ticism, or to that faith by which we receive truths appa- 
rently opposed, or whose point of connexion is beyond our 
radius of mental vision; because, without this, we must 
give up other truths which our moral nature can only yield 
at the price of total darkness on all that most concerns us 
to know. 


LIV. 
The Word ᾿Ανώλεθρος as distinguished from Ai@vioc. Re- 
markable Passage in the Timeus. 


Pace 60, Line 3. ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὃν γενόμενον ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 
αἰώνιον. ‘There is intended here an important distinction 
between αἰώνιον and ἀνώλεθρον. ‘The former means that 
which is in its very nature eternal, not subject, in any sense, 
to generation or decay, and, in fact, having no reference to 
χρόνος, or time regarded as proceeding by succession. 
(See the definition of time as given in the Timeus, 37, E., 
and remarks upon it, page 223.) ᾿Ανώλεθρον, on the other 
hand, suggests, from its etymology, the idea of something 
composite, although, when used without precision, it may 
be applied to that which is possessed of a higher nature. 
It signifies indestructible, not in itself, but because the thing 
of which it is predicated is upheld and maintained in being 
by the Supreme Power, and thus rendered capable of en- 
during through an endless succession, although never strict- 
ly αἰώνιον or eternal in its essence. Kata νόμον ϑεοί, says 
Ast, has respect to αἰώνιον alone, and not to ἀνώλεθρον. 
He would read according to the following order and punc- 
tuation: ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, ἀνώλεθρον γενόμενον, ard’ ov, 
καθἄπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες ϑεοί, ai@viov—indestructible, 
yet not elernal as the Gods are. This contrast between 


REMARKABLE PASSAGE FROM THE TIMZUs. 90] 


Gods and men seems plausible, and yet we are satisfied 
that Ast is wrong. Our opinion is founded upon that pas. 
sage of the Timeus, in which the Eternal Father thus ad- 
dresses the inferior deities to whom he had given being: 
Geol ϑεῶν, OV ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς, πατήρ TE ἔργων, ἃ dv ἐμοῦ 
γενόμενα, ἄλυτα, ἐμοῦ γε ϑέλοντος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν 
πᾶν, λυτόν. τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν 
ἐθέλειν, κακοῦ. δι’ ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, "AOANATOI 
μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ, οὐδ᾽ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν. οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθή- 
σεσθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε ϑανάτου μοίρας, ΤῊΣ ἜΜΗΣ 
BOYAHZEQS μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόν- 
τες, ἐκείνων οἷς ὅτε ἐγίγνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε---- Ye Gods of 
Gods, of whom 1 am the Maker and the Father, δ8΄ of 
works which, deriving their existence from me, are indis- 
soluble as long asI will it. Everything bound (or compos- 
ite) is capable of dissolution: nevertheless, to choose to 
dissolve that which is well harmonized, and works well, is 
the part of an evil being. For which reasons, and since 
ye were made (or had a beginning of your existence), ye 
are not immortal (in yourselves), nor in every respect in- 
dissoluble. Still, ye shall not be dissolved, nor shall ye 
experience the doom of death, partaking, IN MY WILL, 
of a bond of life stronger and more powerful than those 
things by which ye were bound (or of which ye were com- 
posed) when ye received your being.” Timeus, 41, A. 
That is, the permanence of all created things, from the 
highest to the lowest, rests on the moral attributes of the 
Deity. In his goodness they have a stronger bond than in 
all the laws or necessities of nature and of things. On this 
depends the continued existence not only of man, but of 
Gods, or, in the more sublime language of Scripture, of 
Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, and Powers. 

Κατὰ νόμον ὄντες Θεοί : According to the decree or fate 
(fatum) on which their existence depended. Compare, also, 
the similar expression, page 61, line 7: κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἶμαρ- 

ὁ 


302 GREEK WORDS FOR ETERNITY, αἰὼν AND αἰώνιος. 


ὠένης τάξιν Kat νόμον. ‘This confirms the view we have 
taken above in respect to Yeot. They were dependent on 
this jaw, and not on any innate immortality. Νόμος here 
has about the same meaning with μοῖρα, which, according 
to the more ancient creed of the Greeks, meant simply the 
Divine decree. ‘This, we are prepared to show, is its sig- 
nification in Homer, and not a physical fate, as many con- 
tend. The words ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα are to be taken col- 
lectively for all animated beings thus constituted. ‘The 
continued existence of soul and body, severally or united, 
whether in the present state or in any one to come, is de- 
pendent on the Eternal Father, who is thus represented as 
speaking in this sublime passage from the ‘Timeus—who 
alone is strictly αἰώνιος in the highest sense of that epithet, 
or, as the Apostle declares, 1 Timothy, vi., 16, ὁ μόνος ἔχων 
abavactav—who alone hath immortality. 


LV. 
The Greek Words for Eternity, Αἰών and Αἰώνιος. 


Αἰών is compounded of det wy (see Aristotle, De Calo, 
lib. i., c. ix., 10). ᾿Αεΐ, ever, is from GW, ἀέω, or ant, sig- 
nifying, primarily, to blow, to breathe, secondly, to live, to 
pass or spend time. “Aw seems also related to ἀΐω, to feel 
life, to be conscious ; from whence some would derive αἰών 
in the general sense of existence. Homer uses ἄω or ἀέω 
in the second of the above meanings, as in the Odyssey, 
iii., 151, and 490: Ἔνθα δὲ νύκτ᾽ decay. Because this 
verb is thus used, in several places in the Odyssey, in con- 
nexion with νύξ, some lexicographers absurdly render it to 
sleep. It is, however, only thus employed, because by 
night the flow or succession of time becomes a matter of 
distinct observation and consciousness more than by day. 
Hence, as the context shows, it is generally used of wake- 
ful and anxious nights: 


GREEK WORDS FOR ETERNITY, αἰών AND αἰώνιος. 808 


Νύκτα μὲν ἀέσαμεν, χαλεπὰ φρεσὶν ὁρμαίνοντες. 

ΐ Odyssey, 111., 151. 
᾿Αεί, from this derivation, would present the idea of contin- 
uous being, of a going on, or succession ; and as a particle of 
time, is ever used of that which is boundless or undefined ; 
not so much that which cannot be bounded as that which 
is not bounded—which is not attempted to be defined, but 
is always considered as going on, on, on. ’Aeé, therefore, 
alone, would not express the true idea of edernity, but only 
of endless or unbounded time. ‘This flowing word must be 
connected with, and, as it were, anchored upon another of 
more stability ; since stability and fixedness enter into the 
essential idea of eternity. ‘This other word is the partici- 
ple of that verb of existence which expresses, in its philo- 
sophical sense, the highest mode of bezng. One part of the 
_ compound, then, is boundless and unconfined; the other 





chains it to an eternal present, or, rather, since wv is of all 
tenses, altogether excludes the idea of time. It is thus that 
the Greek term approaches as near the true notion of eter- 
nity as it is in the power of language to bring us. 
Although the human mind may fail to take in all that 
idea which αἰών aims to express, still an apprehension of 
it may exist, sufficient, at least, to convince us that it con- 
tains nothing unreal, but has a solid foundation in the truth 
of things. We may approach it by negatives. Alay is not 
time long or short, bounded or endless. It is not the oppo- 
site of time, but that of which χρόνος, or time, in our pres- 
ent state, is the moving image. (See remarks, page 223, 
and the comparison there referred to.) It may more proper- 
ly be said to be the opposite of καιρός, or πρόσκαιρος ; be- 
ing thus used by the Apostle, 2 Corinthians, iv., 18, and in 
such a way as to exclude all cavil as to its extent, at least 
in that place. It is there the direct antithesis of temporal 
or temporary. 
' However difficult it may be for beings who can only 


304 GREEK WORDS FOR ETERNITY, αἰών AND Giwvioc. 


think in a series, to form a conception of that which neces- 
sarily excludes succession of thought, we are nevertheless 
driven, by the clearest decisions of that reason which often 
goes where the conceptive faculty cannot follow, to affirm 
that this is the state in which all things must be present to 
the Divine mind. If to this we apply the term αἰών, we 
have its perfect definition. We may be certain of its real- 
ity, although utterly unable to comprehend it. The idea 
of time is connected with an imperfection necessarily be- 
longing to our present state, namely, an inability to enter- 
tain in the mind more than one thought at once. ‘This 
gives rise to what is called the succession of ideas, consti- 
tuting the measure of time; and this succession we apply 
even to those truths which, as reason plainly assures us, 
have no relation to time or the sequences of cause and ef- 
fect. Nothing, on these abstruse points, could be more sat- 
isfactory than Plato’s comparison and definition, to which 
we have before referred, and which may be found T:meus, 
37, E. 

Almost all our difficulties on the subject of endless being, 
and especially endless future punishment, arise from con. 
sidering eternity, or αἰών, as time infinitely prolonged, as end-— 
less succession or duration. ‘This addresses itself to the 
imagination or conceptive power rather than to the reason, 
and hence this weak faculty of the soul faints and staggers 
under the attempt to realize what, as a conception of the 
sense, never can be realized. But the whole subject pre- 
sents itself under quite a different aspect when we regard 
the future state not as the beginning of a prolonged period, 
having its own past and future, but as a transition into eter- 
nity—as a condition differing not merely in degree, but in 
its very nature, from the present world of time. When the 
revolving mirror of Chronos, which now represents all 
things in motion, has ceased its revolutions, either in re- 
spect to the whole or each man individually, the landscape 


GREEK WORDS FOR ETERNITY, αἰών AND αἰώνιος. 305 


of eternity, with all its fearful states, becomes in experience, 
as it ever had been in reality, fixed and motionless—dxivn- 
TQ, ἀμετάστατα, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα. ‘There will be 
no endless succession of years and periods, which, in ev- 
ery effort of the mind to grasp them, only present, over and 
over again, the same difficulties of comprehension, and, in- 
stead of a true zdea, give rise only to a painful* and imper- 
fect conception of the sense. ‘For days, and nights, and 
months, and years, and all other successions of time,” says 
Plato, “ were not before the heaven existed. The past, the 
present, and the future are but temporal forms, which we 
ignorantly and incorrectly attribute to the eternal οὐσία, or 
essence. For we say was, and is, and will be, when IS 
(ἔστι) alone pertains to eonian being, while was and will 
be belong to that flowing γένεσις, or generation, which exists 
in time. For they are motions (κενήσεις), but the eternal 
is, in respect to these, immoveable; never younger, never 
older, having no past and no future”—ro δὲ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ 
ἔχον ἀκινήτως, οὔτε πρεσθύτερον, οὔτε νεώτερον προσήκει 
γίγνεσθαί ποτε, οὐδὲ γεγονέναι, οὐδ᾽ εἰσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι 
Timaus, 38, A. 

Change and succession may be said to form the predom- 
inating characteristics of the present flowing phenomenal 
world. In eternity, all is just the reverse. There, to use 
language derived from the old Ionic problem, ail things will 
stand. ‘The things which are seen are temporal, probation- 
ary, preparatory (πρόσκαιρα). The things which are un- 
seen are eternal (αἰώνια), fixed, immutable, without succes- 
sion. ‘The word αἰών is undoubtedly used in the Greek 

* In nothing is this more fully realized than in the efforts some- 
times made by preachers and others to convey what they call an 
idea of eternity; as, for example, from an ocean of drops, or the 
space of the solar system filled with grains of sand, and those mul- 
tiplied by myriads and millions of centuries. By such immensities 
of numbers the mind is wearied and exhausted, but never brought a 


hair’s breadth nearer the object at which it aims. 
MG at δ 


- 
306 GREEK WORDS FOR ETERNITY, αἰών AND αἰώνιος. 


poetry in the indefinite sense of life, existence, or state of 
being; and there are also some passages in the Scriptures 
where it is taken figuratively in a lower signification of age 
or dispensation, although even these are grounded on the 
higher and radical import; but this we affirm with confi- 
dence, that the restorationist can derive no aid from these 
specimens of Platonic usage, and, in fact, nothing could be 
more utterly opposed to all his views of change, reforma- 
tion, or restoration in the eternal state. We conclude with 
a definition of αἰών, derived from the high authority of Aris- 
totle. It contains more reference to succession than that 
of Plato, but yet is directly in the way of all attempts to 
limit the meaning of this illimitable word. He is speaking 
of the super-celestial, or extra-mundane state, and what- 
ever we may think of its reality, there can be no doubt 
about the force of the Greek terms by which he attempts to 
set it forth. ‘ Time,” he says, “is the number of motion, 
but above the heaven it has been shown that time cannot 
exist. ‘There, there 15 no growing old, neither is there any 
change, but all is immutable, all is impassible, and having 
the best and most satisfying life (ζωὴν ἀρίστην Kai τὴν av- 
ταρκεστάτην), continues for all eternily (τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶ- 
va); and this its name is divinely declared to us from the an- 
cients (ϑείως ἔφθεγκται Tapa τῶν ἀρχαίων). For that end 
which contains the period of each existence is called its 
αἰών (evum, age, or being). According to the same reason 
or definition—kata τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, καὶ TO τοῦ παντὸς 
οὐρανοῦ τέλος, καὶ τὸ τὸν πάντων ἄπειρον χρόνον καὶ τὴν 
ἀπειρίαν περιέχον τέλος, ᾽ΔΤΙΩΝ ἐστιν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ᾽ΛΕΙ ’EI- 
ΝΑΙ εἰληφὼς τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, ἀθάνατος καὶ Setoc—that 
which constitutes the enclosing limit of the whole heaven 
or universe, that which embraces the infinite period, and the 
infinity of all things—that is αἰών, ETERNITY, taking its 
name from EVER BEING, immortal and divine.” Arist., 
De Celo, lib. i., c. ix., 10. Compare, also, The Laws, iv., 


PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 307 


715, P., where Plato speaks of the Eternal Justice, which 
always follows as an avenger of crimes committed against 
the Divine law (τοῦ ϑείου νόμου τιμωρός), and in com- 
menting on which the scholiast thus defines the word περί- 
πορευόμενος, namely, τὸ αἰωνίως---το "Asi ὡσαύτως καὶ 
κατὰ τὰ αὐτά ἡ γὰρ περιφορὰ τοῦτο ἔχει. 


LVI. 


Plato’s Doctrine of the Freedom of the Will, viewed in Con- 
nexion with the Law of Cause and Effect in Nature. 


Pace 60, Line 11. Μεμηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο, K. 
τ. A.—* He devises this in reference to the whole, namely, 
what kind of a situation everything which becomes of a cer- 
tain quality must receive and inhabit.” That is, the ποιό- 
τῆς or quality which, in the course of generation, anything 
assumes, must determine the quality of its final habitation. 
The establishment and enforcement of this law God has 
reserved to himself as his peculiar prerogative, while, as we 
are told in the following sentence, he has left to our own 
wills, τὰς αἰτίας τῆς γενέσεως τοῦ ποιοῦ TLVO¢—the causes 
of becoming such or such. (See note 10, page 60.) In 
other words, he has so ordered the course of nature, by a 
sort of pre-established harmony, that it constantly enforces 
this law, while the power of becoming the subjects of its 
rewards or penalties is left to the freedom of our own wills. 
The sentiment is about the same with that of Pope: 


And binding nature fast in fate, 
Left free the human will. 


We cannot find much fault with this in the heathen Plato, 
and the doctrine is undoubtedly true of man viewed as un- 
fallen, and in that primitive state when his will was truly 
free, because it was one with the will of God. The Chris. 
tian theology, however, does require us to modify the prop- 


308 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 


osition as regards our present condition, and to believe that, 
in some way, man by the fall subjected his will to nature ; 
that, therefore, although it has a wide prison-house within 
which to rove, and where it may be said to be free in its 
choices of objects before it, still it can never, by any voli- 
tion, rise above this state of nature, or escape its adaman- 
tine chain of cause and effect, until a stronger than nature 
shall interpose for its deliverance and perfect freedom. ‘The 
sick man may turn from side to side upon his weary couch, 
but he cannot rise, take up his bed, and walk. We may 
exercise all kinds of choices (a term which in the strife of 
words on this subject so many have confounded with will) 
within the limits of the sphere into which we have fallen, 
but we cannot well to be holy, to love God with all our souls, 
and to live to his glory. Ifthe Scriptures were not clear 
on the subject, it is so plainly a matter of personal experi- 
ence that we may well wonder how, in the light of an awa- 
kened conscience or consciousness, there could be any room 
for cavil about it. 

There is no doubt, however, that Plato was rather Pe- 
lagian on this great question ; although places could be 
cited which show that his mind was unsettled, and that 
there were very great difficulties attending any view he 
could take of the matter. We may find this same doctrine 
that is here advanced more fully set forth in the Republic, 
x., 617, P., where, after a long argument, in which he in- 
troduces that wild mythical legend respecting the Destinies, 
Lachesis, Clotho, and Atrope, he concludes in the follow- 
ing most concise and remarkable manner: Οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαί- 
μων λήξεται ἀλλ᾽ ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε " ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσ- 
ποτον" αἰτία ἑλομένου" ϑεὸς ἀναίτιος----Ξ Virtue is free 
from control: the fault is in the chooser: God is blame- 
less,” or, rather (since ἀναίτιος and aitia do not in them- 
selves imply blame), God is not concerned in the causation 
of sin or the production of virtue. Notwithstanding this, 


PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 309 


there are several striking passages in which he asserts, 
without qualification, that virtue is a Divine gift, and that, 
in the present state of man, its attainment is hopeless with- 
out the Divine aid. As, for example, in the Meno, 99, P.: 
᾿Αρετὴ οὖν av εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ ϑείᾳ 
μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται----" Wherefore 
virtue would be neither by nature nor by science or teach- 
ing, but by a Divine gift, bestowed upon those by whom it 
is possessed.” So, also, a few sentences below, to the 
same effect. (Meno, 100, B.) Nothing can be clearer 
than this declaration, and yet, when we take into view 
other parts of that same dialogue, it is extremely difficult to 
determine what he really thought about the cause and 
source of true virtue. Whether it was by nature, by sci- 
ence, or directly from God, were questions to which his 
mind often reverts, and which he seems never to have sat- 
isfactorily solved. ‘The student may find it discussed at 
great length in the Protagoras. In the Republic, again 
(lib. vi.), where he is led to draw as strong as possible a 
picture of human depravity, he declares most expressly that 
the acquisition of virtue is zmpossible without the Divine as- 
sistance. ‘ Do you think,” says Socrates, “that any soph- 
ist’—by which he means one of the ancient lecturers on 
moral philosophy who undertook to teach virtue for pay 
—‘‘do you think that any sophist, or any instructions of 
private persons, can control or even withstand such an in- 
fluence for evil? No one; yea, even to attempt it would 
only be evidence of folly.” And then he concludes in this 
most solemn and impressive manner: Οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται, 
οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτε οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρε- 
τὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν. ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε ϑεῖ- 
ον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου. εὖ γὰρ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅ τί περ ἂν σωθῇ τε 
καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει, Θεοῦ μοῖραν 
αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς Epeic— For it neither is the 
case, nor has been, nor ever can be, that any character (or 


- 


310 PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL 


state of soul) should undergo a change to virtue in opposi- 
tion to the corrupt training of these influences. At least 
nothing human, my friend; the Divine I lay out of the ac- 
count. For we may be well assured that he speaks most 
truly who asserts that if anything, under such circumstan- 
ces, is saved, and becomes such as it ought to be, a Divine 
dispensation alone hath saved it.” Republic, vi., 493, A. 
In another part of this same passage he pronounces the 
case absolutety desperate—édy μῆ τις αὐτῇ BonOjoac ϑεῶν 
Tvyy— unless some God should come to the aid of the 
soul.” Repub., vi., 492, A. 

Surely, if this be a true picture of human nature,* Plato 
may be justly charged with inconsistency, yet no greater 
than many have manifested on this subject who possessed 
the higher light of revelation. If these representations be 
correct, how can virtue be said to be without restraint ? 
How can that be free which has so many impediments, to 
say the least? If there is no accountability when these 
impediments are supposed utterly to surmount the strength 
of the will, why is not this same accountability diminished 
pro rata when they exist in a less degree, although falling 
short of an absolute inability ? and how, then, can we avoid 
the conclusion, that the more vicious the disposition, and, 

* There is a most remarkable declaration of Thucydides on the 
subject of human depravity, which is the more worthy of attention, 
because it comes from one who, without any philosophical or reli- 
gious theory, was as cool and keen an observer of human nature as 
ever lived. ‘It is the nature of man to sin (says this sagacious his- 
torian) both in public and private. No law can restrain him from 
it. ΑἹ] modes of punishment have been exhausted in the attempt.” 
Lib. iii, 45. And again, in the same section: ἁπλῶς τε, ἀδύνατον, 
καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας, ὅστις οἴεται, τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὁρμωμένης 
προθύμως τι πρᾶξαι, ἀποτροπήῆν τινα ἔχειν, ἢ νόμων ἰσχύϊ, ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ 
decv@—* To speak plainly, 1{Π15 impossible ; and it is a proof of great 
simplicity for any one to suppose that, when human nature rushes 
eagerly to the attainment of any gratification, it can be turned aside 
either by force of law or any penalty, however fearful.” cS 


PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 311 


consequently, the more difficult the practice of virtue, the 
less the degree of guilt, and the nearer an approach to a 
state of perfect innocence. 

Jacob Zimmerman, in his tract De Prestantia Religionis 
Christiane collata cum Philosophia Socratts, finds fault with 
this doctrine that virtue 1s a Divine gift, and thinks that, in 
the contest.of Socrates with the sophist Protagoras, on the 
question whether virtue could be taught, the latter has great- 
ly the advantage. He also charges the views of Socrates 
with leading to licentiousness, while he seems to regard 
his most corrupt antagonists as the friends of the public 
morals: Et hac ratione Socrates vel invitus effecit, ut illi 
qui jam vitiis immersi sunt aliquod presidium inde caperent. 
Nihil enim libentius ejusmodi homines audiunt, quam ea, 
que summam difficultatem in virtuti colenda probare pos- 
sunt ; ita enim necessario inferri posse putant in sua potes- 
tate situm haud esse virtutem sequi. Vide Amenitates Lit- 
erari@, vol. xi., p. 187. That the doctrine of Divine grace 
—for such is substantially the declaration that virtue is the 
gift of God—should be charged with licentiousness is not 
surprising, since it has thus been characterized in all ages, 
even by men themselves as utterly corrupt as those Gre- 
cian sophists with whom Socrates contended even unto 
death ; but it certainly is a matter of exceeding wonder, 
that a professed Christian writer should censure him for 
that very sentiment in which, of all others, he approaches 
the nearest to the Bible. See some of these questions most 
acutely argued in Cicero’s treatise De Fato, s. v., vi. It is 
worthy of an attentive perusal, if for no other reason, to see 
how very similar, in all ages, have been the discussions 
which have arisen on these most ancient queries respect- 
ing fatalism, causality, co-causes, conditions, moral agency, 
and the freedom of the will. Jonathan Edwards himself 
does not distinguish with more keenness than Cicero and 
the persons whose opinions he has introduced in the tract 
referred to. 


319 EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 


Pace 61, L. 6. ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταθολῆς 
aitiav— Possessing in themselves the cause of change.” 
That is, without, or to the exclusion of external causes, yet 
still not, as those maintain who contend for the self-determi- 
ning power of the will, without being under the law of cause 
and effect existing within them; the cause being the inter- 
nal result of their present stale at any one time, or the com- 
bined sum and product of all the influences, from within 
and from without, then existing in their physical, intellect- 
ual, and moral constitution, and the effect being the one 
single following state which the laws of our minds compel 
us to affirm must result from it. So Cicero, De Fato, s. 
x1.: Sic quum sine causa animum moverl dicimus, sine. ez- 
terna causa moverl, non omnino sine causa, dicimus. 


LVI. 
Explanation of a Difficult Passage. 


Pace 61, Line 8. σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν, κ. τ. A. 
There is a good deal of difficulty about this sentence, and 
yet we think a very good sense may be made of the com- 
mon reading, without resorting to those conjectural emenda- 
tions which some commentators would propose. ‘The ver- 
sions of Ficinus and Cornarius both proceed upon the idea 
that the main contrast is between σμικρότερα μὲν and πλείω 
δὲ, which view, it must be confessed, seems to have ap- 
pearances strongly in its favour. Neither translator, how- 
ever, adheres to the Greek text as it now stands. Viger 
proposes amendments grounded upon the same view of the 
passage. He would read ἐλάττω μὲν καὶ δικαιότερα, that 
it might be more directly opposed to πλείω καὶ ἀδικώτερα, 
just below. Ast thinks there is no need of any other change 
than to expunge ἐλάττω, and would render as follows: 
Que minus depravata sunt, ea per terre planitiem ingredi- 
untur, que vero in majorem depravationem inciderunt in 


EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 313 


profundum, &c.; detruduntur. It seems to us, however, 
that almost all difficulty is removed by regarding the main 
contrast as intended between σμικρότερα μὲν and μείζων δὲ 
five or six lines below, and a subordinate contrast between 
ἐλάττω and πλείω δὲ We would place a comma after 
ἐλάττω, and regard ἃ. μὲν as implied in connexion with it; 
the omission being nothing strange, seeing that the particle 
had just been used to mark the main antithesis. In this 
view of the matter, μεταθάλλοντα is to be taken with éAdr- 
τω, and there will also be a contrast of degree between this 
participle and μεταπεσόντα ; the former, from its being in 
the present tense, implying a slight beginning of a change, 
either for good or evil; the latter, a more sudden and rapid 
descent. Hic is to be taken with μεταπορεύεται understood 
as though repeated, and not with μεταπεσόντα. In this 
view, ἐλάττω, instead of being required to be expunged, 
becomes an important word, and the only real defect in the 
sentence is a mere want of verbal symmetry in having no- 
thing to correspond to ἀδικώτερα, together with the harsh. 
ness which is felt in connecting this word with μεταπεσόν- 
ta. On the other view, it is not easily explained how om- 
κρότερω τῶν ἠθῶν can be made to mean those who are less 
depraved, as the phrase is regarded by Ficinus, Cornarius, 
and Ast. Another objection to their version is, that there 
is nothing with which we can contrast μείζων ψυχὴ below, 
when the whole following context shows that a very strong 
antithesis was most certainly intended. This, we think, 
can only be effected by regarding it as in opposition to ope- 
κρότερα τῶν ἠθῶν, a phrase equivalent to σμικρότερα ἤθη, 
or οἱ ἔχοντες σμικρότερα ἤθη, and which we would consid. 
er aS synonymous with what Platu elsewhere styles σμικρὰ 
φύσις, the small nature, the less marked or inferior char- 
acter or habit of soul, in distinction from the μείζων ψυχῆ ; 
neither expression in itself implying depravity, but, on the 
other hand, each including the good as well as the bad. 
D vb 


314 EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 


With these preliminaries, we proceed to state the order 
of the whole passage, according to the view above taken, 
enclosing in brackets the implied words which are deemed 
essential to a full interpretation: σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν, 
ἐλάττω [μὲν] μεταβθάλλοντα, μεταπορεύεται κατὰ τὸ τῆς 
χώρας ἐπίπεδον, πλείω δὲ μεταπεσόντα καὶ ἀδικώτερα, εἰς 
βάθος [μεταπορεύεται] τά τε κάτω, κ. τ. λ.---μείζων δὲ δὴ 
ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν μεταλάθῃ, κ. τ. λ. Of which 
there may be given the following free translation: “ The 
smaller natures, to wit, those possessed of none of the 
greater traits of soul, whether for good or evil, undergoing 
less change, or as long as they undergo less change, pro- 
ceed with a slight deviation (change being implied in pera) 
along the apparently level plain of life ; but when they de- 
cline more rapidly, and with greater degrees of wickedness 
(the metaphor being carelessly lost sight of in ἀδικώτεραλ), 
they change their course (εἰς βάθος) into a steep descent, 
and to those regions commonly spoken of as being below, 
which, under the name of Hades, men fear and dream 
about, &c.; but as for the greater soul, whenever it par- 
takes of vice or virtue, by the exercise of its own will or 
by association, &c.—such a soul, we say, whenever, by 
mingling with the Divine excellence, it becomes in a re- 
markable degree similar, makes a transition, also, into a 
surpassingly holy place, being continually carried into an- 
other still better region ; but when contrariwise, then trans- 
ferring the seat of its life in a contrary direction and to a 
contrary abode.” From ὅσα to σωμάτων inclusive, may be 
regarded as a parenthetical clause, explanatory of τὰ κάτω 
τῶν τόπων. In the second member of the principal antith- 
esis, had there been preserved a perfect correspondence, 
we should have had μείζω δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν ; from some idea 
of which in the mind of a transcriber probably arose the 
other reading preferred by Ast, namely, μείζω δὲ δὴ ψυχὴ, 
&c. In this way, ἐλάττω (μὲν) and πλείω δὲ indicate two 


EXPLANATION OF A DIFFICULT PASSAGE. 315 


different stages in the course of those denoted by σμικρό- 
tepa ἤθη: the first, a gentle deviation, almost level, and 
therefore called ἐπίπεδον ; the second, a rapid descent. 
There is also a great propriety in the use of the present 
μεταθάλλονταω, which Ast would change into the second 
aorist—while, or as long as, they undergo less change. 

In the words ἐπίπεδον and βάθος there may be one of 
those geometrical allusions of which Plato was so very 
fond, and which he so frequently employs. An evil course 
may be compared to the three dimensions of magnitude. It 
is first a mere point, then extends itself into a line, then 
spreads out into superficial space (ἐπίπεδον), and, finally, 
grows into the solid dimensions of iniquity in all thei 
length, breadth, and depth; that is, in the fixed and immu- 
table condition of the sinful nature—a state from which 
Plato would admit that it was not in the power of the will 
to return. δ νὰν, 

There are, in a critical point of view, several defects 
about both members of this antithesis and the subordinate 
contrasts. It is, however, far better to admit that Plato 
sometimes writes carelessly than to hazard so many con- 
jectural emendations. ‘The whole passage strongly sug- 
gests a similar thought from the Republic: ἔχει δὴ λόγον, 
τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν ἀλλοτριωτέρῳᾳ οὖσαν τροφῇ, κάκιον 
ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης---καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τὰς εὐφυεστά- 
τας, κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας, διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγ- 
veo0ai—“ It 1s reasonable to suppose that the best nature, 
being in a condition adverse to its proper development, 
turns out worse than the meaner ; and that the most high- 
ly-gifted souls, partaking of. evil instruction, become surpass- 
ingly wicked.” ‘Republic, vi., 491, 1. Φαύλη ψυχή. here 
- is equivalent to σμικρότερα ἤθη in the passage before us. 
Compare, also, the Republic, vi., 495, B., where the simi- 
larity of the expression tends greatly to confirm the view 
we have here taken: σμικρὰ dé φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε 
οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ. 


316 GREEK WORD HADES, 


After all, however, it must be confessed that there is no 
little difficulty about the passage. Had the first member of 
the principal antithesis been double, like the second, or had 
it specified two distinct courses in opposite directions, we 
should have had no doubt about the correctness of the ver- 
sion we have given. Such a view, however, may be im- 
plied, and thus σιμμκρότερα ἤθη may be taken of virtue and 
vice both, as well as μείζων ψυχὴ in the second member ; 
the change either way, in respect to the meaner nature, be- 
ing at first so slight as not to call for the distinction ; and, 
in the second stage, the acceleration of velocity being more 
naturally associated with the ideas of descent and sin than 
with that of virtue; so that it is the metaphor which seems 
to have led the writer astray from the symmetry and con- 
sistency of the thought he intended to express. Hence, 
too, we may perhaps account for the introduction of ἀδικώ- 
tepa, which seems otherwise to mar the harmony of the 
passage. Viger proposes as an emendation ἐλάττω μὲν καὶ 
δικαιότερα, as opposed to πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀδικώτερα. This 
would favour the idea contained in our version more than 
his own. A better course, however, would be to regard 
the words κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς, &c., as implied after σμικρότερα 
τῶν ἠθῶν, in the first member, as they are expressed after 
μείζων δὲ δὴ ψυχὴ, in the second. The passage has given 
great difficulties to all commentators. 


LVIII. | | 
The Greek Word “Atdnc, and the Hebrew Sixw and m3 
1 rtp, 

Pace 61, Line 11. “Aidnv ἐπονομάζοντες. ‘This word 
is most clearly from ἀειδῆς, invisible. ‘Thus it is explained 
by Plato, although he is no great authority in etymological 
matters: ἐν Gdov—rtd ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων, Gorgias, 493, B. 
It may therefore mean the invisible world, that is, unseen, in 


AND HEBREW SHEOL AND BETH OLAM. sl? 


the sense of concealed from present vision, or it may be con- 
nected with the more philosophical import of ἀειδῆς, as 
used by Plato in the Phedon, namely, the ideal, the intelli- 
gible world, in distinction from the visible world of sense and 
matter. ‘The first, however, is doubtless the most common 
acceptation of the word—the unseen, the unknown region 
which the grave hides from our view, and whither we can- 
not follow the departed. It strongly suggests the old ety- 
mologies given for the Hebrew inv’ (sheol), and to which 
we cannot help being partial, notwithstanding they are so 
contemptuously rejected by Gesenius. ‘They make it from 
Oxw, to ask, to demand, to inquire ; as though intimating the 
deep anxiety of men in all ages to penetrate the dark mys- 
tery concealed by the veil of death, as in the wailing lan- 
guage of Job: “ Man dieth, and wasteth away; he giveth 
up the ghost, and where is he?” Job, xiv., 10. 

‘The common poetical expression, οἶκος “Atdov, corre- 
sponds, both in form and sense, to the Hebrew iy nva, 
as used Ecclesiastes, xil., 5: Man goeth to the house of 
his eternity, or to his eternal house, instead of our very de- 
fective translation, his long home, which suggests the grave 
for the body, rather than that abode of departed spirits 
which is undoubtedly meant by the Hebrew as well as the 
Greek phrase. Compare Xenophon’s Life of Agesilaus, 
near the close: “ And thus this man spent his life in the 
service of his country, and, having at length died, was 
transferred to his eternal home”—sic τὴν “ATAION ὌΙΚΗ- 
ΣΙΝ κατηγάγετο. So, also, Diodorus Siculus, in his ac- 
count of the Egyptians, says, ‘They call the habitations 
of the living, lodging-places (καταλύσεις), or inns, because 
we dwell in them but for a short time; but the abodes of 
the departed they style eternal houses, because they con. 
tinue in Hades during the boundless elernity”—didiove ot- 
μους προσαγορεύουσιν, ὡς ἐν “Aidov διατελούντων τὸν 
"AITEIPON ’AIQNA. Diod. Sic., lib. i., 51. 

Dp2 


318 SIMILAR FEARS OF HELL IN ALL AGES. 


The Hebrew iy corresponds more closely to the 
Greek “Atdnc than δ. It signifies hidden, unknown, 
boundless in time, and undefined in space. The composition 
of the phrase is the same in both languages: mip n'a— 
οἶκος “Atdov—the house of Olam—the house of Hades—the 
invisible state, the abode of unseen spirits. ‘These terms 
suggest conceptions of vastness, of dread sublimity, while 
the inquiring word sheol calls up the unknown world, and 
presents it to the mind as 

That undiscovered country, from whose bourn 
No traveller returns. 

‘The expression οἶκος “Acdov must have been common 
in the most ancient Greek. Its antiquity is proved by the 
ellipsis, εἰς “Atdov, which afterward came into such fre- 
quent use by the poets. Hence we conclude that it must 
have been an early Orientalism, derived from this very 
phrase with which we have compared it. Had it not been 
so very common in classical Greek, some critics would 
doubtless have pronounced it a Hebraism. 


LIX. 


Similar Views of a Future State, and Similar Fears of Heil 
in all Ages. 


Pace 61, Line 11. ὅσα “ΛΑιδην τε καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα 
τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπονομάζοντες σφόδρα φοθοῦνται καὶ ὀνει- 
ροπολοῦσι ζῶντες διαλυθέντες τε τῶν σωμάτων ---" which, 
under the name of Hades and similar titles, men greatly 
fear (valde horrent) and dream about, both when living and 
when separated from the body.” ‘This may be compared 
with a similar passage from the Republic: Ev γὰρ ἴσθι, ὦ 
Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτή- 
σειν, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντίς. οἵτε γὰρ λεγόμενοι 
υωὖθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν “Atdov, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ 


~ 


SIMILAR FEARS OF HELL IN ALL AGES, 319 


ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, στρέφουσι τὴν ψυχήν. .... ὃ μὲν οὖν 
εὑρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα, ἐκ τῶν ὕπ- 
νων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ϑαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος, δειμαίνει, καὶ ζῇ 
μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος---- For be well assured, O Socrates, 
that when any one is near that time in which he thinks he 
is going to die, there enter into him fear and anxiety. For 
then the old stories about hell, how that the man who has 
here been guilty of wrong must there suffer punishment, 
torture his soul. Wherefore he who, in the retrospect of 
his life, finds many crimes, like frightened children starting 
from their sleep, is terrified, and lives in evil forebodings.” 
Republic, 330, E. Nothing could give us a surer glimpse 
into the ancient conscience than such a passage as this. 
We are very apt to think that the fears of the future world 
are almost wliolly derived from the Bible, and that the an- 
cient mythology respecting Hades was the mere picture of 
the poet, without possessing any very strong hold upon 
the common mind. ‘This declaration, however, of the 
aged Cephalus, is undoubtedly meant by the writer to be 
characteristic of the class and age to which the speaker 
belonged. In this most dramatic of all the dialogues of 
Plato, nothing of the kind would have been put in the 
mouth of such a character, had it not truly expressed a sen- 
timent deeply grounded in the popular creed and feeling. 
It testifies more strongly to the ancient universal belief in 
a retributive hell and a coming judgment, than all the ab 
stract reasonings of our philosopher, and all the mytholo- 
gical allusions of the poets. 

The doctrine of a hell for the wicked, as we have else- 
where observed,* is one of the oldest articles in the reli- 
gious creed of all ages and nations. Such incidental pas- 


* See the Biblical Repository, No. xix., Art. 3d, where this and 
kindred topics are dwelt upon at some length; also a discourse de- 
livered at Burlington, Vermont, 1839, entit!ed Natural Religion, the 
Remains of Primitive Revelation. 


320 SIMILAR FEARS OF HELL IN ALL AGES. 


sages as these refute all the reasonings of Warburton, in 
his attempt to prove that the doctrine of future punishment 
exerted but little influence in the ancient systems of legis. 
lation and religion. ‘The very efforts of the Epicureans to 
ridicule the vulgar fears, and to make light of the terrors of 
the unseen Hades, show how deeply these awful truths, 
whatever may have been their origin, had penetrated the 
human soul. Even the style in which Lucretius speaks of 
them betrays a secret trepidation, and instead of philosophic 
indifference, manifests that bitter hatred which, as in the 
case of most modern infidels, proceeds from a mind once 
deeply troubled, anxious, and yet unable to shake off those 
fears which its philosophy affects to despise. This exhi- 
bition of a soul ill at ease, and of an interested hostility to 
the very idea of future retribution, is apparent in those 
lines in which he thus sets forth that monster of horrid as- 
pect, with whose gloomy frown the timid Epicurean was 
ever haunted: 

Humana ante oculos quom vita jaceret 

In terris, obpressa gravi sub Religione ; 

Que caput a celi regionibus obtendebat, 

Horribili super adspectu mortalibus instans.—Inb. 1., 63. 
The same thing is manifested when (to use Plato’s com- 
parison), like a child who has awaked from some dream of 
terror, he seems to exult in the timid hope of deliverance 
from the fears of a future hell: 

Et metus ille foras preeceps Acheruntis agundus, 

Funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo, 

Omnia subfuscans mortis nigrore ; neque ullam 

Esse voluptatem liquidam, puramque, relinquit. 

Lab. iii., 37. 

Such strong language most clearly shows, that the doctrine 
and fears against which it was directed were no light or 
laughing matter, either to the poet or to those for whom he 
wrote ; 
We have every reason, therefore, for believing that much 


SIMILAR FEARS OF HELL IN ALL AGSES. 321 


the same views of death, and the same apprehensions of 
future retribution as now prevail, have ever existed among 
mankind ; coming not from reason or philosophy, but hand- 
ed down by tradition from some revelation made in the most 
ancient time. In all ages, too, and in all creeds, the rep- 
resentations of the nature of this future punishment have 
been of the most terrific kind, as though the imagination, 
for this purpose, had been taxed to its utmost powers. Fire, 
and chains, and utter darkness, and similitudes of ever-un- 
gratified desire and of ever-raging passion, have always 
formed a part of the dread machinery of Hades. The reli- 
gious poet Pindar describes it as that from which the eye 
of the soul turns away, as from scenes too full of horror to 
contemplate for a moment: 
τοὶ δ᾽ ἀπροσόρατον ὀκχέοντι TOVOY—* 
and, in reference to it, a still more religious poet, even the 
inspired prophet and leader of Israel, asks with dread so- 
lemnity,} ‘“‘ Who knoweth the power of thine anger?” Ory, as 
it has been most admirably paraphrased, 
Thy dreadful wrath exceeds our thought, 
And burns beyond our fear. 

Leaving out of the account the solemn confirmation of the 
doctrine which may be derived from the fearful imagery 
employed by our Saviour, and taking into view only the 
heathen world, we may well ask the question, Whence came 
all this? 'The great problem is for them to solve who as- 
sert that the doctrine of future punishment is contrary to 
‘the Scriptures, the reason, and the feelings. Whence, 
then, came it, in the face of all these opposing influences ? 
Men are not fond of what is irrational for its own sake, and 
they certainly do not love their own misery. Whence, 
then, came this τριγέρων μῦθος, these fears of Hades, of 


* Pind., Olymp. Carm., 11... 2., 0. +t Psalm xc., 11. 
1 Hschylus, Choeph., 312. 


B22 THE WORD ἅγιος. 


Tartarus, of Gehenna, and those other names which, as 
Plato says in the passage before us, men Ifave applied to 
this state? Why, if this be all false, and without founda- 
tion in any view of the moral government of God, have the 
human race thus ever tortured themselves for naught ? 
Why have they indulged in these terrific inventions of fan- 
ey, handing down, from age to age, and from generation to 
generation, a useless, yet most tormenting anxiety? And 
above all, how is it, if sin be such a trifle, that men, by 
these inventions, have ever persevered in passing a sen- 
tence so unjustly severe on their own depravity ἢ Compare 
the Gorgias, 525, C.; Phedon, 114, A.; Republic, 616, A. 


ἼΝ: 


The Word “Αγιος. Exceeding Spirituality of some of Pla- 
to’s Views. Many of his Thoughts capable of being fairly 
accommodated to a Spiritual Sense higher than the Author 
himself had intended to convey. Difference in this respect 
between his Writings and those of all other Hbehilogenhers, 
Ancient or Modern. 


PaGE 61, Line 17. καὶ μετέθαλε τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον---- Is 
transferred, or passes into a place all holy.” Purity, or 
holiness, is generally given as the primary sense of the 
Greek ἅγιος and of the Hebrew wp or ΤΡ. ‘This, how- 
ever, besides being incapable of accounting for the other 
meanings, some of which are almost directly opposite, does 
of itself require some ultimate, and, at the same time, more 
simple conception into which it may be resolved. ‘This 
more simple and primary idea is that of separation,™ or of 


* This will account for those other senses of the root which seem 
almost the opposite of holy, since it may also refer to that which is 
purely wicked, or separated from all good. Hence ἄγος, or ἄγος, may 
signify an abominable crime. So, also, ἅγεος may sometimes denote 


THE WORD ἅγιος. 323 


being set apart. In proof of this we may compare the use 
of the word throughout the Pentateuch, in its application to 
places, sacrifices, and to the whole nation of Israel, as sep- 
arated from the rest of mankind, to be a holy, that is, a sep- 
arate people. In the same manner are Christians charac- 
terized, in the New Testament, as ἅγιοι, separate, peculiar ; 
although in the world, yet not of the world. ‘Thus God is 
styled ἅγιος, in the highest sense, to distinguish him, on 
the one hand, from the earthly and impure conceptions of 
polytheistic idolatry, and, on the other, from the apparently 
more philosophical, but no less degrading views of the pan- 
theist. He is holy, separate from the universe he has call- 
ed into being, and, although filling all things, yet, in his es. 
sence, inhabiting the high and holy place. 

As here used by Plato, ὥγεος τόπος meaus a place set 
apart from everything that is sinful and vile—the end of a 
course of purification, during which there has been a con- 
tinual ἁγιασμός, that is, a continual separation of the pure 
from the impure, leaving at last nothing that defileth or ren- 
ders unfit for this exceedingly separate region. Compare 
the description of this holy place in the Phedon: “ When 
thus the soul is occupied, it goes away to the pure, to the 
that which is accursed, execrable. On the same principle, the Hebrew 
wap may mean one devoted to the most Jeastly wickedness, as in 


Deuteronomy, xxiii., 18. In a similar manner, the kindred Latin 
word sacer may signify blessed or cursed. ‘The Hebrew 773 has the 


same peculiarity, but derives it from a different source. Some would 
make ἅγιος, or ὧγνός, Which occurs in the tragedians (ἅγιος being 
found mostly in later Greek), from ἄζω, ἄζομαι, to revere, to stand in 
awe of. Even here, however, the mind is led to the same original 
or ultimate sense of separation, as the ground of the feeling express- 
ed by it, whether that feeling be one of admiration and awe of the 
pure and holy, or of fearful astonishment at enormous crime. The 
same primary idea undoubtedly exists in the Latin purus, from the 
Greek πῦρ, fire, the penetrating and separating element which has, 
in all ages, been regarded as the means and emblem of purification. 
See the Timeus, 56, A. 


324 PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 


ever-being, to the immortal, the unchangeable, and, being 
of a kindred nature with it, always would abide there, and 
ceases from its restless wandering—kal πέπαυται τοῦ πλά- 
vov—and is ever engaged in the contemplation of the eter- 
nal.” Phedon, 79, D. Elsewhere he tells us, in almost 
Scriptural language, that holiness becomes those who would 
enter this holy place ; whether by the term he means a lo- 
cality in space, or an exceedingly separate state of the 
soul: Ei¢ δὲ ϑεῖον γένος μὴ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ 
ϑέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι---- To enter into the family of the Di- 
vine,” or, in other words, to become a partaker of the Di-. 
vine nature, ‘can only be for him who departs wholly 
pure.” Jbid., 82, B. Without irreverence may we com- 
pare this with Hebrews, xii., 14: ἁγιασμὸν οὗ χωρὶς οὐ- 
Jctg ὄψεται TOV Κύριον ---- Holiness, without which no one 
shall see the Lord. 

We are very far from saying, or even imagining, that 
Plato attached to these expressions the same high sense in 
which they are used by Paul, and yet there are many such 
passages which, without any violation of the spirit of his 
language, are capable of a comparison, to say the least, with 
some of the most precious truths of revealed religion. He 
was evidently directing his vision to a region of reality, far 
beyond the aim of any of the heathen philosophers who 
preceded, or were cotemporary with him. May he not 
have had some faint glimpses of those higher truths which 
his words, without any violence in their interpretation, fre- 
quently suggest to one who reads him by the light of the 
Christian revelation? Almost everything depends upon the 
state of mind with which his writings are studied. ‘To the 
materialist and the skeptic he will often appear visionary 
and unmeaning. Jefferson, in a manner most characteris- 
tic, pronounced him a foggy intellect. Many of the Chris- 
tian fathers, and a succession of the most learned and pious 
in the Church throughout its whole history, have ever re- 


PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 325 


garded him with enthusiastic fondness, and esteemed his — 
dialogues as ranking next to the Scriptures, although at a 
distance which forbade any comparison with the latter as 
an inspired message from Heaven. We would not be so 
extravagant as to assert that Plato has a spiritual or esoter- 
ic sense, as these terms are used by the allegorist or the 
mystic. No violence need be done to the letter, or to the 
ordinary laws of interpretation, and yet, by a species off ac- 
commodation most easy, and, at the same time, most natu- 
ral, a higher elevation, and a new and almost divine beauty, 
may be imparted to many passages, causing them to glow 
with a radiance that seems derived from the same source 
with the inspiration of the Sacred Volume. Whatever may 
be the cause, whether it be that lower truths are ever types 
of higher, which shine through them when examined by a 
peculiar light and in a peculiar state of the soul, so that 
there may be truly a lower and a higher sense equally well 
conveyed by the same letter (a principle which undoubted- 
ly prevails to some extent in what the soundest expositors 
regard as the double sense of Scripture) ; or whether there 
is a spiritual power in language considered in its essence, 
if not in its forms, as an emanation from the Universal 
Reason, so that at times, and when happily employed, it 
may so manifest its own inherent light as to transcend the 
mind and intended meaning of the writer himself, while the 
reader, under more favoured circumstances, is admitted to 
a higher region of thought, and to a deeper participation of 
that Spirit which dwelleth in the words—or whatever may 
be the explanation of the fact, most certain it is, that the 
language of Plato is often thus easily adapted to a spiritu- 
ality of meaning, in the Christian sense of the term, beyond 
that of any uninspired writings, ancient or modern, and to an 
extent which, we may suppose, would transcend anv con 
ception of the philosopher himself. 

Any one may understand what is meant by this, by keep 

KE 


326 PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 


ing these thoughts in mind while reading some of the more 
striking passages to which reference is made. In those 
parts of the Phedon, for example, where the true philoso- 
pher is represented as daily dying to the world and sense 
(κινδυνεύουσι ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσο. 
φίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν 
ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναμ)Ρ, let the reader think of the 
Chistian instead of the philosopher, and what-a close af- 
finity does the style at once assume with some of the ex- 
pressions of the apostle. What language could more truly 
set forth that hidden aim inthe life of the follower of Christ, 
in which he is so unknown to the great mass around him. 
The world knoweth him not. ‘“'The rest of mankind,” says 
Socrates, “ understand not that he lives to die ;” a saying 
which Cicero, although he but imperfectly comprehended 
even its Platonic sense, has imitated in the declaration, 
Tota philosophorum vita commentatio mortis est. Tusc. Disp., 
1,74. Again, in the same dialogue, take the description of 
that wisdom for which everything else must be exchanged, 
and without which all other apparent virtues are but splendid 
cheats—oxiaypadiai—mere shadows of a shade, consisting 
only in a wretched barter of one passion for another (ἡδονὰς 
πρὸς ἡδονὰς, καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας, καὶ φόθον πρὸς φόθον,᾽ 
καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ νομίσματα καταλλάττεσθαι), 
“the exchanging of pleasure for pleasure, grief for grief, 
Sear for fear, and greater for less, like the coin of traffic ;” 
let any one, we say, in reading this, and its most instructive 
context, think of the Scriptural Wisdom in place of the 
Platonic pévyjotc,.and how vividly arise to mind our 
Saviour’s parable of the pearl of great price, and the sub- 
lime personifications of wisdom in the books of Job and 
Proverbs. Plato may not have exactly meant by φρόνησις 
that fear of: the Lord which is the beginning of all right un- 
derstanding, but he was certainly aiming far above any 
philosopher of his day, or any modern moralist who docs 


PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 327 


not draw directly from the fountain of inspiration. Ex. 
amples of a similar kind may be taken from a great variety 
of passages everywhere meeting us in his most important 
dialogues. In the first half of the sixth book of the Re- 
public, for philosophy, and the philosopher, keep in mind 
Christianity and the Christian, and how sublimely does the 
sense, so sublime before, mount up to a new region of 
spiritual light; and yet, in all this, no violence is done to 
the language; every argument, every epithet, every metaphor 
retains its native force and its relative harmony, while the 
mind can hardly resist the impression, that this glowing 
description of the true philosophy and the true philosopher 
was intended for a higher meaning than, at first, appears upon 
its face. ‘The incongeniality of this spirit, be it philosophy 
or be it religion, with the selfish, debasing, and corrupting 
influences in the midst of which we live—its struggles with 
sense, the contempt poured upon’ it by the world, its de- 
pendence upon that Divine aid which Plato, in this passage, 
so expressly acknowledges, its continual aspirations after 
the fixed and eternal, the rest which it bestows where all 
else is changing and flowing, the exceeding joy with which, 
at times, it inspires that small number who, in every age, 
have tasted and experienced how sweet and blessed is this 
gift of Heaven, while they contemplate the madness which 
rules the multitude—ol ὀλίγοι γευόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι 
ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἰδόντες τὴν 
paviav*—the elevation of soul which is produced by a re. 
ligious contemplation of the whole of our being, leading, not 
to a contempt of our present human life, but to a just esti- 
mate of it as an exceeding small portion of our entire ex- 
istence, and of the boundless field of being which lies 
around us, as when he says, ἀδύνατον τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἡ 
ὑπάρχει αὕτη ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ϑεωρία παντὸς μὲν 


* Republic, vi., 496, C. 


328 PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 


χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, μέγα TL δοκεῖν εἷναι τὸν ἀνθρώπι- 
‘vov βίον," all these, as they are presented in this warm and 
eloquent description of philosophy and the philosophic life, 
rise at once to a more elevated meaning, while, at the same 
time, how admirably does every sentence, thought, and 
word accommodate itself to this higher sense, as though it 
had formed the main and only design of the writer. When, 
with that mild pathos which he sometimes uses with 
so much effect, he tells us what difficulties the philosophic 
nature has to encounter in maintaining its ground against 
the unfriendly influences of a foreign, uncongenial clime 
(ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα ἐν γῇ ἄλλῃ σπειρόμενον ἐξίτηλον 
φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἰέναι εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον), we can hard- 
ly help thinking that we hear the spiritual and plaintive 
Leighton declaring, that ‘the grace of God in the heart of 
man is like a tender plant sown in a strange, unkindly soil,” 
where its fruit would inevitably wither and degenerate inte 
affinity with some base native weed, unless he that planted 
it should exercise that constant care, without which it must 
perish. 

In the hands of no other writer, ancient or modern, does 
philosophy ever assume this heavenly aspect. Should it 
be supposed that this is all the effect of a partial imagina- 
tion, let the experiment be tried with others. Let any one, 
with a similar purpose, read Aristotle, or Bacon, or any of 
the moderns who treat of the philosophy of the soul, and 
ascertain if he can, without violence, extract from them any 
such higher sense, or any such easy accommodation to an 
elevated Christian spirituality. A faint resemblance of this 
peculiar Platonic unction may be traced in some of the 
philosophical tracts of Cicero, especially those that were 
written during the latter years of his life, and in the sub- 
dued spirit of his adverse fortunes; but even with Cicero, 


* Republic, vi., 486, A. t-Ibid., 497, B. 


PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 329 


they are mere imitations of the style and manner of one 
whom he professedly takes as his model, and whom he so 
affectionately styles “ his master Plato.” 

Let these thoughts be carried with us in reading, in the 
seventh book of the Republic, the description of the dark 
cave, and of the poor prisoners who are there confined, 
with their backs to the light, and their intent gaze ever fix- 
ed upon those shadowy appearances which so strangely 
flit across the walls of their chamber of imagery. What 
thoughtful mind can fail to recur to the higher truths of 
the Christian revelation, or avoid being struck with the al- 
most perfect parallelism, as, in Plato’s most truthful picture, 
he contemplates the fondness of those miserable bonds- 
men for their gloomy abode, their first aversion to the daz- 
zling splendour of the-world of reality, and the strong grasp 
with which they cling to their prison house, when some 
kind hand attempts to draw them forth, through the rough 
and steep ascent (τραχείας Kal ἀνάντους ἀναθάσεως), into 
the light of life. How graphic, too, the description of the 
science and philosophy of that narrow world (τῆς ἐκεῖ 
σοφίας) How admirably does he depict the interest with 
which these subterranean savans are occupied in the study 
of what they style nature, in tracing the law of cause and 
effect, antecedents and consequents, as the dim shadows 
pass across their contracted scene of observation—the petty 
pride with which they dignify this pursuit with the exclu- 
sive name of science, their stinging jealousy of others who 
are ambitiously aiming at the distinctions and honours of 
the same most intellectual life, the laborious earnestness 
with which they are engaged in thus building up from these 
inductions a science of shadows, which might astonish their 
more vulgar companions, by its seeming vaticinations of the 
periods and returns of those φαινόμενα with which their 
minds are daily occupied, to the exclusion of any study of 
themselves or of their true position—while all this time the 

KE 


= PLATONIC SPIRITUAL SENSE. 


real world, in which shines the real sun, where may be 
seen the real heavens, and where alone exists the real 
science, are as much and as utterly unknown as are the 
high hopes of the Christian, and the sublime truths which 
occupy his soul, to the most grovelling and sensual world- 
ling. Τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι et τινες αὐτοῖς ἦσαν τότε παρ᾽ 
ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθαρῶντι τὰ παριόντα καὶ 
μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσα 
ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα πορεύεσθαι, καὶ éx τούτων δὴ δυνα- 
τώτατα ἀπομαντενομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἥξειν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν 
(τὸν πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοντα) ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ 
ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους ; Republic, vii., 516, 
D. The resemblance between this and the spirit and tenor 
of the Scriptural representations need not be pointed out. 
One might almost fancy it an expansion of the striking, yet 
concise description of the Psalmist: δ ΠῚ ἘΞ Ν 3 ΠΝ, 
Man walketh in a shadow, a land of images, ‘A VAIN 
SHOW. 

Wizh this philosopher even politics assumes a divine and 
religicgus aspect, and, in all his speculations, the political 
closely connects itself with the theological. How easy and 
natural would it be, in pursuance of the same method, to 
adapt what he says of the heavenly paradigm in the close 
of the ninth book of the Republic, and his seventh kingdom in 
the Politicus, to the Christian Church: ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ δὲ πολὺ 
πρῶτόν TE καὶ ἄριστον βιωτέον, πλὴν τῆς ‘EBAOMHY. 
πασῶν γὰρ ἐκείνην γε ἐκκριτέον, οἷον ϑεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, 
ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν. Politicus, or Statesman, 303, A. 

From such an accommodation of Plato’s rich and won- 
drous fancy, how many most valuable thoughts, or rather 
illustrations, might be suggested, which would not be un- 
worthy even of the pulpit—thoughts which, while they 
claimed the ‘closest affinity with the Scriptures, might be 
brought to bear upon the soul and conscience with all the 
power of illustration drawn from the language of the divin- 


MYTHICAL SENSE OF THE WORD ϑάνατος. 331 


est of philosophers. We know of no profane writer who, 
in this way, might be so useful to the preacher as Plato, 
and no one whom we would so earnestly recommend to all 
young men who are aiming at the Christian ministry. Let 
them not read Plato to understand the Bible —although, 
even with this in view, they would receive no small assist- 
ance—but let them read the Bible in close connexion with 
our philosopher, and they will understand Plato better than 
he ever understood himself. 


LXI. 
Mythical Sense of the Word Θάνατος. 


Pace 62, Line 4. ἔν τε ζωῇ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ϑανάτοις. This 
evidently refers to the deaths of one individual, and not of 
many. But why, then, the plural? We think Plato keeps 
in mind here his doctrine of the transition of the soul, or 
its μετεμψυχώσεις, into various states, either in an ascend- 
ing or a descending series; the passage from one to the 
other of which he styles a death anda birth. See the Phe- 
don, 114, B., also 70, C.: παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστί τις ὃ λό- 
γος, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο 
ἀφικνοῦνται, καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν TEOVEO~TWY—* It is an 
ancient tradition that souls go there from hence, and again 
return hither and arise from the dead.” Compare, also, 
what is said respecting the purgations and metempsycho- 
ses of the soul, in the remarkable myth at the end of the 
Republic. Thus, also, in the Gorgias, 493, A., he speaks 
of the present life as though, when compared with some 
preceding state, it might in reality be a death, to which, for _ 
reasons arising out of some former relations, we may have 
been doomed. “As you say,” continues Socrates, “life is 
an awful thing (δεινὸς ὁ βίος), and I should not wonder if 
Euripides spoke the truth when he said, 


332 MYTHICAL SENSE OF THE WORD ϑάνατος. 
* 

Τίς δ᾽ oidev, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, 

τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῇν ; 
Who knows but life is death, and death is life? And per- 
haps we are now dead, as I have heard of the wise, and 
that the body is our monument (σῆμα) or sepulchre in which 
the soul is buried.” 

The context of this strange declaration in the Gorgias 
affords strong reasons for believing, that it may have been 
spoken mystically and mythically of that spiritual death 
which is so prominent a subject of the Scriptures. In this 
most exquisite analysis of the nature of physical pleasure, 
and its utter want of all claim to be considered The Good, 
the sensualist is regarded as “dead while he lives.” His 
soul is said to be rotten and leaky, like a perforated cask 
(ὡς πίθος tetpnuévoc). His pleasure is described as a 
continual znflowing to supply a constant outflowing ; a ‘ bro- 
ken cistern,” requirmg a constant and laborious filling, in 
distinction from that spring which Socrates represents as 
ever full, and which so strongly suggests our Saviour’s 
“well of living water, bubbling up to everlasting life.” In 
this description, physical pleasure is regarded as a pro- 
tracted dying, because it can only exist as the gratifying of — 
an ever-craving want, the removal of an ever-tormenting 
pain, the vain attempt to quench an ever-burning thirst, or 
to fill an ever-empty void. In the language of the sensual- 
ist himself: ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδέως ζῇν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖσ. 
τον ἐπιῤῥεῖν--- καὶ διψῇν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν----ἰς In this 
is pleasure, namely, to have the greatest inflowing (as into 
a vacuum), to drink while ever thirsting, and ever to thirst 
while drinking.” See the whole passage, from 492, D., to 
495, A. In the declaration in our text, Plato probably uses 
ϑάνατος in the first of these interpretations. Ast renders it 
quolibet mortis genere. 


OMNIPRESENCE OF THE DIVINE JUSTICE. 330 


LXIL. 


Omnipresence of the Divine Justice. Remarkable Resenw 
blance of Plato’s Language to some Passages from the 
Bible. 

Pace 63, Line 1. οὐ γὰρ ἀμεληθήσῃ ποτὲ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς. 
In this passage αὐτῆς refers to Δίκη, the Divine Justice or 
Law, which is so frequently personified by the Grecian 
poets as ever sitting on the right hand of Jove and sharing 
his throne. ‘There is a very strong resemblance between 
these declarations and Psalm cxxxix., 7. ‘* You shall never 
be neglected by it. You cannot, being small, so descend 
into the depths of the earth, nor, being raised on high, so 
fly up into Heaven, but that you shall pay the fitting penalty, 
whether remaining in this world, or having passed through 
life into Hades, or having been borne to a region still more 
wild than these.” The expressions of the Psalmist are 
strikingly similar, although not directly applied to the trans- 
gressor. Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, and whither 
shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into Heaven, 
behold, thou. art there. If I make my bed in Hades, behold, 
thou art there. If I should take the wings of the morning, 
and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall 
thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me. More 
in accordance with the spirit, although with less similarity 
of expression, is the, passage, Job, xxxiv., 21: His eyes 
are upon the ways of man, and all his steps he beholdeth. 
There is no darkness, no land of the shades of the dead (no 
nyn7y,* or terra umbrarum), where the workers of iniquily 


* Ts there not some reason to believe that this word, which is 
generally rendered shadow of death, may, more properly, mean the 
Spiritual world itself, the land of the shades, as though it had been 
nine plural feminine of mpg instead of having the punctuation 


| which it has received from the Masorites? 


304 DOCTRINE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT. 


may hide themselves. Compare, also, Amos, ix., 2: If they 
dig down into Sheol (or Hades), from thence shall my hand 
take them. If they ascend up into Heaven, from: thence will 
I bring them down. If they be hidden in the top of Carmel, 
from thence will I discover and take them. If they would 
conceal themselves from mine eye in the bottom of the sea, 
from thence will I command the serpent, and it shall bite 
them. 
How vividly, too, is this doctrine of an ever wakeful, 
retributive justice presented liy Sophocles : 
ἡγεῖσθε δὲ 
βλέπειν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν εὐσεθῆ βροτῶν, 
βλέπειν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς δυσσεθεῖς " φυγὴν δέ που 
μήπω γενέσθαι φωτὸς ἀνοσίου βροτῶν---- 
Bethink you, then ; 
Heaven hath its eye upon the pious man, 
Its eye upon the sinner... Flight there’s none, 


No hiding-place to which the unholy wretch 
Can e’er escape.— (dip. Col., 278. 


ΧΗΣ τῶι 
Doctrine of a Final Judgment. Use of the Word Συντέ- 
Agia. 

Pace 64, Line 1. οὐκ εἰδὼς αὐτῶν τῆν συντέλειαν ὕπη 
ποτὲ τῷ παντὶ ξυμθάλλεται. Ast translates this, nesciens 
eorum collatio quomodo universo comducat, “not knowing 
their contribution,” &c. He takes συντέλεια in what is 
perhaps the more usual signification in classic Greek, name- 
ly, a contribution by members of a society, @ share or assess- 
ment, and which agrees well with ξυμόάλλεται. The other 
sense, however, of termination, consummation, &c., suits far 
better with the context of this most important ait solemn 
passage. It recommends itself, too, to us by its striking 
resemblance to the use of the word in certain declarations | 





DOCTRINE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT. 290 


of the Scriptures. Both the ideas, however, may be united 
in our word reckoning, or final settlement of an account 
which has been long deferred. We prefer this, because the 
whole passage has reference to a judgment or final dispo- 
sition of the wicked, and would, therefore, render it, ‘ not 
knowing their end or consummation, in what way it con- 
tributes to the whole,” that is, in what way the present 
suspension of punishment, and their final doom, sustain the 
universal government. Probably both senses were present 
to the mind of the writer, and both seem necessary to com- 
plete the harmony of the conception. 

Viger, in his Latin version of Eusebius, Prep. Evang., 
page 635, D., prefers this second sense, which, although 
the least used, comes the nearest to the radical and etymo- 
logical meaning of the compound. He translates the pas- 
sage, 7gnorans videlicet qui tandem aut qua parte tstorum 
FINIS et EXITUS cum universi rationibus cohereret. The 
reader may find this deeply interesting subject of the delay 
of God in the punishment of the wicked treated at great 
length by Plutarch in his treatise, Περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ Tov Θείου 
βραδέως τιμωρουμένων ; a very excellent edition of which 
has been lately edited by Professor Hackett of the Newton 
Theological Seminary. he work is accompanied by 
notes, chiefly of a theological character, exhibiting much 
real and useful learning, with no display of that philologi- 
cal pedantry which deforms so many modern editions of 
ancient writers, and, on the whole, forming one of the most 
valuable additions to our theological and classical literature. 

Συντέλεια, in the sense of completion, summing, or wind- 
ing up, and in a connexion impressively similar to the pas- 
sage in our text, is found in the explanation of the parable 
of the tares and the wheat, in which the former are said to 
be permitted to grow for the sake of the latter, and where, 
as is here intimated by Plato, all things are referred to some 
final period of decision and development: ‘O δὲ ϑερισμὸς 


336 DOCTRINE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT. 


συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνός éortv—The harvest is the end (the 
day of reckoning) of the world. So shall it be in the end of 
the world (the winding up, the conclusion, the final account, 
the catastrophe of the great πρᾶξις, or drama of life) ; they 
shall gather out all things that offend and all that do iniquity. 
Matthew, xiii., 39, 41. The same remarkable word is 
found, Hebrews, 1x., 26: ἅπαξ ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων 
—once in the winding up of the ages. 

Συντέλεια signifies not only an end, like τέλος, but an 
ending together, a con-clusion, an accomplishment of great 
purposes brought about by a long series of means, which, 
although, at times, ever so apparently divergent, have all, 
finally, converged to one grand result. 

On this doctrine of the Divine delay in the punishment 
of sin, compare Job, xxi., 29: The wicked is reserved (Heb. 
jwn:, held back) unto the day of doom: unto the day of wrath 
shall they be brought forth. No text in the Old Testament, 
as is shown by the context, points more clearly to a future 
judgment of a general and concluding kind. Very similar 
language is held respecting the fallen angels, Jude, 6: Re- 
served in chains to the judgment of the great day. Compare, 
also, Prov., xvi., 3: All things (τὸ πᾶν, τὸ ὅλον) hath the 
Lord made for himself, yea, the wicked for the day of evil; 
which is almost equivalent to the declaration in our text: 
συντέλεια αὐτῶν τῷ παντὶ ξυμθάλλεται. In like manner, 
the Psalmist, when he ceased to look upon appearances, or, 
in the language of our author (page 63, line 10), ὡς ἐν ka- 
τόπτροις τὰς πράξεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων KaBopav—when he 
‘entered into the sanctuary,” into the study and contem- 
plation of the higher counsels of the Divine government— 
“then saw he their end”’—t7v συντέλειαν αὐτῶν. As a 
dream when one awaketh, so, O Lord, when they* awake, or 





* Psalm Ixxiii., 20. Thus, we are satisfied, should the Hebrew 
“Ya be rendered, as applying to the sinner, and not to God; or it 
may, perhaps, be translated, ‘ When their image (shade, umbra, maxes, 


DOCTRINE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT. 307 


in the awaking (that 15, in the resurrection morning, at the 
great day of account), wilt thou despise their image (Dx), 
their ghost or umbra (LXX., τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτῶν). 
We would not engage in the superfluous work of endeav- 
ouring to prop, by the supports of human reason and human 
feelings, any truth clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures. 
There is, however, no one which, if it were necessary, 
might be more safely trusted to such a defence than this 
doctrine of a general final judgment. Here the long and 
steady voice of humanity may be safely appealed to. From 
the time when the smoking blood of Abel invoked the Di- 
vine justice, there has ever been something in the human ° 
breast which has declared the necessity of a judgment, of 
a fixed time, when there shall be a συντέλεια, or winding 
up; when it will be found that the Judge of all the Earth 
has done right, and must do right ; when every wrong which 
has been seemingly neglected sgall be made right; when 
‘all that is crooked shall be made straight,” and every- 
thing that is dark and mysterious shall be made clear. The 
alarmed conscience, even while it dreads, demands it. We. 
cannot read a poor work of fietion without experiencing a 
painful feeling when the termination of the story crosses 
these instinctive sentiments of the soul, or, in common par- 
lance, does not end well, has no proper συντέλεια; when 
virtue (even the poor, miserable, low virtue which is held 
in repute by the world) is not rewarded, and vice does not 
receive its fitting punishment. ‘The reader, in such cases, 
feels that a wrong has been done to his moral sense—that 
the universal instinct of justice, which even bad men pos- 
sess, has been violated. How, then, can the thought be 


or ghost) arises, thou wilt reject τι. We would also suggest, although 
with much diffidence, whether there may not be a similar idea in the 
parallel Hebrew word 1315) as applied to a different character, 
Psalm xvil., 15: ‘“‘ When thine image awakes,” that is, the new spir- 
itual farm which thou wilt bestow. See, also, Job, iv., 6. 


F fF 


338 PLATONIC USE OF THE WORD τύπος. 


endured, that there will be no set time when the great πρᾶξ. 
ἐς, or drama, of this world shall be brought to a fitting close | 
and every act receive its just recompense of reward? The 
wicked shall not stand in the judgment. Instead, however, 
of bringing forward such Old Testament texts in proof of 
the doctrine as a revealed truth, we would rather see in 
them a taking for granted of what the universal voice of hu- 
manity has ever proclaimed as the voice of God, uttered in 
the conscience as well as declared in his Word. 


———= 


LXIV. 
Platonic Use of the Word τύπος. 


Pace 64, Line 4. ἥν τις μὴ γιγνώσκων οὐδ᾽ ἂν τύπον 
toot ποτέ, K. τ. Δ. “ Which, unless one knoweth, he can 
never know the type (theffform) of life.” That is, without 
this doctrine of the end of the wicked, and of the manner in 
which the present suspension and the final infliction of their 
doom contribute to the universal harmony, life would have 
no meaning. It would be Tohu and Bohu (Genesis, 1., 2), 
a moral chaos, on which no intelligible form had been im- 
pressed ; or, to take a comparison from Job, xxxviii., 14, it 
would be like a confused mass of clay, which had received 
be stamp (τύπος) of no significant seal. Τύπος, also, in a 
econdary or metaphorical sense, means a summary descrip- 
on, or, in philosophy, a general idea, an outline, or model, 
cequiring a correspondence or general conformity in the 
filling up of the more minute parts which are not specified. 
Hence the common phrase, ἐν τύπῳ λέγειν, to say in gen- 
eral terms. 

This use of the word may be found in the Republic, 1., 
379, B., and the following pages, where Plato lays down 
what he styles τύποι περὶ ϑεολογίας, types in theology, or 
first principles respecting the Divine Nature, which are 


EVIL IN _THE PRESENT STATE EXCEEDS THE GOOD. 339 


ever to be kept in mind in forming a right estimate of God’s 
character and government. In a similar application, we 
have τύπος, Romans, vi., 17: χάρις δὲ τῷ Yew, ὑπηκού- 
σατε Ek καρδίας εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε τύπον διδαχῆς--- Βιιί, 
thanks be to God, ye have obeyed, from the heart, that form 
of doctrine in which ye were instructed. So, also, the de- 
rivative ὑποτύπωσις, 2 Timothy, 1, 18---ποτύπωσιν ἔχε 
ὑγιαινόντων λόγων, Hold fast the form of sound words (or 
doctrines)—doubtless referring to some symbol, creed, or 
catechism which Timothy had received from Paul, or had 
heard recited by him, containing an outline of the Christian 
faith, and which he was to use as a preacher and instructer 
in the Gospel. This Paul enjoins upon him to hold in 
faith and love (or, as he says in the passage in Romans, 
éx καρδίας), instead of regarding it as a mere speculative 
scheme, into which, without care, such a τύπος or ὑποτύ- 
mWoL¢ might degenerate. | 

Without understanding this type of life, we are told in 
the text, there could be no right judgment formed respect- 
ing happiness or blessedness, and their opposites. It is an 
expansion of the sentiment of Solon. A complete knowl- 
edge of what constitutes the blessed man depends, not only 
upon the end of his individual life, but also upon his rela- 
tion to the great end, or συντέλεια, of the world or dispensa- 
tion of which he forms a part. See Dissertation xxxviii., 
on the Greek Words for Happiness and Blessedness. 


LXV. 

Explanation of a Difficult Passage, in which Plato seems to 
assert that our Evils, in the Present State, exceed our 
Good. 

Pace 68, Line 11. πλειόνων δὲ τῶν wh. It is not easy 
to determine the true meaning here, or to decide with abso- 


340 EVIL IN THE PRESENT STATE EXCEEDS THE GOOD. 


lute certainty, whether the speaker intends to give the pra 
ponderance to good or evil in the present state; although 
there can be no doubt to which party, in this severe con- 
flict, he would assign the final triumph. Ast renders it, 
pluribus vero que non sint bona, pugna, dicimus, tmmortalis 
est, &c.; to authorize which, he must supply ἀγαθῶν after 
uy. In the Latin version to Clemens Alexandinus, Siro- 
mat., Ve, 593, it is translated, pluribus qui non sunt ejusmodi, 
which is as ambiguous as the Greek, and leaves it utterly 
uncertain whether ejusmodi is meant to refer to ἀγαθῶν or 
ἐναντίων. Viger, in his Latin version of Eusebius, Prep. 
Evang., xi., 549, gives an entirely different rendering, by 
reading τινῶν for THav—quibuscum tamen genus aliud nul- 
lum misceatur—a sense which even his emendation, if it 
convey any meaning at all, would not yield. It might be, 
on the contrary (and the supposition has much intrinsic 
plausibility, if we lay aside all considerations drawn from 
other passages), that the writer meant, by τῶν μῆ, things 
neither good nor bad, or what some would style ἀδιάφορα. 
Ficinus renders concisely, et quidem plurium, meaning 
thereby the evils; which construction, it may be supposed, 
he derived from supplying after μή the word ἐναντίων, and 
regarding πλειόνων as governing τῶν, instead of agreeing 
with it—as though the whole expression had been equiva- 
lent to ἐναντία πλείονα εἶναι τῶν μὴ ἐναντίων. The great 
objection to this is the exceeding awkwardness of the con- 
struction arising from thus piling negatives upon negatives. 

πλειόνων would most naturally be referred to what just 
precedes it, namely, ἐναντίων. It might, however, be sup- 
posed that Plato wrote carelessly, and actually meant to 
connect it with ἀγαθῶν, farther above. In this case it 
would correspond to the clumsy English sentence, “ full of 
good, and full of the contrary, but of more than what 1s not ;” 
which, notwithstanding its harshness, would leave little 
doubt as to the meaning, although it would require us to 


EVIL IN THE PRESENT STATE EXCEEDS THE Goop. 341 


regard πλειόνων as governing τῶν instead of agreeing with 
it. ‘This view, namely, that tov μῆ agrees with ἀγαθῶν 
understood, and is governed by πλειόνων, or which would 
regard the sentence as assigning a preponderance to the 
good, might likewise be strengthened by an inference very 
naturally drawn from his having so expressly given the 
superiority in the moving and control of the heavens tv the 
beneficent soul ; as where Clinias is made to say (page 38, 
line 1), οὐδ᾽ ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν 
ψυχὴν περιάγειν αὐτά. Especially might it be deduced 
from that subtle and beautiful disquisition on the resemblance 
of the heavenly motions to the motion of νοῦς, or intellect, 
or of the best soul in distinction from that evil one which 
eVer MOVES, μανικῶς TE καὶ ἀτάκτως, in madness and dis- 
order. But, as we conceive, we are estopped from this in- 
terpretation, and compelled to acquiesce in the contrary, by 
the fact, that Plato, in the Republic, most expressly asserts 
that our evils exceed our good—dAJW’ ὀλίγων (ὁ ϑεός) 
αἴτιος, TOAD yap ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν. We cannot, 
therefore, help thinking that he suffered a morbid feeling 
of the immediate evils of the world directly around him, 
and which were magnified by contiguity, to cause him to 
forget the legitimate inferences from his own beautiful ar- 
gcument, and to make a declaration which would seem to 
imply that, on the whole, there is more evil than good. We 
may also indulge the supposition, that he refers merely to 
the present time, and believed that the great battle of the 
universe, or the μάχη ἀθάνατος, of which he soon speaks, 
would eventually bring out an opposite preponderance of 
good, and a final triumph of the beneficent over the evil and 
disorderly soul. 


F r2 


$42 Μάχη ἀθάνατος, OR BATTLE OF THE UNIVERSE. 


LXVI. 


Mayn ’A@avaroc, or Batile of the Universe, between the 
Powers of Good and Evil. Sin, therefore, no Light Mat- 
ter, because it is Treason against the Cause of Good, for 
which God is contending with the Evil Soul. 


Pace 68, Line 11. MAXH δή, φαμέν, ΑΘΑΝΑΤῸΣ ἐστιν 
ἡ τοιαύτη, καὶ φυλακῆς ϑαυμαστῆς δεομένη. ‘Such, 
would we say, is an immortal conflict, and needing most 
wonderful care or vigilance.” ‘The simile which was com- 
menced in πόλεμος, several lines back, is here preserved 
and brought out in a style which it would be no extrava- 
-gance to call sublime. All things are most vividly repre- 
sented as engaged in an everlasting conflict between the 
powers of Good and Evil. ‘This is the great ἀγών which, 
as he elsewhere says, is dvti πάντων ἀγώνων, in the place 
of, or before, all other conflicts. In the description of this 
battle of the universe, the author seems inspired with a more 
than Homeric grandeur of imagination. The images in 
the Theomachia of the Iliad may have more tendency to ex- 
cite and arouse the passions, but they are far inferior in the 
power of producing that swelling, yet calm feeling of moral 
sublimity with which the soul is filled in reading this noble 
passage. Not Gods alone 

descending swell the fight,* 


but all nature and all worlds rise into deeply interested 
parties to this universal strife. Order is everywhere 
struggling with disorder. Light is contending with dark- 
ness, truth with error, knowledge with ignorance. ‘The 
science of medicine is fighting with disease, agriculture 
with the hostile stubbornness of the earth, art and science 
of every kind with the rude and savage life. On a higher 


* Tliad, xx., 47. Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μεθ᾽ ὅμιλον ᾿Ολύμπιοι ἤλυθον ἀνδρῶν. 


Μάχη ἀθάνατος, OR BATTLE OF THE UNIVERSE. 49 


scale, the virtues are personified as in conflict with our 
sins. Righteousness is engaged in a strife which knows 
no compromise with unrighteousness. ‘l'emperance main- 
tains an unintermitting struggle with her most powerful and 
unyielding antagonist. To crown all, God himself and the 
celestial powers are represented as everywhere contending 
with the forces of the Evil Soul, and with the dark, mind- 
ess, disorderly Spirit of Matter. 

All this, too, seems to be for our sakes, and for our aid, 
in a strife of which we are so little able to appreciate the 
immortal issues. The Gods and δαίμονες are our allies. 
They fight for us as their κτήματα ; as shepherds for their 
flocks. We do not wonder, then, that this passage sug- 
gested to some of the Fathers that strikingly similar declara- 
tion of the Apostle, Ephesians, vi., 12Q—Ovx« ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ 
πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχᾶς, πρὸς τὰς 
ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τοῦ αἰῶγος 
τούτου, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρα- 
γνίοις----ἰς Our wresiling is not with flesh and blood only, but 
with principalities, with powers, with the rulers of darkness 
of this world, with the spiritual powers of evil in the Heavens.” 
Compare Clemens Alex., Stromat., 593, B., and Eusebius, 
Prep. Evang., xi., 26, p. 550. Both of them institute a 
comparison between this passage and Ephesians, vi., 12, 
and both regard Plato as having derived his doctrine of 
evil powers in conflict with the good from the Old Testa- 
ment, especially from such passages as Job, i., 6, 7, and 
Deut., xxxil., 8. 

Invisible beings are contending for-us and against us. 
It is to something like this, and not to a physical strife only 
(although such a warfare, too, is included), that the philoso 
pher alludes, when he says, ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν ϑεοί τε καὶ 
δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς δ᾽ av κτήματα ϑεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων. Such, 
too, is the constant style of the New Testament. Life is 
ἃ πάλῃ, an ἀγών, a struggle, a battle, a race, in which we 


9.4 Mayn ἀθάνατος, OR BATTLE OF THE UNIVERSE. 


are earnestly called upon “lo press forward to the mark of 
the prize of the upward calling,’ τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως ;* as 
though God from above was uttering aloud the réAevona,t 
or cheering battle-cry, to the contending host, and saying to 
each faithful combatant, ἀνάθηθι ὧδε, “ come up hither,{ and 
I will give thee the crown of life ; ὃ or, as it is admirably 
paraphrased in that noblest of hymns, 


’Tis God’s all animating voice 
That calls thee from on high ; 
’Tis his own hand presents the prize 
To thine uplifted eye. 
A cloud of witnesses around, 
Hold thee in full survey ; 
Forget the steps already trod, 
And upward urge thy way. 


Καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη ---“ For noble is 
the prize, and the hope is great,” as Socrates tells us in the 
Phedon.|| We may learn even from Plato that our present 
existence is no vain thing, no 
fleeting show 
For man’s illusion given— 

according to the mawkish sentimentalism of a modern poet, 
but a most solemn and dread reality, connected with the 
whole scheme of the universe, and in which not only man, 
but angels and devils, powers visible and invisible, are in- 
tent and deeply interested actors. ‘ Life, in itself,” says 
Socrates, in the Republic, “ may be insignificant, but think 
you,” he continues, “that an immortal thing ought to be 
concerned, and in earnest. for so short a part alone, and not 
for the whole of its existence”—ole οὖν ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι 
ὑπὲρ χρόνου οὕτως ὀλίγου μόνον δεῖν ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ᾽ 
οὐχ ὑπὲρ TOY ΠΑΝΤΟΣ. Lid. x., 608, E. 

Pace 69, Line 23. φυλακῆς ϑαυμαστῆς δεομένη, “ Re- 


* Philippians, ili., 14. + Thessalonians, iv., 16. 
t Revelations, Xi., 12... nhTbidaah, Νὴ |! Pheed., 114, C. 


Mayn ἀθάνατος, OR BATTLE OF THE UNIVERSE 948 


quiring a wonderful watch or vigilance.” Φυλακή may 
mean, first, the act of watching ; or, secondly, a watch or 
guard ; or, thirdly, a state of mind, watchfulness, or vigilance. 
Here, perhaps, the first impression would be that it is to be 
referred to the soul of man. A careful consideration, how- 
ever, of the whole argument, andeespecially of what is said, 
page 72, line 11, compels us to refer the term to the Deity, 
as intimating the intense interest and watchful care with 
which God regards the progress-of this great battle be- 
tween Good and Evil. 

The precise point of the argument, as a whole, is not ob- 
vious without considerable attention; but when that atten 
tion is bestowed, it strikes the mind with more force, in 
consequence of not having been obtruded upon its notice. 
The substance of it seems to us to be this: those who 
speak and think of sin as of little moment, and who imagine 
that God is easily propitiated by their poor offerings, are 
asked to what class of mere earthly rulers they would liken 
the Divinities who have charge of us. ‘The absurdity is 
afterward shown (although somewhat out of its regular 
place in the argument), of supposing that even these lower 
guardians could be influenced to do acts injurious to their 
respective charges, by gifts filched from the very treasury 
of those to whom they are presented; as though dogs 
should be seduced to let wolves ravage the flock, by the 
offering of a small share of the spoils of the robbery, or the 
governor of a vessel, tempted, by presents of wine and in- 
cense from the sailors, to destroy both the ship and them. 
How much less, then, should it be thought that the Divini- 
ties could be induced to be placable to offenders, because 
they make offerings to them of the very fruit of their own 
crimes—Gv αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων σμικρὰ ἀπονέμοιεν. 
‘hese considerations being borne in mind, although in part 
subsequently introduced, and we feel the force of this sub- 
lime allusion to the μάχη a@avatoc—the great strife te 


346 Μάχη ἀθάνατος, OR BATTLE OF THE UNIVERSE. 


which we are parties, the immense theatre on which we 
are actors, and the almost infinite relations we bear to the 
universe of rational and immortal beings. Our actions, 
therefore, are not unimportant, nor are they, when evil, to 
be atoned for by any light sacrifice. Moreover, this con- 
test, it should be remembered, is between the powers of 
Good and Evil. God himself is leading on the one host to 
the battle, and is personally striving for the victory. ‘There 
can, therefore, be no neutrality allowed in this warfare, 
much less any actual taking part with the enemy by those 
for whose sake, mainly, the contest is waged. On this ac- 
count, the Deity, by a species of anthropopathy, is represent- 
ed as exercising the utmost vigilance and circumspection 
in behalf of a charge so immense, engaged in a conflict 
and exposed to perils so tremendous. He is compared to 
the commander of a mighty army, who is ever awake and 
watching for the slightest irruption of the enemy— 


Ob χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα, 


τ 


ᾧ λαοί τ᾽ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν." 


In an infinitely higher sense do both the Scriptures and 
Plato assert the ever-sleepless vigilance of the physical and 
moral Guardian of the universe: ‘‘ He never sleepeth or 
slumbereth that keepeth Israel.” ‘ The eyes of the Lord are 
an all the earth, beholding the evil and the good.” {tis ἃ strug- 
ele of life and death. Resistance is to be made at every 
point to the advance of the kingdom of darkness. Final 
triumph is to be secured at every cost. No quarter is to 
be allowed to the foe, and especially when any of those 
moral agents, for whom the battle is fought, are guilty of 
forming an unnatural alliance with the enemy. This con- 
stitutes the intrinsic odiousness and wickedness, the ex- 
ceeding sinfulness of sin. It is treason against the univer- 
sal Cause of Good. It is direct opposition to the very na- 


τὸ ------ 


* Πιδά, il, 24. 


PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF THE δαίΐμονες, oR GEN. 347 


ture of God, and a base and treacherous aiding of his ma- 
lignant foe. When these considerations are kept in mind, 
we are prepared to feel the force of the concluding decla- 
ration, that God will never be propitiated by offerings from 
unholy men, and to sympathize with Clinias in his passion- 
ate burst of indignation at the,very thought: Οὐδαμῶς" 
οὔτε ἀνεκτὸς ὁ Adyoc— By no means; it cannot be; the 
declaration is never to be tolerated.” 


LXVII. 
Plato’s Doctrine of the Aaipovec, or Geni. 


Pace 69, Line 2. Θεοὶ καὶ δαίμονες. ‘There are clearly 
three distinct grades of superhuman beings presented to us, 
not only in the theology of Plato, but also in the Grecian 
mythology as set forth by the poets. These are Ζεύς, Ooi, 
and Δαίμονες. Oot, however, includes both the others, or, 
rather, we should say, when the first two are mentioned, as 
in that invocation so common in the poets, Ὦ Zev καὶ Θεοί, 
the term Veoé contains δαίμονες ; and, again, in such ex- 
pressions as the above from our text, it includes Ζεύς. See 
the Timeus, 41, A. 

We have several times alluded to Plato’s doctrine of the 
Δαίμονες, or Genii, and would dwell upon it in this place 
more at length. ‘The passage in which we find the most 
express and the clearest mention of them is in the Epino- 
mis, or Appendix to The Laws, 984, D.: μετὰ dé τούτους 
καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἑξῆς, AAIMONAY, ἀέριον δὲ γένος ἔχον 
ἕδραν τρίτην εὐχαῖς τιμᾷν μάλα χρεών, κ. τ. A.—‘* Next to 
these, and under these, the Genii (as we prefer to render it, 
because of the bad sense that the New Testament has at- 
tached to the word demons), an aérial* race, having the 


* According to a division which he makes of all beings below the 
Supreme Deity, and corresponding to the four states or elements. 


348 PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF THE δαίμονες, OR GENII. 


third seat, must we honour by prayers,” The reader is re. 
ferred to the entire passage, which is too long for insertion 
here. ‘They are spoken of as possessing wonderful intelli- 
gence, as feeling a deep sympathy in human affairs, as lov- 
ing the good, hating the bad, and, in consequence of their 
middle position in the air, acting as interpreters and medi- 
ators between God and man. ‘To the same effect Socrates 
speaks of them in the Symposion, 202, E.: καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ 
Δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι Θεοῦ TE Kal ϑνητοῦ, ἑρμηνεῦον ϑε- 
οἷς τὰ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ ϑεῶν. διὰ 
τούτου ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη" 
Θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐσ- 
τιν ἡ ὁμιλία ϑεοῖς σὺν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐγρηγορόσι καὶ κα- 
θεύδουσι----“ For the whole demonial race is between God 
«id mortals, acting as interpreters or messengers to both. 
Through this passes all divination, and the whole prophet- 
ical art; fur God mingles not directly with the human race, 
but through these media is ever carried on the intercourse 
between Heaven and men, both when awake and when 
asleep.” See, also, Apuleius, De Deo Socratis, 674: Hos 
Greci nomine Aaivovac nuncupant, inter terricolas ceeli- 
colasque vectores, hinc precum inde donorum® Compare 
with the above, Hesiod, Works and Days, 233: 
ἐγγὺς yap ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐόντες 
ἀθώνατοι λεύσσουσιν. 


For, close at hand, 
Immortal eyes behold us evermore. 


So, also, a few lines below, where he represents the number 
of these invisible beings as amounting to thirty thousand : 


Τρὶς yap μυρίοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὲ πουλυθοτείρῃ 
ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς ΦΎΛΑΚΕΣ ϑνητῶν ἀνθρώπων, 
ἠέρα ἑσσάμενοι, πάντη φοιτῶντες ἐπ᾽ αἷαν. 

For thrice ten thousand wait upon our earth ; 
Jove’s everlasting guards for mortal men, 
Who roam the world in robes of air concealed. 


PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF THE δαίμονες, oR GENII. 349 


Milton must certainly have had in mind this passage from 
Hesiod, and perhaps, also, 2 Kings, vi., 17: 

Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth, 

Unseen, both when we sleep and when we wake. 

In one of Plato’s strange myths, which may be found in 
the fourth book of The Laws, 713,C., the Aaiwovec, or Genii, 
are represented as having been anciently (in the reign of 
Saturn) the political governors of mankind, ruling them as 
man rules the inferior animals. It was intended, probably, 
to indicate the Divine origin of law and government, in op- 
position to the absurd paradox that they derive, not only 
their forms and practical administration, but also their in- 
herent authority, solely from the consent of the governed. 
It is, however, a paradox which it is difficult to refute by 
arguments capable of being appreciated by the mass of 
mankind, and therefore Plato, as is usual with him in such 
cases, does not surrender the truth, or leave it out of his 
scheme of legislation, but throws himself back upon an an- 
cient myth.” The length of the passage compels us to omit 
the Greek. On account, however, of its intrinsic value, as 
exhibiting the origin and ancient mode of presenting certain 
ideas, a version is given in full: ‘“ We have received a tra- 
dition of the blessed life of the men of those days, how 
abundantly and spontaneously it had all things. And this 
is said to have been the cause of it: Saturn, knowing, as 
we have related, how that human nature, in the absolute 
self-control of human affairs, can never avoid being filled with 
violence and unrighteousness, appointed as rulers and magis- 
trates to our cities, not men, but beings of a Divine and no- 
bler race, namely, the Genii. Just as we now conduct to- 
wards the flocks and all tame herds, in that we do not con- 
stitute oxen as rulers over oxen, nor goats over goats, but 
we ourselves retain the dominion, the same thing did the 
Deity, because he was a lover of men. He appointed over 
us a better race than ourselves, namely, the Aaiuovec ; who, 


Goa 


350 PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF THE δαίμονες, OR GENII. 


taking the oversight with much ease, both to themselves 
and us, and giving to us peace, and reverence, and true 
freedom, and an abundant supply of right and justice, ren- 
dered the families of men most blessed, and free from all 
tumult and sedition. ‘his myth (he proceeds), when ac- 
commodated to the truth (ἀληθείᾳ χρώμενος), or truly inter- 
preted, really means, that in whatever states, not God, but 
some mere earthly power, has the ultimate sovereignty, there 
there can be no escape from evils; that we ought, as far as 
possible, to imitate that mode of life which existed in the 
time of Saturn; and that, giving earnest heed to whatever 
principle of ¢mmortality may yet remain in human institu- 
tions, we should, in public and private, administer both our 
families and our states in accordance with it; naming Law 
(νόμον) the dispensation (Nov Acavouny), or government of 
Mind or Reason.” ‘The specimen of Plato’s philology ex- 
hibited in this last sentence is poor enough; but the senti- 
ment corresponds precisely to Aristotle’s definition of Law, 
as Νοῦς ἄνευ ὀρέξεως, or Mind without passiom 

We find the same mythical statement in the Politicus, 271, 
P. 272, A. It may also be connected with the doctrine 
to which there was an allusion (page 231) as having some 
support in the Sacred Volume, namely, of guardian or super- 
intending angels having the care of particular nations. . As 
we have already said, this is regarded by Eusebius, Prep. 
Evang., xi., 26, as maintained in the Septuagint version of 
Deuteronomy, xxxii., 8—6re διεμέριζεν “Ἢ Ὕψιστος ἔθνη, 
ὡς διέσπειρεν υἱοὺς ᾿Αδάμ, ἔστησεν ὅρια ἐθνῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν 
"ATTEAQN ΘΕΟΥ--- When the Most High divided the 
nations, when he dispersed the sons of Adam, he establish- 
ed the boundaries of the nations according to the number 
of the angels of God. But Jacob was the Lord’s portion ; 
Israel was the line of his inheritance.” 


THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES. 351 


LXVIII. 


Beauty and Accuracy of the Ancient and Platonic Division 
of the Four Cardinal Virtues. Deep Moral Significance of 
the Four Greek Words,’ Akodaoia, ’Axpateia, ᾿Ε γκεράτεια, 
and Σωφροσύνη, as indicating the Four Moral Degrees. 


Pace 69, Laine 4. σώζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη 
μετὰ φρονῆσεως : “ Righteousness and temperance, or 80- 
briety, with wisdom, save us.” ‘There was something very 
admirable in the ancient classification of the virtues under 
the four cardinal heads, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, 
and oodia—righteousness, temperance, fortitude (a term 
which we use for want of a better), and wisdom. A most 
philosophical analysis of them all may be found in the 
Republic, lib. iv., commencing 427, P., and continued 
through several pages. ‘They may be briefly defined thus : 
Δικαιοσύνη has immediate reference to the duties we owe 
our fellow beings, although it is used by Plato, in the Re- 
public, in a more extensive sense, for the state of soul from 
whence all right actions proceed, and in the composition of 
which all the other virtues do more or less enter. Σωῴρο- 
ovvn, more properly, relates to duties we owe ourselves, or, 
according to Plato’s favourite allegorical comparison of the 
soul to a state, δικαιοσύνη would have regard to its foreign 
relations, σωφροσύνη to its internal police. ’Avdpeia is that 
strength of soul or will which gives to all the virtues ac- 
tivity and efficacy. See remarks on ἀνδρεία, Dissertation 
xlili., p. 257. Σοφία, when ranked among the virtues, 15 
practical wisdom, as distinguished from the scientific or 
speculative moral insight of the mere casuist. It is what 
Plato elsewhere frequently styles dp6v701c—a wisdom—not 
grounded on scientific calculations of utility deduced from 
antecedents and consequents, but rather an innate percep- 
tion of right, the result of a pure heart clearing the under- 


352 THE FOUR MORAL DEGREES. 


standing ; being, in fact, a sense or taste, rather than scienve 
In its highest import, it would be an innate discernment of 
our relations to God and the universe, and the same with 
the Scripture Σοφία. 

Cicero has attempted the same distinctions of the four 
cardinal virtues, without the names, in his Offices, lib. i., 5. 
He most clearly imitates Plato. Sed omne, quod est hon- 
estum, id quatuor partium oritur ex aliqua. Aut enim in 
perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur; aut in hominum 
societate tuenda, tribuendoque suum cuique, et rerum con- 
tractarum fide; aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magni- 
tudine et robore ; aut in omnium que fiunt, queque dicuntur, 
ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia. Que 
quatuor, quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt, 
tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur. 

The etymology of this beautiful word σωφροσύνη is put 
before us in this very passage from our text: σωφροσύνη 
ΣΏΖΕΙ. It is clearly from σόω, σόος, σώζω, and φρῆν, 
φρόν ; and would, accordingly, signify the sating or healing 
virtue of the soul, soundness of the spirit or sptritual health, 
in distinction from that dissipation, corruption, or internal 
war which is the result of the opposite. 

‘The division into what are styled the four cardinal vir- 
tues may be regarded as made κατὰ ποιότητα, in respect 
to quality. There is another arrangement, which, to use a 
term of Aristotle, is made kata ποσότητα, in respect to quan- 
tity. This expresses what may be styled the moral de- 
grees, ascending, by way of climax, from the lowest stage, 
or total privation of all virtue, to the highest condition, or 
perfect health of the soul. ‘They are represented by four 
Greek terms, namely, ἀκολασία, ἀκρατεία, ἐγκράτεια, and 
σωφροσύνη. The etymological analysis alone of these 
words contains, in itself, volumes of morality of a purer and 
more practical kind than is to be found in many a frigid 
treatise of modern casuistry. ‘The first of two them, as 


THE FOUR MORAL DEGREES. 35 


Aristotle tells us, Ethic. Nicomach., vil., 1, belong to the 
domain of vice, the last two to that of virtue. According 
to another classification, the two extremes denote respect- 
ively the perfection of moral excellence and of moral de- 
pravity, the complete separation™ of all heterogeneous ele- 
ments from both, or, in other words, the purely wicked and 
the purely virtuous ; while the two means would represent 
those mixed states wherein the one or the other moral 
quality may have a temporary superiority, yet neither can be 
5814 to be triumphant. 

᾿Ακολασία (from a, privative, and κόλασις, restraint) 
would denote uncontrolled licentiousness—the Νοῦς (to use 
Plato’s anthropological division) in utter darkness, the ϑυμὸς 
in complete subjection to the ἐπιθυμία ; or, in other words, 
the will not simply overpowered, but the consenting slave 
of appetite and lust. Compare Plato’s description of the 
δημοκρατικὸς ἀνήρ, or the man whose soul is a perfect 
democracy of ungoverned propensities, Republic, lib. viil., 
559, 560. Such a character zs free to sin; or, to adopt a 
mode of speech directly opposite, yet equally correct, he is 
bound in the iron chain of that free wilt for which some 
so strenuously contend as the highest prerogative of man, 
_a will which is its own tyrant, cursed with its own se/f- 
determining power, and utterly unrestrained by any fear of 
man, or any grace of God. 

᾿Ακρατεία 15 want of moral power. ‘The soul is awaking, 
and has some sense of itsbondage. It feels the chain which 


* See Remarks on the two senses of the word ἅγιος, p. 322, 323, 
and note. 

t+ All the seeming paradoxes and contradictions connected with 
this expression arise from the different points of view from whence 
the subject is contemplated. See Romans, vi., 20, ὅτε γὰρ δοῦλοι 
ἦτε THC ἁμαρτίας ἐλεύθεροι ἦτε TH δικαιοσύνῃ, κ. τ. A. “For when ye 
were the servants of sin ye were free from righteousness, but now, 
being freed from sin, and having become subject to God,” &c. 


Ge2 


094. THE FOUR MORAL DEGREES. 


the first character mistakes for freedom. ‘The rational will 
is overpowered, but unreconciled to its degradation, and 
struggling feebly against it. 

"Eyxpateta, temperance, or inward power, would ΣΝ 
the rational will a conqueror, yet holding the sceptre over 
a turbulent and rebellious foe ever seeking to regain the 
supremacy, and requiring constant watchfulness and re- 
straint. 

Σωφροσύνη is the spiritual Hygeia, and signifies the will 
“not only superior, but triumphant—in perfect harmony with 
the reason, and presiding, with ever-unresisted sway, over 
appetites and propensities in cheerful submission to its true 

and rational authority. . In its highest Platonic sense it is 
the spirit healed—in harmony with itself, and only falling 
short of the Scriptural idea of harmony with Heaven. 

Such are the thoughts suggested by the very terms, a 
faint outline of which may be found in Aristotle, Ethic. 
Nicomach., lib. vil., c. i., 5, 6, c. ix. Almost, if not quite, 
all the wos derived fe φρήν (dpov), such as φρόνησις, 
φρόνιμος, σώφρων, σωφροσύνη, φρονέω, although generally 
rendered wise, wisdom, prudentia, &c., partake. more of ἃ 
moral than of an intellectual quality, or, rather, may be said 
to express a combination of both. ‘They refer to what may 
be styled practical wisdom, in distinction from speculative 
knowledge even of the science of morals. ‘This moral wis- 
dom formed a peculiar trait both in the life and philosophy 
of Socrates. Xenophon has most admirably said of him, 
Σοφίαν καὶ σωφροσύνην ov διώριζεν, Memorabilia, 111., 9 


PECULIAR. USE OF THE INDICATIVE MODE. 355 


LXIX. 


Peculiar Use of the Indicative Mode in certain Cases. Com- 
parison of Passages from the New Testament. 


Pace 70, Line 2. πείθουσι ϑωπείαις Aoywv—* Would 
persuade by flatteries.” We thus render, because the con- 
text, in this place, requires it, and because other examples 
justify us in thus sometimes taking the indicative mode sub- 
jectively, as expressing destre, disposition, tendency, or na- 
ture of a thing—what it ought to do, or would do, rather 
than what it actually does; thus seeming to occupy the 
place of the subjunctive. ‘his is probably the case, to 
some extent, in all languages, and there is no great difh- 
culty in determining by the context when it is thus em- 
ployed. The usage occurs a number of times in the New 
‘Testament, as, for example, John, Ist Epist., 1i., 9: πᾶς ὁ 
γεγεψνημένος EK TOV Θεοῦ ἁμαρτίαν ov ποιεῖ---- Whosoever 
is born of God committeth not sin; that is, it is not his nature, 
tendency, or disposition—he would not sin. A much clearer 
example, and one about which there can be no question, 
although very similar to the preceding, may be found, Ro- 
mans, 11., 4: ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τὸ χρηστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς μετάνοι- 
av σε ἄγει----ποὶ knowing that the goodness of God leadeth 
thee to repentance. Such is its tendency or nature, that is, 
what it would do, although wicked men often furnish the 
most striking proof that the actual effect does not always 
take place. Compare, also, Mark, xiv., 21: καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ 
—It would have been better for him, &c.; 2 Peter, i1., 21: 
κρεῖττον ἦν αὐτοῖς μὴ ἐπεγνωκέναι---- 1: would have been 
beiter for them not to have known, &c. 


356 ARITHMETICAL AND GEOMETRICAL EQUALITY. 


LXX. 


Use of the Word IWAeovesia. Aristotle’s Distinction between 
Arithmetical and Geometrical Equality. 


Pace 71, Line 4. πλεονεξίαν. ‘This is a very general 
term, and, although usually rendered covetousness wherever 
it occurs in the New Testament, may be applied to any 
case in which one seeks to have more than others, be it in 
respect to wealth, worldly honours, or sensual enjoyment. 
Plato, as well as the Scriptures, would place them all in 
the same low scale, and regard the passion, whatever may 
be its immediate object, as in all cases alike opposed to 
the harmony of the universe; that is, to the good of the 
whole, the good of the parts, the good of the individual who 
exercises the feeling, besides being intrinsically, or irre- 
spective of consequences, an evil, and a disease in the spir- 
it. It comprehends all that is included under our term am- 
bition, and, when directed to personal distinction, is pre-em- 
inently “ἃ lust of the mind,” in distinction from those bodily 
propensities which some moralists would regard as the only 
sources of sin. } 

Plato here compares it to a plethora, or a tendency in 
one member to absorb into itself more than its share of 
what belongs to the whole body: τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἐν μὲν 
σαρκίνοις σώμασι νόσημα καλούμενον. We may call it, 
generally, a violation of the law of equality ; not simply of 
that arithmetical equality which would reduce all ranks of 
being, be it angels, men, or the lower animals, to the same 
undistinguishing level, but of that geometrical equality with- 
out which harmony could not exist, or would become only 
a dead and monotonous unison. A violation of this equal- 
ity would consist in the desire or tendency of any member 
to grow out of its natural proportions. ‘Those who have it 
may call it a lofty ambition; the Scriptures, however, and 


FOLLY OF ATTEMPTING TO BRIBE HEAVEN. 3857 


true philosophy, represent it as a low and selfish passion, 
utterly blind to that infinitely nobler sentiment which, while 
it causes the soul to acquiesce, and.even rejoice in ranks 
and distinctions, as necessary parts of the Divine scheme, 
yet enables it to lose sight of them all in its aspirations 
after “that honour which cometh from God only.” 

For the distinction alluded to between arithmetical and 
geometrical equality, or ἰσότης (from which, we can hardly 
help thinking, comes the Latin jus, justus, justitia), see Ar- 
istotle, Ethic. Nicomach., lib. v., c. iii. and iv.; also, the 
sixth book of The Laws, 757, A., at the passage commen- 
cing, δυοῖν yao ἰσοτήτοιν οὔσαιν. 


LXXI. 
Impiely and Folly of Attempting to Bribe Heaven. 


Pace 71, Line 11. ἂν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπο- 
νέμῃ. ᾿Αδικημάτων is an elliptical expression, and may be 
rendered, of the fruit of their wrong doings. ‘There cannot 
be a baser conception than this, that God could be bribed 
by a share of the product of iniquity ; and yet, in all ages of 
the world, and under all religions, men have been both 
weak enough and wicked enough to entertain it ; that is, if 
they can disguise it under some delusive name and appear- 
ance, since, in its gross, naked form, it would revolt even 
the most brutish soul. Instead of making clean hands and 
a clean breast by giving up the gains of iniquity, we often 
find men, even in Christian lands, endeavouring to make 
atonement, and to purchase ease of conscience, by devoting 
a part of their ill-gotten wealth to religious uses. How in- 
dignantly, in the fourth book of ‘The Laws, does Plato re- 
pudiate the very thought that God, or even a good man, can 
receive gifts from the wicked: παρὰ dé μιαροῦ δῶρα οὔτ᾽ 
avon ἀγαθὰν οὔτε Θεόν ἐστί ποτε τόγε ὀρθὸν δέχεσθαι. 


3598 FOLLY OF ATTEMPTING TO BRIBE HEAVEN. | 


μάτην οὖν περὶ ϑεοὺς ὁ πολύς ἐστι πόνος τοῖς ἀνοσίοις, 
717, A. Compare Cicero, De Legibus, lib. 11., 41: Donis 
impii ne placare audeant Deos: Platonem audiant, qui ve- 
tat dubitare qua sit mente futurus Deus, quum nemo bonus 
ab improbo se donare velit. . Also, Plautus, Rudens: 

Atque hoc scelesti in animum inducunt suum, 

Jovem se placare posse donis, hostiis ; 

Sed operam et sumptum perdunt, quia 

Nihil Ei acceptum est a perjuris supplicil. 

To refer to all the passages in the Scriptures where the 
same sentiment is strongly expressed would be to quote no 
small portion of the Sacred Volume. TI will not receive a 
bullock from thine house, nor goats from thy fold ; for all the 
beasts of the wood are mine, the cattle upon a thousand hills. 
Psalm 1., 9. Bring no more vain oblations ; your incense is 
an abomination unto me. Isaiah, i.,13. Nothing could be 
more absurd than to suppose that, by such declarations, the 
God both of the Old and New Testament meant to under- 
value his own most solemnly-appointed institution of sacri- 
fice. It is most clear that he intended, rather, to guard it, 
by denouncing, in most indignant terms, that gross abuse 
which would pervert the ritual avowal of the need of expia- 
tion, and the ritual acknowledgment of the Great Atonement 
through its type, into the miserable conception of a bribe to 
the Almighty—an offering of flesh and fat as to a hungry Baal. 
And yet this is the only view which some, who would be 
styled theologians, can take of this institution, so ancient 
and so universal, not only as it regards the heathen nations, 
but even in respect to those who were expressly taught of 
God. | | | 
The sentiment which we have quoted from Cicero and 
Plautus is most admirably expressed by Shakspeare. No- 
thing can be finer than the contrast he presents between 
Divine Justice and the imperfections of human courts. It 
is also rendered peculiarly striking by being put into the 
mouth of the guilty King of Denmark : 


DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ATHEISTS. 359 


Forgive me my foul murder! 
That cannot be; since I am still possessed 
Of those effects for which I did the murder, 
My crown, mine own ambition, and my queen. 
May one be pardoned, and retain the offence ? 
In the corrupted currents of this world, 
Offence’s gilded hand may shove by justice ; 
And oft ’tis seen, the wicked prize itself 
Buys out the law. But "tis not so above. 
There is no shuffling ; there the action lies 
In its true nature ; and we ourselves compelled, 
Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults, 
To give in evidence.—Hamlet, Act III. 


LXXIL. 


Different Species of Atheists. Morality of Atheist nos 
Founded on Principle. First Species, styled δίκαιος by 
Plato, and invested by him with too good a Character. 
Second Species, the Magician or Juggler. The Atheist 
often in Secret the Victim of Superstition. Hobbes. The 
Ironical Species of Atheist, a character peculiar to the 
Ancient World. Elymas the Sorcerer. Simon Magus. 
Apollonius of Tyanea. 


Pace 78, Line 4. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ, κ. τ. A. This is 
the first and most harmless kind of atheist, the one who, 
although honest and just in his private relations, does not 
hesitate boldly to avow his atheism in speaking against re- 
ligion with its oaths and rites, while, at the same time, he 
ridicules those who respect them. Sucha one Plato thinks 
may have a dislike for wrong doing (τῷ δυσχεραίνειν, page 
77, line 7), that is, a dislike founded on habit, prejudice, 
or an early bias of the mind, remaining in spite of his 
atheism ; for the δέκαιον ἦθος he is there represented as 
possessing could not be the result of anything like princi- 
ple, seeing he rejects the principium of all morals and all 
law in denying the existence of a Deity. That such indi- 


360 DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ATHEISTS. 


viduals may be found here and there in the midst of a so- 
ciety holding to a different belief, may, perhaps, be admit- 
ted. ‘Their virtue, however, is only the effect of outward 
pressure. How. long anything like morality would remain 
in a nation of atheists is a question of far more fearful mag- 
nitude. Although the experiment has never yet been fully 
tried, there can be but little doubt as to what would be the 
horrid result. 

We can hardly help thinking that Plato, in what is said 
page 77, line 5, has given altogether too good a character 
to this man. Such persons may be found putting on a show 
of morality, and making their lives a lie for the sake of 
giving support to the falsehood of their creed, yet still, it is 
exceedingly difficult for them to disguise their deep hatred 
of all who are righteous from religious principle. ‘This, 
however, was probably less apparent in Plato’s time. 
Christianity has brought out many a malignant trait in the 
human character, which, although deep seated in the heart, 
never made its appearance in the dusky twilight of the 
heathen systems of religion. Notwithstanding the laboured 
chapters of Gibbon, he who reads human nature in the light 
of the New Testament will have little difficulty in under- 
standing why, Christianity kindled such a flame of persecu- 
tion on its first entrance into the world, or in realizing the 
truth of Christ’s declaration, that he ‘‘ came, not to send 
peace upon the earth, but a sword.” 

Pace 78, Line 8. ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων pév..... εὐφυὴς δὲ, 
κ. τ. A. This is a very different character from the other. 
He has no ambition to be thought above vulgar prejudices. 
His grand object is to turn to the best account, in promoting 
his own interests, the prejudices and the superstitions of other 
men. Hence he carefully conceals his atheism, while he 
makes the most abominable abuse of the religious fears of 
mankind. Having none of that fear of the invisible which 
would deter ordinary men, he resolves upon playing a bold 


DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ATHEISTS. 361- 


game in the assumed character of fanatic, magician, con- 
jurer, fortune.teller, oracle-monger (a character, as we learn 
from Aristophanes, quite common among the Athenians), 
Sophist, public lecturer, or whatever may best suit his un- 
holy purposes. It is on this account he is styled εὐφυής, 
acriort ingenio preditus, a man of great resources, having a 
nature well adapted to any scheme of impiety. Sometimes, 
however, the character may not be all affected. Gross as 
is the apparent inconsistency, atheism is often found con- 
nected with superstition. ‘The absence of the fear of God 
may sometimes give rise to most alarming fears of a devil. 
The religious instinct, to which atheism has done violence, 
but has not been wholly able to destroy, may yet live in 
the most painful terrors of a superstitious and darkened 
imagination. ‘The soul of man must have, in some way, 
its supernatural world It cannot long endure the desolating 
void of atheism, and would even find relief in the most 
horrid imaginings of malevolent superhuman powers. It 
must believe in something stronger and higher than itself. 
Hence, if a God is denied, the moral vacuum must be filled 
with some personification of Fate, Fortune, or Destiny, or 
peopled with the Gorgons and Chimeras of a diseased and 
troubled fancy. See page 133, where we have shown that 
the atheist, even on his own theory, has no security against 
an unknown world of horrible superhuman beings. 

No man ever furnished a stronger proof of the truth of 
these positions than Hobbes. However seemingly bold he 
may have been in his writings, we are told on the best au- 
thority* that during a large portion of his life he was m 


* Vide Bayle’s Dictionary, vol. iii.. 471, N. Bayle loved some- 
times to expose the skeptic as well as to sneer at the believer, and 
he says, most justly, that ‘‘ the principles of philosophy (meaning ma- 
terialism) are not sufficient to rid a man of the fear of apparitions ; 
for, to reason consequentially, there are no philosophers who have 
less right to reject magic and sorcery than the atheists.” 


Hsu 


362 DIFFERENT SPECIBS OF ATHEISTS. 


constant terror of ghosts and hobgoblins, and that he could 
never sleep without a light burning in his chamber; not 
daring to trust himself to that darkness which presented so 
true a picture of his own depraved and gloomy mind. 

* Pace 78, Line 15. τὸ μὲν εἰρωνικὸν. ‘The first impres- 
sion would be that this refers to the first character, who is 
described as ridiculing (καταγελῶν, line 6) and making ἃ 
mock of sacred things. It is clear, however, that a more 
serious and develish kind of irony is intended. It is the 
irony of the laughing and jugeling fiend, secretly triumph- 
ing in the ruin which he is accomplishing in weak and 
wicked human nature. ‘The second character is undoubt- 
edly meant—o δόλον καὶ ἐνέδρας tAHpn¢o—“ the man full 
of guile and stratagem.” Nothing could more perfectly 
correspond to some parts of Plato’s representation, than the 
description of that magician and false prophet who is men- 
tioned, Acts, xill., 6, 10, under the name of Elymas the 
Sorcerer, and whom Paul addresses in a style remarkably 
similar, in some of its terms, to that which is here used: 
Ὦ πλήρης παντὸς δόλον καὶ πάσης ῥᾳδιουργίας, υἱὲ Ata- 
θόλου, ἐχθρὲ πάσης δικαιοσύνης. 

We can hardly appreciate, at the present day, the de- 
scription of this character, as given by Paul and Plato; 
but there can be no doubt that heathenism furnished many 
an example, exhibiting a hideousness of depravity of which 
it is now difficult to form a conception. It was a charac- 
ter which combined, in their most revolting forms, the bold- 
est and most Heaven-daring atheism with all the devalism 
(if we may use such a term) that existed in some of the 
most horrid rites of the heathen religions. Most faithfully 
drawn specimens of these last productions of the expiring 
reign of Satan may be found in two tracts of Lucian; one 
entitled The History of Alexander, and the other, The 
Death of Peregrinus. The first was a follower of the fa- 
mous Apollonius Tyanzeus, who has often been blasphe- 


THE NIGHTLY CONFERENCE, OR AREOPAGUS, OF PLATO. 368 


mously compared by infidels to our Saviour, and who him. 
self exhibited, in a most remarkable degree, this abominable 
combination of transcendental sophistry, mystic pantheism 
or disguised atheism, and Satanic magic. Whether this 
last was wholly pretended, or to what extent it may have 
been real, it is very difficult now to determine. 


LXXIII. 


The Nightly Conference, or Areopagus, of Plate’s State. The 
Athenian Areopagus. 


Pace 79, Line 7. οἱ τοῦ νυκτερινοῦ ξυλλόγου κοινω- 
γοῦντες. ΑΒ far as we can recollect, no description of this 
body, styled The Nightly Conference, is given in any of 
the preceding books of this dialogue. The reader, how- 
ever, will find its composition and offices subsequently set 
forth in the twelfth book of The Laws, 961, A., B. It was 
to be formed by a careful selection from the body of the 
magistrates, and of those who had travelled abroad for the 
purpose of learning the morals and legislation of foreign 
lands; together with some of the more choice young men 
who might be thought worthy of so distinguishing an hon- 
our. ‘This court, which he styles the anchor of the state, 
was to assemble very early, either at, cr just preceding, 
daybreak; a season which, besides presenting the most 
leisure from other necessary employments, was also most 
favourable to clear thought, and calm, impartial deliberation. 

In a subsequent part of the twelfth book (968, B.) it is 
again spoken of under the same title. It 1s not expressly 
mentioned, we think, in the Epinomis, or Appendix to the 
Laws, and yet the whole of that obscure book seems to be 
intended to point out a peculiar mode of education for the 
’ members of this conference, and a certain higher philoso. 
phy, into which, as into sacred mysteries, they were to ba 


364 COMMON LAW AGAINST PRIVATE RELIGIONS. 


- 


initiated before they could enter upon this most responsible 
trust. Perhaps in this Plato hoped to realize one of the 
dreams of the Republic, namely, that union of the characters 
of the statesman and the philosopher, in the combination of 
which he found the perfection of the political structure. 

This body was intended to unite civil with religious and 
Spiritual functions. It was to be the high ecclesiastical 
court of equity and conscience. ‘The members were not 
only to perform the duties of judicial magistrates, but also 
of public censors. ‘hey had, besides, the still more sa- 
cred and spiritual office of counsellors and instructers to 
those who were undergoing the discipline of the Sophro- 
nisterion, but had not yet been sent to the prison of the in- 
curable ; thus acting, in short, not only as judges, but also 
as chaplains and ghostly advisers of the wretched criminals, 
especially of such despisers of God and blasphemers of 
Providence as the characters treated of in this book. In 
addition to all this, they were intrusted with the censorship 
of the laws themselves. 

In this court or conference, Plato seems to have had in 
his mind the Athenian Areopagus, which, in like manner, 
was the guardian of the laws and public morals. It was 
also of a religious nature, and was regarded with so much 
religious awe that, as Auschines informs us, it was not al- 
lowed for any one to laugh within its precincts. 


> 


—- 


LXXIV. 


Common Law against all Private Religions. Examination 
of Plato’s Doctrine in respect to Changes in the Public 
Worship and Religion of the State. 


Pace 81, Line 5. κοινὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτοις πᾶσι νόμον, K. 
τ. Δ. The law here set forth was intended not only for 
the three kinds of offenders which have been mentioned, 


COMMON LAW AGAINST PRIVATE RELIGIONS. 365 


but for all the people of the state. It was to be a law of 
prevention, intended to reach the origin of the evil, namely, 
that private superstition which led weak men and women 
(yvvatkac καὶ τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας πάντας) to have private 
chapels and rites of their own, while they neglected the 
administrations of the public temples and altars. ‘This 
seems, in Plato’s time, to have been carried to a great ex- 
tent, and to have produced, and been produced by, the very 
class of atheists against whom he has been legislating ; es- 
pecially those of the third division, who held that God was 
easily propitiated by peculiar rites and offerings. ‘These 
men were also interpreters of dreams, expounders of omens, 
and, in short, the priesthood of a private superstition, which 
became more extensive and more iniquitous in proportion 
as it shunned the notice of the legal guardians of the public 
religion. ‘To prevent this evil, with its irreligious and de- 
moralizing consequences, this law was to be established for 
the common weal—iepda μηδὲ εἷς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἐκτήσθω. 

‘The same law is given by Cicero in his treatise De Le- 
gibus, lib. 11.,8, as cited from the twelve tables: Separatim 
nemo habessit Deos ; neve novos, sed ne advenas, nisi pub- 
lice adscitos, privatim colunto. Clemens Alexandrinus re. 
fers with approbation to this law of Plato,* although there 
can be no doubt that the similar statute in Rome was the 
proximate, if not the remote, exciting cause of the cruel per- 
secution Christianity had to undergo as, at first, a foreign, 
and, in a great measure, a private religion. ‘There was, 
however, one most beautiful species of family religion, 
which Plato not only allowed in his scheme of legislation, 
but even encouraged by the warmest commendation. We 
allude to the sacred domestic altar, which he would have 
dedicated to the paternal and filial affections, and to the 
worship of the aged living parent or grandparent, as the 


* Stromata, lib. v., 584, D. 
we 


366 COMMON LAW AGAINST PRIVATE RELIGIONS. 


: 
best representation of the invisible God. See remarks on 
the passages referred to, Dissertation I., pages 88, 89. 

Pace 81, Line 15. ἱερὰ καὶ ϑεοὺς ov ῥάδιον ἱδρύεσθαι, 
μεγάλης δὲ διανοίας τινὸς ὀρθῶς δρᾷν τὸ τοιοῦτον---“ It is 
no easy thing, or it is no small matter, to establish (or con- 
secrate) chapels and Divinities. Such a work requires no 
ordinary intelligence.” The phrase ἱδρύεσθαι ἱερὰ καὶ ϑε- 
ov¢ may be taken generally for the introduction of new re- 
ligious rites and the adoration of new Divinities. The pri- 
mary reference is to private innovation, but it has respect, 
likewise, to all changes attempted in the public worship, 
either by private individuals or by magistrates. We may 
compare with this a passage from the fifth book of ‘The 
Laws, 738, D.: περὶ ϑεῶν τε καὶ ἱερῶν ἅττα τε ἐν τῇ πό- 
λει ἑκάστοις ἱδρύσθαι δεῖ, οὐδεὶς ἐπιχειρήσει κινεῖν νοῦν 
ἔχων, ὅσα ἐκ Δελφῶν, ἢ Δωδώνης, ἢ παρ᾽ ἴλμμωνος, ἤ τι- 
γες ἔπεισαν παλαιοὶ λόγοι, φασμάτων γενομένων, ἢ ἐπιπ- 
νοίας λεχθείσης Sewv— In respect to the Gods and sacred 
things and places, &c., no one who has reason should at- 
tempt to change or unsettle anything which has come from 
Delphos, or Dodona, or Ammon, or which ancient traditions 
have recommended to us on the authority of supernatural. 
appearances, or of a Divine afflatus or inspiration.” In an- 
other place (Laws, vi., 772, D.) he condemns all innova- 
tion in religion, or in any of the fundamental laws of the 
state, unless there shall be the threefold consent, first, of 
all the magistrates ; secondly, of all the people (by which 
he means, at least, a large majority) ; and, thirdly, of all the 
oracles of the Gods : πάσας μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς χρὴ ξυμθούλους, 
πάντα δὲ τὸν δῆμον, Kal πάσας ϑεῶν μαντείας ἐπελθόντας " 
ἐὰν συμφωνῶσι πάντες, οὕτω κινεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μηδέποτε 
μηδαμῶς. | 

When we regard Plato as without any special revela- 
tion from Heaven, or any Divine commission to change 
the religion of his country, we cannot severely condemn his 


COMMON LAW AGAINST PRIVATE RELIGIONS. 367 


solicitude in this matter. He may have wished to preserve 
all the forms of religion, and yet have been influenced by a 
sincere and earnest desire to introduce a thorough reforma- 
tion into its spirit. He had not the experience of a thou- 
sand years, such as 15 now spread before us in the history 
of the Christian Church, to convince him that this thing 
was impossible. We, however, with such a special revela- 
tion in our hands, cannot approve the doctrine or the law 
here laid down, however much we may respect the motive 
which gave rise to it in his peculiar circumstances.* The 
Oxford theologians would hail Plato as inculcating here 
their favourite dogma of authority and tradition. Professor 
Sewal, of that University, has made every effort to turn his 
language to such a use, sometimes with a tolerable degree 
of fairness, and sometimes by giving to Plato a sense of 
which he never dreamed ; although we do not think that the 
professor has ever referred to the passage before us. Every 
attempt, however, to bring to their aid the divine philoso- 
pher of Greece must fail them, when it is remembered that 
to him tradition was αἰ the revelation he possessed, and 
that when this tradition became corrupted, he had no higher 
standard (such as we possess) by which he might correct 
it. How much he would have prized such a special written 
revelation, and how joyfully he would have put away from 
him any inferior guide, may be learned from his famous 
declaration in the second Alcibiades: ‘That we must wait 
patiently until some one, either a God, or some inspired 
man, teach us our moral and religious duties, and, as Pallas, 
in Homer, did to Diomed, remove the darkness from our 
eyes” --άΠκὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὴν ἀχλὺν ἀφελεῖν. Alcibiades, 
i., 150, D. A like inference may be drawn from that most 
remarkable passage in the Republic, where he indulges the 


_ * See a more extended discussion of this subject, Diss. v. ἂν 102, 
x., 116, and Note 13, page 6. 


368 COMMON LAW AGAINST PRIVATE RELIGIONS. 


hope that the true heavenly philosophy (ἔμ τινος ϑείας ἐπιπ 
νοίας ἀληθινὴ φιλοσοφία), and a people in possession of it as 
a gift from above, either had existed in the immense past 
ume, or might now exist in some obscure part of the Bar- 
barian or Oriental land—(év τινε βαρθαρικῷ τόπῳ πόῤῥω 
που ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως), or might at some future 
period be revealed to the rest of the human race. Lib. vi., 
499, B. Can we suppose that he would have preferred 
his myths and his traditions, had he known assuredly that 
just such a people, with just such a Heaven-inspired philoso- 
phy, then existed in the mountains of the barbarian Judea, 
and that it had been most solemnly declared, even then, 
that “A Law should go forth from Zion, and the Word of the 
Lord from Jerusalem.”* | 

Without fearing at all for our Protestantism, we may in- 
deed admit, as Plato says, that it is a most important matter 
to establish new religious rites, or to attempt a change in 
religious doctrines or modes of worship which have long 
prevailed, and which, even when most erroneous, can sel- 
dom be suddenly and violently taken away without danger, 
to say the least, of tearing up something which may be vital 
to the soul. The sentiment of Plato may have some truth, 
even in reference to times and countries possessing a per- 
manent revelation from God, and to which resort may be 
had in bringing men back from those deviations from it ᾿ 
which are the natural results of human depravity. Admit- 
ting that there are such seasons when doctrine and worship 
must be reformed, and when private men under the general, 
if not special, revelation may be regarded as lawfully call- 
ed to engage in this most responsible work, still may we 
say, with Plato, that it does, indeed, require no ordinary in- 
telligence. Such occasions call for souls of the highest 
order—rtij¢ μεγίστης dtavoiac—and no vulgar instrument, 


* Tsaiah, ii., 3. 


BELIEF IN GHOSTS, ETC., THE SAME IN ALL AGES. 909 


no brawling, fanatical reformer should be regarded as 

_Heaven’s agent in so solemn an undertaking. When such’ 
men as Luther and Calvin arise, it is not easy to mistake 
the evidences of their peculiar mission, or their fitness for 
the great work to which they are called. 


LXXYV. 


Belief in Apparitions, Ghosts, Spectres, Dreams, &-c., the 
same in all Ages. 


Pace 82, Linn 2. ἔν τε φάσμασιν ἐγρηγορότας διὰ φό- 
Gove καὶ ἐν dvetporc— Startled, when awake, by appari- 
tions, and in sleep by dreams.” Nothing would present a 
more interesting subject of investigation than the nature and 
extent of the ancient belief in ghosts and apparitions. That 
it prevailed extensively, that 10 was most deeply rooted, and 
that it had existed from the most remote antiquity, is be- 
yond all doubt. If ever there was a doctrine of which it © 
could be said that it was held semper, ubique, et ab omnibus 
this is one. ‘There can be no greater mistake than to sup- 
pose that this is a consequence of Christianity, and that its 
revelations of the spiritual world have quickened the ima- 
gination to impressions and terrors unknown to the ancient 
times. ‘The belief in ghosts and supernatural appearances 
is as old as the belief in a hell, or in any existence after 
death, and all of them may be traced back to a period where 
profane history wholly fails us. It was the creed alike of 
Jew and Gentile, of the East and the West, of Greek, 
Chaldean, and Idumean. The account of Saul and the 
Witch of Endor incidentally discloses the extent and depth 
of the common Jewish belief in the ghostly world, and that, 
too, much more strengly than would have been done by any 
express declarations. Whatever may be thought of the si- 
lence of the Old Testament in other parts, the fact of a nu: 


370 BELIFF IN GHOSTS, ETC., THE SAME IN ALL AGES. 


merous and well-known class of persons, whose profession 
“it was to maintain intercourse with the dead, whether such 
intercourse was deceptive or not, does prove, beyond all 
cavil, that the ancient Israelites were no Sadducees, and 
that, if they did not get their belief in a spiritual world from 
Moses, they must have derived it from some still more an- 
clent source common to all mankind. 

‘That it existed as a part of-the patriarchal religion, we 
have direct evidence from the vision of Eliphaz, Job, iv., 
13: A spirit (a φάσμαλν stood before my face. The manner 
in which the appearance of this ghost is described, bears a 
striking resemblance to all representations of the kind in 
ancient or in modern times. ‘The φάσμα, or shadowy ap- 
pearance under which the mind is always led to contem- 
plate the departed yet restless soul—the changing and flit- 
ting motion, so admirably expressed by the Hebrew 2m 
the formless form, the silence, and the voice, present the 
same marked features that are to be found in almost all 
ghostly narrations. It is not spoken of as a phenomenon 
until then unknown, but as something in the possibility of 
which all his hearers are supposed to believe. It is no an- 
swer to say.it was a dream. How came the nightly world 
of the imagination to be peopled with representations from 
an unseen state, if a belief did not universally prevail 
which brought such representations before the soul? As 
an example far less sublime than this, but with many of the 
same points of resemblance, we may cite the apparition of 
the shade of Patroclus to Achilles, as described in the twen- 
ty-third book of the Iliad, v. 100: 


Ν δὲ Ν θ 7 > st ΄ 
ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονός, ἠῦτε καπνός, 
ᾧχετο τετριγυΐῖα. ταφὼν δ᾽ ἀνόρουσεν ᾿Αχιδλλεύς, 
χερσί Te συμπλατάγησεν, ἔπος δ᾽ ὀλοφυδνὸν ἔειπεν " 
Ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστι καὶ εἰν ᾿Αἴδαο δόμοισιν 
x x ν > Ἂς , 7 ν ΄ 
ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον " ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν. 


We may sometimes find ancient accounts of this kind 


BELIEF IN GHOSTS, ETC., THE SAME IN ALL AGES. 37] 


that may compare with any of the narratives of the Middle 
Ages. Take, for example, Plato’s myth at the end of the 
tenth book of the Republic. His wild and fiery beings 
(ayptot καὶ διάπυροι), that torment the wicked, one might 
almost suppose had beer copied from some saint’s legend. 
When Socrates tells us, in the Phedon, of the ghosts that 
haunt the tombs and monuments — σκιοειδῇ φαντάσματα 
ola παρέχονται τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, ai μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπο- 
λυθεῖσαι----ἰ 6 shades of the impure departed—we might al- 
most fancy it the language of some German ballad. The 
story of the apparition which so solemnly summoned Brutus 
to his last meeting at Philippi presents another striking in- 
stance of the same kind. A still more remarkable case is 
recorded by the younger Pliny (pistola, lib. vil., 27), of a 
frightful spectre which appeared in a certain house at Ath- 
ens. ‘I'he details are given with such an air of truth and 
sobriety, that we cannot help thinking that the writer, ma- 
terialist as he was, did really believe it, or, at least, was 
seriously affected by the account. It is, however, mainly 
interesting, by reason of its presenting features so very 
much resembling some of those that are to be found in the 
ghost stories of modern times. . ‘The old, spacious, desert- 
ed, and suspected house ; the clanking of chains, first faint- 
ly heard at a distance, and becoming louder and louder as 
the spectre approaches at the dread hour of midnight; the 
silent and fixed position; the waving of the hand; the 
pointing with the finger; the motion to follow; the solemn 
tread with which the apparition leads the spectator through 
the lonely passages of the building until it finally disappears 
m the courtyard, and the result, which the reader of mod- 
ern legends can almost anticipate, namely, the finding the 
bones of a murdered man, as they are dug up in the very 
spot where it had vanished—all these are of such a nature 
as to make us feel for ἃ moment as though, instead of read- 
ing Pliny and a story of the ancient Athens, we had actv- 


372 BELIEF IN GHOSTS, ETC., THE SAME IN ALL AGES. 


ally been occupied with some of the wild creations of 
Shakspeare’s fancy in Hamlet or King Richard the Third. 
Whatever may be thought of its truth, it is of value as 
showing that the imagination, in all ages of the world, has 
been filled with the same image’, and that there must be 
some deep ground of reality to which all such incidents, 
however deceptive in outward appearances, are to be re- 
ferred. 

How much even the Epicurean age of Horace was af- 
fected by these preternatural terrors, may be learned from 
the great variety of frightful names he presents in two lines 
of one of his Epistles, in which he would describe a mind 
raised above the superstitious imaginings of the multitude ; 
although, from some evidences he has left us, 1t was not a 
state to which he himself could lay claim: 

Caret mortis formidine et ira? 
Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas, 
Nocturnos lemures, portentaque Thessala, rides ? 
Hor., Epist., lib. ii., 2, 206. 

Φάσμα is nearly, if not quite, synonymous with φάντασ- 
wa. ‘The latter term is the one employed in the New Tes- 
tament, Matthew, xiv., 26; Mark, vi., 49. In another pas- 
sage, to express the same idea, the word πνεῦμα is used ; 
as where Christ says, A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye 
see me have. Although he asserts that he himself appears 
in his risen body, yet, at the same time, he seems clearly 
to sanction the belief in the existence of ghosts or spirits, 
and to treat it as a well-known fact. We cannot bear, in 
this passage, the doctrine of accommodation. Let any one 
think for a moment of those solemn circumstances which 
so strongly demanded the utmost sincerity and truth on this 
very point. Would Christ have used such language to his 
anxiously-inquiring disciples, after having himself just re- 
turned from the world of spirits, if their belief had been a 
mere popular delusion? Would he thus have trifled with 


BELIEF IN GHOSTS, ETC., THE SAME IN ALL AGES. 373 


them, while their minds were intent upon the solemn real- 
ities of the spiritual state, and occupied with those thoughts 
which were suggested by his own death and resurrection ? 
If, under these circumstances, he spoke the language of 
accommodation to a false belief, we know not when and 


where we may expect the literal truth. 
. Ii 





INDEX 


OF PASSAGES QUOTED AND EXPLAINED FROM THE OTHER 
WRITINGS OF PLATO. 


Page 


Alcibiades IT. 367 


Cratylus . 1, 101, 161, 162, 163, 

175, 183, 199 
Critias . , eel 
προ. ς ἐν ἡ 0 
Epinomis 226, 227, 260, 271,363 
Epistles . . 198, 199, 238 


Gorgias 7, 17, 22, 28, 45, 62,77, 
135; 139, 147, 240, 246, 
290, 316, 322, 331, 332 


Hippias Sa . 184 
Tom i". LOY 
Laches . oe 8 of OG 
Laws 75, 88, 92, 100, 101, 107, 


126, 134, 136, 140, 149, 
219, 235, 246, 247, 306, 
347, 349, 357, 358, 363, 


| 365, 366 
Meno : .. 009 
Parmenides 2... 6... 184, 246 
Phedon 17, 107, 129, 147, 151, 


165, 224, 261, 268, 282, 
322, 324, 326, 331, 344, 371 


Page 

Pheedrus . Las, 184; 195 
Philebus 47, 150, 184, 203 
Politicus 214, 215, 216, 330, 350 
Protagoras . 66, 140, 259, 309 
Republic . 6, 42; 43, 51¢72,102, 
103, 140, 150, 184, 208, 

290, 308, 309, 310, 315, 

318, 319, 322, 327, 328, 

329, 330, 338, 341, 351, 

353, 368, 371 


Sophista . . 158, 199, 285 
Symposion.. . ...», 101,140 
Theetetus . 22, 62, 98, 122, 138, 


153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 
160, 161, 163, 164, 183, 
184, 199 

. 35, 96, 102, 121, 122, 
123, 144, 150, 171, 172, 
173, 184, 211, 212, 217, 
219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 
228, 229, 230, 234, 235, 
240, 277, 279, 300, 301, 
304, 305, 323, 347 


Timeus 


INDEX 


OF CITATIONS FROM OTHER ANCIENT AUTHORS. 


Page 


/JESSCHINES . 364 
JESCHYLUS: 
“* Choeph. 321 


“ Prom. Vine. 68, 88, 128, 252 


APULEIUS *. . 348 
ARISTOPHANES: 

. Acharn. 22, 41 

τς Aves .. Bare 80 

“© Nubes . Eye 128, 245 

ee Plutus: . ie ΔΠν 

* 128 


“ Thesm. 


Page 


ARISTOTLE: 
“ De Anim.. . 41, 101, 126 
‘“ De Celo 302, 366 
“ De Mundo Ate Te4 
εἰ “De,Gen. 119, 120, 186, 78% 
ec Ethic: Eud: ΠΕΡ ΠΝ] 


ἐς  Ethic. Nie. 47, 70, 91. 940: 
241, 353, 354, 357 

“ Metaph. 115, 154, 159, 160, 
184, 190, 191, 192, 

. 193, 194, 222 


376 INDE. 
ARISTOTLE : Page | LxOMER : Sar Pize 
ς Meteorol.. . i) ties e ied ΟΣ λυ, 80, 139, 
Pa WYSIC. 134, 185, 186, 193, 149, 158, 168, 208, 
221, 279, 280 209, 342, 346, 370 
“ Politic. . 47, 265, 266,349| «« Odyssey . . 147, 302, 303 
ATHENAGORAS . 101 | Horace: 
CICERO: ‘| Ars Poet: . 188 
ἐς Acad. Post. 160, 200, 275 “ Pepist. . eee 
“ De Fato ott, 912 “« Ode 299, 294 
“> De Fin. * 4 2°". 297) Tameuicaae ἘΣΘ 
“ De Leg. 95, 111, 272, 358 | Justin Mart. ieee i) 
“De Nat. Deor. 101,113,227, | Luctan . ae 157, 362 
244, 245, 258 Teed 204, 207, 7. 293, 320 
BS OTE, oS" . . 3852] NemeEsius Ries 2. 
Pusey Disp. 114, 147, 194, | Ortezn, Contra Celsum . . 235 
326 Ovip . 259 
CLAUDIAN : 244! Pino . are 
CLEMENS ALEX. 248, 340, 343, 365 | PINDAR _ 89, 144, 321 
Cyrit ALEX. . . 275:) PLaprus; hudens.-. > O08 
Dioporus Sicuuws . 101, 317 | Piiny, Epist. ane 
EMPEDOCLES . - (7; 115, 159 | Piurarcnu, Ces, ay 
EuRIPIDEs : st "Die PaO Ba kk oe ERR Oa 
* Helena =. 1, tee ‘© De Isid. et Osir. 182, 236 
‘‘ Hippolytus 90, 101 “De Placit: Pinios: *. 136 
‘<¢ Medea . 16, 62, 242:| Procius, Com. Buc.” 65 
“ Orestes 129, 240 | SenEcA : i ΟΝ 
«6 Pheenisse . 242 | Sext. Empire. 24, 136, 156, 185 
« Rhesus . 101 | SopHoc.Es : 
‘© Supplices . τ} ee “Ajax ae 
ἐς o"Preades 217, 235; °° Antigone ~~ Pow, 89 
τς Fragments 93, 128, 129, SCH Col. 994. 
130, 197, 23%, ooo ee Ob bak ὦν ταὶ eo. YF 
EUseEBIwvs : ἐς Philoe. 42, 260 
fo Prep, vane ὙΠ ες ἐς gi rach, . 64, 65 
272, 340, 343, 350 1 THaLes ee Ss ΤΥ ἢ 
Heropotus . 65, 1739231) με τ Lex. . . 248 
Heslop: Vireit, Georg. . 93 
‘‘ Works and Days . 48, 83, | XENoPHON: 
113, 348 ‘¢ Agesil. : a. Ole 
ss Theog: . 180] τὸ Mem. ᾿ 88, 153, 354 


INDEX 


OF PASSAGES CITED FROM: THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS. 


GENESIS. 
Page 
ot 212, 273 
i.,2 216, 283, 338 
i 3 ayy rs! 
i, 31 , 222 
il., 4 ΕΣ ΕΣ 
Exopu3. 
ΠΕ ΤΕ . 180 
LEVITICUS. 

Bs Os . 248 
ΠΧ 2: 93 
DrEUTERONOMY. 
iyi, 26 92 
v., 30 92 
Vi., 2 oe 
Sail.) 1S. , 320 
XXXI1., 8, 231,343, 350 
JOSHUA. 

Vii., 25 82 
2 SAMUEL. 
ae ἢ. 1. 270 
2 Kines. 

vi. 17. 271, 348 
Jon. 

Oo ey a O43 
ῖν.. 6 S337 
ae 9.0 
xiv., 10 Wore 
os «Say as . 244 
XX1., 29 . 336 
XXVIlI., 24 Le 
ark 333 
EXKVill.,-7 Mey 
RM Svit., 14 rs ss, 
Psaums. 

11., 9 262 
wiv 1. ot 


Page 
xvil., 15 ΞΟ 
ἈΧΧΙΧῚ bee Ns) 
ἈΠΕ D1 weet 
179 AON Bk OR eRe ΘΘ 
IX NUIT, Soo, LD, «240 
pide’ RON aime re 3 5: 
weet |g 70 
Ixxvill., 61 . 89 
ΧΟΙΣΝ . ata 
igs Mai habe ἢ 
Cac ΘΙ 
C1V., 2 ieee 
«80 πὴ 
CXX1.,.4. 346 
CXKKIX. ΟΡ 
PROVERBS. 
ΧΙ 70 
ΧΥ..9 996 
XVil., 6 89 
he eee ἡ 13 
pe. ΧΟ 70 
EcCLESIASTES: 
Sih. Oe. 317 
IsAIAH. 
Lets 358 
Tt we: 368 
> a ee 232 
Mi ἦν: 209 
xlvii., 14 . 274 
DANIEL. 
xi. 26, Ὁ]. 231 
HosEa. 
1 ae 269 
AMOS. 

ΙΧ Ὁ 994. 
HaBAKKUK. 
119 210 
Matacul. 

Vien ee 43 


119 


Page 
WIspoM OF SoLomon. 
> eed I ame 28a 

MatTrHEw. 

TY OMS mag ac 262 
xili., 39, 41 336 
X1V., 26 ats 
Kxv.,. 46 298 
ν Mark. 

Vi., 49... are 
xiv <1 355 
LUKE. 

Mi, 9’. 139 
RIM, 42 139 
XM 42 139 
JouNn. 
eae ge 179 
1M, ve: 181 
Vill., 58 180 
Acts. 

Mis 6540 362 
XVil., 28 181 
XVIUES22 260 
ΧΧΙΠ 9.0 199 
Romans. 

i., 21, 28 115 
ag 283 
See 355 
ἵν V4. < 271 
Wasp ΣΝ 339 
Vie 20. Pepi ΘΕΣ 
SaaS. 180, 181 
Viii., 28 287 
xe cet 180 
IX, ee: 139 
1 CorINTHIANS. 
iii., 21, 22 . 287 
2 CoRINTHIANS. 
Lvig Reds 282, 303 


378 


INDEX. 
GALATIANS. 2 Timotuy. 
Page | Page 
Iv., 16. ιν 18 999 
ψι,.8 . 297 Heteeeee: 
. EPHESIANS. ἜΣ ἊΝ 939 
iv., 15 . OF FIR 26 ee -. 336 
Wt, Le ., . 343 Xi., 3. ΟΣ 5 
PHILIPPIANS. X1., 6 65 
ics 4: . 2 2. ΧΗ 142 O24 
1 'THESSALONIANS. JAMES. 
iv:, 16. . 344] 1, 23 64 
1 Timotry. 2 PETER. 
1: γος πο Ra a ee a GE 
wi. 16. 126, 302 | ii, 21 . 305 


YHE END. 


1 Eristie Joun. 


ἊΣ Page 
Hie ood 
JUDE. 
Disses =). B36 
REVELATIONS. 

1 Os . Lek 
110 . 344 
τς ear ee :/262 
γΠ 17 τ 
xi, 12. . 344 
Nie Ss, . 262 
xix., 15 . 262 





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